

Oleg Kuznetsov

The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century

A Historico-Criminological Study



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TO MY FOREIGN READERS

In 2015, a book called *Istoria transnatsionalnogo armianskogo terrorizma v XX stoletii* (The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century) was published in Baku. This is the first attempt by a Russian academic to study Armenian terrorism. The Armenians who used terror at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries to fight for their interests gave this phenomenon its own national feature. It was not easy to publish this book in Russia. Russia, along with the U.S. and France, are countries with compact Armenian communities and diasporas that take active part in the financial, sociopolitical, and cultural life of their country of residence. These same countries have put up artificial barriers to researching Armenian terrorism, albeit the fact that it was in Russia, the U.S. and France that Armenian terrorist organizations engaged in dozens of acts of vengeance first appeared. After coming out in Baku, the book was then published in Russia, although the Armenian Diaspora launched its entire arsenal of pressure on the law-enforcement agencies, inundating them with complaints and denunciations against the author and costing him a great deal of effort and resources to fend off this onslaught.

After reading the above, any rational person might wonder why the topic of Armenian terrorism is such a taboo in Russia. There can only be one answer—Russia has always protected the Armenians and Armenia at different times in history, be it during the imperial, Soviet, or post-Soviet era. Moreover, if they did not openly protect, the Russian authorities at least never actively opposed the religious and political activity of the Armenians in the Caucasus at any time, thus allowing for the emergence and development of the most radical manifestations of national and religious activity—national-religious extremism and nationalist terrorism.

First, in the aftermath of their victorious wars with Persia in 1826-1828 and the Ottoman Empire in 1828-1829, the authorities of the Russian Empire resettled more than half a million Armenians from these countries in the former Erivan khanate, thus throwing the national composition of the Transcaucasian population into great disarray. In the 1830s-1880s, they did everything they could to assist the proselytism of

the Armenian Gregorian Church and even subordinated the previously autocephalous Albanian Church to the Etchmiadzin Catholicate, not to mention affording the Armenian clergy privileges for acquiring real estate in the Caucasus. In 1887, Armenian students studying in Switzerland, who were subjects of the Russian Empire, created the first revolutionary and terrorist party, Hunchak (The Bell). Three years later, in 1890 a second, even more bloodthirsty, revolutionary and terrorist party called Dashnaksutiun (Commonwealth) was founded in Tiflis (now Tbilisi), the administrative capital of the Russian imperial authorities in the Caucasus. The manifestos of both parties envisaged terror as the main and essentially only available method of revolutionary struggle. At the time, the Russian imperial authorities explained their protection of the Armenian national-religious extremists and terrorists by saying they were using them as a geopolitical tool in Transcaucasia in the global military and political opposition against the Ottoman Empire.

However, it was not Ottoman, but Russian officials who were the first victims of Armenian terrorism, which is more graphic evidence of the immutable truth that any aiding and abetting of terrorism sooner or later turns the tables on those who pander to terrorism and render it political and administrative support. In 1903, the Russian imperial authorities established control over the property and finances of the Armenian Gregorian Church, but encountered open armed opposition from Armenian national-religious terrorists, who killed the Russian officials taking inventory of church property. This subject is covered in sufficient detail in the book, so I will not go into it here. I will only say that the Armenians have never been allies of imperial Russia, while the spiritual hierarchy of the Armenian Gregorian Church has never supported either the Holy Synod or the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church. All of the notions imposed today on Russian public opinion about the fraternity of the Russian and Armenian people and the ideological kinship of their churches are shattered against the historical facts presented in this book. The Armenians were never Russia's allies, they only took advantage of its benevolence in their own selfish interests, while having no qualms about using terror against Russia when imperial ambitions or interests contradicted them.

The advent of the Bolsheviks (who also began as revolutionary terrorists) to power in Russia in 1917 and the Sovietization of Transcaucasia that followed made one country too small for different breeds of terrorist. So the Bolsheviks began actively and systematically exterminating the Armenians, their brothers in terrorist methods of political struggle, but opponents in ideology. In particular, in November 1937, U.S.S.R. People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and General Commissar of State Security Yezhov sent a report to Joseph Stalin that said the following: "In order to rid Armenia of anti-Soviet elements, Comrade Mikoian is asking for permission to shoot another 700 people from among the Dashnaks... I suggest shooting another 1,500, making a total of 2,000, in keeping with the previously approved figure."¹ The Bolsheviks, who themselves came to power on the crest of revolutionary terror in Russia, had to know that only mass physical destruction of former terrorist nationalists could preventively stop new outbursts of Armenian terrorism in the Soviet Union. So while Stalin was in power, they were afraid of even mentioning Armenian terrorism.

The shift in political regime in the Soviet Union from totalitarian to authoritarian led to conditions conducive to the revival of Armenian nationalism and the national-religious terrorism accompanying it. It only took one generation for Soviet Armenia to become a hotbed of terrorist ideology and practice again. At the end of the 1960s, Yerevan saw the appearance of the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist National United Party of Armenia, the main goal of which was to establish an independent Armenian state in the territory of the former Armenian S.S.R.

¹ Russian State Archives of Social and Political History (RGASPI), rec. gr. 17, inv. 166, f. 580, sheet 10.

and join several northeastern regions of Turkish Anatolia to it in the future. Terrorism, as is easy to guess, became a tool in the fight of the Armenian people for national independence from Soviet power. In January 1977, activists of the National United Party of Armenia committed three terrorist acts at once in Moscow, including an explosion in a Moscow subway train. There was also an attempt to carry out a terrorist act in October of the same year in the crowded lobby of a railway station. It was only by a stroke of luck that the tragedy was prevented. I also describe this topic in detail in my book.

The transnational nature of Armenian terrorism was most graphically manifested in the last quarter of the twentieth century, when three international terrorist organizations of Armenian nationalists began functioning in the countries of the Greater Middle East, Europe, and North America at the same time—the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, and the New Armenian Resistance Group. The insurgents who belong to these organizations are responsible for more than 300 terrorist acts in more than twenty countries around the world over a span of fifteen years (1975-1991). One of these terrorist structures, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, worked in close contact with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and even had its command center at the headquarters of this insurgent organization in the capital of Lebanon, Beirut. As we know, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine enjoyed the constant support of the political leadership and intelligence services of the Soviet Union, which gives reason to believe that the terrorist activity of ASALA (at least in Western Europe and North America) was also under their control. As we know, any intelligence service is very unwilling to reveal its secrets, which is why the topic of transnational Armenian terrorism in present-day Russia is taboo, and studying it and publishing the results is considered extremism. There are enough indirect reasons to claim that Armenian terrorism of the last quarter of the twentieth century is mainly the result of the activity of the Soviet KGB, and this largely explains why the Russian authorities do not want to hear anything about it and shun away from it.

In the context of the global geopolitical standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States (including their allies in the Warsaw Pact and NATO, respectively) and between the intelligence services of these two countries, an active and even vicious fight developed in the 1980s to establish or retain control over the organizational structures of transnational Armenian terrorism. This topic is also described in detail in this book. Running ahead, I will say that the U.S. CIA was able to outwit the Soviet KGB in this area. Moreover, the Americans had managed to form a controllable mini army out of Middle East terrorists of Armenian nationality by the mid-1980s and, with the help of the authorities of the Armenian S.S.R., send it to the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., after which ethnic upheavals began in this region of Soviet Transcaucasia that led to the Karabakh war of 1988-1994—the first terrorist war in the history of humanity. This topic is also covered in this book.

As we see, Armenian terrorism in its most diverse historical guises has been part and parcel of Russian history over the past 130 years. At first, it made a significant contribution to the downfall of the Russian Empire, after which it was equally instrumental in the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a Russian patriot, I wrote this book to warn the current political leadership of my country against showing any trust in the current political regime in Yerevan, most of the members of which have participated in the combat ranks of transnational Armenian terrorists in one way or another in the Karabakh war of 1988-1994, often being directly subordinate to Middle Eastern militants in those years. Transnational Armenian terrorists succeeded in creating a quasi-state in the areas of Karabakh they seized, which in turn, by means of the terrorist act in the parliament of the Republic of Armenia in 1999, when the parliament speaker and prime minister were killed, was able to occupy that country too. Today Armenia is essentially inundated by transnational Armenian terrorists who have been able to legalize and legitimize

themselves through the country's political institutions. It is they, and not the Armenian people, who hold all the moral and legal responsibility for the situation in Karabakh. The solution I offer is also set forth in this book.

Bringing this word to English-speaking readers to a close, I would like to repeat that this book was primarily written for Russian and Russian-speaking readers who, for objective reasons, have no access to sources of information on the history of transnational Armenian terrorism. I wrote it with the intention of breaking the stereotypical thinking that has emerged over the past hundred years regarding this constituent issue. To do this, I had to use logical evidence, some passages or fragments of which might not be entirely understandable or seem unnecessarily evocative to the foreign reader.

TO MY RUSSIAN READERS

The topic of Armenian terrorism, or to be more precise, the terrorism of Armenian nationalists, along with the national-religious extremism that forms its integral part, has never been addressed before in Russian academic literature. Throughout the twentieth century, however, it has been an ethnic-forming ideology of the Armenian people in their struggle to gain national statehood and, in fact, has objectively existed for more than one hundred years. This gives it every right, like any other phenomenon of sociopolitical human history, to be the target of scientific research. In so doing, however, this research should be unprejudiced and free of ideological underpinnings, political speculation, and other similar attributes that turn a scientific work into a propaganda tool or political technique for manipulating public opinion. If the author recognizes this subtle distinction, he can prevent his research study from turning into a tool of ideological struggle, when the researcher becomes a political technologist, or even stoops as low as a banal propagandist. In writing this book, I made every effort to avoid this, taking a very solicitous approach to collecting, evaluating, and analyzing the facts and their sources and rejecting from the outset any demonization of the entire Armenian nation. It must be stressed that no more than a few thousand Armenians over an entire century have been involved in terrorist activity and committed corresponding crimes, thus going down in history.

Unfortunately, however, this century-long practice of terrorism and the national-religious extremism that forms its integral part have left a deep scar on the self-consciousness of the Armenian people, distorting in the most serious way their worldview and world understanding compared with other people on the planet. Today Armenians are the only ethnic group in the world, a significant number of whom elevate terrorists, essentially marginals, hangmen, and murderers, who even have a special name—Fedayis, to the rank of heroes and examples for emulation, with memorial complexes built in their honor and monuments erected in the Republic of Armenia. Of course, I realize that a much more monstrous phenomenon, from the point of view of a civilized person, than “traditional” Armenian terrorism exists in the world and has been gaining momentum in recent years—Islamic fundamentalism. However,

for its followers, extremism is a way of life and part of their subjective spiritual practice, while for those Armenians exulted in the nationalist spirit, it nevertheless remains a theoretical idea, a kind of dream, an ideal of sorts, an unattainable sacral goal, in the name of which monuments are erected. This is the main difference between Armenian national-religious extremism, which is widespread in the global information space, and Islamic fundamentalism. Today, we should say, the former is more of a spiritual practice, a method of self-expression, less often a source of subjective material prosperity that does not entail radically illegal kinetic actions, while the latter is a guide to action, when people take up arms, go to kill, and die.

It is the Armenian people themselves, both those living in the Republic of Armenia, and those in the Diaspora, who are primarily in need of a retrospective analysis of their historical heritage, an integral and significant part of which is terrorist practice. A nation that sings the praises of terrorist feats will never be understood or accepted on a par with other contemporary nations of the world. There can be no doubt that both the intellectual elite of the Armenian ethnicity and the political leadership of the Republic of Armenia recognize the inevitable truth of this fact. And speaking of the Armenian leadership, they should be empathized with if only for the fact that they have to govern two-and-a-half million people, most of whom wholeheartedly believe that terrorist Fedayis were heroes, while some of the young people are striving to be like them. You must agree that it is difficult to govern a country, in which most of society lives with the dream of a full-fledged revival of political terrorism as the foundation of national policy and so takes immense delight in the most radical extremist propaganda. However, it is impossible to use law-based repressive measures to deal with this, since it is all an immanent dominant idea of national history and political culture. It stands to reason that the Armenian people, or, at least, the intelligentsia, will not stop glorifying the terror of the Fedayis overnight. This process will take several decades and perhaps will be over after the two current generations of Armenian politicians who built their political careers on this foundation in the 1990s pass away. This will take two or three decades, or maybe fifty years. But it must happen sooner or later, otherwise for a large number of peoples in the world, the ethnonym “Armenian” will remain a synonym for “terrorist” for long years, if not for centuries to come. For I am talking not only about the Armenians’ closest neighbors on the geographical map of the world—Russians, Turks, Azeris, and Georgians, who were the main victims of Armenian terror in the past century, but also the representatives of a large number of peoples of Europe and Western Asia, who also witnessed Armenian terrorism in the twentieth century.

Returning to the question of the ideological underpinnings of publications devoted to the history of Armenian terrorism, it should be noted that not one of them corresponds one hundred percent in its concepts and content to the criteria of scientific rigor and objectivity. Absolutely all of them are of a vivid propagandistic nature and can be divided strictly into two groups: those who make apologies for Armenian terrorism (they are all written, of course, by ethnic Armenians), and those who demonize it (these books are written either by ethnic Turks, or European authors engaged by them). The most vivid and even exaggerated example of the literature in the first category is a two-volume work by Eduard Oganessian titled *Vek borby: ocherk 100-letnei istorii dashnakskoi partii i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoi borby armianskogo naroda* (A Century of Struggle: Essay on the 100-Year History of the Dashnak Party and the National-Liberation Struggle of the Armenian People) (Moscow, Munich, 1991), which not only gives a loving description of most of the terrorist acts committed by Armenian extremists, but also depicts their victims in very negative terms using superlative adjectives, which in itself is an abomination of their memory. A diametrically opposite publication in terms of the tone of its assessments is a book by Erich Feigl, an Austrian documentary film producer, called *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, published at different times in English, German, Russian, and Turkish. Being a convinced and true-blue Turkophile,

the author blamed the Armenian influence for all the hostile actions of the European countries and peoples toward the Turks, Ottoman Empire, and Republic of Turkey. Such strict division into black and white will not be found in my book.

So not another word will be said in this book about the discussion of the notorious “Armenian genocide” in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, or about the persecutions of Armenians in this country at any earlier or later time. This question does not even have the slightest relevance to the topic of this study. Armenian terrorism arose and claimed its first victims long before 1915 in what was then Russian Transcaucasia—dozens of high-ranking officials and ordinary civil servants, generals, officers, policemen, and soldiers of the Russian Empire serving in the Caucasus were killed or wounded and maimed by Armenian terrorists in 1903-1907. The notorious Nemesis operation to physically eliminate several high-ranking officials of the former Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic consistently carried out by Armenian Fedayis for several years in the 1920s, about which contemporary Armenian authors write in a rush of delight, was far from the first chain of political terrorist acts committed by their fellow countrymen. Even two decades (!) before this, a Commander of the Caucasus Military District and Infantry General Prince Grigory Golitsyn, Governor of the Tiflis Gubernia Lieutenant General Maksud Alikhanov-Avarskiy, Governor of the Baku Gubernia Privy Councillor Prince Mikhail Nakashidze, and Governor of the Elizavetpol Gubernia Lieutenant General Nikolay Lutsau were targets and victims of Armenian terrorists, not to mention dozens of other lower-ranking officers and civil servants. At that time, their attempts to establish control over the property of the Armenian Gregorian Church in keeping with the law of the Russian Empire of 12 June, 1903 cost them their lives or health. It was Russia, and no other country of the world, that first became a target of organized political terror carried out by Armenian national-religious extremists. A decade later, when the Ottoman Empire entered into World War I, the rulers of this country were left to take stock of the grievous experience of their northern neighbor and carry out the strictest preventive measures, which, as history shows, did not yield any particular result. So this book was written in Russia and published in Russian.

The social and ideological roots of Armenian terrorism are not found in the “events of 1915,” as Armenian propagandists have been broadcasting for the past fifty years, tagging along with them a multitude of other authors who are not particularly interested in looking for the true reasons for this phenomenon. Rather they are found in the traditional religious worldview and collective nature of diaspora life of the Armenian people that is part and parcel of this worldview. So the extremist manifestations of the Armenians are not their direct response to external ailments or persecution, but are an expression of the deep essence of their ethnic mentality or ethnic psychology, formed during the many centuries of diaspora life and the national and religious harassment related to it in nearly all of the countries of the Islamic ecumene. It is not our place to say whether this is good or bad, since it is pointless to discuss, condemn, or justify objective reality that exists regardless of our will and is beyond our comprehension. Everyone knows that the *Armanstvo* (Armenian Diaspora) today is a conglomerate of descendants of fifteen or more ethnic groups or nationalities joined by a common religious ideology and metaphysics, for the representatives of which sharing a common faith is valued higher than blood relations or other anthropological ties. This means that national-religious extremism (and terrorism as the extreme form of its manifestation) is a tool for protecting this communality, which qualitatively distinguishes the Armenians from all other peoples of the world. So it should come as no surprise that the Armenians will fight for this privilege right, left, and center. Otherwise they will cease to be Armenians.

The practice of Armenian terrorism goes back at least ten years before 1915, while its theory is twenty-five years older and dates to 1888, to be precise, when the political program of the first Armenian socialist party, Hunchak, was publicized, declaring terrorism as a form of

political struggle. However, during the last fifty years, targeted and mass propaganda has turned the thesis of Armenian genocide from an intellectual premise into a dominant idea of the collective Armenian consciousness, thus separating this nationality, which is traditionally in strict religious self-isolation anyway, from the rest of civilization even more, and taking it one step further from the rest of humanity. Of course, a nation consolidated by the ideology of a common historical fate full of persecution and collective suffering is easier to control and is capable of sacrifice for the sake of abstract ideas. And it is also easy for this same nation to weed out people capable of giving their lives and committing terrorist acts in the name of abstract ideals. And while this state of affairs exists, there is no guarantee that blood for the sake of an idea will not be spilled again in Russia.

Any terrorism (including Armenian) is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that can be analyzed from different points of view: political, ideological, economic, historical, criminological, psychological, culturological, and so on. This phenomenon cannot be studied and analyzed equally well in all or even some of its aspects by one person due to his limited amount of knowledge and scholastic attainments. He may be able to quite knowledgeably describe in detail only one or at most (depending on his point of view) two aspects or areas of this widespread phenomenon. For instance, clearly recognizing my rather modest strengths and opportunities (primarily regarding access to reliable sources of information) and not claiming comprehensive coverage of the topic, I decided to examine Armenian terrorism in its historical-legal retrospect, thus basing my study on the methodology of historical and criminological science. This systemic comprehensive approach will allow us to examine it not only from the viewpoint of the evolution of the internal structure of terrorist communities and the practice of their criminal activity, but also to place them in the specific historical reality of the time Armenian terrorists committed their criminal deeds. This will make it possible for us to understand in what way and how significantly the practice of Armenian terrorism deformed a particular state or society, for, as we know, in keeping with the generally accepted criminological description, terrorist activity is considered to be violent acts that “intimidate the population, and create the threat of human death, of infliction of significant property damage or the onset of other grave consequences, for the purpose of influencing the taking of a decision by authorities or international organizations” (Art 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation).

When talking about terrorism, we must understand that terrorist activity is the most dangerous type of crime against people, society, and the state, so when discussing and studying it, there can be no room for “double morals,” when committing terrorist crimes is justified by the ideals of social justice, religious altruism, ethnic exclusivity, national liberation struggle, or any other ideological frippery. Any terrorist, no matter what slogan he uses to justify his inhuman, antisocial, and anti-state deeds, is a murderer, and there can be no two opinions on that account in principle. Therefore, when we talk about Armenian terrorists, we must clearly and honestly understand that they are in no way heroes of a national-liberation or any other struggle of the Armenian people, but fanatical murderers, cunning racketeers, unprincipled extortionists, and cold-blooded executioners, who are the disgrace and curse of their own people, and whose hands are covered in the blood of their innocent victims. And if any of my ideological opponents takes it into his head to dispute this thesis, he should also understand that by doing so he, given the eternal opposition of Good and Evil, Light and Dark, is consciously occupying a very definite place in the ranks of the adversaries of the human race, after which he can only expect to reap what he sows.

When examining the topic of Armenian terrorism, I will be forced, whether I like it or not, to also talk about Armenian terrorists who have committed murders and violence. By giving their names, I am in no way striving to eternalize their memory, on the contrary, I fully support the position of Russian legislators who set forth in the Federal Law on Burial and Funeral Af-

fairs of 12 January, 1996 No. 8-FL the regulations, according to which killed or deceased terrorists should be buried anonymously in unnamed graves and without informing their relatives of where they are buried. Unfortunately, I chose the historico-criminological approach as the methodological basis of study, according to which the crimes of Armenian terrorists should be examined in accordance with the criminal law qualification of the deeds they committed, the most important component of which is the mandatory presence of the perpetrator. Therefore, placing the canons of judicial science above the canons of civic science, I am compelled to mention specific Armenian terrorists. Unfortunately, the personal data of a murderer are an inalienable part of the atrocity he committed, and the description would not be complete if he were not named, whether we like this or not. Without this, this study would not be reliable.

This book was primarily written with the representatives of the radical part of the Armenian ethnicity in mind, mainly the Armenian Diaspora, who tend toward extremist rhetoric and currently live in Russia and other countries of the post-Soviet region, where they can still talk and read in Russian. It was written as a warning so that they know and remember that we, citizens of Russia, know and remember all the terrorist crimes committed at different times by Armenian extremists, both against the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, as well as against the Russian Federation. Our right to remember this cancels for them the right to state that it was all done in the name of the ideals of “Great Armenia.” Facts are always more eloquent or truer than words: we remain silent not because we are weak, but only because we feel we are above asking for recompense and are willing to give our opponents time to recognize their sins and repent. Armenian society must recognize its sins and repent in order to change the image of its people it has created over a century of terror performed under the banner of protecting its national-religious exclusivity.

Repentance is a long path to overcoming and recognizing the specific sins committed and correcting specific errors. Any nation, just like any person, cannot be bad or good in and of itself, its deeds or attitude toward the deeds of other people are what make it bad or good. A nation that elevates terrorists and murderers to the rank of national heroes cannot expect other nations whose members have died at the hands of these terrorists and murderers to treat it kindly. The Armenians themselves must choose their path of development—if they discontinue imposing feelings of responsibility for the suffering they have experienced on other nations, it is very possible that these nations, remembering their own sins, will forgive them this tragic heritage of Armenian terror.

Let this book serve as a reminder that the first victims of Armenian political terrorism in the twentieth century were in no way Turks or Azerbaijanis, but ethnic Russians—generals and ordinary soldiers. It was Russians, in 1996, who were the last victims of Armenian terrorism of the past century. We, Russians, like no other people in the world, have the right to demand just recompense from Armenian terrorists for the suffering they have caused our nation. Therefore, Armenian national radicals, particularly those who live today in Russia, should first admit their responsibility and honor the memory of the victims of Armenian terrorism in this country before they begin remembering the victims of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire of 1915. And only after doing so can they count on our understanding and empathy.

INTRODUCTION

The term “Armenian terrorism” as an independent definition of the entire spectrum of contemporary social studies first publicly appeared and was officially put into circulation in the United States of America in 1982 by Andrew Corsun, a member of the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s Threat Analysis Division (DS/TAD). He wrote an article in the August issue of *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* for that year called “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile,”¹ which immediately turned this phrase into a sociopolitical neologism. Publication of this article aroused such a wide public response and mass protests from the Armenian Diaspora throughout the world that editorial board was compelled to apologize and inform its readers on the title page of the September issue (admittedly in small print) that “the article does not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. State Department, and the interpretive comments in the article are solely the choice of the author.”² Nevertheless, thanks to Andrew Corsun, the term “Armenian terrorism” has assumed a place of its own in contemporary political science and remains current to this day, particularly in Europe and the New World (to which Turkey and Azerbaijan also belong).

As for Andrew Corsun’s neologism, we should comprehend that he coined it as a politico-scientific term, not as legal terminology. He then began using it to designate not some specific incidence or set of criminological facts in the sphere of forensic science or the delinquent social process, the participants of which deny the generally accepted principles, concepts, and values of world order, but precisely to define and describe a sociopolitical phenomenon that is inherently complex and multifaceted, with immanent historical roots, a specific ideological base, and clearly defined prospects of further development or generation. This American expert in state security threats proved to be the first to make an attempt to interpret, present, and acknowledge Armenian terrorism not as

¹ A. Corsun, “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile,” *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2065, August 1982, pp. 31-35.

² “Contents,” *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2066, September 1982, p. 3.

a component or radical element of the struggle of the Armenian people to retain their national-religious identity and acquire national statehood, but as some autochthonic and, therefore, entirely self-sufficient phenomenon that has signs of sovereign institutionalism, allowing it to exist independently as a self-organized and self-regulated (auto-reflexive) organism and separate from other institutional structures of the Armenian Diaspora and corporate ties among them and inside the Diaspora itself. In other words, he made the first attempt to view Armenian terrorism as an external product of the existence and activity of the organized, consolidated, and extremist part of the Armenian ethnoreligious community (a kind of “secret society” within the Armenian ethnicity). It is very obvious that Andrew Corsun, as a state security expert, does not suffer from conspiratorial mania or phobias, but tried from a strictly scientific and even materialistic position to figure out an extremely specific issue of objective reality that presents a clear, virtual, but nevertheless eventual threat to the national security and interests of the U.S. establishment.

However, we should understand that Andrew Corsun was a civil servant working for the diplomatic service, and not an officer of the U.S. special services. Therefore, he objectively did not have access to either intelligence or any other operative information acquired contrary to the law, morals, and morality. In view of the specifics of his official position, he was able to rely on information gleaned either from open sources (mainly from the mass media), or from diplomatic correspondence documents with limited access and initially meant for official use only, or from generalized analytical reports of the U.S. special services on a specific issue (in our case, Armenian terrorism). Regardless of where he acquired his information, Andrew Corsun’s article in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* is the result of intellectual reflection of a strictly civilian person using all the facts and documents on targeted illegal activity at his disposal, for which he honestly tried to find a rational explanation based on his own official competence and, very possibly, in correspondence with subjective stereotypes of world perception, moral precepts, level of intellectual development, and quality of professional education. Whatever the case, this author’s publication is the result of his personal efforts based on a specific (and as is revealed from other sources, very limited) amount of thematic information that only reflected his claim to full-scale coverage of the topic, but which he did not achieve.

Nevertheless, Andrew Corsun was and will remain the person who first introduced the term “Armenian terrorism” into scientific and literary-journalistic circulation, a term that is still used today and has aroused diametrically opposite evaluations and emotional opinions. Therefore, I am using it as an established term that has passed the test of time and hundreds of discussions.

This work is the first more or less systematic study published on the topic of Armenian terrorism in Russian, which is entirely logical. It should be stressed that this has been a taboo topic for Soviet and then Russian historical science for almost an entire century. And this is not surprising, since during Soviet power, the topic of terrorism (be it political or national-religious) against supreme power and representatives of the state structure of the Russian Empire was either hushed up in every possible way or presented in the literature as a component of the revolutionary or national-liberation movement against imperial power. What is more, propaganda turned political terrorists from among the *narodovoltsy* (members of the Narodnaya Volya [People’s Will] nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary organization), Socialist Revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, Dashnaks, and anarchists into national heroes; cities, streets, squares, and metro stations were named after them, which fostered a sympathetic and even approving attitude in Soviet society toward terrorism and extremism as a permissible and extremely effective component of the political struggle for power in the country. So you would not hear in Soviet times that revolutionary extremists and terrorists of all political breeds and nationalities were waging a brutal struggle against imperial power in Russia for their own ends and obtain-

ing financing (as today) from abroad. It is enough to recall that the insurgent terrorist squads on what is now Krasnaya Presnya in Moscow were entirely armed with Japanese Arisaka rifles in 1905 (which was when the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905 was going on), delivered to Russia on steamships through Sweden by Boris Savinkov, one of the most well-known Russian terrorists from the leadership of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, which he wrote about with no qualms in his memoirs. Should we be surprised after this that during the 70 years of the Soviet Union's existence, Armenian national-religious extremism and terrorism in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century was heartily greeted as a component of the "revolutionary" movement, although it did not have anything to do with it at all, being no more than an extreme form of Armenian nationalism? Nor is there any point in being surprised that incidences of Armenian terrorism against Russian citizens during the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century are also strictly hushed up, since they are a logical continuation of the first, and without unconditional condemnation of the one, there can be no condemnation of the other. But at this juncture, unfortunately, the reasoning of Russia's geopolitics regarding the Southern Caucasus steps in, which seems to render this issue "non-existent." I am taking the liberty and responsibility to remind our readers that such a threat to the world and human security as Armenian terrorism has existed and continues to exist. This is being done for the first time, hence the academic novelty of this book.

Every year, on 3 September, Russia mourns the victims of terrorism, expressing empathy and giving their condolences to the relatives of those who died or suffered as a result of terrorist attacks. But for some reason this Day of Solidarity with the victims of terrorism is a time to remember those who innocently fell or suffered at the hands of radical Islamic extremists, without saying a word about how, in addition to them and long before them, the blood of Russian citizens was spilled by staff officers of the special services of the Republic of Armenia, who did not escape the retribution they deserved from Russian justice. Such a selective memory, which is very like amnesia, objectively leads to a selective approach, which cannot help but insult the people who personally or whose relatives were the victims of Armenian terrorism in post-Soviet times. This state of affairs, when society identifies with the victims of Islamic terrorism, while entirely forgetting about the victims of Armenian terrorism, is not only amoral in itself, but also contradicts the constitutionally guaranteed principle of formally legal equality of Russian citizens, i.e. is illegal. It turns out that in this sensitive issue, in which, at first glance, there can and should be no compromises, we are all witness to the practice of double standards, which, in turn, creates favorable ground for Armenian terrorists now and in the future to escape moral condemnation and moral responsibility for the crimes they committed in the Russian Federation. This book is a reminder that in present-day Russia, Armenian terrorism has still not been unequivocally condemned, so its ideology is alive and has not disappeared into oblivion. Every right-minded resident of Russia should know and remember this, which is the primary motivation of this work.

When I began working on this book, I set out to draw as broad a retrospective picture as possible of Armenian terrorism throughout the twentieth century on a planetary scale, but I soon came up against the problem of insufficient information about this phenomenon. And it is not that this information does not exist—a sufficient amount of reported evidence about particular acts of Armenian terrorism can be found in the archived newspapers and magazines of various countries at different times, but they all comprise only the visible, and so only the smallest, tip of the iceberg of this topic. The most valuable in terms of comprehensive understanding documents on police investigations regarding the crimes of Armenian terrorist organizations and groups are still strictly classified and beyond the reach of the extraneous researcher, which, frankly, is not surprising. In this context, the position of the administration of public

relations of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of National Security regarding the terrorist acts committed in the country during the years of its state independence is a good case in point: its official website has information about 34 terrorist acts, but there is objective information about only 7 or 8 of them, which have been fully investigated and the perpetrators identified, exposed, and punished. However, this position can be understood, since according to international forensic scientific statistics of the International Police Association (IRA), 10-12 percent of terrorist crimes in the world currently remain unsolved, while information about them is closed, since they are still being investigated, or have been halted until new facts are revealed. This meant I had to give up on my initial idea.

Since, due to the unavailability of sufficient information, any attempt to draw a full-fledged retrospective picture of Armenian terrorism is doomed to failure, despite the relevance of this topic for Russia today, I had to limit myself to creating a kind of sketch or outline reflecting only the general features of this criminological phenomenon in its historical retrospect. Therefore, I identify and show only the general trends of the historical transformation of Armenian terrorism as it turned from a tool of political struggle into a dominant of the ethnic mentality accompanied by the creation of an entirely specific ideology substantiating and justifying the transformation of Evil into Good. I can say quite definitely today that Armenian political terrorism has become the first illegal antisocial practice in human history that has acquired a metaphysical and even sacral aura in the eyes of its followers, based on which a multitude of contemporary Islamic radical groups are building their extremist activity.

This has given rise to the urgent need for detailed study of the theory and practice of Armenian terrorism, not only from the social studies viewpoint, which includes history, political science, sociology, and social psychology, but also from a criminological perspective, making it possible to unify the methods of scientific cognition inherent in these areas of knowledge and create on their basis a combined methodology for studying this criminological phenomenon, thus creating a highly reliable model even without sufficient objective information. Hence, I was forced to accept and apply the methodology offered by well-known Swedish historiographer and historian Rolf Torstendahl, which he called “constructivism.” He described this methodology as follows: “By ‘constructivism’ the author means history as a construction created by the historian, and not reconstruction. It is a way representing and interpreting data from the present that is projected onto the past.”³ In other words, in this book facts or events of the past will not be evaluated in the context of the specific historical reality of the time they took place or were committed, but based on the understanding of today, when not only the conditions in which a particular deed was committed are understood, but the consequences to which they led can also be evaluated. This methodological approach makes it possible to remove all the ideological tinsel contemporaries have strewn on every act of Armenian terrorism, dust off the parings and ideological foam applied, take a good look at the original item without its inherent emotional background and intentional subjective distortions of reality, gather all the facts together, and use them to build a model (“construction” according to Rolf Torstendahl) of such a complex and specific historico-criminological phenomenon as Armenian terrorism.

I mentioned when addressing the reader that this book is based on the historico-criminological approach. Now I can explain why I chose this to address this topic of research precisely from this particular angle. During the past one hundred and fifty years, terrorism (which I believe began in Russia with the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Emperor Alexander II on 4 April, 1866 in the Summer Garden in St. Petersburg by member of the gentry of the

³ R. Torstendahl, “Konstruktivizm i reprezentativizm v istorii,” in: *Problemy istochnikovedeniia i istoriografii. Materialy II nauchnykh chtenii pamiati akademika I.D. Kovalchenko*, Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia, Moscow, 2000, p. 63.

Penza Gubernia Dmitri Karakozov) has paved a broad evolutionary path, gradually gaining increasingly new forms, methods, and means. Current ideas about this phenomenon are wider, deeper, and more systematic than thirty, fifty, or one hundred years ago, and they fundamentally incorporate the ideas that existed earlier. Today's knowledge from a higher level of cognition makes it possible to adequately understand and assess yesterday's events, in so doing ensuring them their dutiful place in the model of the phenomenon being studied. This kind of approach also makes it possible to weed out and discard those events that, from today's viewpoint, are not terrorist acts, but were called such at the time they were committed. The historico-criminological approach makes it possible to use not only general theoretical methods of civic science cognition, but also specific theoretical methods of judicial sciences based on formal qualifying signs that make it possible to impartially evaluate and systemize each event from the past to discern whether or not it can be confidently classified as a product or result of Armenian terrorism. To put it more simply, not everything that contemporaries call Armenian terrorism was actually so in contemporary terms. Sometimes such acts comprised other forms of crimes or violations of the law or could not be classified as a civil wrong at all. I will give an extensive criminal law description of terrorist crimes in correspondence with the current legislation of the Russian Federation in a separate chapter and carry out my retrospective historico-criminological analysis in keeping with its provisions.

I arbitrarily chose the chronological framework of this research, which covers only the twentieth century, although there were practical reasons for this. It goes without saying that I am informed of the fact that Armenian nationalists committed several terrorist acts against the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century. Perhaps the most well-known of them was when a group of 26 armed Armenian terrorists under the supervision of Karekin Pastermadjan, better known later under his pseudonym Armen Garo, and Papken Siuni seized the Ottoman bank (Bank Ottomani) in Istanbul on 26 August, 1896. Many foreign employees, subjects of the British Empire and citizens of France, worked at this bank, whereby two French bank employees were first deliberately shot and wounded, and when representatives of the Ottoman authorities came to their aid, the head of the Istanbul gendarmerie and the lieutenant accompanying him were killed. Turkish sources and research studies also inform us about several dozen armed attacks carried out by Armenian national extremists during the last decade of the nineteenth century on Ottoman officials, policemen, servicemen, and local residents in rural areas of the eastern vilayets of the Ottoman Empire, among the population of which the percentage of the Armenian population was a little higher than in other regions of the country. Here are just a few of them in which the participation of criminal elements from among representatives of the Armenian ethnicity has been reliably established and subsequently not disputed by Armenian and pro-Armenian journalists:

20 June, 1890, Erzurum. Armenian nationalists who organized pogroms of the Muslim population in the city fight in the streets with Ottoman troops and gendarmerie;

4 August, 1894, village of Kyomiag, Togat-Istanbul road. Armenian nationalists attacked a postal carriage, cut off the coachman's head, and absconded with important state documents, letters, and money;

16 September, 1895, village of Zeytun (now the settlement of Süleymanlı). During a rebellion, the village commandant, 50 officers, and 600 soldiers of the Ottoman army were seized by Armenian nationalists and later killed;

26 September, 1895, Trabzon. A group of Armenian fighters, who arrived from Istanbul, opened fire on the peaceful population on the city's East Square, resulting in 22 deaths;

21 October, 1895, the villages of Ker-Tel and Chukr-Khisara. Armenian nationalists set fire to around 60 homes in the village of Ker-Tel, after which they killed 150 men, 40 women, and 95 children in the village of Chukr-Khisara.

It is very possible that all of these acts were sporadic and did not have some common logical thread, ideology, or performance tactic. I cannot exclude the fact that all the above-mentioned attacks, or some of them, were strictly criminal or were committed out of revenge or for selfish purposes, just as the criminals who committed them were mentally unstable, so these atrocities cannot be unequivocally classified in terms of criminal law as terrorist crimes. Due to this fact, without sufficient reliable information from the sources of that time, I cannot say with any certainty that isolated terrorist acts committed by Armenians on the grounds of nationalist or national-religious extremism were initially coordinated in advance, thus forming an organized practice of terrorist activity.

In other words, I have enough evidence about instances of Armenian terrorism in the last decade of the nineteenth century against the Ottoman Empire (incidentally, these facts are not contested by any pro-Armenian or anti-Armenian researcher I know of). However, I feel this evidence is clearly insufficient to talk about any full-fledged practice of Armenian terrorism, which implies a whole set of planned, organized, and systematic crimes carried out by their organizers and performers, using scare tactics, to procure a decision made in their favor from the state power structures, or a rule of court. This is why this study focuses on the twentieth century, when the practice of Armenian terrorism in terms of scope of activity and degree of organization does not arouse the least doubt. Nor am I looking much beyond the end of the twentieth century, because the last terrorist act I know of that has been proven to have been committed by Armenians occurred in 1999. These considerations prompted me to choose Armenian terrorism of the past twentieth century as the target of my study.

This study is based on a set of documents, official as far as their origin is concerned and narrative, containing primary information about the terrorist acts committed by Armenian national extremists in different countries of the world, primarily against Russia, their consequences, as well as the court action taken against the terrorists for the atrocities they committed. All of the sources I used can be divided into the following groups:

- (1) press publications;
- (2) record keeping documents of law-enforcement agencies;
- (3) decisions of the judicial power structures;
- (4) documents of the supreme state power structures containing the attitude of the country's political leadership to Armenian terrorist acts.

Periodicals are particularly important in this research since they furnish information (particularly from the criminal chronicles) on the content and circumstances of the terrorist acts committed by Armenian nationalists, the reaction of the authorities and society of those countries and cities where these crimes were committed. There is no point in listing the names of the newspapers I resorted to in writing this book since although they are sufficiently well-known to the reading public, they cannot tell it anything significant on the topic of this study as such. I will only say that all of them were respected publications at that time, the reliability of the reports of which did not arouse doubt and cannot be classified as tabloids or gutter press that place greater emphasis on sensations and catching headlines than on essential facts.

For many objective reasons, I was unable to make use of many official documents of law-enforcement agencies since access to this kind of information is restricted by all manner of classifications. Therefore, when writing this book, I could only use those documents that are freely accessible in the archives or were published by different special services in document collections about their activity. They primarily include documents of the Separate Corps of Gendarmes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire, the State Security Committee under the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, as well as some documents from the CIA. A few of these documents were published in the collection *Istoricheskije fakty o deianiiakh arмян*

na azerbaidzhanskoi zemle (Historical Facts of Deeds of Armenians in Azerbaijani Lands) compiled under the editorship of Yagub Mahmudov, Director of the Bakikhanov Institute of History of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, which was published in 2009.⁴

The decisions of the judicial power structures are interesting because they contain a kind of quintessence of each terrorist act, the perpetrators of which were exposed and convicted. The criminal sentences contain descriptions of these illegal acts, the names and personal data of the accused, information on evidence of their guilt or innocence, and court decisions on the type and measure of responsibility for committing them. In contrast to the documents of the law-enforcement agencies, the decisions of the judicial power structures are public documents, so they are more accessible to the researcher. If the sentence on some terrorist act contains information that is a state or other law-protected secret, its preamble and substantive provisions are nevertheless open and can be accessed for study. The decisions of the judicial power structures are also interesting in that they make it possible to see for yourself and graphically understand what precisely the attitude of the official state powers toward Armenian terrorism was at the time the terrorist act was committed. If the authorities and public opinion empathized with the terrorists and the topic of Armenian terrorism was “fashionable,” the court chose a liberal punishment with a more than moderate term, whereas if the position of the state and society were diametrically opposite, the criminals were isolated from society for long or for life, while some of them ended their lives on the gallows or in the electric chair. So I can definitely say that any court sentence on a terrorist act contains not only information on this illegal act, but also shows how the authorities and society related at a specific time in history to Armenian terrorism.

It stands to reason that investigatory-judicial documents, as well as press materials are the sources from which the country’s supreme political leadership gleans information through its executive office for forming its response and making decisions. Armenian terrorism has always been a significant irritant that demands from the establishment of the countries where Armenian extremists have committed terrorist acts a public (or off-the-record) expression of very definite and unequivocal approval and encouragement, or condemnation and repression. Some top state officials took the Armenian fighters’ lead and fulfilled their demand, some uncompromisingly fought them, but whatever the case, they were forced to explain the position they had chosen. If we take events and documents from the history of the Russian Empire by way of example, the position of imperial vicegerent in the Caucasus Count Vorontsov-Dashkov can be considered the epitome of accommodating to Armenian extremists. He set forth this position in 1907 in his “Most Devoted Note on Administration of the Caucasian Territory...,”⁵ in which he honestly talks about how the widespread terrorist activity of the Armenians in 1903-1907 in Transcaucasia forced him to suspend the imperial law of 12 June, 1903 on taking the property and funds of the Armenian Gregorian Church under state control. The report of Senator A. Kuzminskiy sent to Baku and the Baku Gubernia in 1905 for inspection also demonstrated this kind of position. In his report, he described Armenian terrorism as a specific tool of the noneconomic struggle for economic domination of the ethnoreligious elite of the Armenian ethnicity in the economic life of Transcaucasia.⁶ The revolutionary change in the sociopolitical

⁴ See: Ya.M. Makhmudov, et al., *Istoricheskie fakty o deianiakh armian na azerbaidzhanskoi zemle*, Sc. ed. Ya. Makhmudov, ed. and comp. by T. Musaev and A. Mamedov, Bakikhanov Institute of History, Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, Takhsil, Baku, 2009.

⁵ [I. Vorontsov-Dashkov,] *Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska po upravleniiu Kavkazskim kraem general-adiutanta grafa Vorontsova-Dashkova*, State print shop, St. Petersburg, 1907.

⁶ See: [A. Kuzminskiy,] *Vsepoddanneishy otchet o proizvedennoi v 1905 g. po Vysochaishemu povelenu senatorom A.M. Kuzminskim revizii g. Baku i Bakinskoi gubernii s prilozheniem Vsepoddanneishei zapiski ot 26 dekabria 1905 g., soderzhashchei glavneishie vyvody Otcheta o proizvedennoi v 1905 g. po Vysochaishemu povelenu senatorom Kuzminskim*

system in Russia in 1917 and the cardinal changes in the social structure that followed it, which frequently ended in repressive and other illegal methods, predetermined the mandatory presence of the “political” context, or at least some implication in any manifestation of nationalism, not to mention of terrorism, each of which demanded not only the mandatory interference of the state security structures, but also the making of a politico-ideological decision at the regional or supreme level based on the results of their investigatory-judicial activity. An example is the decision of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee Political Bureau made after Armenian nationalists committed a series of terrorist acts in Moscow on 8 January, 1977.

I am putting some of the official sources into circulation for the first time; I have presented a collection of such documents as appendices following the main body of my study. So that my opponents and critics have no doubts about their veracity or about the adequate conveyance of the content of the text published, on the left-hand side of the double page spread a facsimile reproduction of the document original is placed, and on the right-hand side a printed reproduction of its content translated into English (see Appendices 3B, 3C, and 3D). I hope that the sources I have newly identified and published will be interesting and beneficial to other researchers who turn to the history of Armenian terrorism after me in forming as integrated and adequate idea of this topic as possible.

Another historical source on the topic of this study is memoir literature, which makes it possible to fill in the gaps and solve the problems remaining after study of the official records. As a rule, when conducting a historical survey, researchers include memoir writing in the general historical sources they use when writing their papers. However, I have deliberately not done this in order to be able to specifically explain the reason for this action. The thing is that I was very selective about the use of memoir literature, immediately rejecting the use of literary works written by Armenian terrorists in which they justify and glorify the crimes they committed. I am deeply convinced that terrorism is not a means or tool for resolving humanitarian issues, so people who have committed terrorist crimes should be banished from humanity’s historical memory. Terrorism and terrorists should not have the least opportunity for justification, and particularly for self-glorification. This is precisely why when writing this book I exclusively used memoirs of those authors who, bound by their official duty, have been fighting against Armenian national terrorists and making a point of ignoring the testimonies of those who try to rehabilitate or justify the atrocities of Armenian terrorists (these sources include the memoirs of First Deputy Chairman of the Central KGB Army General F.D. Bobkov, as well as those of Deputy Head of the Operative Investigation Administration of the U.S.S.R. KGB Central Apparatus Major General V.N. Udilov).⁷ Naturally, I understand that this selective approach will inevitably cause Armenian and pro-Armenian journalists to criticize us. Anticipating their accusations, I respond to them as follows: I am deeply and sincerely convinced that the moral duty of every honest person lies in eradicating Evil to the best of his/her ability, no matter what national-religious garb it may appear in. Armenian terrorism is an Evil that must be stigmatized in the face of history, and primarily in Russia, whether people like it or not.

Turning to a preliminary presentation of the historiographic survey of the sources and research studies on which this work is based, I need to make two what I consider to be fundamental comments. They will help readers to understand what precisely is guiding me in using particular sources and studies in preparing this book. An analysis of the literature I used will be

revizii g. Baku i Bakinskoi gubernii, Russian State Archives of Social and Political History (RGASPI), rec. gr. 543 (Collection of manuscripts kept in Tsarskoe Selo Palace, 1863-1916), inv. 1, f. 402.

⁷ See: F.D. Bobkov, *KGB i vlast*, Veteran, Moscow, 1995; V.N. Udilov, *Zapiski kontrrazvedchika: Vzgljad iznutri*, Iaguar, Moscow, 1994; idem, *Terakty i diversii v SSSR: stoprotsentnaia raskryvaemost*, ed. by S. Gromov, Algoritm: Eksmo, Moscow, 2011.

presented in a separate section, while here I will limit myself to only the most general comments regarding the sources and research studies at my disposal.

First, the authors of all the publications I know of on the history of Armenian terrorism (both justifying or even popularizing it and condemning it) are, in terms of their methodology of scientific cognition, the supporters and followers of the representative sample methodology popular in the 1970s-1980s in North American and West European civic science, in correspondence with which any social or sociopolitical phenomenon (which Armenian terrorism definitely is) is viewed in its dynamics and internal diversity, whereby often being separated and even dissected from the civilizational process of human development, geographical region, or ethnicity. In this respect, the accent is placed on studying some single dominant aspect that is the most important qualitative sign of the phenomenon, but does not describe it in general. For example, many pro-Armenian authors who adhere in their scientific activity to the representative sample methodology believe that Armenian terrorism is the result of the response of the more radical representatives of this ethnicity to the so-called Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, all of their studies are composed in a way that does not include criminological components in the description of this phenomenon and decriminalizes the felonies of Armenian terrorists by retaining only the aura of romanticism and daring spirit of struggle for the radiant future of their people. Their opponents (mainly from among Turkish authors), on the contrary, strive in every way to emphasize the criminological component of Armenian terrorism, in so doing relegating into the background recognition of the political component. In both the first and second cases, for the followers of the representative sample methodology, the real historical events and facts comprising the factual basis of the topic I am examining, the volume of which is limited, objectively finite, and equal to the number of terrorist crimes committed by Armenian national extremists, form a kind of background, against which the struggle of the ideas of the supporters of antagonistic viewpoints unfolds. They no longer see the initial gist of the phenomenon they are writing about behind the clash of opinions, which results in opposing assessments and private opinions about the phenomenon, and not in an attempt to reconstruct this phenomenon in the form of a logically explained model for ease of study both in its general and particular nuances. I will talk more below about the main vicissitudes of the ideological struggle.

Second, I know of only two studies in which an attempt was made to examine Armenian terrorism from the criminological viewpoint, while all the other researchers of this topic absolutized the ideological or moral issues. So we are seeing a state of affairs in which (at least in the Russian and English literature) Armenian terrorism, as a specific sociopolitical and criminological phenomenon, has never previously been given a comprehensive legal assessment. Certain crimes may have been investigated and the specific criminals from among the Armenian national extremists who committed them discussed, but the question of condemning Armenian terrorism in general has never been raised. Essentially, the ideological struggle that became aggravated every time Armenian terrorists committed their next crime always drew Armenian terrorism as a cohesive illegal phenomenon out from under Themis' penal sword, sending to court only some executors who, as is common in such cases, were only foolish pawns in someone else's geopolitical game. As we see, the ideology of extremism, by justifying political terror, seems to varnish its reputation in the eyes of the court and humanity, taking upon itself the motivation for committing vile and terrible crimes. So I can confidently say that the literature presents a description of two terminologically similar, but essentially different phenomenon—"Armenian terror," or the extremist ideology of Armenian nationalism, and Armenian terrorism—the illegal practice of Armenian extremists, the first being popularized in every way, while the second actively concealed. The history of Armenian terrorism has graphically proven, throughout the century of its existence, the justice of these words. Incidentally,

criminology as a separate branch of legal science should study the illegal phenomenon, and not assess it from the viewpoint of morals or morality, so it is essentially pointless to expect qualified assessments of it.

Nevertheless, running ahead, I will say that the use of the historico-criminological approach for a retrospective analysis of the practice of Armenian terrorism might produce very unexpected results: for example, in the literature I know of, there are numerous descriptions of politically justified crimes committed by Armenian national extremists, and thus called terrorist acts, which they are not from the formal-legal point of view. A separate chapter of this study will be devoted to examining this legal paradox. However, I can already announce my main criminological conclusion: in addition to the terrorist crimes they committed, Armenian terrorists made no bones about committing so-called general felonies—murder for the purpose of extortion, armed robberies, thefts, and other grave crimes that have no political implications. I can essentially say that the political organizations of the Armenian Diaspora in different countries of the world have always had specific organized crime groups in their structure (or are such themselves) along the lines of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (Our Cause), or the Neapolitan Camorra (“gang,” “feud”) so brilliantly described in Mario Puzo’s *The Godfather*. I can also say that the funding obtained from members of the Armenian communities in illegal or criminal ways was partially used to commit political crimes in order to justify, in the eyes of their fellow countrymen, the ideologically substantiated “legality” of such extortions, which are sources of the private financial prosperity of the leaders of so-called terrorist groups, while political terrorism itself was a tool of non-economic bloodsucking by the representatives of organized criminal groups who call themselves “fighters for the national liberation of the Armenian people” of their own fellow countrymen.

Therefore, in the bibliographical survey of the literature on the topic being examined to follow, I will have to separate the ideology and practice of Armenian terrorism. Whereas the first has been a public target of constant, sociopolitical, and scientific discussion over an entire century, the second is cloaked in obscurity. The gaudily demonstrative, hypertrophically open, and actively propagandized ideology of Armenian terrorism was created as a false target that drew attention to itself away from the true organizational structure of Armenian criminal groups that govern the life of Armenian communities beyond present-day Armenia. I do not intend drawing up a stratigraphy of the world Armenian Diaspora or Armianstvo, as it is called in the Turkish and Azeri press. I have limited myself to the task of studying and systematically setting forth the heritage of Armenian terrorism of the twentieth century, both theoretical and ideological, as well as practical. But when we talk about Armenian terrorism from the perspective of criminological science, we should understand that it has very little in common with Armenian terror—a political ideology and criminal practice, which has allowed the establishment of the Armenian Diaspora to hold most of its fellow countrymen living in different countries of the world under its financial control and non-economic management for one hundred and fifty years, necessitating them, by means of a historically justified threat of violence, to participate in illegal economic activity and create a marginal product that can be passed on to a small number of representatives of the ethnic establishment for carrying out their political activity. Therefore, when talking about the history of Armenian terrorism of the twentieth century, I am essentially describing only the visible peak of the iceberg called Armianstvo, without touching the submerged part, which is ten times larger and any attempt to study which entails a mortal threat. Very well aware of this, I am limiting myself to stating this fact and returning to a retrospective analysis of Armenian terrorism of the last century.

Due to the biased specifics of its content, the politicized history of Armenian terrorism entails or deliberately conceals a large number of gaps, which the authors of most of the works I know of on this topic have either had no desire or the professional qualifications to study.

I have already mentioned above that a whole series of crimes that the researchers I know of proudly, or, vice versa, disgustedly call Armenian terrorist acts, are not such from the viewpoint of legal science, or to be more precise, from the viewpoint of the theory of criminal legal qualification of crimes, since they belong to general crimes against individuals or citizen property. Based on initially false intellectual considerations, they are beginning to create pseudo-scientific representations, presenting their own fantasies as the objective truth. After this, their colleagues, or no less biased opponents, begin to discuss their theses and conclusions, turning scientific constructs into a subject of scientific discussion or debate, after which the earlier expressed idea, which is far from the truth, gradually turns into a generally accepted postulate and even almost dogma. A graphic example of this is the method traditionally used recently of dividing the history of Armenian terrorism into four chronological periods. This method immediately falls apart if the criminological approach is used to criticize it (I will talk about this in more detail in the section devoted to the problems of criminal-legal qualification of crimes of Armenian terrorism). Recognizing the objective fallibility of the initial considerations of most civic science works on the history of Armenian terrorism, I was compelled to take up the pen and present the results of my own interpretation of this problem in order for readers to judge for themselves.

To ensure that readers do not find my theoretical arguments boring or insipid, I will list the main theses I plan to discuss and untangle on the pages of this book:

1. Armenian terrorism as a historico-criminological phenomenon is narrower in its content and number of criminal acts that fall under the criminal-legal qualification of terrorist crimes than the practice of so-called Armenian terror, about which civic science experts in different countries of the world write about.
2. Absolutely all the ideas Russian, European, and North American readers currently have about Armenian terror are the product or targeted political propaganda of the thesis of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 by extremist representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia and researchers who supported them, or the responses to such propaganda by the ideological opponents of *Armianstvo* and the intelligentsia of the Turkish and Azeri nations, against whom this propaganda is aimed.
3. Armenian terrorism has never been an end in itself or a means of self-expression of Armenian extremists and the ethnic oligarchy standing behind it. Throughout its existence, it has served as a way to protect the corporate economic and financial interests of *Armianstvo* and so is a vivid example of how non-economic tools of ideology, political extremism, and terrorism support macroeconomic projects.
4. Political, social, cultural, and other (perhaps with the exception of religious) organizations of Armenians beyond present-day Armenia have for an entire century now, beginning in the 1920s, essentially been ethnic organized crime groups that feed off communities of their fellow countrymen in different countries of the world using funds of non-economic compulsion.

Bringing this introduction to a close, I hope that the thoughts, facts, information, considerations, arguments, and conclusions presented in this book will be beneficial to everyone who is interested not only in the narrow topic of Armenian terrorism, but also in contemporary terrorism in general as a criminological phenomenon that is currently being used as an effective tool not only in global geopolitics, but also in macroeconomics.

CHAPTER ONE

WHERE DIVERGING OPINIONS MEET

(A Historico-Bibliographical Survey of the Literature on the History of Armenian Terrorism)

No Russian researcher has yet attempted to compile an extensive historiography of this problem, so I am breaking new ground. And since I am the first to try and do this, I ask readers to forgive me if I have inadvertently left certain research studies out of the picture—I did make an honest attempt to gather and study all the works freely available on this subject. One person cannot objectively accomplish what a whole group of researchers might do, but I took the liberty of trying. It will be up to my opponents and critics to judge the outcome.

So, I know of only two analytical criminological studies on Armenian terrorism. The first is the aforementioned article by a member of the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security's Threat Analysis Division (DS/TAD) Andrew Corsun titled "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile." The second is a research paper called *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*, compiled at the Directorate of Intelligence of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (No. GI 84-1008 EUR 84-10004) no earlier than January 1984; it was partially declassified and published on the U.S. CIA's official website on 30 April, 2013.¹

Each of these two texts, both the article and the research paper, are interesting in themselves since they are the result of the efforts of one person or a group of authors, whereby the compositional structure of each unwittingly reflects the basic ideological postulates of its compiler or group of compilers and the goals and tasks they set, regardless of whether they were officially voiced or not. Each of them essentially sets forth the official viewpoint of the State Department and U.S. CIA and, in a broader context, the standpoint of the military-political establishment of the United States, i.e. that Armenian terrorism was a real threat at that time (the 1970s-1980s). They examine it and search for ways to oppose and overcome it.² However, if this issue is viewed in a wider context,

¹ See: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*, available at: [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005462031.pdf].

² Despite the fact that the editorial board of *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* denied in every way in September 1982 the official nature of A. Corsun's article, this publication in

these two documents essentially contain the quintessence of the position of the U.S. military-political elite on the problem of terrorism as a factor of international policy, which raises the value of the results of their comparative analysis to a qualitatively new height. The difference between them is that the first was originally intended to be read by any number of people in the diplomatic corps around the world in order to acquaint them with the position of the U.S. foreign policy department on this troubling issue, while the second was classified from the very beginning, based on operative intelligence information, and created for a narrow circle of high-ranking politicians and U.S. officials with the authority to draw up, formulate, and make decisions on U.S. foreign policy issues.

A comparison of the content of the two above-mentioned documents is interesting in itself from several viewpoints or intellectual-ideological positions at once.

First, despite the significant difference in their headings, both texts are thematically related, and since the first of them was created in the foreign ministry, and the second in the special services, together they present the integrated and comprehensive position of the U.S. expert community on Armenian terrorism oriented toward intellectual support of the political decisions made by the top U.S. political leadership.

Second, both of the documents mentioned are so similar in compositional structure that seem to have been written by people with approximately the same analytical or operative professional training in keeping with the same (universal or unified) pattern, which again confirms that I was right when I wrote above that the compilers of the documents and the end users of the information they contain belong to very specific (although different) circles of the American state apparatus. However, these people have the same mindset, which, in turn, shows that their professional training was based on the same theoretical methodology.

Third, both documents are similar chronologically (Andrew Corsun's article gives statistics about acts of Armenian terrorism until 26 July, 1982, while the analytical notes of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence continue until the end of 1983). This shows that their authors rely on and use essentially the same body of information and sources. Consequently, a comparison of these texts reveals the real level of competence and information awareness about Armenian terrorism both of the authors themselves, and of the departments, under which they carried out their professional activity.

Thus, I can definitely say that a comparison of these analytical documents written at approximately the same time by authors with approximately the same professional education and professional competence and working for the U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency makes it possible with a high degree of reliability to reproduce a general picture and assess the scope of the terrorist activity of Armenian political and national-religious extremists during the first decade of the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Without delving into the ideological bias and predilection of these authors, but nevertheless respecting them for their professionalism and competence, it should be emphasized in particular that both of these texts, the reliability of which I have no reason to doubt, give an exhaustive description of Armenian terrorism in the 1970s-1980s, interpreting it as an ethnocriminal phenomenon with orthodox ideological implications, sufficiently marginal in the nature and content of its unlawful activity and ways of committing terrorist acts, but extremely

reality reflected the official position of the U.S. Department of State, which is shown by the postscript to it titled "Note." The disclaimer in a boxed "Note" reads as follows: "Because the historical record of the events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish Government committed a genocide against the Armenian people. Armenian terrorists use this allegation to justify in part their continuing attacks on Turkish diplomats and installations" (see: A. Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2065, Washington, D.C., August 1982, p. 35, available at [<http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.319510012285091;view=1up;eq=141>]).

effective in the degree of its impact on the target auditorium. Without burdening themselves with allusions to Good and Evil, they examined this very autochthonic phenomenon from the viewpoint of its possible use in the future as a specific lever of pressure on specific problem issues of international relations in the interests of U.S. foreign policy. Such a strictly pragmatic approach allowed the analysts of the U.S. Department of State and CIA to convince the representatives of the top U.S. political leadership that not only is Armenian terrorism a real international threat to the interests of the United States and their allies in Europe and Western Asia, but also that, due to its autochthony and marginality, it is not part of the global standoff between the “communist” East and “capitalist” West, which means the latter may use it in its geostrategic interests. The West’s “hand-reared” version of Armenian terrorism played a momentous role in the historical fate of the Soviet Union and all of the East and Southeast European socialist states, since Armenian nationalist terrorists became the main striking force in the organization and targeted waging of the Armenian-Azeri war in Nagorno-Karabakh during the second half of the 1980s, which essentially put an end to the existence of the Soviet Union and the entire Warsaw Pact bloc.

Both texts—Andrew Corsun’s article and Research Paper of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence—were written more than thirty years ago, so are no longer in step with the times. During the interim, in which two generations have emerged, there has been a shift in people’s perception and evaluation of events, which, while still within their memory, have paled against the more current upheavals they have had to live through. This circumstance, which objectively exists and is independent of the awareness, desire, and will of the researcher, creates for him the epistemological problem of scrutinizing the knowledge offered by other authors in the form of texts, scientific conceptions, schools, or even philosophical systems. Epistemology as a category of philosophical science is based on gnosiology (the theory of objective scientific cognition), but, in contrast to it, has a powerful source that evaluates the authenticity of the acquired knowledge, not in terms of the result achieved, but by assessing the quality and content of how it was acquired, i.e. from the position of methodology. In other words, epistemology not only explains a particular phenomenon (I hope that readers have no doubt that Armenian terrorism has always been an integrated phenomenon and not a sporadic chain of spontaneous events in the form of terrorist acts), but also explains why the researcher chose certain specific means or tools of cognition for studying this phenomenon. This sheds more light on the researcher and clarifies whether he is a compiler who unthinkingly repeats hackneyed evaluations and conclusions, or an independent author who, with the help of his own subjective gnosiological tools, has studied the object of cognition he is interested in and formed his own conceptual view of the phenomenon based on the patterns and cause-effect ties he identified during its study, including not only its description (perception), but also clarification (comprehension). To put it in simpler terms, when solving his scientific task, the researcher not only answers the questions “who?”, “what?”, and “which one?”, but also “and why precisely that one?”

A very superficial comparison of the content of the two documents mentioned above makes it possible to offer several fundamental considerations regarding where they came from and the sources of information used to write them. Every statement they contain is a consistent assumption, but a composite comparison reveals a trend, the very existence and internal consistency of which presumes a high degree of reliability of the conclusions drawn. Essentially, the two documents are structured in keeping with the second law of Hegel’s dialectics, the only difference being that the transfer of quantitative changes to qualitative was not done using the inductive way of multiplying frequent facts aimed at their subsequent sum transformation into an integrated phenomenon, but using the linear way of transforming the aggregate of similar trends into a single multifaceted process. In simpler terms, during the first half of the 1980s, the American State Department and special services had finally understood what Armenian na-

tional-religious and political terrorism actually was in the context of world practice during the first decade of the last quarter of the twentieth century and so decided to share their very reliable knowledge with the U.S. political elite so that it could decide how it might use it to its personal ends or in the country's national interests, or whether it was worth using at all.

And this, in turn, means that by the indicated time, Armenian terrorism had not only reached its culmination or peak, but, having exhausted all of its internal resources and ethnic reserves, had begun degenerating and dying out, therefore it needed outside stimulation to rekindle it, if, of course, there were reasons for that beyond the goals and assignments that Armenian terrorists or their ideologists had initially set themselves. Andrew Corsun's article and Research Paper of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence were essentially asking their respective leaderships how the United States should behave in the future in regard to Armenian terrorism: should it be allowed to die a natural death, or should it be turned into a tool for implementing U.S. foreign policy plans? History saw to it that the dilemma was resolved the second way. However, both of these documents only initiated the decision-making process, or preceded it, without having any principal influence on its result (if this had been otherwise, it is unlikely the CIA document would have been declassified in our day and age even after expiration of its 30-year shelf time, albeit in abridged form).

The monograph by Israeli researchers Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari titled *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool*, published in English in Jerusalem in 1985³ is another graphic example of the predominance of the criminological approach over the social studies line when examining and describing Armenian terrorism. The Israelis did not just have an idle interest in the topic of Armenian terrorism in the 1980s: before the Arab-Israeli war of 1982, the terrorist organization, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was based in the Armenian districts of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, and made use of the financial and technical support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Islamic movements and sheiks of the Middle Eastern countries behind it, with which it acted in unison against the Jewish state from time to time. It goes without saying that Armenian terrorist activity could have been another real military-political threat for Israel, and since terrorist attacks of the Palestinian radicals who allied with ASALA were and continue to be the main threat to the security of that country, this potential threat needed to be understood and evaluated in terms of its possible risks. Israeli researchers came to the unambiguous conclusion that the terrorist activity of the Armenian national extremists was not the result of a psycho-emotional response to the events of the past, but was coordinated activity aimed at the future. In the opinion of these authors, Armenian terrorists in those years were not moved by feelings of revenge at all, rather they were driven by a very rational striving to obtain territorial sovereignty, which in the historical sphere would make it possible for them to carry out the geopolitical plans of the Armenian Diaspora aimed at establishing a place for its financial resources. In the context of Russia's national history, the following question posed by Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari is particularly interesting: which Armenia in particular—Turkish or Soviet—is the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) planning on liberating in the future? No one could answer this question in the specific historical conditions of 1985, when this book was written, but its public posing in itself meant that the West was not excluding the possibility of using Armenian national terrorists against the Soviet Union and its backbone, Russia. In other words, even then it was obvious that Armenian terrorism in the last decade of the twentieth century would no longer be of an anti-Turkish, but of an anti-Soviet and, consequently, anti-Russian nature.

The content of the documents on the crimes of Armenian terrorism that the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs disseminated in the 1970s-1980s bore a criminological stamp. In those

³ See: A. Kurz and A. Merari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool*, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, 1985.

years, Turkish diplomats and diplomatic representative offices in more than twenty countries of the world became targets of terrorist attacks by Armenian national extremists, and the foreign policy department of this country was supposed to react to them. I thought long and hard about whether to qualify these documents as documental sources or as research studies and decided to include them in the bibliographical survey of the literature because documents of this type *a priori* have not only an informational, but also analytical thrust, and so are objectively an intellectual product of research and informative activity. To be fair, I should say that the Turkish Foreign Ministry was very conscientious and somewhat innovative about fulfilling its obligations, which led to some of the information disseminated through this department being published under the auspices of the University of Ankara in order to raise its clout and give it an academic status. As a rule, these informational documents came out after another scandalous terrorist act had been committed by Armenian extremists. They described the particular act and Armenian terrorism in general, and in some cases proposed improving the regulations and tools of international law in order to consolidate efforts to prevent repeated terrorist attacks. For example, after the explosion of a homemade bomb at Orly Airport (Paris, France) at the check-in counter of Turkish Airlines carried out on 15 July, 1983 by ASALA fighters, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a series of informational documents at Ankara university: *Armenian Terrorism and the Paris Trial*⁴ and *Terrorist Attack at Orly, Statements and Evidence Presented at the Trial: 19 February-2 March, 1985*.⁵ These publications shed light on many criminalist and criminological aspects of a specific terrorist act; we find out the type and construction of the explosive device, the names of the executors of the terrorist act, and subjective descriptions of their personalities, the distribution of roles between them, tactical questions of planning and executing the crime, and the extremists' motivation for committing the terrorist act. This information also makes it possible to understand and with a high degree of reliability evaluate the other side of the coin of Armenian terrorism and look at it through the eyes of extremists who are ready to kill people for the sake of an abstract idea in the hopes of obtaining moral and monetary incentives from the people who ordered the crime. This makes this information valuable and extremely beneficial from the viewpoint of the methodology of legal science.

When addressing the reader on the first pages of this book, I said that I was not tying two entirely different topics together—the topic of Armenian terrorism and the topic of the so-called Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire (even in its widest interpretation as a topic of Armenian-Turkish or Armenian-Turkic opposition). This technique (which is actively used by the ideologists of the Armenian Diaspora and their politically motivated propagandists) is incorrect from the perspective of the laws of formal logic and constitutes a substitution of concepts and mixing of methodologies, which is impermissible in scientific research. Therefore, in this bibliographical survey, I will try to avoid mentioning works whose authors do this, particularly since, on my part, this would not be entirely correct in terms of academic etiquette. The thing is that in 2007, a fundamental historiographic and bibliographic study came out in Istanbul by Candan Badem called *Türk-Ermeni Sorunu Bibliyografyası/Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question* published in Turkish and English.⁶ The author gathered and annotated 4,450 books for his Turkish colleagues published in different countries of the world between the end of the nineteenth century and 2006 in Turkish, Russian, English, French, German, Ar-

⁴ See: *Armenian Terrorism and the Paris Trial*, University of Ankara, Ankara, 1984.

⁵ See: *Terrorist Attack at Orly, Statements and Evidence Presented at the Trial: 19 February-2 March, 1985*, University of Ankara, Ankara, 1985.

⁶ See: C. Badem, *Türk-Ermeni Sorunu Bibliyografyası* (in Turkish) and *Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question*, Aras, Istanbul, 2007.

menian, and other languages, which are thematically devoted to different aspects of the Armenian-Turkish opposition in the Ottoman Empire, called the Turkish-Armenian question in contemporary Turkish historiography, as an alternative to the thesis of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire promulgated by the Armenian side. An analysis of the content of this collection of bibliographic documents shows that no other aspect of the history of human civilization has given rise to such a large number of publications, three quarters of which were penned by Armenian authors. We can essentially say that popularizing and marketing the topic of the Armenian genocide has been a lucrative commercial undertaking for an entire century, since the authors, publishers, and dealers have always gained profit from the sale of these books. In order to avoid the temptation of joining the ranks of those who derive profit from exploiting this topic, I decided to completely distance myself from the speculative topic of the Armenian genocide, considering it to be contrived and thoroughly commercialized.

The range of historical or political scientific studies on Armenian terrorism is much wider, whereby the quality of their content varies from strictly scientific to openly propagandistic. It should be emphasized in particular that books of such content are found to an equal extent among works that both condemn and justify, even laud, Armenian terrorism. Earlier, in my address to the reader, I mentioned two works that I feel present an apology of these two points of view. The first of them is a two-volume work by Eduard Oganessian titled *Vek borby: ocherk 100-letnei istorii dashnakskoi partii i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoi borby armianskogo naroda* (A Century of Struggle: Essay on the 100-Year History of the Dashnak Party and the National-Liberation Struggle of the Armenian People),⁷ pompously published to coincide with this anniversary, and the second is the anti-utopian book by Erich Feigl called *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*. I will begin this bibliographic survey with a description of these two works.

As I have written above, in his research study, Eduard Oganessian describes in great detail, and even lovingly, most of the terrorist acts committed by Armenian national extremists, particular against the Ottoman and Russian empires, paying tribute to the interfactional struggle inside the Armenian Diaspora itself. Frankly, this is not surprising, since the book was published in Russian in 1991, on the very eve of the final collapse of the Soviet Union, when the residual influence of the ideology of “proletarian internationalism” was still objectively strong and the heritage of the Russian Empire in the newly formed Russian Federation, if not yet demonized, was at least not taken into consideration. In Armenia, on the other hand, which was already waging an aggressive war against Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, the resurrection of the organizational party structures of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutium was in full swing. In this historical context, it stands to reason that this book was primarily intended for Russian-speaking ethnic Armenians who, during the Soviet era, were expansively brought up in the spirit of non-acceptance of the nationalist ideology of the Dashnaks, and needed to be initiated in the new ideology of Armenian national statehood they were going to have to build on the ruins of the Armenian S.S.R. and occupied territories. Therefore, it raises no eyebrows that the main accent in this book is placed on a description of the persecution the Armenians were subjected to in the Ottoman and, partially, the Russian empires, as well as on a detailed account of so-called Armenian terror that was supposedly the response of the most intellectually developed and socially active members of this nation to the repression and persecution it suffered, and then revenge for the so-called Armenian genocide. In so doing, little by little, the ethnic and religious cleansing actively carried out in Armenia and Karabakh were theoretically substantiated and ideologically justified, when under threat of bodily harm around

⁷ See: E. Oganessian, *Vek borby: ocherk 100-letnei istorii dashnakskoi partii i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoi borby armianskogo naroda*, in 2 vols., Phoenix, Moscow, Munich, 1991.

a million local residents of the Muslim faith, primarily ethnic Azerbaijanis, Kurds, and Meskhetian Turks, were exiled from their traditional places of residence.

However, I think that this book is most interesting in the fact that its author seems to be implying that those terrorist crimes committed against the Ottoman or Russian imperial administration by their political opponents inside the Armenian world, or *Armianstvo*, i.e. by fighters of the Hunchak Party, were in fact committed by the supporters of the Dashnaktsutjun Party. In addition, Eduard Oganessian informs us that since the end of the nineteenth century, Dashnaktsutjun was almost the only revolutionary and main driving force behind the national-liberation struggle of the Armenians to gain national statehood, while all other terrorist groups of the same ilk were no more than opportunists, renegades, and betrayers of national interests and ideals of the struggle. So when describing this publication, I should say that it has been assigned the role of a “new Bible” of the Armenians in the struggle for their national statehood that differs little from the odious *Brief History Course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*. Incidentally, this should come as no surprise, for any totalitarian ideology, and this is precisely what the ideology of Armenian terrorism is, passes through the same stages and cycles, thus acquiring similar forms of expression and methods of dissemination.

Moreover, in an attempt to give the strictly propagandist content of his book a quasi-academic scientific nature, its author tried to create a kind of chronology and even periodization of the history of Armenian terrorism, or to be more precise of the terrorism of the fighters of the Dashnaktsutjun Party. Incidentally, this is being used extremely actively and successfully (whereby also utterly unthinkingly) in the media and information resources of the Internet by both the ideological followers of Armenian terrorists and their ideological opponents. So I can say very objectively that the propagandists of the idea, practice, and heritage of Armenian political terror from among the extremist part of the intelligentsia of this nation triumphed in the information war against their opponents, since they were able to impose their point of view on them. According to it, Armenian terrorism, or the terrorism of the Dashnaktsutjun Party (according to Eduard Oganessian), in its historical retrospective is divided into four chronological periods or “waves”: the first—before World War I; the second—immediately after it, the peak of which was the so-called Nemesis Operation for the physical elimination of former state officials of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic; the third—in the 1970s-1980s, when the main targets of terrorist attacks were diplomats, diplomatic institutions, and the offices of Turkish Airlines, as well as government establishments and airports of countries that actively opposed Armenian terrorism; and the fourth—from the second half of the 1980s, when the aggression of international Armenian terrorists began against the Soviet Union, the main result of which was the war in Nagorno-Karabakh against Azerbaijan and occupation of a sixth of this country’s territory. In our opinion, despite all of its external logic, this periodization of the history of Armenian terrorism is anti-scientific, since it is based on the crimes of Armenian extremists that differ dramatically in terms of the juridical qualification of their criminal acts. It goes without saying that Eduard Oganessian, being a social studies expert and journalist, did not pay much attention to the criminalist description of the crimes of his fellow countrymen, classifying both terrorist crimes and general crimes that had little in common with the national-liberation struggle—mercenary homicide, gangster-related crimes, robberies, extortion (everything that Americans classified as “racket” thanks to the linguistic influence of the Italian—Sicilian and Neapolitan—mafia)—as “Armenian terror.” Since I am adhering to the historico-criminological method when describing Armenian terrorism, I will have to devote one of the chapters in this book to a legal description of its heritage in keeping with the regulations of Russian legislation in order to convincingly show the reader that Eduard Oganessian’s conclusions have absolutely no scientific methodological base under them.

Austrian art critic and film producer Erich Feigl was the most active and consistent critic of the ideology and opponent of the practice of Armenian terrorism among West European humanitarians. It was not by accident that I called his last and most well-known book, *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*,⁸ “anti-utopian” in my address to the reader: he holds forth against the thesis of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire with the same reckless abandon and obsession as Armenian propagandists lobby for it in the intellectual circles of the civilized world, often criticizing and refuting it in detriment to historical truth and permitting entirely incorrect interpretations and assessments of well-known historical events during disputes. For example, when talking about the Kars Treaty on Friendship among the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the governments of the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic, the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia, and the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia of 13 October, 1921, signed with the participation of a representative of Soviet Russia, he claims that this treaty was signed among the Republic of Turkey, Russian S.S.R., Azerbaijan S.S.R., Armenian S.S.R., and Georgian S.S.R., which in itself contradicts historical reality (*Armenian Mythomania*, p. 127). As we know, the Republic of Turkey was declared on 23 October, 1923, so in October 1921, it could not have been an entity of international law, the *socialist Soviet* republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia were not renamed as *Soviet socialist* republics—the Azerbaijan S.S.R., Armenian S.S.R., and Georgian S.S.R.—until 1924, when the U.S.S.R. was formed, while the Russian S.S.R. never existed at all, but was the R.S.F.S.R.—first the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and in 1924 the words “socialist” and “Soviet” switched places in its name, after which the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic appeared on the political map of the world. It stands to reason that the Austrian professor of art history could not have known such nuances from the state-political history of Russia and Turkey by definition, but their presence in the work is immediately striking to an impartial Russian researcher and lowers the confidence in the rest of the thesis and conclusions of this book. This also entirely relates to the section of Erich Feigl’s *A Myth of Terror* on the history of Armenian terrorism, when the author’s words of emotional frustration exceed statements of fact and analysis, thus preventing me from considering this book a trustworthy contribution to the topic I am examining.

However, I cannot claim that Erich Feigl was totally engaged in falsifying history, although some of the interpretations of historical facts he made arouse serious and very justified questions. He wrote a commendable study worthy of attention that came out in Russian with the support of the political leadership of the Azerbaijan Republic—a monograph called *Pravda o terrore: armianskiy terrorizm—istoki i prichiny* (The Truth about Terror: Armenian Terrorism—Sources and Reasons),⁹ published by Azerbaijani State Publishers Azerneshr in Baku in 2000. It should be noted that the Russian version of the name of the book does not fully reflect the original. This book was originally published in 1986 in Salzburg in German, and a few months later its English version came out, the names of both entirely differed from the Russian title.¹⁰ For some time, the Turkish government and public organizations distributed free copies

⁸ See: E. Feigl, *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, Zeitgeschichte, Salzburg; Freilassing, 1986 (see also: E. Feigl, *Armenian Mythomania: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Historical Context, An Illustrated Exposé by Erich Feigl*, Amalthea Signum, Wien, 2007, available at [[http://www.tarix.gov.az/kitablar/Armenian Mythomania.PDF](http://www.tarix.gov.az/kitablar/Armenian%20Mythomania.PDF)]), as well as in German: E. Feigl, *Ein Mythos des Terrors. Armenischer Terrorismus, seine Ursachen und Hintergründe*, Zeitgeschichte, Salzburg; Freilassing, 1986.

⁹ See: E. Feigl, *Pravda o terrore: armianskiy terrorizm—istoki i prichiny*, Azerbaijan State Publishers Azerneshr, Baku, 2000.

¹⁰ See: E. Feigl, *Ein Mythos des Terrors. Armenischer Terrorismus, seine Ursachen und Hintergründe*, Zeitgeschichte, Salzburg; Freilassing, 1986; idem, *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, Zeitgeschichte, Salzburg; Freilassing, 1986.

of this book among U.S. government officials, in university libraries, and among private individuals, seeing it as an information resource opposing propaganda of the idea of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. By refuting the Armenian genocide as a historical event, Erich Feigl was the first researcher in recent history to separate, knowingly or not, the ideology and the practice of Armenian terrorism from each other, showing, using examples, that it is not only the response of radical Armenians to events of a century ago, which pro-Armenian authors are trying to convince public opinion of, but also a very independent and self-sufficient public and criminological phenomenon that has long existed and is capable of existing in the future separately from the ideology it declares, which is a cover or screen for it. Erich Feigl's indisputable merit lies in the fact that he creates prerequisites for using a methodology to analyze the practice of Armenian terrorism that differs from the social studies approach, although not being a professional lawyer himself, he could not objectively inject the ideas he postulated into a full-fledged concept.

Erich Feigl's works were actively criticized by his ideological opponents, who, in full correspondence with the practical techniques of Armenian propaganda, did not limit themselves to discussing the content of his books, but went for personal insults, calling its author a "revisionist" and even a "crypto Fascist." Dagmar C.G. Lorenz, Professor of German Studies and Judaism of the University of Illinois at Chicago¹¹ and Michael M. Gunter, the author of several books and dozens of articles on the history and anthropology of the peoples of Western Asia¹² went to great lengths to think up insulting things to say about Erich Feigl. When lavishly criticizing him for his active negation of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire, both of these authors, independently of each other, made the same significant methodological mistake—in their enthusiasm to uphold the interests of Armanstvo in their publications, they did not say a word about the main content of Feigl's book *A Myth of Terror*, that is, about the criminal practice of Armenian terrorists. Essentially, Lorenz and Gunter followed the cue of the Armenian propagandists, repeating after them hackneyed and worn-out phrases, in so doing trying to blanch over the deeds of the Armenian terrorists and free them from moral and legal responsibility for hundreds (!) of terrorist acts committed by Armenian extremists in Europe, North America, and Western Asia in the twentieth century. And to be totally frank, they tried in an entirely underhand way to turn the cards and, by switching the concepts, shift the conversation from the legal vector to the vector of political science, which they understood better, where the same concepts have very different meanings. It is entirely obvious that such actions do them no honor, although these kinds of techniques are traditionally and very successfully used by political technologists during propaganda campaigns, but this is already politics and not science. All of this gives me reason to state with a high degree of confidence that the works of Erich Feigl, despite all the ambiguity of their content and objective mistakes in interpreting specific historical facts, have not become a subject of serious and targeted scientific criticism in the twenty-five years since they were published. And this, in turn, means that all of the historical facts presented in them are the truth and the conclusions drawn from them reliable, or at least not contradictory. This gives me every right to call this author the first European researcher who opened the eyes of European and North American readers to the problem of Armenian terrorism.

The appearance of Erich Feigl's books required that the ideologists of Armanstvo take countermeasures to reinstate their ideology and practice of extremist terrorist activity by representatives of their ethnicity in the eyes of the international community (I have every right to call the work mentioned above by Eduard Oganessian a response to these publications). One

¹¹ See: D.C.G. Lorenz, "Hilsenrath's Other Genocide," *Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual*, Vol. 7, 1990.

¹² See: M.M. Gunter, "Review of *A Myth of Terror*," *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, Vol. 12, 1988, pp. 54-57.

of the steps in this direction was removing Erich Feigl's books from public access so that people who found out they existed could not read them. The fact that not one of the largest libraries in the world today has the first edition of any of this author's works shows that this practice was successful. And if it were not for the concern of the government structures of the Turkish and Azerbaijan republics, which reprint them from time to time, as well as society's information awareness, few people today would remember about them. Incidentally, Erich Feigl was not the first author, whose works members of the Armenian Diaspora would like to send into permanent oblivion. The same fate earlier awaited another book, a high-quality academic study by Louise Nalbandian published in 1963 by the University of California Press in Berkeley.¹³

Louise Nalbandian's book was designed to be a strictly scientific study unrelated to political intrigues that honestly and impartially relates the ideology and practice of the revolutionary activity of Armenian political parties in the Ottoman and Russian empires, beginning from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and the continuation of their struggle for national statehood in subsequent years. Its author showed, using specific historical examples, that terrorist activity was the main and most effective tool of the Armenian nationalists' political struggle against the Ottoman and Russian imperial authorities. This is not actually surprising since due to the millet system in the Ottoman Empire and the national-religious self-isolation of the Armenians in the Russian Empire, most of the representatives of this nation were vegetating in ignorance, while the ethnicity itself, in terms of its social organization, lived in conditions of early feudal theocracy, which entirely excluded the possibility of it developing any kind of liberalism. Due to this objective fact, the revolutionary-minded representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia could not count on wide social support from their fellow countrymen in their struggle for national statehood. This was because their minds were in the grips of the religious dogmas of the Armenian Gregorian Church. So the only effective means of struggle was terror aimed not only against the representatives of the Ottoman or Russian administration, but also against their fellow believers who did not wish to see the church hierarchs being replaced by new leaders from the emerging intelligentsia. Louise Nalbandian is essentially the first researcher to point to the dual nature of the goals and assignments of Armenian revolutionary terrorism: on the one hand, it was a tool for changing the global political structure, while on the other, it was a means of social transformation of the Armenian ethnicity as it turned from a polyethnic religious sect into a nationality, and then a nation with its own statehood. For a long time, no one objected to this concept.

Everything essentially changed in 1973, after Armenian lone terrorist Karekin (Gourgen) Yanikian, a native of Erzurum (Turkey), graduate of Moscow State University, philologist, and writer, who emigrated from the Soviet Union to the U.S., shot Turkish Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Consul Bahadır Demir in the Baltimore Hotel in the Santa Barbara suburb of Los Angeles (California, U.S.), after enticing them to a meeting with an offer of cultural property to be donated to the Republic of Turkey. Following this crime, Armenian terrorists, considering themselves to be Yanikian's ideological followers, organized more than two hundred (!) terrorist acts worldwide for fifteen years, mainly against diplomatic representative offices and commercial structures of the Republic of Turkey. Against this specific historical background, the words of Louise Nalbandian proved prophetic. Representatives of the West European and North American intellectual elite received a state and social contract to find an answer to the question of what precisely forms the foundation of Armenian national terrorism. It is crystal clear that the book *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Arme-*

¹³ See: L. Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1963.

nian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century, which was published not long before by the press of a respected American university, proved for them to be the most accessible and understandable source in terms of methodology and narration. According to Louise Nalbandian's conclusions, it turned out that the ideology and practice of terrorism (or political terror) is immanently inherent in essentially every Armenian sociopolitical movement aimed at protecting or maintaining corporate ethnic or ethnoreligious interests. Following this, certain American social study experts and political scientists began expressing the same thought (I will talk about their works below). This made both Louise Nalbandian and her study extremely inconvenient for the elite of the Armenian Diaspora, as a result of which measures were taken to remove her book from academic social studies circulation.

Like most of the early publications of Erich Feigl's works, Louise Nalbandian's monograph disappeared from almost all the public libraries, while publishing houses that tried to earn money by reprinting it were threatened with the destruction of their facilities if they did. When talking about this, we cannot fail to give the following very noteworthy fact: the fate of Louise Nalbandian and her monographs is a wonderful illustration of the instability and variability of the tools of Armenian propaganda in the historical reality of the sociopolitical mainstream, when first resources are spent on glorifying the historical and political heritage of Armenian terrorism, and then even more effort and money are spent on disavowing it and correcting the context.

Incidentally, we do not think that Louise Nalbandian's book was subjected to public ostracism by the ideologists of the Armenian Diaspora and their politically motivated authors due to its honest and impartial account of the ideology and practice of Armenian terrorism throughout the entire history of its existence. If careful attention is paid to its title, the author uses the concept "Armenian political parties" in the plural, that is, this book is not only about the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiu, which has been the only real political force of the Armenian Diaspora since the mid-1960s, but also about its rivals in historical retrospect—the Hunchak Party, and its historical predecessor, the Armenakan Party. The victory of Dashnaktsutiu in the interfaction struggle (it appears this struggle was caused by a standoff between the Armenian Gregorian Church hierarchs of the Etchmiadzin and Cilicia catholicates) also objectively demanded the establishment of its ideological supremacy in the literature on the history and heritage of the Armenian national-liberation (read terrorist) movement. For this purpose, a wide-scale campaign was launched to rewrite the studies on this topic, within the framework of which the Dashnaks or Dashnacakans, members of the Dashnaktsutiu Party, emerged as the only true fighters for the interests of the Armenian people. Incidentally, I do not know of one work by Armenian authors published since the 1970s that contradicted this intellectual thesis in the slightest, and since this is truly the case, I can say with a high degree of likelihood that the stonewalling of Louise Nalbandian's book ten years after it was published was not so much a response to the information it contained about the ideology of national Armenian terrorism, as a visible manifestation of the striving of the Dashnaktsutiu leaders to establish their ideological monopoly inside the Armenian Diaspora.

The names of Louise Nalbandian and Erich Feigl have in time become a kind of benchmark for determining the moral or ideological position of the author of a particular work on the history of the Armenian people, their political structures, and the activity of the latter. If a researcher as much as mentions their names and the titles of their books, never mind gives an objective and conscientious appraisal of their content, he is automatically declared an enemy of the Armenian people and denier of the ideologeme of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Not one publication supporting this thesis and thus blanching over the crimes of Armenian terrorism in the past twenty-five years mentions the names of these people, even critically. We seem to be witnessing a deliberate taboo not only on certain topics of the past, but

also on the very memory of those honest researchers who studied and interpreted the historical heritage of Armanstvo (primarily Armenian terrorism) from a viewpoint disadvantageous to its establishment, as well as on the works in which they did this.

The names of American researchers Justin and Carolyn McCarthy, who wrote a very noteworthy book called *Turks and Armenians: A Manual on the Armenian Question* published in English and Russian,¹⁴ should definitely be added to the list of authors who ended up on this black list. The third chapter of this study called “Revolutionary Nationalism: Nationalism and the Armenian Revolutionaries,” which largely uses facts put into scientific circulation by Louise Nalbandian, is devoted to a description and analysis of the main theses of the ideology of the Armenian revolutionary nationalists who openly declared terror and terrorism as the main, if not only, effective tool in their political struggle to form a monoethnic Armenian state in Eastern Anatolia on Turkish land. This work is interesting for the bibliographical survey of this study in that, without any hint of liberal political correctness, it tells everything as it is. In addition to the above-mentioned work written with his wife, Justin McCarthy has published another nine monographs at different times on the history of the Ottoman Empire of the beginning of the twentieth century in English and Turkish, in which he comprehensively defended and developed the so-called thesis of provocation. According to this thesis, the terrorist attacks of Armenian nationalists on government institutions and representatives of the authorities of the Ottoman Empire should have provoked them to unselectively carry out reciprocal repressions of the entire millet of Armenians, or their national-religious communities, in the spirit of the times. This, in turn, should have entailed the revolutionization of the broad, but essentially marginal, masses of the Armenian ethnicity and its subsequent uprising against Turkish domination. The facts and conclusions of these works repeat in one way or another the intellectual theses set forth in the book *Turks and Armenians*, so I will not include them in the bibliographical survey of the literature on the history of Armenian terrorism.

Justin McCarthy did not coin the provocation thesis. Twenty-five years before the earliest of his books I know of came out, this was the honor of American scientist William L. Langer in his work *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, published in New York in 1951.¹⁵ According to this author, it was terrorist acts by radicals from among the Armenian intelligentsia that forced the Ottoman authorities to apply the harshest military and police measures to the entire nation during World War I in 1914-1918 in order to secure the rear areas and supply routes of their current army from the threat of the Armenian rebels. As we can see, William Langer, intentionally or not, united two relatively dissimilar themes: Armenian terrorism as a criminological phenomenon and as political terrorism, the latter being the reason for the administrative repressions that descended on the people, which they later began calling genocide. I do not agree with this posing of the question from the start and think it is unscientific, since I see this as an attempt to arbitrarily mix the methodology of two separate areas of science—political history and jurisprudence, although examples of this are found quite often in West European and North American representationalism. My viewpoint on this account is such: Armenian terrorism is an autochthonic and self-sufficient phenomenon, the manifestation of which we see in the history not only of the Ottoman Empire, but also of a whole series of other world countries, primarily Russia. Therefore, I do not feel I have the right to include William Langer’s

¹⁴ This book was originally published in 1989 in Washington by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (see: J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy, *Turks and Armenians: A Manual on the Armenian Question*, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, Washington, 1989), and then republished in Russian in Baku by Azerbaijani State Publishers Azerneshr (see: J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy, *Türki i armiane: rukovodstvo po armianskomu voprosu*, Azerbaijani State Publishers Azerneshr, Baku, 1996).

¹⁵ See: W.L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951.

book among the studies devoted to the history of Armenian terrorism, since it will most likely introduce more methodological vagueness than clarity into this rather complicated and sensitive issue. However, nor would it be correct not to mention its existence at all from the viewpoint of academic etiquette. I also think the same about the works of other supporters of the provocation thesis—Walter Laqueur,¹⁶ Sanford J. Shaw, and Ezel K. Shaw¹⁷—who, without suspecting it themselves, provide grist for the mill of Armenian propaganda when criticizing the thesis of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire, by supporting public and scientific interest in an entirely concocted topic that humanity should have long forgotten. It stands to reason that I am not including these works in our bibliographical survey either, nor the bookish responses to them prepared by Armenian and pro-Armenian liberal authors (in the context of listing their titles, I draw the reader's attention to the fact that some researchers have made a name for themselves on the topic of the Armenian genocide).¹⁸

Returning to the topic of the historiography of Armenian terrorism, I should point out general theoretical works that examine the terrorism of nationalists, Armenian terrorism being one of its aspects. Priority, in my opinion, goes to a collective monograph called *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda* published by California University Press (Los Angeles, California, U.S.).¹⁹ The retrospective theme of Armenian terrorism is a particular aspect of this study, but its authors, like us, adhere to the historico-criminological methodological approach when setting forth their facts, leaving aside any ideological and propagandistic scrutiny of the topic. This made a strong impression on us, which makes it hard to overestimate the methodological value of this work, although it gives a schematic and even sketchy account of Armenian terrorism, which can only be expected of a general monograph.

Similar studies include *Terrorism in Europe* edited by Yohan Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers and published in London in 1982.²⁰ This work gives a representative description of the terrorist activity of the main leftist-radical terrorist groups in Western Europe in the 1960s-1970s, the best known among which were the leftist extremists from the German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), the Italian Brigade Rosse (BR), the French Action directe (AD), and the radical nationalists from such organizations as Óglaigh na hÉireann (the Irish Republican Army, IRA) or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA—Basque Country and Freedom). Armenian terrorism is examined in this book as a logical continuation or embodiment of two of these branches of European terrorism—one demanding social transformation of public life (this is how the terrorist activity of ASALA was interpreted) and the other rooting for national separatism and conser-

¹⁶ See: W. Laqueur, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, Oxford University Press U.S., New York, 2000.

¹⁷ See: S.J. Shaw and E.K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, in 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977.

¹⁸ See: D. Bloxham, *The Final Solution: A Genocide*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009; idem, *Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001; idem, *Genocide, the World Wars and the Unweaving of Europe*, Vallentine Mitchell, London, Portland, 2008; idem, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005; M.M. Gunter, "Pursuing the Just Cause of their People": *A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1986; R. Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992; R.G. Suny, *Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1993; idem, *The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1993. Another several dozen books could be added to this list, but we have listed here the works of those American and British authors, to the authority of which Armenian propagandists appeal when imposing the concept of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire on humanity.

¹⁹ See: *The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al Qaeda*, ed. by G. Chaliand and A. Blin, Transl. by E. Schneider, K. Pulver, and J. Browner, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2007.

²⁰ See: *Terrorism in Europe*, ed. by Y. Alexander and K.A. Myers, Groom Helm Ltd., London, 1982.

vatism (the authors of the study gave JCAG this role). Of course, looking back today, such ideas seem naïve. However, at the time they were very pertinent, since they ruminated on current reality, without wondering specifically what it would all turn into in a decade or two.

The monograph by American researcher Anna Geifman with the catchy title *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917*, published by Princeton University (New Jersey, U.S.), is methodologically close to this work in terms of composition and narration.²¹ The study devotes a special chapter to describing the terrorist attacks by Armenians against members of the Russian imperial authorities in the Caucasus, giving a relatively detailed list of the crimes of the Armenian nationalists against representatives of the administration of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus. Anna Geifman directly, openly, and honestly talks about how Armenian terrorism was aimed not only against the Ottoman, but also against the Russian Empire, the people and authorities of which were equally hated by the radical representatives of the Armenian national intelligentsia, because they were the main force stemming their strivings to scare their own ethnicity through the use of terror and fill the place in its social structure that had long been previously occupied by the clergy of the Armenian Gregorian Church, thus assuming control over all the monetary resources of the Armenian people. Anna Geifman very justifiably calls the political terrorism of the Armenian nationalists a form of revolutionary terror, the only difference being that it was aimed not at bringing down the state structure and sociopolitical way of life existing in the Ottoman or Russian empires, but at social reformation of the Armenian ethnicity itself and at moving it from a theocratic to a totalitarian political arrangement, in which the organizing structures of one party (this party became Dashnaktsutjun after a tough political struggle) replaced the church hierarchy. This left the main mass of the Armenian people in an unlawful position with respect to their corporate leaders, today customarily known as the establishment. Of course, Anna Geifman does not draw any far-reaching conclusions in her book, but very precisely, perhaps at an intuitive level, senses the essence of Armenian terrorism, the revolutionary nature of which was in no way political, but strictly social.

The topic of the place of “political murders” in the history of human civilization became the subject of a representative study by Harvard University Professor Franklin L. Ford called *Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism*, published in 1985.²² It stands to reason that he could not avoid the topic of the several dozen murders of diplomats of the Republic of Turkey committed by fighters of the Armenian terrorist organizations ASALA and JCAG in the 1970s-1980s when studying this subject. In so doing, he did not close his eyes to the fact that what appeared at first glance to be “political” murders of the Turkish diplomats had a very mercantile implication for world Armenianstvo, since the Armenian extremists (particularly among the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, JCAG) tried by means of political terrorism to force the Turkish authorities to pay the Armenians a contribution or monetary compensation for the supposed Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. In his book, Franklin Ford did not act against his conscience, but stated directly that the propagandist campaign of the Armenians, accompanied by explosions and murders, in no way corresponds to the restoration of historical justice or preservation of the memory of their ancestors who were killed, while the main purpose was to gain monetary benefits in order to set the Armenians apart even more from the rest of humanity and subordinate the people to the power of the ethnic theocratic oligarchy. So the main stimulus of Armenian terrorism was not honoring the memory of their deceased fellow countrymen, but the craving to profit from this memory.

²¹ See: A. Geifman, *Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995.

²² See: F.L. Ford, *Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985.

In his book *Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World*,²³ American researcher David J. Whittaker points to the struggle to divvy up property and gain access to the monetary resources of the regions by seizing political power using terror as the main driving force behind the contemporary transnational terrorist movement. According to this author, Armenian terrorism, the mass manifestation of which was the Armenian armed aggression in Nagorno-Karabakh, was always oriented toward seizing territory rich in natural resources, while the attacks of Armenian terrorists against diplomats and the diplomatic representative agencies of the Republic of Turkey in different countries of the world carried out under the slogan of revenge for the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire in reality had a very down-to-earth and mercantile goal—to force the government of this country to pay contribution to the Armenian people, and essentially to the elite of the Armenian Diaspora, for the war crimes supposedly perpetrated against this ethnicity during World War I, in the same way as the government of the FRG compensated the Jewish State of Israel for the Nazi crimes of the Holocaust. Using the criminological approach to his analysis of Armenian terrorism, David Whittaker very specifically pointed out that the terrorist activity of the Armenian nationalists was and remains a non-economic means of wealth accumulation for the elite of the Armenian Diaspora, while the ideology pursued for justifying this activity is nothing other than a false goal to attract the attention of the world community and victims of Armenian terrorism by camouflaging the true purpose, i.e. accumulating power and wealth by seizing and subsequently exploiting the resources of the peoples taking the brunt of the onslaught of the Armenian terrorists. I will add that if David Whittaker's thoughts are further developed in the same direction, it can certainly be said that the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988-1994 was the first experience of the aggressive and even expansionist war that is being waged today throughout the world by international terrorist alliances created on ethnic, religious, or ethnoreligious grounds against the governments and people of certain states for the purpose of intermittent enrichment of the international oligarchic structures that protect terrorists at the expense of the countries and peoples they subdue.

David Whittaker was not the first political scientist to publicly express this thought. Sixteen years earlier, another American researcher David C. Rapoport voiced the same opinion in his book *Inside Terrorist Organizations*.²⁴ In it, he not only described the inside structure of political terrorist organizations, which proved to be very similar to ethnocriminal groups such as the Italian-generated American crime syndicates Cosa Nostra and Camorra, but also showed their common ways of doing things, when non-economic methods of violence and terror are used to solve the very mercantile tasks of personal wealth accumulation of the ideological leaders of the terrorist organizations. Thirty years ago David Rapoport examined and described political extremism and the terrorism accompanying it as an effective tool for solving macroeconomic tasks, which either major transnational corporations in the struggle to divvy up raw material and sales markets, or the political establishment of the largest world countries in the struggle for spheres of geopolitical influence could use to their ends. I will add on my part that the individual representatives of those forces capable of rationally using the tool of political terrorism without detriment to their own interests are today very often one and the same people at different times in their lives. Consequently we can say that political or ethnoreligious terrorism, based on David Rapoport's concept, can be used exclusively by oligarchic circles, the existence of which is objectively impossible without maintaining a policy of macroeconomic expansionism. In this case, Armenian terrorism is also not an exception to the general rule.

²³ See: D.J. Whittaker, *Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World*, Taylor & Francis, Routledge, 2004.

²⁴ See: D.C. Rapoport, *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988.

In his book, *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism*,²⁵ Jeffrey D. Simon also talks about ethnic or ethnoreligious terrorism (including Armenian) as a foreign policy tool of the U.S. government. In his work, he says directly that in today's world, terrorism is an effective foreign economic tool of macroeconomic competition in the main world markets, which the United States began making active use of in the last quarter of the twentieth century for Cold War purposes in order to economically weaken and then destroy the Warsaw Pact bloc. Although he does not say so directly, the author of this book implies that the war in Nagorno-Karabakh was also a U.S. experiment in the system of terrorist wars aimed at destroying the Soviet Union, while organized Armenian terrorism was allotted far from the last role in this.

The collective monograph by Russian authors M. Dzliev, E. Izzatdust, and M. Kireev titled *Sovremenny terrorism: sotsialno-politicheskiy oblik protivnika* (Contemporary Terrorism: A Sociopolitical Portrait of the Adversary), as well as two monographs by Azerbaijani law expert and political scientist Ramiz Sevdimaliev *Mezhdunarodny terrorism—globalnaia problema sovremennosti: monografiya* (International Terrorism: One of Today's Global Problems) and *Mezhdunarodny terrorism i politiko-pravovyye problemy borby s nim: monografiya* (International Terrorism and Political and Legal Problems in Fighting It)²⁶ should be mentioned among the historico-criminological general works on international and transnational terrorism published in Russian, in which a historical retrospective look at Armenian terrorism is an integral part. The first of these works is interesting in that while the reader's attention is drawn to the comprehensive study of a broad range of aspects relating to the existence of international terrorism in the Northern Caucasus, it also examines the historical sources of this criminological phenomenon, among which Armenian terrorism against the Russian Empire is mentioned, which is not typical at all for this type of literature published at present in the Russian Federation. Ramiz Sevdimaliev's monographs are noteworthy in themselves and interesting for us in that they give relatively detailed and adequate proof, without the propagandistic overtones partially inherent in the civil scientific research of his fellow countrymen and incorporating a wide range of arguments, not only of the international, but also of the transnational nature of Armenian terrorism. Throughout its entire history, this has been a tool of someone else's geopolitics, expressing the striving of the European countries for dominance in the economy and trade of regions of Western and Central Asia.

The historiography of the works that shed light on Armenian terrorism includes several special studies specifically on this topic. These are primarily the monograph by Francis P. Hyland called *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects* published by Westview Press in 1991.²⁷ When the war in Nagorno-Karabakh was only just gaining momentum, the author prophetically claimed that this armed conflict was the first terrorist war in the recent history of mankind waged by the Armenian Diaspora against the people of the Azerbaijan Republic. He went on to say that the entire history of political terrorism of Armenian national extremists before it was nothing other than many years of targeted and planned preparation precisely for this kind of war. He pictured the future of Armenian terrorism (I will remind you that this book was written in 1991) as the most important factor in destabilizing regional security that for long decades to come would threaten peace and calm not only in Transcaucasia,

²⁵ See: J.D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap: America's Experience with Terrorism*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994.

²⁶ See: M. Dzliev, E. Izzatdust, and M. Kireev, *Sovremenny terrorism: sotsialno-politicheskiy oblik protivnika*, ed. by V. Gordienko, Academia, Moscow, 2007; R. Sevdimaliev, *Mezhdunarodny terrorism—globalnaia problema sovremennosti: monografiya*, Elm Publishers, Baku, 2004; idem, *Mezhdunarodny terrorism i politiko-pravovyye problemy borby s nim: monografiya*, ed. by Kh. Vagabov, Indigo, Baku, 2011.

²⁷ See: F.P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991.

but throughout all of Western Asia, including the Middle East. As history in the past thirty years has shown, Francis Hyland was very close to the truth in his conclusions and predictions.

The works of authors who are citizens of the Republic of Turkey comprise a separate and special group of studies on the history of Armenian terrorism. It stands to reason that Turkish politicians, public figures, and social study experts disagreed and continue to disagree with the intellectual interpretation of Armenian terrorism as the response of the Armenian intelligentsia to the so-called Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire, which has been regularly expressed for seventy-five years in the publications of their pro-Armenian opponents, thus compelling them to enter into dispute with them. Practically all the works by Turkish authors on Armenian terrorism published during the second half of the twentieth century were of a strictly propagandistic, journalistic, or contentious nature, having little in common with scientific analysis and thus appealing primarily to readers' emotions and feelings, and not to their common sense. It is worth mentioning those publications that were translated into English and other European languages, which are more understandable to European, Russian, and Russian-speaking readers. The first works using the phrase "Armenian terrorism" in their titles began appearing in Turkey five years after this definition became a widely used political science term, although, rationally speaking, the Turkish experts should have done this immediately. It seems that the representatives of Turkish political thought needed some time to understand, perceive, and assess the changes that had occurred in the mainstream of North American and West European political thought and adapt their lexical tools to the new reality. On the whole, the works of Turkish political scientists, social studies experts, and criminologists provide very little new material for understanding the nature, sources, and essence of such a sociopolitical and historical-criminological phenomenon as Armenian terrorism. They merely extend the range of viewpoints on one and the same events in diametrical opposition and are interesting in the context of our study only as a source of additional information on the criminalistic picture of a particular criminal deed committed by the Armenian fighters. However, proceeding from principles of objectivity and academic conscientiousness, it is worth pointing to the main Turkish authors who wrote on the topic of Armenian terrorism and listing their main works.

In 1987, what was more like a journalistic brochure than a serious scientific work called *Armenian Terrorism: A Menace to the International Community*²⁸ by Salâhi Ramsdan Sonyel came out in London under the auspices of the Cyprus Turkish Association operating in Great Britain. In it, the author called upon the international community to stand on the side of the Turkish authorities in their advanced position in the struggle against Armenian terrorism, the history of which dates back to the last quarter of the nineteenth century. He set forth his views on the reasons and sources of Armenian terrorism later in a whole series of works on the history of relations among the Turkish, Greek, and Armenian peoples at the beginning of the twentieth century as part of the Ottoman Empire. However, since they do not have any direct relation to the topic of this book, I will not take a closer look at them. Judging from the number of publications in various world languages, Salâhi R. Sonyel was considered, until recently, to be the main specialist in the Republic of Turkey on the Turkish-Armenian question. However, since all of his works are largely similar in terms of content to the indicated brochure, I can say with a high degree of confidence that Turkish historical science is permanently in a deep intellectual crisis.

Other similar works also had approximately the same content, among which it is worth naming *The Armenian File* by Kamuran Gurun,²⁹ as well as the brochure by Omer Engin Lutem

²⁸ See: S.R. Sonyel, *Armenian Terrorism: A Menace to the International Community*, Cyprus Turkish Association, London, 1987.

²⁹ See: K. Gurun, *The Armenian File*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985. This book was also published at the same time in Great Britain: K. Gurun, *The Armenian File*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1985. This fact makes it possible to

*Armenian Terror*³⁰ that came out this century in 2007 in Ankara under the joint efforts of the Institute for Armenian Research and the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies. The first of these works, despite its large volume (around 400 pages), is essentially an intelligent compilation of arguments expressed earlier by the Turkish side of its position on the Turkish-Armenian question, while the second is an extract or brief exposition of the main provisions and conclusions of the first. The anonymous brochure titled *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism* published in the U.S. under the aegis of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) also belongs to the same category.³¹ However, the crowning glory of this kind of propagandistic-educational and journalistic literature is the 12-page brochure called *Armenian Terrorism: A Threat to Peace*³² published under the aegis of the Research Center for the Study of Atatürk Reforms and Principles of Akdeniz University in Turkish Antalya. I can certainly not talk about any scientific value or academic significance of the above-listed publications by Turkish authors, but I must mention them in this bibliographical survey for two important reasons: first, guided by the principles of historicism and conscientiousness, I cannot fail to mention their existence, while giving a corresponding evaluation of their content; second, I do not wish to be like my possible pro-Armenian critics and hush up the existence of this kind of literature, even if I do not have a very high opinion of it.

To render a full bibliographical survey, I will point out a few more works on the history of Armenian terrorism belonging to Turkish authors and published in the Republic of Turkey in Turkish. All of them are very similar to the above-listed studies of their colleagues in terms of content and tone, so I will only give their titles without focusing attention on annotating their content. The closest in terms of theme to this work are the historico-criminological books by M.A. Birand *Ermeni Terörü (4 Lisanda)* (Armenian Terrorism), A. Vatandaş *ASALA Operasyonları Aslında Ne Oldu?* (What Were the ASALA Operations Really All About?), and Z. Karaş *Ermeni Terör Örgütü ASALA* (The Armenian Terrorist Organization ASALA).³³

In an attempt to curry favor with the American and European intellectual elite, the government and academic circles of the Republic of Turkey that suffered from the terrorist attacks of Armenian extremists held international scientific conferences and symposiums throughout the 1980s, to which they invited those North American and West European scientists who were negative about Armenian terrorism as a sociopolitical phenomenon and unequivocally criticized all of its manifestations, as well as skeptically assessed and perceived the thesis of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that several such international scientific forums were held in Ankara and Istanbul, only the papers of two of them, published as collections of reports, are known at all today. These are the collection of reports of the international and formally culturological scientific conference called *Symposium on International Terrorism* and the collection of speeches at the international symposium on *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection*, held one after the other at the University of

talk about an attempt by the Turkish government to use the widest means to publicize its position on the Turkish-Armenian question for the reading public of North America and Western Europe. This book was later translated into Russian and published in Baku in 1993 by the State Publishing House of the Azerbaijan Republic Azerneshr.

³⁰ See: O.E. Lutem, *Armenian Terror*, Institute for Armenian Research, Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, Ankara, 2007.

³¹ See: *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism*, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, Washington, 1999.

³² See: *Armenian Terrorism: A Threat to Peace*, Akdeniz University, Research Center for the Study of Atatürk Reforms and Principles, Antalya, 1985.

³³ See: M.A. Birand, *Ermeni Terörü (4 Lisanda)*, And Kartposatal ve Yayınları, Ankara, 1983; A. Vatandaş, *ASALA Operasyonları Aslında Ne Oldu?*, Alfa Yayınları, Ankara, 2005; Z. Karaş, *Ermeni Terör Örgütü ASALA*, TC Atılım Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi (Department of International Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, Atılım University, unpublished doctoral diploma), Ankara, 2007.

Ankara in 1984.³⁴ Most of the authors we named above participated in these scientific forums, while the factual content of their reports correlated in one way or another with the content of the books they wrote and published. Consequently, there is no need to comment in particular on the conceptual ideas of the reports and statements they made.

In the footsteps of the Turkish researchers and scientific institutes, the scientific and public circles of the Azerbaijan Republic carried out active journalistic activity on the history and practice of Armenian terrorism in the last decade of the twentieth century, which is entirely legitimate and explainable. For members of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia, exposing the crimes of Armenian terrorism was then and is today an important component of the propagandist war being waged in the context of the unsettled Nagorno-Karabakh conflict spurred by international Armenian terrorists and leading to their occupation of a sixth part of Azerbaijan's territory. As a result of this, in most of the books by Azerbaijani authors I know of, propagandistic rhetoric unfortunately prevails over an academic rendition of facts and conclusions, which certainly lowers the scientific value and significance of these publications, while an analysis of the context is replaced with a digest of events. Consequently, a work that began as a research study turns into a kind of chronology of facts and personal opinions, i.e. a composite source, by the time it is finished. Nothing more should be expected today of representatives of Azerbaijani social studies and humanitarian science in general, since the absolute majority of them are participants or eyewitnesses of the events of the Karabakh war of 1988-1994, which predicates the emotionality of the assessments and conclusions they make, and in some cases, this is even manifested in the titles of their publications. Nevertheless, their works are very important for understanding the entire historical retrospect of the problems we are examining in this book, since it was in Transcaucasia that Armenian terrorism began and revealed itself to the world in its heyday. The Azerbaijani authors could theoretically join the alpha and omega of this historico-criminological phenomenon. Giving my due to the work done, I will point out the most significant books by Azerbaijani colleagues.

First, I will mention Bakhtiar Nadjafov's book *Litso vraga. Istoria armianskogo natsionalizma v Zakavkazie v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka* (Face of the Enemy: The History of Armenian Nationalism in Transcaucasia at the End of the Nineteenth and Beginning of the Twentieth Centuries), published in Baku in 1993.³⁵ This book came out as a two-volume work, whereby it was prepared in 1988-1994 Karabakh war conditions—let's all fall in again!—which predicated its phraseology and far from academic style of narration. Second, a study similar to it in tone and content is the monograph by Director of the Institute of Human Rights of the National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan Rovshan Mustafaev called *Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva (XIX-XX vv.): Kratkaia khronologicheskaiia entsiklopediia* (Crimes of Armenian Terrorist and Gangster Formations Against Humanity [Nineteenth-Twentieth Centuries]), published in 2002.³⁶ This work, which has the subtitle "Short Chronological Encyclopedia," is in reality far from the genre of scientific literature and is more like an accusatory lampoon in narration and content that lists the crimes the author knew of committed throughout the twentieth century against the peaceful Azerbaijani population, not only terrorist, but all other crimes as well—military and general, which he describes as "gangster." This kind of approach is not appropriate or correct from the

³⁴ See: *Symposium on International Terrorism: Collection of Reports*, Ankara University Press, Ankara, 1984; *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection: Collection of Reports*, Ankara University Press, Ankara, 1984.

³⁵ See: B. Nadjafov, *Litso vraga. Istoria armianskogo natsionalizma v Zakavkazie v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka*, Elm, Baku, 1993.

³⁶ See: R. Mustafaev, *Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva (XIX-XX vv.): Kratkaia khronologicheskaiia entsiklopediia*, Elm, Baku, 2002.

criminological viewpoint, since it does not take into account, and in our case totally ignores, the type and qualification of a specific criminal act, which is especially strange to see from someone who heads an academic institute studying humanitarian law and human rights. The indicated shortcomings of the research methodology did not prevent this work from being reprinted in 2013, but this time as a collective monograph,³⁷ which in itself shows that this book was a tool of ideological struggle and not of scientific erudition.

However, along with the extremely propagandist works of the Azerbaijani authors listed above, we also find very high-quality, in the academic sense, studies, in which emotions and the urge to argue do not get the better of a conceptual and ethical rendering of the facts. Among these works are the book by Saleh Qarabağlı *Armanstvo*,³⁸ the author of which quite convincingly reveals and describes the economic motives and monetary implication of the criminal activity of international Armenian terrorists, for whom the war against the Azeri population in Nagorno-Karabakh was a kind of business project in the interests of transnational corporations. F. Dashdamirov and A. Jangir, who examine Armenian terrorism as one of the oldest expressions of contemporary international terrorism and one of the branches of the terrorist international that has a long and splendid history, express thoughts similar to Qarabağlı's in their works.³⁹ Havva Mamadova and Rovshan Novruzoglu, who examine this historico-criminological phenomenon through the prism of the most tragic events of the Karabakh war of 1988-1994, join them in their assessments of Armenian terrorism of the last decade of the twentieth century.⁴⁰

When talking about the works of Azerbaijani authors on different aspects or events of the history of Armenian terrorism, I cannot help but notice a particular feature of this literature, which is essentially imperceptible to anyone not initiated in the specifics of this topic. The thing is that the books published in Azeri differ significantly in content and style from scientific and journalistic works of similar content published in other world languages. As a rule, the publications in Azeri are written more emotionally and even expressively, playing on readers' feelings rather than reason and focusing on issues that an academic researcher would rarely address. All of this together makes it possible to classify it as literature of an extreme propagandist nature, which is not surprising, if we keep in mind that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has still not been peacefully resolved in keeping with the regulations of international law. The following journalistic publications by S. Hajiev, M. Quliev, and A. Israfilzade⁴¹ prove how right my viewpoint is (I have listed the authors of only a few works in order to show the reality of this kind of literature, but with no intention of analyzing their

³⁷ See: *Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva: XIX-XXI vv.: Kratkaiia khronologicheskaiia entsiklopedia*, Compiled by A. Mustafaeva [et al.], Human Rights Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, Elm, Takhsil, Baku, 2013.

³⁸ See: S. Qarabağlı, *Armanstvo*, Sc. ed. M. Ismailov, Elm, Baku, 1994. This work with changes, appendices, and a new subtitle "Detonator of an International Bomb" was reprinted in Baku in 2011 as the second volume of this author's two-volume work (see: S. Qarabağlı, *Sudba mira*, in 2 vols., Vol. 2, *Armanstvo: detonator mezhdunarodnoi bomby*, ed. by M. Ismailov, 2nd revised ed., Elm, Baku, 2011).

³⁹ See: F.G. Dashdamirov, *Armanijskiy terrorism i separatizm: "Pokroviteli i dvoynoy standart."* Ganjlik, Baku, 2005; A. Jangir, *Terrorizm: vchera, segodnia i naveki: proekt "Chetvertaia mirovaia vojna,"* Azerbaijan, Baku, 2003.

⁴⁰ See: H. Mamadova, *Khojali: shekhidy i shakhidy: armianskiy terrorizm kak sostavnaia chast mezhdunarodnogo terrorizma*, Transl. by S. Mamedzade, Ministry of Culture of the Azerbaijan Republic, Dom skazki, Baku, 2005; R. Novruzoglu, *Karabakh: "Cherny rynok" dlia mezhdunarodnogo terrorizma: monografiia*, ed. by A. Sailov, Araz, Baku, 2003.

⁴¹ See: S. Hacıyev, *Böyül Çin Səddi erməni terrorizminin hədəfində* (S. Hajiev, The Great Wall of China as a Target of Armenian Terrorism), Nurlan, Bakı, 2004; Ə. İsrəfil-zadə, *Azərbaycanda erməni-daşnak terrorunun xronologiyası: bədii-tarixi publisistika* (A. Israfilzade, Chronology of Armenian-Dashnak Terror in Azerbaijan: Literary and Historical Journalism), Təknur, Bakı, 2009; M. Quliyev, *Metroda terror: sənədli Povest* (M. Quliev, Terror in the Subway: A Documentary), Adiloğlu, Bakı, 2009.

content). Therefore, I can state with full justification that in present-day Azerbaijan, activity is being carried out to form public opinion in an extremely anti-Armenian spirit, which is an integral part of state policy to prepare the country's population for returning the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh territory, or for engaging in an armed struggle to keep it.

Professional duty and a feeling of justice, as well as the demands of academic etiquette, compel me to point out a few works by those Armenian authors who, contrary to the logic of common sense, tried to publicly justify the crimes of Armenian terrorism, rehabilitate, and even make heroes out of the criminals who committed them. Among them I will name a book by Rouben Manouel Torossian called *The Contemporary Armenian National Movement* published in San Diego (California, U.S.) in 1980.⁴² Of course, the increased activity of the Basque and Northern Ireland nationalists in the second half of the 1970s, who compelled the world press and public opinion to talk about them, influenced the author's choice of name for his book. On the wave of the public's increased interest in any nationalist movement in Europe, Rouben Torossian tried again to draw society's attention to the political and closely related economic aspirations of his people, attempting to present Armenian terrorism as a tool of the popular national-liberation struggle topic at that time. But the striving to draw an analogy between Armenian and, let's say, Northern Irish terrorism had one significant shortcoming: the fighters of the Irish Republican Army only committed their acts in Londonderry and Great Britain, while the fighters of ASALA and JCAG acted throughout the world beyond the Republic of Turkey. And this looked very unlike a struggle for their land, at least in the eyes of the Americans and Europeans. So this and all other works like it by Armenian authors did not leave any noticeable footprint in world political or historical science.

After failing to independently justify the sources of their own terrorism and rehabilitation of its crimes in the eyes of the world community, the Armenian intellectual and financial elite mobilized authors from among the countries of their Diaspora to perform this task. As mentioned above, the role Dagmar Lorenz began playing in the U.S. was performed in Russia by Pavel Shekhtman, who published a historico-journalistic essay called "Plamia davnikh pozharov" (The Flame of Old Fires)⁴³ in several issues of the *Pro Armenia* magazine (Moscow) in 1992-1993. Its content is a compilation of arguments of Armenianstvo in favor of the supposedly "historical justice" and "substantiation" of Armenian terrorism against high-ranking officials of the state administration of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus at the beginning of the twentieth century, which have neither been subjected to historical analysis or historiographic comprehension (at present this essay is being disseminated in a separate brochure through online publishing houses). For example, taking his cue from the ideologists of Armenian terrorism, Shekhtman calls the imperial law of 12 June, 1903 On Concentrating Management of the Property of the Armenian Gregorian Church in Russia in the Competence of Government Institutions and on the Means and Property of Said Church to be Transferred to the Competence of the Ministry of National Education, for which Armenian Gregorian Church Schools Have Been Provided (in keeping with which the imperial authorities took under administrative control the property of the Armenian Gregorian Church not used directly for performing church services or for Episcopal activity) the Law on Confiscation of Property of the Armenian Gregorian Church without even trying to figure out whether this was the way it actually was. Consequently, he interprets the terrorist acts of Armenian nationalists against Russian government institutions and officials in the Caucasus and particularly in Transcaucasia as their fight to preserve the "religious freedoms" of the Armenians, who were supposedly "oppressed" by the

⁴² See: R.M. Torossian, *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement*, United States International University, San Diego, 1980.

⁴³ See: P. Shekhtman, "Plamia davnikh pozharov," *Pro Armenia*, Moscow, 1993.

tyranny of the imperial authorities. Pavel Shekhtman himself is well known in present-day Russia as an author of articles that promulgate liberal ideals and values, but I know that he began as an advocate of Armenian nationalist terrorism. In today's world, this has unfortunately already become a norm, when fighting for human rights and humanitarian values are used to mask the aggression of terrorist communities against sovereign countries financed by transnational corporations looking for new sources of raw materials and sales markets. Since his work is not devoted to an analysis of the ideology or crimes of Armenian terrorism, but to their rehabilitation and glorification, I will not include this publication in the bibliographical survey of books on Armenian terrorism. I am only talking about it here so that Russian readers know that in Russia, too, which is a victim of the terrorist attacks of Armenian extremists, there are liberal journalists who do not criticize, but praise such crimes.

Before it turned into a topic of numerous monographic studies, the topic of Armenian terrorism was one of the most discussed subjects of social studies and scientific discussions constantly held in the first half of the 1980s on the pages of the scientific journals of North America. The article I mentioned earlier by Andrew Corsun in the August issue of *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* for 1982 launched the political science debate, and it went on for more than a year. Keeping in mind the extensive public response that this topic spontaneously received in the circles of the American scientific intelligentsia, several people almost instantly joined the discussion. They can immediately be divided into two groups with diametrically opposite ideological and moral positions—those who unconditionally condemned, and those who just as unconditionally rehabilitated Armenian terrorists and, in the historical retrospect, justified the crimes they committed. The first group of authors includes Paul Wilkinson and Michael Z. Szaz, and the second comprises Michael M. Gunter already mentioned above, Robert Jordan, and Christopher J. Walker.⁴⁴ Most of the publications of these authors, which came out in various U.S. social study journals throughout (with rare exception) 1983, were unscrupulously speculative. Then they were almost immediately turned into monographs by these authors, who, having exhausted their entire supply of eloquence during the journalistic debate, painstakingly transferred all the thoughts they earlier expressed into their monographs. Due to this, I might have skimmed over the journalistic debate, but since I am adhering to the principle of historicism, i.e. a historical approach to the topic being examined, my bibliographical survey should reflect the evolution of views on Armenian terrorism in Western historiographic science, which is why I am mentioning these articles.

Different kinds of thematic references and encyclopedias comprise a special category of studies that especially address Armenian terrorism in one way or another. Usually publications of this kind are not included in bibliographical surveys of historical studies, but since I am a consistent supporter of the historico-criminological approach to examining Armenian terrorism, I am doing this to show readers that information about this unlawful and antisocial phenomenon is widely represented in specialized publications. Without claiming an exhaustive list of the titles of reference publications, I will only point to several of them which, in my view, are distinguished by the greatest factual reliability and adequate assessment. So that readers can

⁴⁴ See: M.M. Gunter, "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey," *Orbis*, No. 27, Summer 1983, pp. 447-477; idem, "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey," *Orient*, No. 24, December 1983, pp. 610-637; idem, "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism," *Terrorism*, No. 3 (8), 1986, pp. 213-252; idem, "The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, No. 9, Fall 1985, pp. 77-96; idem, "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism," *Conflict Quarterly*, No. 5, Fall 1985, pp. 31-52; R. Jordan, "The Proud Armenians," *National Geographic*, No. 153, June 1978, pp. 846-873; M.Z. Szaz, "Armenian Terrorists and the East-West Conflict," *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Winter 1983, pp. 387-394; C.J. Walker, "The Armenian Holocaust in Its Modern Historical Context," *Ararat*, No. 24, Spring 1983, pp. 43-45; P. Wilkinson, "Armenian Terrorism," *World Today*, No. 39, September 1983, pp. 344-350.

see how such books come into being, I arranged them in chronological order, from the very earliest to the very latest. To this category belong the informational-statistical collection by Edward Mickolus called *Transnational Terrorism: The Chronology of Events, 1968-1979*,⁴⁵ a survey by Bruce Hoffman *Terrorism in the United States During 1985*,⁴⁶ a dictionary reference called *Contemporary Terrorism*, published in 1986 in New York and edited by William Gutteridge,⁴⁷ an analytical survey titled *Terrorism 1985-1986. Annual*, published under the editorship of Karl A. Seger in 1986,⁴⁸ a reference called *Terrorist Group Profiles* distributed in 1990 by DIANE Publishing,⁴⁹ Konstantin Zharinov's reference guide *Terrorizm i terroristy* (Terrorism and Terrorists) published in Minsk in 1999,⁵⁰ the *Encyclopedia of Terrorism* prepared for print by Harvey W. Kushner,⁵¹ and the *World Police Encyclopedia*, compiled by Das K. Dilip and Michael Palmiotto.⁵² Each of these publications features articles on the main organizations and groups of Armenian terrorists functioning in the 1970s-1980s, in which the gravest and therefore headline-making crimes they committed are listed. The annual surveys *Terrorism: An Annual Survey* published by John L. Scherer in 1980-1983 are very close to these publications in form and content.⁵³ In my opinion, it is extremely noteworthy that most of the above-listed publications came out in the U.S. during the second presidential term of Ronald Reagan (1984-1988), with whose name the beginning of the active participation of the U.S. government structures in the establishment and financing of international terrorist organizations is associated, beginning with al-Qa'eda and ending with ASALA. The information presented in most of these reference works cannot be described as research-related as such, but is a kind of quintessence of the knowledge (or at least of the ideas) of society in a particular country of the world at one time or another relating to the history and unlawful activity of a particular Armenian terrorist group. So I included them in this bibliographical survey to give a broader informational picture.

It should be noted that later, already in the 21st century, systemization and publication of information about the potential, structure, and activity of international terrorist groups in the U.S. and West European countries was no longer the initiative of individual researchers, but had been raised to the official level. In particular, in the United States, this kind of information and analytical activity was entrusted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which compiles and publishes in electronic form on the official FBI website an annual analytical report on the state of the terrorist threat in the world (*Federal Bureau of Investigation. Terrorism: An Annual Survey*), the content of which, due to the geopolitical confrontation between the U.S. and the Russian Federation, is not published or disseminated in Russian. Russian users can only gain access to the content of this website through providers in West European countries, and so obtaining information in this way is not entirely correct in terms of international civil law and intellectual property law, which made it impossible for me to make legal use of the information from this source when preparing this book.

Due to selective access to the FBI's information on the international terrorist threat and its refusal to allow Russian users to obtain it, I am compelled to make use of the references

⁴⁵ See: E. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: The Chronology of Events, 1968-1979*, Greenwood Press, New York, 1980.

⁴⁶ See: B. Hoffman, "Terrorism in the United States During 1985," The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1985.

⁴⁷ See: *Contemporary Terrorism*, ed. by W. Gutteridge, Facts on File Publications, New York, 1986.

⁴⁸ See: *Terrorism. 1985-1986. Annual*, ed. by K.A. Seger, Corporate Consultants, Knoxville, 1986.

⁴⁹ See: *Terrorist Group Profiles*, DIANE Publishing, 1989.

⁵⁰ See: K. Zharinov, *Terrorizm i terroristy: Ist. Spravochnik*, ed. by A. Taras, Harvest, Minsk, 1999.

⁵¹ See: H.W. Kushner, *Encyclopedia of Terrorism*, SAGE, Thousand Oaks, 2002.

⁵² See: *World Police Encyclopedia*, ed. by D.K. Dilip and M. Palmiotto, Routledge, New York, 2006.

⁵³ See: J.L. Scherer, *Terrorism: An Annual Survey*, in 2 vols., Vol. 1, Minneapolis, 1982; Vol. 2, Minneapolis, 1983.

officially published in Russian compiled by foreign authors based on the official data of the FBI. An example of this type of publication is the catalogue of terrorist and extremist organizations compiled by Jangir Aras and published in Moscow in 2003 in cooperation with several publishing houses called *Chetvertaia mirovaia voina: Informatsionno-analiticheskiy spravochnik po negosudarstvennym voenizirovannym sistemam* (World War IV: Informational and Analytical Reference on Non-State Militarized Systems).⁵⁴ This publication contains an extensive, although by no means full, list of such systems, among which we find the names of most of the organized structures of Armenian terrorists and extremists functioning in the twentieth century. I decided to fill in the gaps in this reference by taking its content as a basis and compiling my own more extensive and fuller list of transnational Armenian terrorist and extremist organizations existing and functioning in the last century. This list will be presented in Appendix 1.

In completing this bibliographical survey of specialized scientific literature on the history and criminal practice of Armenian terrorism, I would first like to say once more that my efforts to compile an extensive survey of academic literature on this topic is the first such attempt in Russian historical and political science. For this reason, I admit that it may not be exhaustive and prefer to consider it an experimental (preliminary) version of the references.

However, even in its possibly incomplete form, the list of studies I compiled makes it possible to see how well Armenian terrorism has been studied in various spheres of Russian humanitarian sciences, from historical and political science to anthropology and criminology. The most superficial look at the list of works I compiled shows that most of the studies (more than 60%) on this topic were done in the United States, and therefore the political and intellectual elite of that country (at least that part of it responsible for forming the state's foreign policy strategy) was fully informed of the resources and potential of Armenian terrorism, allowing it to make use of it for its own purposes or in national interests. The authorities of the Republic of Turkey manifested much less, but still significant, activity in studying this politico-criminological topic. Turkey's political prestige on the international arena and in diplomatic representative structures suffered the most from the attacks of Armenian terrorists, but they most likely did this without having enough intellectual, monetary, informational, operative, or other resources. The Azerbaijan Republic is the third country in the world, the scientific and public circles of which are studying, with active state support, the past, present, and future of Armenian terrorism. Armenian terrorism is without doubt discussed in the public circles of the other countries of the world, but it has not been studied specifically at the academic level using the methodology of scientific knowledge. Therefore, ideas about the scope and complexity of this issue have remained at a conventional level. Also, thanks to the efforts of ideological propaganda, Armenian terrorism in some countries of the world (for example, in France) has been perceived with open approval and enjoyed a certain amount of public support, thus making government opposition to it difficult.

As for Russia, there has been a total taboo on the topic of Armenian terrorism both in Soviet and most recent times. During the Soviet Union, this issue was a closely guarded secret, since it graphically demonstrated the entire failure of the ideology of "proletarian internationalism." After all, most of the residents and party and political leaders of the Armenian S.S.R. shared, approved of, and supported the terrorist acts of their fellow countrymen living in Europe and North America against the state bodies and commercial structures of Turkey, France, Switzerland, and many more world countries. Armenian terrorism graphically proved the victory of the idea of nationalism in all of its most blatant—extremist—manifestations, which

⁵⁴ See: J. Aras, *Chetvertaia mirovaia voina: Informatsionno-analiticheskiy spravochnik po negosudarstvennym voenizirovannym sistemam*, AST, Astrel, Tranzitnika, Moscow, 2003.

went against the official ideology of the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation not only inherited the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and place of permanent member in the U.N. Security Council, but also the attitude not only to the existence of Armenian terrorism in the world, but also to the terrorist acts of Armenian extremists against its own citizens. As in Soviet times, in present-day Russia, the numerous instances of crimes of Armenian terrorists are carefully hushed up, which is graphically shown by the bibliographical survey of literature on this subject I compiled: only 15 of the more than 60 scientific works or the collections they were included in have been published in Russian, whereby 12 of them came out in the Azerbaijan Republic and one in Belarus. What is more, the only work published in Russia proved not to condemn, but to glorify the crimes of Armenian terrorism (including against the authorities of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union) and make heroes out of the criminals who committed the terrorist acts. This fact speaks volumes in itself and does not need any additional comment.

Another very important circumstance draws attention to itself—most of the published studies on Armenian terrorism were carried out and publicized in the U.S. in the mid-1980s, when the Cold War between the West and East was at its peak. This is the most graphic and objective proof that special attention was focused on the study of the phenomenon of Armenian terrorism in the U.S. in those years, and so no resources were spared on conducting corresponding studies and testing their results (including beyond the U.S.). The sporadic and amateurishly organized, in terms of tactics, attacks of Armenian terrorists did not present any significant threat to the U.S.; after all, the mass murders of diplomats did not bring the Republic of Turkey to its knees. All the same, Armenian terrorism was studied there from different angles and aspects, using the methodology of scientific research in essentially all spheres of humanitarian science, which is clearly shown by the titles and content of the studies I know of. A pragmatic country, which the U.S. is, would not spend millions of dollars on research that did not promise it even greater economic dividends in the future, which it could only obtain one way—by establishing its own world domination after the destruction of the Soviet Union. Consequently, I can conclude with a high degree of certainty that the theory and practice of Armenian terrorism in the U.S. was studied only for the purpose of using it as a tool to destabilize the Soviet Union by provoking the country's internal political collapse and disintegration. The vector of development of the geopolitical processes at the end of the twentieth century in Transcaucasia proves the justice and truth of my conclusions. For essentially an entire decade, the United States was not only studying, but in every way encouraging Armenian terrorism beyond its own territory, in so doing training fighters for a future Armenian-Turkic (read Armenian-Azeri) war in Transcaucasia, which was to become the first “terrorist war” in the history of humanity.

The aggression of the Armenian international terrorists in Nagorno-Karabakh became precisely this kind of war. And it was not just anyone who gave it this description, but American researchers Jeffrey Simon, David Rapoport, David Whittaker, and Francis Hyland, as well as Azeri author Saleh Qarabağlı. Taking their cue, we should all also understand and accept this truth, no matter how bitter it may be. Armenian terrorism has proven to be one of the most effective and efficient tools of the Cold War (in fact, the Third World War), which led to the downfall first of the Warsaw Pact Organization, and then of the Soviet Union. The aggression of international Armenian terrorists first against the Armenian S.S.R. in 1986-1988 and then against the Azerbaijan S.S.R. in 1988-1990 and the Azerbaijan Republic in 1991-1994 became the “hottest” front in the Cold War against the Soviet Union, which it ingloriously lost. This bibliographical survey of the content of works of American authors leads precisely to this conclusion.

Summing up the above, I would like to emphasize in particular that the content of the books I included in the bibliographical survey of sociopolitical and criminological literature

(the authors of which researched Armenian terrorism from different angles and in different aspects) makes it possible for me to say very definitely and reliably that during the twentieth century alone, it turned from the political ideal and practice of crimes by individuals or small groups of members of the exalted part of the Armenian intelligentsia into a full-fledged state phenomenon, in which a large number of citizens of the present-day Republic of Armenia and their fellow countrymen living today in the Diaspora around the world are in one way or another, directly or indirectly, involved. The ideology of terrorism, which a century ago was the psychological burden and fate of a few, has essentially become the worldview of an entire ethnicity, making it its slave. So even though its last crimes were committed 15 years ago, Armenian terrorism is still topical today.

CHAPTER TWO

ARMENIAN TERRORISM: LEGAL CONTEXT AND PERIODIZATION

(Criminal and Legal Qualification of the Crimes of Armenian Terrorism and the Impact of the Results of a Criminological Analysis on the Interpretation of Its Content and Chronology)

As I begin to examine Armenian terrorism and its crimes in historical retrospect from the legal standpoint of contemporary Russian legislation and the rules of present-day legal science, I want to make it clear that I will analyze the unlawful acts Armenian extremists committed in history according to the criminal and legal qualification envisaged in current Russian Federation legislation, while casting aside the ethical and moral aspects and rejecting the scholastic attainments of historical or political science. In other words, I will try to determine whether all the criminal offenses committed by Armenian nationalists in the twentieth century should be considered crimes of terrorist orientation, and if not, which category of crime they should be classified in, and how they characterize the Armenian political groups, whose members took responsibility for committing them. This will provide me with the answer to the most important question: is notorious Armenian terror, or some part of it, actually terrorism in historical retrospect, and if not, what category of criminal activity is it related to?

I searched for the answers to these questions in Russian Federation legislation on counteraction against terrorist organizations, which now includes Federal Law No. 35-FZ of 6 March, 2006 On Counteraction against Terrorism (in the version of 28 June, 2014)¹ and (as it says in Art 1 of this law) “generally recognized principles and rules of international law, international treaties made by the Russian Federation, ... federal laws, normative legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation, normative legal acts of the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as normative legal acts of other governmental bodies adopted in compliance with them.” Among the latter, I will mention the Russian Federation Criminal Code, which envisages liability for committing a whole set of

¹ “On Counteraction against Terrorism: Federal Law of 6 March, 2006, No. 35-FZ (in the version of 28 June, 2014),” in: *Collection of RF Legislation*, 2006, No. 11, Art 1146; No. 31 (Part 1), Art 3452; 2008, No. 45, Art 5149; No. 52 (Part 1), Art 6227; 2009, No. 1, Art 29; 2010, No. 31, Art 4166; 2011, No. 1, Art 16; No. 19, Art 2713; No. 46, Art 6407; 2013, No. 30 (Part 1), Art 4041; No. 44, Art 5641; 2014, No. 19, Art 2335; No. 23, Art 2930; No. 26 (Part 1), Art 3385.

terrorist crimes, the Concept of Counteraction against Terrorism in the Russian Federation approved by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev on 5 October, 2009,² and numerous international treaties and agreements that, having been ratified by either the Soviet Union or Russian Federation, belong to Russia's legal system in keeping with Art 15(4) of the Russian Federation Constitution and have greater legal force than the regulations of Russian national legislation:

- The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December, 1970;
- The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September, 1971;
- The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 14 December, 1973;
- The International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 17 December, 1979;
- Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24 February, 1988;
- The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 15 December, 1997;
- The Convention of the Council of Europe on the Prevention of Terrorism, adopted at Warsaw on 16 May, 2005.³

The international legal acts and acts of Russian legislation listed above form a comprehensive and integrated system of legal provisions that make it possible to make a full, adequate, and objective criminal and legal qualification of absolutely all the crimes known to be committed by Armenian radical nationalists throughout history and then understand (based on present-day ideas) what precisely comprised the public criminal activity of the militants of the main Armenian sociopolitical organizations of the twentieth century—the Social Democratic Party Hunchak and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutium.

So what unlawful acts in present-day Russia are customarily called terrorist acts?

Before answering this question, I must define the main legal concepts used in the criminal and legal qualification of this type of crime. This requires taking a look at the corresponding provisions of the Federal Law on Counteraction against Terrorism and the Concept of Counteraction against Terrorism in the Russian Federation (whereby I am focusing only on the definitions of interest in this study—"terrorism," "terrorist act," and "terrorist activity"). In compliance with Art 3 of the indicated federal law,

- terrorism* is "the ideology of violence and the practice of influencing the adoption of a decision by public authorities, local self-government bodies or international organizations connected with frightening the population and (or) other forms of unlawful violent actions;"
- a terrorist act* is "making an explosion, arson or other actions connected with frightening the population and posing the danger of loss of life, of causing considerable damage

² See: "The Concept of Counteraction against Terrorism in the Russian Federation approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 5 October, 2009," *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, No. 198, 20 October, 2009.

³ You can acquaint yourself with the texts of the international legal documents that obligate states to counteract terrorism in different forms of its manifestation in the following publication: *United Nations Treaty Collection. Databases*, available at [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/MTDSG/page1_en.xml].

- to property or the onset of an ecological catastrophe, as well as other especially grave consequences, for the purpose of unlawful influence upon adoption of a decision by public authorities, local self-government bodies or international organizations, as well as the threat of committing the said actions for the same purpose;” and
- terrorist activity* is any unlawful activity, “including the following:
- (a) arranging, planning, preparing, financing and implementing an act of terrorism;
 - (b) instigation of an act of terrorism;
 - (c) establishment of an unlawful armed unit, criminal association (criminal organization) or an organized group for implementation of an act of terrorism, as well as participation in such structure;
 - (d) recruiting, arming, training and using terrorists;
 - (e) informational or other assistance to planning, preparing or implementing an act of terrorism;
 - (f) popularization of terrorist ideas, dissemination of materials or information urging terrorist activities, substantiating or justifying the necessity of the exercise of such activity.”

The three legal definitions given above, which describe the object of cognition from the theoretical, applied, and systemic viewpoint, make it possible to identify and point to the most important specific features that qualitatively distinguish terrorism and its associated activity from other types of especially grave crimes and the actions associated with their perpetration. All terrorist crimes, regardless of the specifics of their *corpus delicti*, have a particular target of criminal encroachment—state power bodies, local self-government structures, or international organizations for the purpose of scaring the population, or carrying out other forms of unlawful violent actions aimed at destabilizing their activity or having an impact on their decision-making. In other words, any specific terrorist act is not aimed against a specific state official, serviceman, or law enforcer, or against any specific businessman, public figure, or legal person engaged in commercial or socially significant noncommercial activity, but against the state as a whole in order to force it to make or cancel a previous legally important decision in the interests of a person, group of people, or criminal organization carrying out terrorist activity.

In keeping with the above, any terrorist activity is qualified from the criminal and legal standpoint in the Russian Federation as all or several component elements of crimes that are generally defined as “crimes of terrorist orientation.”⁴ According to Art 24(1) of the Federal Law on Counteraction against Terrorism, the felonies envisaged by the following articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation form this body of crimes:

- Art 205 —Act of Terrorism;
- Art 205.1 —Contributing to Terrorist Activity;
- Art 205.2 —Public Calls for Committing Terrorist Activity, or Public Justification of Terrorism;
- Art 205.3 —Training for Terrorism for Carrying Out Terrorist Activity;
- Art 205.4 —Establishing a Terrorist Community and Participation in It;

⁴ This legal definition was introduced into Russian legal practice by “Resolution No. 1 of the Plenary Meeting of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 09.02.2012 On Issues of Judicial Practice Regarding Criminal Cases on Crimes of Terrorist Orientation,” *Bulletin of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation*, No. 4, April 2012; *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, No. 35, 17 February, 2012.

- Art 205.5 —Establishing a Terrorist Organization and Participation in the Activities of Such an Organization;
- Art 206 —Hostage-Taking;
- Art 208 —Organization of an Illegal Armed Formation, or Participation in It;
- Art 211 —Hijacking of an Aircraft, a Sea-Going Ship, or a Railway Train;
- Art 220 —Illegal Treatment of Nuclear Materials or Radioactive Substances;
- Art 221 —Stealing or Possession of Nuclear Materials or Radioactive Substances;
- Art 277 —Encroachment on the Life of a Statesman or a Public Figure;
- Art 278 —Forcible Seizure of Power or Forcible Retention of Power;
- Art 279 —Armed Rebellion;
- Art 280 —Public Appeals for the Performance of Extremist Activity;
- Art 282.1 —Establishing an Extremist Community;
- Art 282.2 —Organizing the Activity of an Extremist Community;
- Art 282.3 —Financing Extremist Activity; and
- Art 360 —Assaults on Persons or Institutions Enjoying International Protection.

Most of the nineteen articles of the Russian Federation Criminal Code listed above are multicomponent, due to which they cover a total of 43 component elements of crimes called “crimes of terrorist orientation.” Since this study is largely of a humanitarian and politico-scientific, rather than purely criminological nature, I am limiting my criminal and legal description to what I consider the most significant and perilous crimes for society and the state, particularly since I have every formal reason for taking this methodological approach. For example, in addition to determining the abetting of terrorist activity, Art 205(1) of the Russian Federation Criminal Code also differentiates component elements of crimes relating to terrorist activity, on the one hand, and directly to terrorism, on the other. The latter includes the crimes envisaged in Arts 205 (act of terrorism), 206 (hostage-taking), 208 (organizing an illegal armed formation or participation in it), 211 (hijacking of an aircraft, sea-going ship, or railway train), 277 (encroaching on the life of a statesman or public figure), 279 (armed rebellion), 280 (public appeals for the performance of extremist activity), and 360 (assaults on persons or institutions enjoying international protection). I will concentrate on those crimes listed here that were committed at different times by Armenian terrorists.

All of the above-listed crimes are also incorporated in the same category because the regulations of international law on fighting terrorism recognized by the Russian Federation insist on this. For example, in addition to the Russian Federation Criminal Code, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 15 December, 1997 also insists on the need to punish the perpetration of a terrorist act; the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents of 14 December, 1973 recognizes assaults on persons or institutions enjoying international protection as acts of terrorism; and the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages of 17 December, 1979 qualifies hostage-taking as a type of terrorist activity. With respect to the criminal and legal qualification of all the other types of terrorist crimes, a corresponding correlation can also be found between acts of international law and Russian national legislation. Moreover, some provisions of international law are sources for similar regulations of Russian national legislation: for example, the Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism adopted on 16 May, 2005 by the Council of Europe entailed (after it was ratified by the country’s legislative structures) inclusion of another type of crime to the list of crimes of terrorist orientation defined

as public appeals for the performance of extremist activity. All the indicated facts make it possible to say in all confidence that counteracting the terrorist international is of a *de jure* coordinated international nature, full manifestation of which is only hampered by the desire of the ruling circles of some countries to use it as a tool for implementing their geopolitical strivings, which also fully applies to Armenian terrorism.

The criminal and legal description of a crime usually includes five main aspects of its content—target, object, *actus reus*, subject, and *mens rea*. However, since the target of the crime is a specific feature, which is the same for all crimes of terrorist orientation, and since I mentioned this above, I will not talk about it again. The subject of the crime is the person, or the group of people who commit it; the *mens rea* is the circumstances characterizing the personal attitude of the criminals to the crime they have committed (intention, guilt, motive, and so on); the object is that against which the crime is committed—human life or health, the property of private individuals and organizations, the environment, state interests, official functions and authorities, and so on; and the *actus reus* refers to those actions or non-actions that led to the consequences of the crime. In order for any act to be recognized as a crime of corresponding content, it must include all four features, and if even one of them is absent, the act cannot be considered a crime of this type. If it does not correspond, the crime must be qualified under a different category (for example, encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure could be intentional or unintentional, committed by a single terrorist or a group of persons, and so on; or it might not be a crime of terrorism at all if the politician was murdered by a jealous husband who caught him in bed with his wife). This is why most of the articles of the Russian Federation Criminal Code that determine the punishments for committing crimes of terrorist orientation usually include between two and four component elements, depending on the degree of their public menace. They also have comments, indicating the conditions, which, if fulfilled voluntarily by a person drawn unwittingly into the terrorist activity, will release him from criminal liability. This is all done so that when punishments are designated, the factual circumstances of committing each crime, including a terrorist act, are taken into account as fully as possible and evaluated as objectively as possible.

Despite their large numbers and diversity when defining their subject (or subjects), all of the crimes of terrorism committed by Armenian nationalists during the twentieth century have specific features inherent in them. They were all committed by militants of Armenian national and revolutionary (or extremist) organizations based on the ethnoreligious principle. The personal data or personification of the criminal in this case is not essential for the criminal and legal qualification of the terrorist act committed, since it was committed for political purposes that did not presume, for instance, wealth accumulation for the criminal himself or for the people associated with him, but pursued the goal of obtaining eventual benefits for an indeterminate number of people, commonly called *Armanstvo* in the political and journalistic literature. In other words, when preparing and committing any crime of terrorist orientation, there has always been, is, and will be an ideological (humanitarian, intellectual) underpinning in one form or another—religious, ethnic, corporate, and so on. A terrorist does not commit a crime for his own personal purposes, but for “society,” for “the world,” and in this way he significantly differs from everyday, “ordinary” criminals who commit their atrocities out of selfishness or based on personal animosity.

Any crime of terrorist orientation is always intentional, since its perpetration is always preceded by a fundamental change in the performer’s conscience and worldview, turning him into a person who is willing to underhandedly kill other people for the sake of his dominant idea. The perpetration of a terrorist act is always preceded by a preparatory stage, or to speak in legal parlance, preparations for the perpetration of the crime, during which the weapons for committing it are manufactured or selected (Armenian terrorists first used knives, revolvers,

and other small arms for performing political assassinations, then they began using Czech-made Semtex explosives for committing the acts of terror against the diplomatic representative agencies of the Republic of Turkey in European countries, adding different kinds of damaging elements to the handmade detonators), the site of the terrorist act is inspected, the withdrawal route after the crime has been committed is chosen, and so on. In other words, committing any terrorist act presumes a mandatory preparation period, during which organizational, technical, and tactical tasks are resolved. Thus every terrorist initially recognizes the illegal nature of his actions and their public menace, but prepares for the crime and anticipates the damage to life, health, property, state interests, and so on that will ensue from it. This is precisely why the regulations of Russian legislation and international law call this crime accomplished from the time its preparations begin. In other words, from the viewpoint of criminal law, a terrorist is considered a terrorist from the moment he acquires the components for making a bomb, for instance, and not from the moment he sets it off in some public place.

By the way, the international history of the struggle against Armenian terrorism knows of several examples when the militants of Armenian terrorist organizations were discovered by the intelligence services and disarmed at the preparatory stage due to their amateurishly unskilled treatment of explosives leading to self-detonation. Later in court they wondered why they were being accused, for they had not blown anyone up yet, so were victims of an accident, not terrorists. Such a case occurred on 8 October, 1980 in Geneva when the Swiss police arrested two fighters of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) Suzy Mahseredjian and Alex Yenikomechian, who had manufactured an improvised explosive device in a hotel room. Before their release on 12 January and 9 February, 1981, respectively, ASALA had carried out 18 explosions against “Swiss targets” over a span of four months, using means of terror to force the Swiss Confederation authorities to release their accomplices. As a result, both would-be terrorists were put on probation for 18 months and were deported from the country for 15 years.⁵ In fact, the Swiss authorities made a deal with the terrorists, which not only did not stop or pacify them, but even encouraged them to commit new terrorist attacks, now in other countries of the world.

The object and the *actus reus* of a specific felony correlate with each other as the general and the particular: if the latter corresponds to the general qualifying features of the first, that is how it is recognized. Therefore the object of criminal encroachment envisaged in the disposition of the relevant article of the Russian Federation Criminal Code is described in as much detail as possible. I have already mentioned above that most types of crime of terrorist orientation are multicomponent, which is why their number does not coincide with number of articles of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. At present, Russian criminal law envisages the following components of crimes of terrorist orientation:

- The carrying out of an explosion, arson or other actions intimidating the population, and creating the threat of human death, of infliction of significant property damage or the onset of other grave consequences, for the purpose of influencing the taking of a decision by authorities or international organizations, and also the threat of commission of the said actions for the same purposes (Art 205[1] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- The same actions committed by a group of persons in preliminary collusion or by an organized group which have, by negligence, entailed the death of a person, or which have entailed the causing of considerable property damage or the ensuing of other grave consequences (Art 205[2] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);

⁵ See: A. Corsun, “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile,” *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2065, Washington, D.C., August 1982, p. 34.

- Terrorist acts which have entailed the intentional death of a person (Art 205[3] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- The capture or detention of a hostage committed to compel the State, an organization, or an individual to perform or to abstain from taking any action as a condition for the release of the hostage (Art 206[1] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- The capture of a hostage by a group of persons by previous concert, with the use of violence posing a danger to human life and health, with the use of arms or objects used as arms against an obvious minor, against a woman in a state of pregnancy obvious to the convicted person, against two or more persons, out of mercenary motives or by hire (Art 206[2] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- The capture of a hostage committed by an organized group involving the death of a person by negligence, or any other grave consequences (Art 206[3] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- The capture of a hostage involving the intentional death of the person (Art 206[4] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- The creation of an armed formation (unit, squad, or any other group) that is not envisaged by a federal law, and likewise operating of such a formation, or the financing thereof (Art 208[1] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- Participation in an armed formation that is not provided for by a federal law, as well as participation in an armed formation in the territory of a foreign state that is not provided for by the legislation of the particular state for purposes counteracting the country's interests (Art 208[2] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- Hijacking of an aircraft, a sea-going ship, a railway train, and likewise seizure of such a ship or train in order to hijack it, accompanied by the committing of a terrorist act or other terrorist activity (Art 211[4] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- Encroachment on the life of a statesman or a public figure, committed for the purpose of terminating his government or any other political activity, or out of revenge for such activity (Art 277 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- Organization of an armed rebellion or active participation in it for the purpose of overthrowing or forcibly changing the constitutional system, or of breaching the territorial integrity of the country (Art 279 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- Assault on a representative of a foreign state, or on a staff member of an international organization that enjoys international protection, as well as on official premises or living quarters, or transport vehicles of persons enjoying international protection (Art 360[1] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code);
- Assault on a representative of a foreign state, or on a staff member of an international organization that enjoys international protection, as well as on official premises or living quarters, or transport vehicles of persons enjoying international protection for the purpose of provoking a war or of complicating international relations (Art 360[2] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code).

Thus, current Russian criminal legislation sets forth seventeen “basic” crimes of terrorist orientation that have been considered, are considered, and will be considered such in the future, regardless of the political regime in the country or the geopolitical situation. Committing such felonies is prohibited by the legislation of all civilized countries worldwide without exception. At present, the intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies of most countries of the world hold Armenian national extremists responsible for committing around 300 acts of terror-

ism in more than 20 countries of the world. However, they, just like their ideological opponents from among Turkish and Azerbaijani journalists, increase this number more than 1.5-fold, bringing it up to almost five hundred. This requires interpretation and explanation, and is necessary if we are to understand the real scope of Armenian terrorism throughout its history.

Therefore, I will qualify the crimes of Armenian terrorists known to the world, as well as those felonies they themselves call “acts of terror,” according to the criminological definitions stated above used in Russian criminal law and legal framework. Running ahead, let us say that not all the crimes of Armenian national extremists, which they declare to be “sacred terror,” are in fact acts of terrorism or terrorist attacks, while a considerable number of criminal acts to which a political undertone or context is ascribed (such mystifications are equally inherent in the proponents of Armenian terrorism, as well as their ideological opponents from among Turkish and Azerbaijani authors) in fact had an economic basis. Moreover, a hundred years ago, they were motivated by their desire to hold onto the existing or acquire new material resources and preferences using non-economic means, i.e. violence. And this means that the struggle of Armenian extremists for the “national liberation” of their fellow countrymen throughout the twentieth century was a strictly commercial enterprise, resulting in the enslavement of most representatives of the Armenian ethnicity by a handful of radical politicians and the militants subordinate to them using methods of coercion. This led to the total supremacy of radical elements over the Armenian people replacing the supremacy of the church theocracy of the nineteenth century.

This understanding of the history of Armenian terrorism and all the facts comprising it compels me to thoroughly reexamine the assessments given by representatives of the Armenian ethnicity of the “national liberation” terrorist struggle of their people, as well as the periodization of the history of Armenian terrorism, the author of which is Rouben Torossian, while Eduard Oganessian publicized it in Russian.⁶ Today, this periodization forms the methodological base of most Internet publications on various aspects of the history of the Armenian terrorism in the twentieth century and presumes identifying several waves or periods of increased activity in its mainstream. But when speaking about the periodization of the history of Armenian terrorism offered by Armenian authors, it must be remembered that it reflects in one way or another the position of the side that holds full legal and moral responsibility for the crimes committed and so it seeks, consciously or not, to shift at least some of the responsibility for the crimes committed by their fellow countrymen onto the leadership of other countries and nations, or give them a heroic or romantic hue. What is more, it must be clearly understood that this periodization of the history of Armenian terrorism offered by Armenian authors (and unthinkingly accepted by their opponents) reflects the viewpoint of only that part of the Armenian intelligentsia that is intellectually, ideologically, or financially associated with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun, since the periodization of the history of Armenian terrorism is also in fact a structured chronology of the activity of this party and therefore serves to glorify and promulgate it. Consequently, this periodization offered by Rouben Torossian and Eduard Oganessian has not only taken the brunt of the self-censorship of these authors, but also of the external censorship of the financial and political oligarchy of the Armenian Diaspora and functionaries of Dashnaksutiun. And it was created to hide from the broad public the scandalous and memorable crimes related to the economic confrontation between the party and financial groups within the Armenian Diaspora behind the shocking presentation of the crimes of Armenian terrorists. Therefore many economic crimes were presented as political, although

⁶ See: R.M. Torossian, *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement*, United States International University, San Diego, 1980, pp. 10-11; E. Oganessian, *Vek borby: ocherk 100-letnei istorii dashnaksnoi partii i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoi borby armianskogo naroda*, in 2 vols., Vol. 1, Phoenix, Moscow, Munich, 1991, pp. 13-15.

extortion and racket have very little in common with a “national freedom fight” and are directed, on the contrary, toward the nation’s economic and political enslavement.

The historico-criminological approach I have chosen provides a splendid methodological basis for studying all of the crimes of both political and ordinary criminal nature known to be committed by Armenian national extremists. This historical retrospective view of the political actions and sources for financing ARF Dashnaksutiun allows me to answer the main question: what in fact is this organization—an ethnocriminal community living on extortion and robbery, or a corporation of fighters for an idea who were little interested in mercantile problems. But before drawing such an insightful conclusion, I will try to find the answer to an easier question: were all the crimes committed by the militants of Armenian extremist organizations under the slogan of “national terror” actually crimes of terrorist orientation and, if not, how reliable is the periodization of the history of Armenian terrorism used in the mass media nowadays (especially in the electronic networks of information resources claiming the status of open electronic libraries)? This is also necessary to ensure that certain types of known crimes are not classified as terrorist attacks, thus making the criminal and legal qualification carried out in this book fallible. In order to avoid accusations of being biased and prejudiced, I will only analyze those crimes that Armenian researchers and Armenian information resources chalk up to their militant Fedayis.

However, before beginning this analysis, I must make one more comment that realigns the vector of my study. In order for my conclusions to be as correct as possible and appropriate for the historical context of the events being examined, I must correlate the subject matter of the legal definitions of the objects of crimes of terrorist orientation among themselves by taking them from current reality and inserting them in the events of a century ago. In other words, the contemporary qualifying signs of the object of each crime of terrorist orientation must be shifted to the reality of the beginning of the last century or to later chronological periods to allow readers to understand what meaning the definitions used today might have had back then. For some objects, the subject content has essentially not changed (this can be seen, for example, in the criminal and legal qualification of terrorist attacks against diplomats or institutions enjoying international protection), but in many cases the content of particular legal concepts has significantly changed over the past decades, as happened, say, with the understanding of who precisely should be considered a statesman or public figure for an attempt on his life to be considered a crime of terrorist orientation. This will provide a clear understanding of what specifically should be considered a crime of Armenian terrorism in historical retrospect.

I will immediately specify that Armenian national extremists were unable to carry out certain illegal acts classified by contemporary Russian criminal legislation as crimes of terrorist orientation for objective reasons. The main one was that throughout their history the Armenians have never composed the ethnic majority anywhere in the world, apart from the present-day Republic of Armenia, and even then they acquired it after more than a million non-Armenian indigenous residents of this country were forced to leave their places of traditional residence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early nineties. This made it objectively impossible for Armenian political extremists to organize and carry out in the historical retrospect such crimes of terrorist orientation as armed rebellion, which is punishable under Art 279 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. The thing is that according to the disposition of this article of criminal law, criminal action in the form of organizing an armed rebellion or active participation in it can only be carried out by military personnel as members of lawful armed groups refusing to observe the law and intending to carry out violent acts aimed at changing the constitutional system of the Russian Federation or its territorial integrity. Armenian terrorists and extremists have never been members of monoethnic government army units, as was the case in both the Russian and the Ottoman Empire, opposed to the authorities of their

country. Therefore this criminal and legal regulation could have never directly applied to them before, since there was no real material basis for the commission of such a crime.

But this does not mean that they have never been abettors in committing such crimes, playing the role of instigators or even contractors. The most striking example of the complicity of Armenian terrorists in armed rebellion was participation in the fighting on 25-26 February, 1992 during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in and around the Azerbaijani city of Khojali, along with militants from the Arabo, Aramo and Patriotic Contingent armed formations of military personnel, of the 366th guards motorized rifle regiment of the 23rd guards motorized rifle division of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, which later provoked the crimes qualified as genocide in this city against the peaceful Muslim population—mainly ethnic Azerbaijanis and Meskhetian Turks. The actions of the personnel of the military unit (but not the Armenian militants allied with them) produced a *corpus delicti* in the form of armed rebellion, since it was directed against the law and violated the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, although no judicial investigation was carried out at the time. To conceal this crime, in the first days of March 1992, the command of the CIS Joint Armed Force disbanded this regiment, and its officers, ensigns, and soldiers were dismissed from military service or transferred to other units—some in Russia and some in Armenia.

But to be honest, it was *de jure* impossible for a whole number of reasons to bring some of the senior officers of the divisions of the 366th guards motorized rifle regiment to account in compliance with current statutes of the Russian Federation Criminal Code in the specific legal conditions of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This is primarily explained by the fact that the regiment was not part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at that time and was not in the territory of the country and therefore was not a Russian military formation in February 1992. Therefore, it was the duty of the authorities or the law-enforcement agencies of the present-day Azerbaijan Republic in the territory of which this crime was committed to open a criminal case under the article of criminal law envisaging punishment for armed rebellion. But in the conditions of war, they did not do this because this crime entailed even worse felonious atrocities when 613 civilians, most of them with particular cruelty, were killed by Armenian terrorists in one night in and around Khojali. Since 2007, the official authorities, law-enforcement agencies, and public of Azerbaijan have been demanding that the international community recognize the mass murders of the population of Khojali as the crime of genocide, thus losing sight of the fact that this act was either preceded or accompanied by an armed rebellion of the military personnel of the 366th guards motorized rifle regiment of the 23rd guards motorized rifle division of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. So we see that killing the people of Khojali, a crime much crueler and heinous in the eyes of the public, which was qualified as genocide, obscured a crime of terrorist orientation in the form of armed rebellion. Thus, by striving for justice in a matter that was of political significance for their country, the law-enforcement agencies of the Azerbaijan Republic ignored a crime they considered to be of lesser significance. As a result, this crime was not investigated or solved.

It is impossible to say reliably today from a formal and legal viewpoint what role the Armenian terrorists from the separatist armed formations that called themselves the Artsakh Defense Army played in the preparation and commission of this crime, since no investigation regarding this armed rebellion was carried out and the actions of the military personnel of the 366th guards motorized rifle regiment of the CIS Joint Armed Forces were not officially qualified. Therefore, for the Russian and Azerbaijani systems of justice, it remains a latent, that is, unregistered crime that was not investigated. However, to be fair, it should be noted that the law-enforcement agencies of Azerbaijan issued an international warrant through the National Interpol Office of the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs for the arrest of 28 ring-leaders and the most active participants of the armed rebellion, but demanded their extradition

for the crime of genocide in the city of Khojali and not for organizing the armed rebellion. Since the Khojali massacre during the night of 25-26 February, 1992 has still not gained international recognition as a crime of genocide, these people are only wanted on paper. However, if they had been wanted for armed rebellion, the results of the international criminal investigation might have been very different. The armed rebellion by military personnel of the 366th guards motorized rifle regiment is a classical example of how the unprofessional actions of the law-enforcement agencies played their part in qualifying, for some unknown reason, a crime of terrorist orientation as an additional *corpus delicti* against humanity, thus permitting the criminals to escape responsibility.

Another type of crime of terrorist orientation that Armenian political extremists were not known for throughout the entire twentieth century is hijacking air, sea-going, or rail transport, or seizing such transport for the purpose of hijacking accompanied by the committing of a terrorist act or other terrorist activity, criminal liability for which is set forth in Art 211(4) of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. I think the main reason for this is that practically all the crimes of Armenian terrorists were characterized by a low level of operative-tactical and operative-technical preparation, as experts and analysts always noted regarding this issue. Committing the kind of crime mentioned above objectively requires that the criminal has special professional knowledge and skills in managing and operating the necessary technical means, which Armenian terrorists never had. I have written above that very often Armenian extremists had not the technical knowledge to put together and then activate some rudimentary handmade explosive device. So it comes as no surprise that hijacking an aircraft or ship was nothing short of a pipedream for them. Moreover, Arab—Lebanese, Palestinian, and Yemen—terrorists specialized in crimes against aircraft and sea-going transport in the last quarter of the twentieth century, so it is very likely that their Armenian colleagues did not wish to compromise themselves, particularly since their easier-to-commit crimes were just as resounding. They were very successful at committing all other kinds of crimes of terrorist orientation, from terrorist acts and hostage-taking to creating illegal armed formations, encroaching on the lives of statesmen and public figures, and attacking diplomats and institutions enjoying international protection.

Transnational Armenian terrorism excelled in committing the most diverse forms of terrorist acts. Art 205 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code envisages liability for this kind of criminal act, defining a terrorist act as “the carrying out of an explosion, arson or other actions intimidating the population, and creating the threat of human death, of infliction of significant property damage or the onset of other grave consequences, for the purpose of influencing the taking of a decision by authorities or international organizations, and also the threat of commission of the said actions for the same purposes.” In terms of its performance and consequences, a terrorist act is often very similar to another type of crime—deliberate destruction or damage of property, the criminal liability for which is envisaged in Art 167 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. The main difference between these two types of crime lies in the goal, for the sake of which the criminal carries out his actions, i.e. in the object of criminal encroachment. Deliberate destruction or damage of property pursues the goal of causing direct material damage to another physical or legal person, while the object of criminal encroachment of a terrorist act is public security. In other words, the first type of crime threatens private legal relations, while the second is of a public legal nature and affects the interests of society as a whole, so is of greater public danger.

Twentieth-century history knows of several hundreds of examples of terrorist acts committed by the militants of different Armenian extremist organizations and terrorist groups that are different in terms of their execution technique, ranging from setting off handmade bombs to firing at buildings from hand-held grenade launchers. However, to be scrupulously precise, firing from grenade launchers creates the very same explosion as a banal terrorist bomb only it

delivers the explosive charge to the target in a more technically sophisticated way. Organizing explosions by different ways and means was transnational Armenian terrorism's claim to fame throughout the past century.

Christopher Mikaelian, one of the three cofounders of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun, was the initiator of the Armenian terrorist bombing organized on 21 July, 1905 against Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II in the Yıldız mosque in Istanbul where the monarch went every Friday to perform the prayer mandatory for all Muslims (according to one version, a bomb planted in one of the cars went off, while another had it that the carriage of the sultan himself was blown up). The last officially confirmed act of terrorist bombing committed on the instructions of Armenian national terrorists was the explosion on 3 July, 1994 in the Baku subway, when a handmade explosive went off in the carriage of an electric train on the stretch between the Ganjlik and 28 May stations (this terrorist act was carried out by former captain of the Azerbaijani army Azer Aslanov, who was captured during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh and persuaded by the Armenian intelligence services to cooperate with them and commit crimes against his own country).

In the nine decades that have passed between these events, Armenian extremists have blown up offices, churches, airports, buses, and cars, while more than a thousand people in different countries of the world have fallen victim to their violence (although to be fair it should be noted that they carried out most of the acts of terrorist bombing for propagandistic or demonstrative purposes, so they did not entail mass human victims, while the few victims were often accidental). Nevertheless, for nine decades, Armenian terrorist bombing was the greatest threat to the state security of the Republic of Turkey and also had an indisputable impact on the security of most of the world's leading countries, from Australia to Canada and from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. Moreover, running ahead, I will say that the terrorist activity of Transnational Armenian extremist groups was the reason the U.N. adopted several international legal acts at once aimed at suppressing terrorism. They primarily include the Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence in Airports Servicing Civil Aviation that supplements the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24 February, 1988 (drawing up this act of international law was prompted by the terrorist act committed on 15 July, 1983 by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia at Orly airport close to Paris that took eight lives and injured another 55).

The second type of crime equivalent in public threat to crimes of terrorist orientation is hostage-taking, the criminal liability for which is envisaged by Art 206 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. The main qualifying feature that distinguishes this criminal act from crimes relating to abduction (Art 126 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code) and illegal deprivation of liberty (Art 127 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code), which are outwardly similar in form but qualitatively different in content, is that hostage-taking is "committed to compel the State, an organization, or an individual to perform or to abstain from taking any action as a condition for the release of the hostage." In other words, the main object of criminal encroachment in this case is not individuals (they are the secondary object), but public security, state interests, and other spheres of legal regulation relating to an indeterminate number of people. Any hostage-taking is accompanied by the use of violence (usually armed), however it is qualified as crime of terrorist orientation not from the moment the person is abducted, but from the moment the criminal makes his demands of a state, organization, or individual. The circumstances described above show the *actus reus* of this type of crime of terrorist orientation. The subject of this type of crime is a person or group of people; this criminal act is always deliberate; and the criminal always recognizes the unlawfulness of his actions and wishes for the result he is striving for. Therefore all of the listed features make it possible to interpret it as an especially grave crime of excessive public danger.

As the analysis of crimes committed in the twentieth century by Armenian terrorists shows, they were incapable of active hostage-taking. Arab—Palestinian and Lebanese—terrorists specialized in committing this type of crime of terrorist orientation during the last century, while their Armenian brothers-in-crime specialized more in committing “classical” terrorist acts. However, one of the first scandalous crimes by Armenian national terrorists that made the whole world know of their existence was the hostage-taking at the Ottoman Bank (formerly Imperial Ottoman Bank) on 26-27 August, 1896, carried out by fighters of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiu under the supervision of Papken Siuni and Karekin Pastermadjian (aka Armen Garo). A group of 28 people took the bank by storm, holding 100 of its employees and customers hostage for 14 hours. During the operation, a captain and lieutenant of the Ottoman police force and two terrorists were killed, while criminals in the safekeeping of the French and Russian consuls to Istanbul were taken on a French military ship to Marseilles.

Armenian sources say this terrorist act was a gesture of desperation on the part of the Ottoman Armenians called on to draw the attention of the leaders of the European countries to their repressed plight under the power of the Turks. However, in his historical novel *Ottoman Bank* (translated into Russian as *Zakhvat banka “Ottoman”* [Seizure of Ottoman Bank]),⁷ Armenian writer Alexander Topchian gives this crime a different, not political, but strictly criminal and mercantile subtext. According to him, a certain Swiss thief and safe-cracker was a member of Pastermadjian’s group of Armenian militants. This Swiss safe-cracker had made the acquaintance of anarchists in prison, who put him in touch with Dashnaktsutiu and then beguiled Pastermadjian into attacking the bank. While the Armenian nationalists were making heart-rending appeals to the people and governments of Europe to protect their people from the repression of the Ottomans, this safe-cracker was to break into the safe and steal a large blue diamond belonging to Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid II for the Swiss bankers.

Based on the historico-criminological approach I have chosen for my research, I cannot either deny or agree with this statement by Alexander Topchian, particularly since it was expressed in a literary work, the genre of which permits the author much room for maneuver. Even if he is right and the hostage-taking in the bank was only an operation to cover up for the daring robbery of this bank’s depository and absconding with Sultan Abdul-Hamid II’s diamond, this does not exclude the fact that hostages were taken and political demands made, making this an obvious crime of terrorist orientation. If Alexander Topchian is right in his literary considerations and the hostage-taking really was a cover for stealing Abdul-Hamid II’s precious stone, the incident in the Ottoman Bank on 26-27 August, 1896 was, in keeping with the current regulations of Russian criminal legislation, a multicomponent crime including hostage-taking (Art 206 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code), murder (Art 105 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code), encroachment on the life of an officer of a law-enforcement agency (Art 317 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code), and theft (Art 158 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code).

However, I cannot deny myself the satisfaction of expressing my opinion about Alexander Topchian’s opinion on the real reason for taking hostages in the Ottoman Bank, once more proceeding from the historico-criminological approach I have chosen. After 1896, Armenian national extremists never again used this kind of terrorist activity (hostage-taking) to reach their propagandistic and political goals (at least there are no official data about this). I think that this is indirect proof that there was indeed an attempt to steal Sultan Abdul-Hamid II’s diamond while Pastermadjian’s comrades were appealing to European public opinion. So, afraid of becoming a blind tool in someone else’s hands, they never attacked a bank again in this way, al-

⁷ See: A. Topchian, *Zakhvat banka ‘Ottoman’: istoricheskiy roman*, Unipress, Moscow, 2012.

though they subsequently took hostages on several occasions (for example, on 24 September, 1981, ASALA fighters seized the consulate of the Republic of Turkey in Paris by storm, where they took 51 people hostage and held them for 15 hours, whereby one of the hostages was killed). However, I wish to emphasize that I may be mistaken, particularly since I took the subject of Alexander Topchian's fiction novel as the basis, certain elements of which could have been invented.

Having placed the dots on the "i"s with respect to qualifying crimes of terrorist orientation related to hostage-taking, I will now go on to a criminal and legal qualification of unlawful acts, the criminal liability for which is envisaged in Art 208 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, which sets forth punishment for organizing an illegal armed formation or participation in it. In keeping with the ideas of Russian criminological science, any illegal armed formation differs qualitatively from other types of criminal associations—organized crime groups and organized crime communities—in its multicomponent elements, which include armament, stability, hierarchy, and professionalism.

In contrast to other criminal associations, in which firearms are usually the common property of the group, in an illegal armed formation, each of its participants has his own weapon, or a weapon registered in his name, that corresponds to his rank in the structure of the illegal armed formation, professional training, and function. This kind of formation is created with the prospect of functioning for an extensive time with essentially the same members for the purpose of inflicting the maximum damage on the public security of the eventual adversary and not on the economic interests of third parties, as is the case with other stable criminal groups. In terms of structure and hierarchy, illegal armed formations copy the organizational and personnel structure of armed forces units or intelligence services, which is determined by the tactical and technical specifications of the weapons, techniques, and a command, control and communications system, as well as by methods of supply and deployment. The distinguishing features of hierarchy are as follows: a stable internal structure, a command system, subordination, distribution of roles (functional duties), specific ways of communicating, and general action plans that are mandatory for all. The professionalism of the militants of an illegal armed formation is characterized by their excellent weapons knowhow, physical, firing, and tactical proficiency, and on-duty discipline. Any illegal armed formation is essentially a replication of an armed forces unit, the only difference being that it does not serve the state or protect its interests, but opposes it and strives to impair public security, in so doing infringing on citizens' legal rights.

There have only been two illegal armed formations in the history of transnational Armenian terrorism, one of which still exists. The first is the police force that arose as a self-defense force in the Armenian districts of Beirut and other cities of Lebanon during the civil war in this country (1974-1990) as a compulsory measure to consolidate the male population aimed at protecting lives and property (it was this police force that supplied fighters for the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia). And the second is the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army in the form of an occupational corps in the territory seized by Armenia during the years of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 1988-1994, integrated today into the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia.

Other formations of Armenian nationalists that existed in history during World War I (1914-1918) and immediately following it should be considered legal armed formations, although contemporary Azeri and Turkish researchers have an essentially different viewpoint on this. For example, the Armenian (Eastern, Cilicia) four-battalion legion that fought in 1916-1921 against the Ottoman and then Turkish troops in Western Asia was organizationally part of the armed forces of the French Republic and subordinate to the command of the French expedition corps in the Middle East. It was supplied in keeping with the regulations of the

armed forces of the Entente countries, and its military personnel were given the status of combatants in compliance with the regulation of international humanitarian law and warfare customs. The same can also be said of the military personnel of the four Armenian voluntary squads (first one-battalion and then two-battalion units) formed in December 1914 by the Armenian committee in Tiflis and fighting on the Caucasian front in the ranks of the Russian Imperial (and then Russian) Army right up until 5(18) December, 1917, when the Armistice of Erzincan was signed that signaled Russia's withdrawal from this theater of war. The fact that the personnel of these formations committed crimes against the peaceful Turkish population during the war in Eastern Turkey occupied by Russian troops and organized the mass extermination of Azeris in Baku and throughout the territory of present-day Azerbaijan in 1918 does not deny the legitimacy of their origin. I totally agree with the fact that the activity of the Armenian voluntary formations in both the Russian and French armies in occupied Turkish territory and in the territory of Azerbaijan was criminal, but this does not mean that these formations themselves were illegal.

The fact that transnational Armenian terrorism served a particular state in wartime is a characteristic that qualitatively distinguishes it from other similar nationally oriented and variegated types of terrorist activity, such as that carried out by Irish, Basque, or even North Caucasian terrorists. This legalizes its status to a certain extent from time to time and this, in turn, makes it impossible to investigate it in keeping with the generally accepted regulations of international law. This was how it was during World War I, and this is how it was during World War II when the Armenian legion was formed within the Nazi Wehrmacht (notorious Drastamat Kanaian, General Dro, first a terrorist, then minister of war of the Dashnak Republic of Armenia, took active and direct part in forming it). This was a legal armed formation according to the legislation of the Third Reich, as it was during the civil war in Lebanon and as it was during the Karabakh war of 1988-1994 when Armenian terrorist groups (*humb*) were the driving force behind the first stage of this armed conflict. At present, "the illegal armed formation of Armenian separatists" (official U.N. formulation) of Nagorno-Karabakh, called the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army, has been partially integrated into the structure of Armenia's armed forces, which allows it to acquire all manner of provisions and material and technical supplies, while freely presenting itself as a threat to the peace and stability of the South Caucasian region.

To sum up the above, it should be noted that further in this study, I will concentrate only on the participation of national extremists from the Astvatsatsin, Aydat, Tigran Metz, White Crusaders, and several other combat groups in the unleashing and subsequent escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since it is the first regional war in most recent human history waged using terrorist means and methods. Here I will add that I am not interested in the content of the combat action or punitive operations against the peaceful population, but only in the fact that these illegal armed formations existed in the theater of war. According to Art 208 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, the *corpus delicti* of this crime does not envisage participation in combat or other actions within an illegal armed formation (depending on the type and content of the act, this envisages a different *corpus delicti*), but participation in an armed formation that is not provided for by a federal law. Therefore, I will not go on to analyze the felonies of Armenian terrorists from the illegal armed formations listed above, since most of them will not be crimes of terrorist orientation. It will be enough to show that everything these militarized formations did or are doing today is unlawful from the viewpoint of Russian criminal law envisaged in the *corpus delicti* set forth in Art 208 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. This is enough to understand the gist and nature of the current state of transnational Armenian terrorism.

Encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure is the next type of crime of terrorist orientation I must examine from the viewpoint of criminal and legal qualification of

crimes repeatedly committed by Armenian terrorists throughout the twentieth century. According to Art 277 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, which envisages criminal liability for encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure committed for the purpose of ending his state or other political activity or to avenge such activity, the crime only entails premeditated murder or attempted murder of a statesman or public figure. This *corpus delicti* does not envisage any other purpose for committing unlawful acts toward such a person (beating, bodily harm without intention to kill, violent actions with the aim of public humiliation, and so on).

Statesmen are the leaders of state federal and Russian regional structures and other state officials who actively promulgate state policy in their activity. Statesmen are also Federation Council members, Russian Federation State Duma deputies, and, during election campaigns, officially registered candidates for election to government agencies and their authorized persons. They essentially include all federal and regional officials holding category “A” and “B” government service posts in keeping with the federal laws On the State Service System in the Russian Federation No. 58-FZ of 25 May, 2003 (in the version of 26 February, 2013)⁸ and On the State Civil Service in the Russian Federation No. 79-FZ of 27 July, 2004.⁹

Public figures are people holding elected offices in political parties and public and religious federal and regional associations who are not deputies of legislative or representative power structures, but due to their status have an influence on the political and public life in the country or region. In this respect, particular attention should be paid to the fact that the following government representatives are not included in the category of statesmen and public figures: officials of the law-enforcement agencies and intelligence services, judges and court employees, category “B” civil servants, municipal deputies, and white-collar workers. Unlawful obstruction of their activity or encroachment on their lives is qualified under different articles of the federal criminal law (for example, Arts 294, 295, 317, 318 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code) as it is not considered to be a crime of terrorist orientation.

If we examine the question of who is a statesman or public figure in the historical retrospect in terms of the reality of the Russian or Ottoman Empire, the specific features of the feudal social structure prevalent in these two countries at the beginning of the twentieth century must be taken into account in order to reliably claim that encroachment on the life of this person was a terrorist act, and not an act of hooliganism or simply murder for revenge. I believe that the main criterion determining whether an official in the social or power hierarchy has achieved the status of statesman or public figure is the procedure for appointing this person to his post or any other formal institutionalization of his status. It should not be forgotten that in a feudal society, the social and official status of an individual was always confirmed by a document his owner possessed that verified the acquisition of this status. In the Russian Empire, the appointment of a person to a high government post or his authorization in an elected office allowing him (inserting his newly acquired office in current reality) to be and be recognized as a statesman or public figure was always accompanied by an inscribed imperial rescript (in the tradition of the Ottoman Empire such a document was called a *buyuruldu*). Ministers, deputy ministers, estate owners, general governors, governors, vicegerents, and appointed atamans of the Cossack troops received inscribed imperial rescripts upon their appointment to a post in Russia, while governors, district marshals of the nobility, university directors, and the hierarchs

⁸ “On the State Service System in the Russian Federation: Federal Law No. 58-FZ of 25 May, 2003,” in: *Collection of Russian Federation Legislation*, 2003, No. 22, Art 2063; 2007, No. 49, Art 6070; 2011, No. 1, Art 31; No. 50, Art 7337; 2013, No. 27, Art 3477.

⁹ “On the State Civil Service in the Russian Federation: Federal Law No. 79-FZ of 27 July, 2004,” in: *Collection of Russian Federation Legislation*, 2003, No. 31, Art 3215; 2011, No. 50, Art 7337; 2013, No. 27, Art 3477; 2014, No. 14, Art 1545.

of most confessions (apart from Judaists, Buddhists, and pagans)—Orthodox metropolitans, archbishops and bishops, Catholic and Lutheran archbishops and bishops, Armenian Catholicos and bishops, Muslim muftis and sheiks—received authorization for elected offices. I am basing my determination and separation of the crimes of Armenian extremists at the beginning of the twentieth century against representatives of the authorities of the Ottoman and Russian empires precisely on this feature, which forces me to thoroughly reexamine the content, chronology, and periodization of the “national liberation struggle of the Armenian people” created by Armenian propagandists.

I will use specific examples to explain my point of view. At the end of February 1905, leaflets were distributed all over Baku in the name of the “Armenian committee,” which said that “the committee had sentenced Baku governor Prince Nakashidze and members of the Baku police—chief of police captain Deminskiy, police officer captain Mamedbekov, Assistant the police officer Sultanov and district supervisors prince Mikeladze and Shakhtakhtinskiy—to death” (at least, this was how this event was reported by the official newspaper *Kavkaz* on 29 March, 1905 [No. 83]). The newspaper wrote about this a month after the fact because prior to the first murder of the person named in this proscription list, no one believed in the reality of the threat, even after an attempt was made on the life of captain Mamedbek Mamedbekov, chief of the district police department, by six fighters of the Armenian Hunchak Party armed with revolvers, which he managed to beat off due to his composure, endurance and professionalism. At the time, two of the attackers and another four were seized after being pursued from the scene of the crime. However four days later, on 16 March, 1905, another group of Armenian militants gunned down prince Mikeladze, a district police officer, along with city inspector Eremushkin, as they were riding in a horse cab. Two weeks after this crime, Baku Civilian Governor and Privy Councillor Prince Nakashidze, along with his footman and two Azeri passersby, were killed by a handmade bomb thrown by Drastamat Kanaian, later defense minister of the Dashnak Republic of Armenia and commander of the Armenian legion in the Wehrmacht; the coachman survived but was seriously injured.¹⁰ In his book Eduard Oganessian wrote that Mamedbekov and Shakhtakhtinskiy also became targets of the “vengeance of the Armenian people” (the author wrote the latter’s name in the Russian fashion as “Shakhtakhtinov”),¹¹ but a search through the archives of the Baku police department did not yield any documentary evidence of his words: both of these police officers served until the end of 1917.

Proceeding from the legal definitions and interpretations of crimes of terrorist orientation customary today in the Russian Federation, I will try to decipher which of the crimes listed above can be qualified as terrorist attacks, and which not. It stands to reason that murder of the Baku Civilian Governor Privy Councillor Prince Nakashidze by means of a handmade bomb, which also killed three other people, was a terrorist act in all of its qualifying features. But the attempt on the lives of police officers and even their murder cannot be qualified as a terrorist attack based on the reality of current Russian criminal legislation, since these felonies comprise a different *corpus delicti*—encroachment on the life of a law-enforcement official, serviceman, as well as members of their family in order to obstruct their legal activity in protecting public order and ensuring public security or to avenge such activity. Each of these crimes is multicomponent and often accompanied by a whole series of other felonies (for example, illicit circulation of weapons), so is not of less, but could be of even greater public danger. However, this

¹⁰ For more details, see: O. Kuznetsov, “Armianskiy natsionalno-religiozny ekstremizm v Rossiiskoi imperii v nachale XX veka (po materialam periodicheskoi pechati Kavkaza),” *IRS Nasledie*, International Azerbaijani journal, 2014, No. 4 (70), pp. 52-58; No. 5 (71), pp. 48-54.

¹¹ See: E. Oganessian, op. cit., pp. 86, 156.

study is devoted to examining the terrorism of Armenian extremists exclusively, so I will not linger on crimes they committed against law-enforcement officers or servicemen engaged in keeping public order.

Qualifying crimes related to encroachments on the lives of public officials, which also took place in the history of Armenian terrorism, is an equally hard nut to crack in my research. In his book *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism*, Erich Feigl says that American professor Stanford J. Shaw, the author of a two-volume study called *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, who denies the thesis of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 in his academic works, was obstructed by the Armenian Diaspora in the U.S., which culminated in an explosion in his own home.¹² The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation came to the conclusion that this crime entailed the threat of violence and premeditated destruction of property and not encroachment on the life of a public figure, since Professor Shaw was not the leader of either a public or a religious organization. Despite feeling some internal unease, I must agree with the criminal and legal qualification of this felony, since indeed not every academic is a public figure, although his work is capable of having an influence on public opinion.

However, not all of our colleagues, particularly from among Azeri and Turkish authors, share this viewpoint, and when disputing in an attempt to accuse Armenian extremists of committing another terrorist act, often call general crimes this for absolutely no reason, which is not in keeping with the rules and concepts of legal science. In particular, when talking about the use by officials of the Armenian political parties Dashnaksutun and Hunchak living in the U.S. at the beginning of the twentieth century of means and methods of terror against their fellow countrymen who did not wish to finance the activity of terrorists and their extortion of money from them for this purpose, the author of the *Crimes of the Armenian Terrorist and Gangster Formations against Mankind (the 19th-20th Centuries): Short Chronological Encyclopedia* presents the murder on 22 July, 1907 on Union Square in New York of wealthy carpet merchant Khakim Tavshanjian as an example of this type of crime, referring to a publication in *The New York Times*. His murderer, Bedros Ambartsumian, who was detained at the scene of the crime, said during the investigation that by killing Tavshanjian, he had saved his country, since the murdered man had not wanted to give money for the country's liberation. It later transpired that many wealthy Armenians in the city had been threatened with death if they did not donate \$10,000 each to overthrowing the Turkish authorities in districts with an Armenian population.¹³ Despite the fact that due to his wealth Tavshanjian played an important role in the life of the Armenian Diaspora in New York, he was not its elected public or religious leader, and so he clearly did not fall into the category of a public figure. Therefore, in keeping with the current regulations of Russian criminal legislation, his murder cannot be examined in compliance with Art 277 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code as encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure and be a crime of terrorist orientation, but must be qualified in compliance with point "h," "murder committed out of mercenary motives by hire, or attended by robbery with violence, racketeering, or banditry," or "k," "committed by reason of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or by reason of hatred or enmity with respect to some social group" of Art 105(2) of the Russian Federation Criminal Code. In any case, this murder did not have any predominant political implication and was related to the desire to get rich at someone else's expense concealed behind political slogans.

¹² See: E. Feigl, *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, Zeitgeschichte, Salzburg; Freilassing, 1986, p. 121.

¹³ See: R. Mustafaev, *Crimes of the Armenian Terrorist and Gangster Formations against Mankind (the 19th-20th Centuries): Short Chronological Encyclopedia*, Elm, Baku, 2009, p. 19.

By the way, I should note that when talking about the expropriation of money by Armenian extremists from their coreligionists for their terrorist activity, not all the Armenian authors put an equals sign between extortion and terrorism. For example, when talking about how Dashnak Ambartsum Ovnatov murdered merchant N. Shakhnazarov on 22 June, 1906 in the town of Armavir of the Don Host Oblast for refusing to give 10,000 rubles for the needs of the local branch of ARF Dashnaksutiun, L. Karapetian, in his article “From the History of Armenian Political Parties in Kuban at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century,” directly calls this crime murder accompanied by extortion, without giving it a pretentious description.¹⁴ This fact, like no other, shows that those Armenian researchers who genuinely love their people and are not committed to the ideology of Armenian national extremism supported in Russia from abroad (from the Republic of Armenia and the information centers of the transnational Armenian Diaspora) write very objectively, adequately, and honestly about the felonies of their coreligionists and fellow countrymen, valuing scientific objectivity higher than nationalist ideological speculation, which gives hope that an authentic perception of historical reality can be formed among the intellectual part of Arмянство.

Qualifying the murders of Armenian clergy committed in different years by Armenian national extremists is an equally difficult task. For example, on 15 October, 1895, fighters from the Armenian Hunchak Party publicly executed Armenian monk Passikh, who refused to cooperate with this organization, in the Armenian village of Sogujak in the Erzurum vilayet of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ On 24 December, 1933, archbishop Levon (Gevond) Turian, elected as primate of the Eastern Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church in New York, was murdered in the Armenian Apostolic Church of the Holy Cross during the Christmas service. This murder, which was carried out with meat knives, was reminiscent of a ritual pagan sacrifice. And archbishop Turian was murdered because, when he arrived to perform the prayer service during the celebration of Armenian Day at the World’s Fair in Chicago on 1 July, 1933, he ordered for the flag of the Dashnak Republic of Armenia of 1918-1920 to be removed from the stage since he did not want to arouse the discontent of representatives of the Soviet Union and Armenian S.S.R. authorities in attendance.¹⁶ At first glance, both of these crimes are similar—in each of them the victim is a member of the Armenian clergy, murdered publicly to avenge his moral position. However, there is a significant difference between the victims of these two crimes. Despite the fact they both observed celibacy and performed church services, the first was not an elected hierarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church, while the second was. This is precisely why Passikh’s murder by Hunchak fighters in 1895 should be qualified today in keeping with point “k” of Art 105(2) of the Russian Federation Criminal Code as a murder committed by reason of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or by reason of hatred or enmity with respect to some social group, while the murder of archbishop Levon Turian in 1933 by Dashnaksutiun fighters as committed to avenge his political and public activity.

Encroaching on a member of a foreign state or employee of an international organization enjoying international protection, as well as on the official or residential buildings or transportation vehicles of persons enjoying international protection, is the last type of the criminally punishable felonies that the Russian Federation Criminal Code groups together in terms of specific features with crimes of terrorist orientation. In keeping with the disposition of Art 360 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, which envisages criminal liability for this kind of felony, the personal immunity, health, honor, and dignity of people possessing the immunity

¹⁴ See: L. Karapetian, “Iz istorii arмянских politicheskikh partii na Kubani v nachale XX veka,” *Arмяne Severnogo Kavkaza: Collected Articles*, Center for Pontus-Caucasian Studies, Krasnodar, 1995, p. 89.

¹⁵ See: R. Mustafaev, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁶ See: *The New York Times*, 10 April, 1935.

envisaged by the regulations of international law are the objects of the crime, as well as the property of diplomatic institutions and international organizations equivalent to them, the status of which is generally recognized and enforced in acts of international law. This kind of criminal and legal regulation is aimed at protecting the person or institution enjoying international protection from different kinds of extremist groups using means of terror to achieve their goal. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in 1973 is the legal source of the corresponding regulations of Russian criminal law. This convention defines and postulates the term “internationally protected persons.” According to the provisions of this Convention, this applies to:

- (a) A Head of State, including any member of a collegial body performing the functions of a Head of State under the constitution of the State concerned, a Head of Government or a Minister for Foreign Affairs, whenever any such person is in a foreign State, as well as members of his family who accompany him;
- (b) Any representative or official of a State or any official or other agent of an international organization of an intergovernmental character who, at the time when and in the place where a crime against him, his official premises, his private accommodation or his means of transport is committed, is entitled pursuant to international law to special protection from any attack on his person, freedom or dignity, as well as members of his family forming part of his household.

Not only are employees of diplomatic, consular, and foreign trade services categorized as internationally protected persons and institutions, but also these services themselves and their property in the foreign states. Criminal law is also called upon to protect different kinds of public organizations and their representatives who also enjoy international protection (this refers, for example, to corresponding representatives of different kinds of international organizations—the U.N., UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF, IAEA, and so on—and international charity associations, for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Wildlife Fund, and so on).

Any assault (and not only arson, explosions, or gunfire using different kinds of weapons) against the said persons, institutions, and property belonging to them, without any exceptions and assumptions, are seen as terrorist acts. With respect to the topic of this study, a terrorist attack in the form of assault on a foreign citizen or employee of an international organization enjoying international protection will be recognized as organized aggression against the said persons (including psychological aggression committed by unlawful means) to have an influence on their legal activity regardless of the motivation of the Armenian extremists.

The historico-criminological approach I have chosen for studying the crimes of transnational Armenian terrorism, the legal foundation of which I have formulated and set forth above, requires the urgent reexamination of a whole series of stereotypical views about this in the international scientific community. First, the series of murders of former high-ranking statesmen of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic committed in 1920-1922 by fighters of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutium, later called Operation Nemesis in Armenian and international historiography, cannot be called a crime of terrorist orientation. On 19 June, 1920, former prime minister of Azerbaijan Fatali Khan Khoisky was killed in Tiflis, while former minister of justice of Azerbaijan Khalil-bek Khasmamedov was injured. A month later, on 19 July, 1920, former deputy chairman of the National Parliament of Azerbaijan Hasan-bek Agaev was killed in Tiflis, and on 19 July, 1921, former minister of internal affairs of Azerbaijan Behbud Khan Javanshir was murdered in Istanbul. On 15 March, 1921, former minister of internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire Talaat Pasha was killed in Berlin, and on 5 December, 1921, former great vizier (prime minister) of the Ottoman Empire

Sayyid Halim Pasha, who occupied this post in 1913-1917, was killed during a horse ride. On 17 April, 1922, former vali (governor) of Trabzon Jemal Azmi and doctor Behaeddin Shakir, leader of the military-police operation to deport Armenians from the coast of the Black Sea to the interior regions of the Ottoman Empire in 1915, were murdered in Berlin, while on 25 July, 1922, former naval minister of the Ottoman Empire Ahmed Jemal Pasha was killed in Tiflis. The total number of victims of Operation Nemesis amounted to eight.

The murders of all these state officials of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, who were well known in their time, cannot be classified as crimes of terrorist orientation in the form of encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure for one significant formal and legal reason. The thing is that when they were killed by Armenian nationalists, none of them was a statesman or public figure of their country, they were private persons in emigration. However, according to the disposition of Art 277 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, the qualifying feature of this kind of crime is the fact that it is committed to put a halt to state or other political activity or to avenge the activity a specific statesman or public figure was carrying out at the time the crime against his life was committed. So here we have a clear lack of correspondence between the regulations of criminal law and the specific historical circumstances in which the above-mentioned murders were committed. Therefore, they should be qualified in historical retrospect not as encroachment on the life of a statesman or public figure in keeping with Art 277 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code, but as murder committed by reason of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or by reason of hatred or enmity with respect to some social group (Point “k” of Art 105[2] of the Russian Federation Criminal Code).

Moreover, when carrying out a legal qualification of the crimes Armenian extremists committed during Operation Nemesis, another important fact should also be kept in mind. When making the decision to murder former high-standing state officials of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, the 9th congress of ARF Dashnaktsutun proceeded from the tribal principle of talion (*lex talionis*—“an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”). The main motive and driving force behind Operation Nemesis was revenge for the mass deaths of Armenians during the military-police operation by the police force of the Ottoman Empire to ensure security of the army support area during World War I, which Armenian authors later (from the mid-1950s) began calling “the Armenian genocide.” In other words, from the very beginning, the political leadership and fighters of ARF Dashnaktsutun chose blood feud as the ideological justification for the deaths of their coreligionists and fellow countrymen. Therefore, the crimes committed under Operation Nemesis should be qualified in historical retrospect not only in compliance with the regulation of Point “k” of Art 105(2) of the Russian Federation Criminal Code as murder committed by reason of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or by reason of hatred or enmity with respect to some social group, but also in compliance with the regulation of Point “f.1” of Art 105(2) of the Russian Federation Criminal Code as murder committed by reason of blood feud. This fact makes it possible to say that the leaders and functionaries of ARF Dashnaktsutun who personally hold responsibility for the organization and execution of Operation Nemesis at the beginning of the twentieth century were guided by convictions that were ancestral for the Christian world at that time and harked back to the time of tribal relations, which says enough about the level of their intellectual development, morals, and worldview. These two qualifying features together make it possible to define the series of murders during notorious Operation Nemesis as a series of especially grave general criminal felonies that do not relate to crimes of terrorist orientation.

So to sum up the above, I must conclude that through its more than century-long history, transnational Armenian terrorism in the activity of Armenian radical extremists of nationalist

organizations, beginning with the Hunchak Party and ARF Dashnaksutiun and ending with its present-day organizational structures, have always gone hand in hand with national ethnic crime. Very often, particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Armenian terrorist politicians did not shy away from engaging in extortion and even racket in order to provide themselves and their associates with a means of living and material resources for carrying out their unlawful and anti-humane activity. In so doing, it was Armenians themselves who primarily were the victims of extortion and other economic crimes, for whom rendering financial support to terrorists essentially replaced paying the traditional monetary donations for the upkeep of the Armenian Gregorian Church. First in the Russian Empire, and then throughout the entire Diaspora, organizational structures of Armenian extremist groups entirely replaced the hierarchy of the Armenian Apostolic Church by subordinating the national property of the Armenian ethnicity that used to belong to the clergy to party functionaries. This all makes it possible to say with certainty that transnational Armenian terrorism throughout its history (at least throughout the twentieth century) always had a hidden and latent economic context, in addition to its public political context, which Armenian authors do not have either the courage or intellect to admit.

If the history of Armenian national terrorism is examined precisely from the viewpoint of its economic subtext, the following periodization of its history can be proposed, which is not directly related to systemization in the historical retrospect of all the crimes of terrorist orientation. I think that three universal institutional periods can be singled out, which have very vague time frames due to the objective existence of the regional specifics of the manifestation of the unified socioeconomic trends inherent in them, under which the logic of Armenian national terrorism developed. It stands to reason that I am not claiming the ultimate truth, but the model of periodization I offer for the genesis of this social and legal phenomenon (which, in my opinion, Armenian terrorism precisely is) makes it possible to understand and structure the general trends in development of the processes within the Armenian Diaspora and Armanstvo as a whole that objectively existed, regardless of where a particular community lived, even if these processes occurred in each of them a few years or even decades apart. But before I begin describing each of them, I will say again that the periodization without any clear chronology I offer has two qualitative features—conventionality and universality. This fully corresponds to the public formational methodology of Marxism, according to which every nation has gone through all the main stages of the development of human civilization, beginning from the primordial to the post-industrial society, but has done this in its own time and at a different pace.

The first period of history of Armenian terrorism was externally characterized by the militants' struggle against the authorities and official structures of the Ottoman and Russian empires and the Persian Shahdom, but its true goal was to establish control of the rulers of the revolutionary parties Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun over the income and property of the Armenian Gregorian Church in the countries of residence of the Armenian Diaspora not directly related to theological activity, that is, acquiring rent from land plots, commercial apartment buildings, mills, and so on, which were managed by the Church, but did not serve the purposes of right of chapel. This period began in the 1890s and ended in the 1910s. However, the objective external reason, i.e. the defeat of these three empires in World War I, reduced all the efforts of the Armenian revolutionary terrorists to naught, since when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia and the Kemalists in Turkey, all the church property in these countries, with the exception of church buildings, was nationalized or secularized in some other form. This meant that the Armenian professional revolutionaries, who had gotten a taste for money, had to start their activity from scratch again.

The second period in the history of Armenian terrorism was related to the institutionalization of the organizational structures of the Armenian revolutionary parties and groups in the

countries where the Diaspora settled with subsequent establishment of non-economic control over the business of their fellow countrymen in their places of residence. This process, regardless of the regional specifics, took up the whole of the second and third quarters of the twentieth century and was accompanied by armed clashes between the representatives of the two competing structures of Armenian nationalism—the Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun parties. It ended with marking the borders of their zones of responsibility in each of the countries where the Diaspora lived (apart from the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey, in which both of these structures of Armenian nationalism were strictly prohibited).

The third period of the history of Armenian terrorism was characterized by the spread in influence specifically of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun (it did not permit the Hunchak Party to participate in this process) with the organizational support of the intelligence services of the U.S. and its NATO allies on the population of the Armenian S.S.R. and the Armenian Diaspora in other Soviet republics. This process started at the beginning of the 1980s and ended in 1999, when representatives of the so-called Karabakh clan, who seized the organizational, administrative, and financial resources from Dashnaksutiun not only inside the country, but also in a certain part of the Diaspora, ultimately came to power in the country as the result of a terrorist act in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia on 27 October. After the said event, the activity of Armenian terrorism throughout essentially the whole world was reduced to naught, and any of its sporadic manifestations were perceived by the world community not as politically-motivated crimes, but as crimes relating to the divvying up property or spheres of economic influence, that is, they lost the main qualifying element from the standpoint of criminal law.

In summary, I can draw a few pertinent conclusions:

First, the content, assessment, and results of the historico-criminological and political, or sociopolitical, analysis of the specific manifestations of such a social and legal phenomenon as transnational Armenian terrorism are very different. Not all the crimes that political scientists (primarily Armenian or those influenced by them) call terrorist are in fact so from the legal point of view. The most vibrant example of this type of logical substitution of concepts is the series of murders in the past of high-ranking statesmen and public figures of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic committed by fighters of ARF Dashnaksutiun at the beginning of the 1920s during the notorious Operation Nemesis. These were murders committed by Armenian nationalists in order to put psychological pressure on the Armenians themselves and gain access to their souls and money. In reality this was a blood feud, which could in no way influence the political situation in the world or in the country (for example, in Germany, Italy or Georgia) where the specific crime was committed. It is very likely that it was terror, as many authors write about, but it did not have anything at all to do with terrorism. Let every intelligent person understand the difference. Murders to extort money from one's rich coreligionists and fellow countrymen, which the functionaries of Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun practiced throughout the entire twentieth century, can of course also be called terror toward wealthy industrialists and merchants from among the members of the local Armenian communities, but from the criminological viewpoint, all of these crimes in sum are called racket, and not terrorism. So the concepts of Armenian terrorism and Armenian terror are not only not equivalent, nor are they identical. So from now on, I will study the first and totally disregard the second.

Second, skillful juggling with the concordant, but far from equivalent concepts of “terror” and “terrorism” has made it possible for Armenian propagandists to create an image of their people in the world community as fighters for a national idea and statehood inspired by the same belief, which in no way corresponds to reality. The essence of Armenian terror throughout the twentieth century boiled down to a permanent struggle using the toughest and even cruelest

and inhuman methods to acquire the largest amount of material resources, while political terrorism or extremism was used as an important, but far from main tool or means. Transnational Armenian terrorism has always been motivated by material gain and never guided by ideological reasons. It was aimed at seizing a particular segment of social relations and its economic foundation, and so it was never idealistic, but always mercantile and pragmatic. All of these circumstances allow me to affirm that political terrorism was part of the theory and practice of terror used by the functionaries of different Armenian radical parties and groups to concentrate the most power and resources in their hands.

And last of all, I think that periodization of the history of transnational Armenian terrorism should be carried out not according to chronological, but exclusively according to socio-economic features. So it has nothing in common with the description given it by Armenian authors, who skillfully intertwine the concepts “terrorism” and “terror.”

CHAPTER THREE

FROM TERROR TO TERRORISM: TRANSNATIONAL ARMENIAN TERRORISM IN THE LATE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

An objective and adequate understanding of transnational Armenian terrorism as a historico-criminological phenomenon (above I have established the fact that this is such in the context of human civilization) calls for a clear understanding of the sources, origins, and content of its theory and practice at the early stages. This will allow us to establish whether it is an autochthonous phenomenon and, therefore, an immanent feature of this ethnicity's social organization as a form of its national consolidation and ethnic or religious unity. On the other hand, it might have been imposed on the Armenians from the outside by certain centers of geopolitical power seeking to implement their geopolitical plans and satisfy their ambitions, using the Armenians as a handy instrument. The answer to this question will clarify the extent to which the Armenians are free to choose the path of their development and what is in store for them.

For over half a century (from the 1920s to the 1980s), the West European and North American academic community remained convinced that Armenian terrorism (its crimes shattered the civilized world for almost the entire last quarter of the twentieth century) was a response of sorts to the so-called "Armenian genocide" in the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Actively supported by the Armenian intelligentsia, the idea was imposed on the majority of European and American researchers and perceived as objective. The fundamental bibliographic and historiographical study by Candan Badem *Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question* (published in Turkish and English) supplies us with an objective idea of how much Armenian propaganda did to popularize the subject of the "Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire."¹ He gathered and annotated 4,450 books for his Turkish colleagues published in Turkish, Russian, English, French, German, Armenian, and other languages, which appeared between the end of the nineteenth century and 2006 in different countries. They deal with different aspects of the Armenian-Turkish confrontation in the Ottoman Empire, described as the Armenian-Turkish question in Turkish historiography and treated as an

¹ C. Badem, *Türk-Ermeni Sorunu Bibliyografyası* (in Turkish) and *Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question*, Aras, Istanbul, 2007.

alternative to the Armenian genocide thesis. An analysis of Badem's study suggests that the absolute majority of the books (there are over 3,600 titles) dealing with the Armenian-Turkish question, or Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire were published between 1920 and 1990 in the main languages of the world.

This means that the entire volume of these publications cannot be discussed here in any detail. In fact, even one percent of the works claiming that the so-called Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire generated Armenian terrorism cannot be enumerated here for lack of space.

It is not surprising that the global intellectual community perceives the ongoing attempts of the Republic of Turkey to draw attention to an alternative point of view as pitiful efforts at self-justification, very much in line with what the Armenian intellectuals wanted in the first place. Two objective factors, however, have reduced to naught the effect of Armenian propaganda. I have in mind the wave of transnational Armenian terrorism during the last quarter of the twentieth century (discussed in the next chapter) and the fact that the public is overfed. Tired of boring repetition of the same arguments, people want to listen to the other side and hear different arguments. The works by Justin and Carolyn McCarthy, Erich Feigl, and Michael Gunter, which appeared in the 1980s,² radically changed the ideas of Europeans and Americans about the subject and undermined the intellectual constructions of Armenian propaganda. Turkish authors³ (their books have been translated into European languages and published in Western Europe and the United States) offered their contribution, albeit of secondary importance, to the cause. In fact, the numerous crimes of Armenian terrorists of that time played an important role in the U-turn performed by the public. It was enough for the public to learn about another blast and be informed that seventy-five or fifty years earlier the Ottoman Empire was exposed to Armenian terrorism fulltime and that the Turks had to rely on the army and the police to defend themselves. In short, the sociopolitical context of that time dotted the "i's" and made it possible to discuss the sources of transnational Armenian terrorism.

After looking around and finding themselves in a qualitatively different context, the Armenian intellectuals had to join the scholarly discussion and offer new fundamentally different concepts so as not to lose face. Prof. Richard Gable Hovannisian of the University of California had no choice but to shoulder the role of a new intellectual leader of the Armenian Diaspora. In the works published in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, he and Rouben Torossian admitted that the ideology of political terror and transnational Armenian terrorism as its outcrop were not born in the early 1920s (something the *spyurq* intellectuals insisted on), but in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.⁴ This chronological shift suggested the logical supposition that the political terror of Armenian nationalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries caused the consistent military-administrative repressions against Ar-

² See: E. Feigl, *A Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, Zeitgeschichte, Salzburg; Freilassing, 1986; M.M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1986; J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy, *Turks and Armenians: A Manual on the Armenian Question*, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, Washington, 1989.

³ See: K. Gurun, *The Armenian File*, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1985; St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985; Z. Karaş, *Ermeni Terör Örgütü ASALA*, TC Atılım Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2007; O.E. Lutem, *Armenian Terror*, Institute for Armenian Research, Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, Ankara, 2007; S.R. Soniel, *Armenian Terrorism: A Menace to the International Community*, Cyprus Turkish Association, London, 1987.

⁴ See: *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, in 2 vols., ed. by R.G. Hovannisian, Vol. II: *Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, Los Angeles, 1997; idem, *Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2003; idem, *Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide*, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1998; R.M. Torossian, *The Contemporary Armenian Nationalist Movement*, United States International University, San Diego, 1980.

menians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I, which the Armenians later presented to the world as Armenian genocide. In fact, since the late twentieth century, the historical studies have not associated these two independent phenomena—the Turkish-Armenian question and transnational Armenian terrorism. It is widely believed that there is no cause-and-effect relationship between these two phenomena, even though they belonged to the same period of time.

Multinational Soviet historical studies could not move away from seeking the truth in this ideologically vulnerable problem potentially damaging for the Soviet Union's domestic policy. This explains the specifics of the historical studies on many sensitive issues and the very specific way of publishing the results. The party and political leaders removed vast bodies of facts and subjects from scholarly studies: according to the official ideology of “proletarian internationalism” and the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle, public statements about Armenian-Turkish contradictions were ruled out and no books or articles on this sensitive matter were permitted. Few authors proved bold enough to send their manuscripts abroad for publication. Official political terminology accepted the terms “class” or “national-liberation” struggle of national minorities in the Russian Empire. Any mention of national conflicts or conflicts between ethnic communities was “anti-Soviet propaganda.” This explains why the Soviet academic intelligentsia concentrated on the narrow and highly specific segment of academic writings—thesis research—to which ordinary people had no access. In the 1980s-1990s, this segment became an ideological battlefield between the Armenians and the Turks (Azeris, to be more precise).

The contradictory nature and context of assessments of the same historical events and processes found in scholarly works are explained by their authors' ethnic origin and education, which determined their affiliation in the Armenian-Turkic conflict. Events that look “revolutionary” to Armenian academics and are described as a “national-liberation movement” or even “heroic struggle” look like “nationalism” or “national-religious extremism” to their Azeri and Turkish colleagues.⁵ The extreme ideological bias is a product of one hundred and fifty years of confrontations between the Armenians and the Muslim peoples of Western Asia and the fact that the Armenians learned to regard their Muslim neighbors (who constituted the region's national and religious majority) as “oppressors.” The Turks regarded the Armenians as “aggressors” or “insurgents.”

I mentioned above that the genre of this article—historico-criminological investigation—does not allow me to plunge too deeply into an analysis and assessment of the content of the ideological struggle around the subject of transnational Armenian terrorism still being waged in academic publications. I can, however, describe this struggle as a historical fact.

Today, most contemporary historians associate the emergence of the theory and practice of transnational Armenian terrorism with the appearance, in the latter half of the 1880s, of several Armenian political parties—Armenakan, Hunchak, and Dashnaksutiun—the program of which recommended terror (but not terrorism, dear reader) as an effective tool for carrying out the proclaimed aims and tasks. The Armenakan (Motherland) Party was set up in 1885 in Marseilles by Mkrtich Portugalian (Mekertich Portukalian), the son of an Armenian banker from the city of Van. It proved to be short-lived; two years later it merged with the Social Democratic Hunchak Party, which was set up by a group of Armenian students from Russia in Geneva in 1887. The Dashnaksutiun (Comradeship) Armenian Revolutionary Federation

⁵ Cf. (on the example of these): B.I. Nadjafov, *Istoria armianskogo natsionalizma v Zakavkazie v kontse XIX-nachale XX veka* (based on the published monograph Litso vruga (*The Face of the Enemy*), doctoral thesis, the A. Bakikhanov Institute of History, NASA, Baku, 1995; A.A. Nersesian, *Natsionalno-osvoboditelnaia borba 1894-1908 gg. v Tarone*, PhD thesis, Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R., Yerevan, 1992; E.S. Saakian, *Revolutsionnoe dvizhenie uchashcheyisia molodezhi v Armenii i armianskoy deystvitelnosti Zakavkazia (1880-1917)*, doctoral thesis, Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R., Yerevan, 1989; K.Z. Tarokian, *Osvoboditelnye dvizheniia zapadnykh armian v 1878-1908 gg.*, doctoral thesis, Institute of History, Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R., Yerevan, 1991.

(ARF) was set up by a constituent congress convened in Tiflis in 1890, which brought together the extremist groups of Armenian *narodovoltsy* (members of the Narodnaya Volya [People's Will] nineteenth century Russian revolutionary organization), Marxists, and Anarchists. The first version (1894) of its political program (Points 8 and 11 of "The Means [of Revolutionary Struggle]" section) described terror as one of the main means and methods of revolutionary transformation. It suggested that "officials, traitors, usurers, and all kinds of exploiters should be subjected to terror, and government buildings should be looted and destroyed." Similar formulas could be found in the documents of the Hunchak Party, the ideology of which was described as "Propaganda, Agitation, Terror, Organization, and Peasant and Worker activities."⁶ As we can see, in the 1890s, Armenian nationalists declared terror and, accordingly, terrorism as its manifestation in action and a tool of revolutionary struggle. This means that it could not be described as a response to the military-police repressions of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

The Armenians did not invent terror as a means of political struggle; they borrowed it from European radicals and extremists. In fact, the theory and practice of Armenian terror implemented first in the Ottoman and later in the Russian Empire at the turn of the twentieth century became part of the objective historical process of the empires' "Westernization" and an entrance fee of sorts to the European economic and political space. This gave rise to the immanent and specific feature of Armenian terrorism—it was transnational from the very beginning. Hunchak and Dashnaktsutun were set up as structures of the Armenian Diaspora (*spyurq*) scattered across Europe, Western Asia, and partly North America. From the outset, their organizational structures sided with Armenian terror spearheaded against the Muslim population of the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire. By 1890, for example, i.e., during its first three years, Hunchak set up a ramified network of local organizations in Armenian-populated regions. Supported by hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church, they set up 114 local structures in the Ottoman Empire; 86 in the United States; 36 in the Russian Empire (Transcaucasia); 15 in Persia; 9 in Bulgaria; 7 in Rumania; 6 in Egypt, etc. These were closed organizations with a purely Armenian membership; outsiders stood no chance of getting to their secrets, while the organizations could and did draw Armenians, citizens of many different states, into their political activities and even acts of terror. Before or even after the terrorist acts, these people were entirely unknown to one another. This made it doubly difficult to oppose or prevent acts of ethnic criminal nature.

This raises a question: What were the ideological reasons behind the political terror enacted by Armenian nationalists against the autochthonous Muslim majority and officials in the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century? The question has not lost its relevance, but before answering it we should take a look at the political or legal-political ideas that prevailed in the European establishment, in order to find out why the ideologists of Armenian revolutionary nationalism of the late nineteenth century opted for terror as a tool of political struggle. This should be done because there is any number of reasons to say that the ideology of transnational Armenian terrorism was a melee of all sorts of political theories in vogue in the European intellectual space a century-and-a-half ago. The Armenians lumped them together and adjusted to regional reality.

In 1798, Thomas Robert Malthus, a British philosopher and political economist, published his main work (with a long title as was popular at the time) *An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other Writers*. Malthus established a correlation between a country's population growth (he wrote about Great Britain) and its requirements. Six consecutive

⁶ J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 34, 35.

editions appeared between 1798 and 1826, each iteration adding newly discovered aspects of practical applications of the basic law he had discovered. Finally, the author arrived at a theoretical-ideological system of political economic ideas that explained and justified the geopolitical aims of British imperialism. The last edition of this fundamental work was translated into Russian and published in St. Petersburg in 1868.⁷ Put in a nutshell, his law stated: population grows in a geometrical ratio (1, 2, 4, 8, 16...), while the means of subsistence increase in an arithmetical ratio (1, 2, 3, 4...). Wars, epidemics, and ethnic cleansing were needed, wrote the author, to balance out the two figures, to increase the per capita share of boons and give the survivors a chance to consume more natural resources. In order to achieve this, the state (this principle limited to preindustrialized societies) should check or at least slow down population growth. This explains colonial wars, in which the poorest strata of the empire's population served as cannon fodder; the British nobility and the U.K. ruling circles waged wars to check the population growth of the Foggy Albion, ensure a steady flow of resources from the conquered (or otherwise subjugated) lands, and increase their share of wealth and the wellbeing of the powers that be. In 1804, Malthus' theoretical deliberations were rewarded with professorship in history and political economy at the college of the East India Company in Haileybury (Hertfordshire). The ideologist of Britain's colonial economic expansion remained at the post until his death.

By declaring terror against the authorities of the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim majority of the local population, the ideologists of Armenian revolutionary nationalism of Hunchak and Dashnaksutium were, in fact, guided by the ideas of Thomas Malthus, which by that time had become accessible to Russian readers. It seems that the ideologists of Armenian revolutionary nationalism expected that terror would drive the autochthonous population out of its homeland to create *Lebensraum* for Armenian settlers, who would become the sole owners of the local natural (land, water, and forests) and mineral resources. In this sense, the idea of the Armenian nationalists to "recreate" the "Greater Armenia" of the myths and legends in Eastern Anatolia can be described as imperialist, even though both parties publicly announced their intention to build a socialist republic of Armenia. The ideology of Armenian nationalism, which spoke of freedom, equality, and fraternity within the ethnic group, contained a lot of aggressive feelings, hatred, and terror directed toward other peoples and states. This is sufficient to explain the illegal acts of Armenian nationalists in Eastern Anatolia.

The thesis research defended *en masse* in the 1980s at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian S.S.R. supplies us with information about illegal acts of Armenians in the eastern *vilayets* of the Ottoman Empire in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Initially kept in the Institute's archives for "restricted use," this research appeared on the Internet to become accessible to a wide circle (the relevant works have been enumerated above). Their authors developed their own periodization of the sociopolitical and criminal activity of "Western Armenians" (a term applied in the historiography in the Armenian S.S.R. to the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire or, to be more exact, to the Armenians of Turkish Transcaucasia). It was divided into the periods of the so-called Hayduk Movement (the 1870s-1890s) and the "liberation struggle" (the 1890s-1908, i.e. before the Young Turk Revolution began in the Ottoman Empire). This periodization is based on the facts, logic, and ideology of each particular period.

The range of problems related to the emergence of transnational Armenian terrorism is far removed from the history of either the Hayduk or the "liberation" movement of the Armenians

⁷ See: T.R. Malthus, *Opyt o zakone narodonaseleniia ili izlozhenie proshedshego i nastoiashchego deystviia etogo zakona na blagodenstvie chelovecheskogo roda, s prilozheniem neskolkikh issledovaniy o nadezhde na odstranenie ili smiagchenie prichiniaemogo imi zla*, I.I. Glazunov print shop, St. Petersburg, 1868.

in Turkish Transcaucasia. This issue warrants acknowledgement here, even if we do not enter a detailed analysis. In the twentieth century, Armenian ideologists spoke of the terrorist activities of Armenian militants as a logical continuation of these movements. The fighters borrowed certain tactical methods and even called their illegal armed units by the names of prominent Fedayis of the “Hayduk period.” I do not think, however, that there was a direct logical connection between the Armenian Hayduk Movement of the last quarter of the nineteenth century and transnational Armenian terrorism of the twentieth century. Armenian intellectuals, Soviet Armenian intellectuals in particular, relied on the principles of Communist political ideology to link these unconnected social phenomena. By doing this, they devalued the Hayduk Movement, an absolutely logical stage of Armenian ethnogenesis.

This movement in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire was a legal continuation of Art LXI of the Berlin Treaty of 13 July, 1878, which registered the results of the Balkan war of 1877-1878, guaranteed by the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, British and Ottoman empires, the Prussian and Italian kingdoms, and the French Republic. The article said, in part: “The Sublime Porte engages to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who will superintend their application.”⁸ The Ottoman rulers could not carry out the demands of this provision amid the postwar ruin and economic decline in Turkish Transcaucasia. The task became impossible when some of the Armenians living in the region moved to Russia’s side and, after fighting together with the Russian army, moved to Russian Transcaucasia. The semi-nomadic Kurds and Circassians were quick on the uptake: they exploited the situation to plunder Armenian villages and the economic infrastructure. Turkish historians offer their own, and debatable, opinion. They speak of these attacks as the Muslim response to the proselytism of the Armenian Apostolic Church and retribution against the apostates who had abandoned Islam for the Armenian Gregorian faith. (Turkish ethnographers regard the Armenians of the mountain region of Sassoun as descendants of the ethnic Kurds who changed their faith in the first half of the nineteenth century.) Amid the postwar ruin, the Ottoman authorities could not gather enough money to bridle the religious criminal anarchy. This was when so-called Hayduks (individuals or groups of people who protected the property of their co-religionists, the security guards of our time being the closest analogy) appeared among the Armenians of Turkish Transcaucasia.

To my knowledge, none of the Armenian works written in Soviet times contain information that the Hayduks had political ideals or pursued political aims. They were waging a partisan war, sort of *bellum omnium contra omnes* (a war of all against all) in a country where central (Ottoman) power could not put an end to anarchy. They had their heroes, whom the Armenians remember for their courage and bravery. This was due (to a great extent, because of the specifics of Armenian ethnic psychology) to the tragic deaths of Armenians ambushed by Kurds and Circassians or perished at the hands of the Ottoman gendarmes, who never bothered to distinguish the Hayduks and the criminals from the semi-nomadic Muslims tribes. We cannot treat the Hayduk Movement in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire as nationalist or even criminal. Famous Russian lawyer Fyodor Plevako described crime as the normal response of normal people to abnormal circumstances.

In the 1880s, by which time the Hayduk Movement had spread, the everyday life of the Armenians of Eastern Anatolia could not be described as normal. Basic survival was impossible without resorting to crime; this can be said about all the Caucasian peoples living in the Ottoman and Russian empires. It was a purely economic movement untouched by ideological over-

⁸ [http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/11909/1/Roscini_2014_final_author_version.pdf].

tones. An ideological admixture transformed it into a liberation movement, which borrowed from its predecessor the trained fighters and material and technical resources that came in handy for carrying political terror, the main tool of the Armenian sociopolitical movement of a later period. This stage should be associated with the appearance, in the latter half of the 1880s, of the two most important Armenian revolutionary-nationalist organizations—Hunchak and Dashnaktsutun, their setup being aided by the Armenian Apostolic Church. They created the theory of political terror in relation to high-ranking officials and the Muslim majority and showed how to apply it in practice.

The archives and historical studies in Turkey are insufficiently developed. This means that the available sources and scholarly works are not informative enough to inspire an adequate idea about the crimes committed by Armenian nationalists in the Ottoman Empire in the last decade of the nineteenth and the first two decades of the twentieth century. Consequently, it is also impossible to correctly qualify them in legal terms. The available Turkish and Azeri publications mention hundreds of crimes committed by fighters of Hunchak and Dashnaktsutun⁹ rather than describing them; this makes unbiased typologization impossible. It is likewise impossible to distinguish crimes in the form of an act of terror from crimes of genocide and the organization of mass disturbances and murders due to social, national, or religious hatred, which are not qualified as crimes of terror under the current Russian laws. My work is devoted to studying the history of the criminal activities of transnational Armenian terrorism, which means that I analyze only those crimes of Armenian nationalists that can be pigeonholed as acts of terror. This approach does not allow me to paint a broad and detailed picture of the terrorism of Armenian national extremists at the turn of the twentieth century. However, it saves us from mistakes, which our opponents might exploit in order to cast doubt on the objective nature of my work. I have done this deliberately to observe the principle of academic impartiality and objectivity: the slightest doubt about the veracity of facts or the logical nature of conclusions excludes their publication.

Mass disturbances and the ethnic Armenian-Muslim clashes that invariably accompanied them cannot be classified in legal terms, since normally there is not enough information about their nature. Stirred up by acts of disobedience organized by Hunchak party members in Istanbul on 18 September, 1894 (which paralyzed the city for twenty-four hours), they swept the Ottoman Empire in October-November 1894. The wave of unrest reached the administrative centers in the east of the Empire (Erzurum, Trabzon, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, and Harput), in the center (Marash [Kahramanmaraş], Sivas), and in the West and Middle East (the Adana, Aleppo, and Urfa [Şanlıurfa] regions). Everything that has been written on the subject so far does not contain enough information about the nature and content of ethnic clashes. This means that today no objective and substantiated assessments of them as armed riots or deliberate and organized actions of illegal armed groups of ethnic Armenians (the latter should be classified as crimes of terror and an outcrop of transnational Armenian terrorism) or spontaneous massive disturbances stirred up by Hunchak members are possible. This means that they cannot be classified as international terrorism. Here I will simply say that these tragic events took place in the history of the Armenians and Turks and refrain from placing them among the crimes of Arme-

⁹ See: R. Mustafaev, “Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva (XIX-XX vv.),” in: *Kratkaia khronologicheskaiia entsiklopedia*, Elm, Baku, 2002; B. Nadjafov, op. cit.; “Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva: XIX-XXI vv.,” in: *Kratkaia khronologicheskaiia entsiklopedia*, Compiled by A. Mustafaeva [et al.], Human Rights Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, Elm, Takhsil, Baku, 2013; *Armenian Terrorism: A Threat to Peace*, Akdeniz University, Research Center for the Study of Atatürk Reforms and Principles, Antalya [Turkey], 1985; M.A. Birand, *Ermeni Terörü (4 Lisanda)* (The Atrocities of Armenian Terrorism), And Kartposatal ve Yayınları, Ankara, 1983; K. Gurun, op. cit.; O.E. Lutem, op. cit.; *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism*, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, Washington, 1999.

nian terrorists. This fully applies to the events that took place in the Zeytun mountainous region in September 1895-January 1896. The Armenian demonstration of 30 September, 1895 triggered Armenian-Kurd clashes, which continued for many months in the absence of political demands being presented to the Ottoman government. This means that the clashes cannot be described as political terror, let alone terrorism. In particular, this is explained by the fact that both Armenian authors and their Turkish or Azeri counterparts demonstrate an extreme ideological bias by heaping guilt on one of the sides without sufficient evidence.

The first crime of Armenian nationalists that can be reliably classified as terrorism took place on 26 August, 1896. That day, Dashnaksutiun fighters took hostages in the Ottoman Bank, the central bank of the Ottoman Empire. The militants, who wanted to attract the attention of the European diplomats stationed in Turkey to their political demands, chose wisely: there were many Brits and French among the bank's clerks and clients. A group of 28 headed by Papken Siuni and Karekin Pastermadjian (aka Armen Garo) armed with pistols and homemade hand grenades burst into the building around 1:00 PM. They attacked the security guards at the entrance, killed a captain and a lieutenant of the Ottoman gendarmerie, moved inside, occupied the floor, took the clients and clerks hostage, and lost nine of their own people. They threatened to blow up the building, killing the 156 hostages and destroying all the valuables found in the bank, unless the European countries put pressure on Sultan Abdul-Hamid II and his government to accord more rights to the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.

After fourteen hours of talks and several failed attempts to liberate the hostages, Director of the Ottoman Bank Edgar Vincent, 1st Viscount D'Abernon, managed to persuade the terrorists, who had barricaded themselves with sacks of silver coins, to free the hostages and vacate the building in exchange for their personal safety and the promise to inform the Western governments of their demands. Together with secretary and interpreter of the Russian Embassy Maximov, he led 17 militants out of the building and allowed them to use his yacht to board a French frigate out at sea, which took them to Marseilles. The frigate commander suggested that the terrorists leave their pistols and grenades behind. Wishing to avoid an international scandal, Maximov bought them from the Armenians to the great pleasure of both sides.¹⁰

The life of Karekin Pastermadjian, who headed the terrorist group that had captured the bank, abounded in adventures and volte-face. At the time of the terrorist attack, he was a student at the Agricultural School of Nancy-Université in France, but after being made a *persona non grata* in France for his role in the attack, he moved to Switzerland to continue his studies at the University of Geneva; he did not sever his contacts with Dashnaksutiun. In 1900, after graduating from the university with a diploma in physical chemistry, he went to Tiflis, where he opened a chemical laboratory. In 1903-1907, he used it to produce explosives and bombs for acts of terror against Russian officials in the Caucasus (there are reasons to believe that his bombs killed Privy Councillor Prince Mikhail Nakashidze, Civilian Governor of the Baku Gubernia, and Military Governor of the Tiflis Gubernia Lieutenant General Maksud Alikhanov-Avarskiy). After the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, he was elected deputy to represent Erzurum in the Turkish parliament; in 1911, at the suggestion of Talaat Pasha, he was appointed Minister of Railway Transport. Three years later, Garo, who by that time had become ultimately disappointed in the Turks, moved to the Russian part of Transcaucasia where he actively contributed to forming Armenian volunteer units to fight on the side of the Russian army in World War I. In 1917, he went to the United States as a representative of the Catholicos of All Armenians; in 1920-1921, he acted as ambassador of the Dashnak Republic of Armenia to the United States. He was the first Armenian politician and state figure to show all other

¹⁰ More information can be found in the Osmanlı Bankası Müzesi (The Osman Bank Museum) in Istanbul (Karakoy, Voyvoda Cad. 35/37, Galata).

Armenians the shortest and most effective road to success: commit a couple of widely publicized terrorist acts and escape unpunished, earn social status and authority among the Armenians, move to the higher post of coordinating the terrorist activities of others and, after winning the trust of the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church, perform a U-turn to become a public and political figure with good prospects of rising high on the state ladder. This proved to be a more or less standard career for a whole generation of passionate representatives of the nation (*spyurq*) (more about them below). I can say here that practically all those who figure prominently in the Republic of Armenia changed, in the late twentieth century, the uniform of a Nagorno-Karabakh commander of an illegal armed union (that is, terrorists) for the office suite of a respectable bureaucrat.

On 21 July, 1905, Sultan Abdul-Hamid II survived a failed assassination attempt organized by Hunchak and Dashnaktsutiun fighters in the Ottoman Empire. There can be no doubt that this was crime of terror. It was inspired and organized by Christapor Mikaelian, one of the three founders of ARF Dashnaktsutiun, a former teacher at the Armenian national school, who emigrated from Russia to Switzerland in 1898. His initial plan included a car stuffed with explosives and driven by a suicide bomber; the attack was scheduled to coincide with the sultan's official visit to Sophia (the capital of Bulgaria) in the spring of 1905. The plan fell through: on 4 March, 1905, Mikaelian and his assistant Kendirian died when a bomb they were testing on Mt. Vitosha outside Sophia unexpectedly went off. They "scored an own goal," to borrow an expression from the American secret services. Their comrades-in-arms decided to follow suit in Istanbul, next to the Yıldız Mosque, which the sultan attended every Friday for the obligatory Friday namaz. The task was entrusted to a certain Zareh, one of those involved in seizing the Ottoman Bank and who, therefore, was well known to the Turkish police and their colleagues in most European countries. The bomb was placed in a car driven by Zareh to the mosque; the homemade timer was set to 42 seconds. This time the sultan stayed inside much longer talking to the sheik. He avoided the explosion, which killed and wounded over 60 people.

The Police Department and the Separate Corps of Gendarmes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire used their offices and agents in other countries to learn all the details of this crime, which resounded all over Europe. This interest is easily explained by the fact that a Russian subject was involved in the preparations and execution of the terrorist act. These efforts pointed to a certain Todorov from Bulgaria, who was arrested in Odessa on 9 July, 1906 carrying two homemade grenades and 150 pistol cartridges. When interrogated, he said that early in 1905 Dashnaktsutiun members (also known as *Droshaks* after the title of the newspaper *Droshak* [Flag] published by Dashnaktsutiun) had established close ties with Macedonian radical social democrats, who in turn, several years earlier, had contacted Armenian terrorists and moved weapons and explosives to Turkish Transcaucasia via the Russian dominions in the Caucasus. The Russian law enforcers were not surprised: they had learned this two years earlier, on 12 June, 1903, from a group of Armenians detained in the Artvin District, Kars Region. They lived in different cities of Russian Transcaucasia, their activities coordinated by Abramian, a student of Stuttgart Polytechnic. They moved weapons and explosives across the Russian-Ottoman border. Searches in their homes revealed small arms, ammunition, dynamite and homemade bombs.¹¹

The transit of weapons, ammunition, and explosives from Europe (mainly from the Balkan countries) to the Ottoman Empire via the territory of Russia was not the only occupation of Armenian terrorists in the early twentieth century. They made explosive devices of different types, frequently with the professional assistance, knowledge, and skill of "foreign experts"

¹¹ See: R. Mustafaev, op. cit., p. 13.

(ethnic Armenians living in Europe and North America). On 29 August, 1903, Russian law-enforcers were confronted with this unpleasant fact in Kars. That day, a certain Tanoev (Taneev), who lived not far from the barracks of the Quba Infantry Regiment, was killed in his home by an accidental explosion. John Nakhikian, a citizen of the United States, who worked together with Tanoev, was the second victim. In the ruins, the police discovered dynamite sticks (normally used in the mountains), parts of which went into handmade bombs and other explosive devices.¹² This is one more confirmation that transnational Armenian terrorism has always been dyed in national-religious and never state-political hues.

The failed assassination of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II organized by terrorists of ARF Dashnaktsutun revealed, for the first time, one of the specifics of Armenian terrorism—its transnational nature created by the involvement of ethnic Armenians from different countries in terrorist activities. Indeed, Mikaelian was a Russian subject, Kendirian came from Bulgaria, and Zareh was a subject of the Ottoman Empire. They, however, formed a closely-knit and well-organized criminal group determined to see an act of terror through, even if several of them were killed by an explosion at the preparatory stage. Such crimes could not have been brought to a successful (even partially successful) conclusion if the terrorists had not relied on the complete and unquestioned support of the rest of the nation and the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church, the main consolidating force of the Armenian ethnicity at that time. This and specific facts suggest that in the early twentieth century, if not all the Armenian people, at least a large majority of them, accepted the ideology of political terror formulated some fifteen years earlier by Hunchak and Dashnaktsutun and were ready to extend practical assistance to the fighters of both structures. This made them accomplices in the crime: one hundred years ago acceptance of all types of ethnic-criminal activity was the main feature of Armenian ethnopsychology. This fully applies to our time; more on this below.

The government of the Russian Empire and the Russian Caucasian Administration long remained indifferent to the ethnic-criminal and terrorist activities of Armenian nationalists in the neighboring empire. They tacitly supported them as an efficient tool for weakening the Ottoman Empire's economic and military-political might. It comes as no surprise that, for two centuries, the Russian Empire regarded its neighbor as a geopolitical rival in the Black Sea-Caucasian region. In the Russian archives, historical documents related to this period and this subject have not yet been declassified. For objective economic and political reasons, Russian scholars have no access to the state archives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, or Georgia. They have no choice but to rely on the press, the newspaper *Kavkaz* being the main source of information. Set up in 1846 by the second Vicegerent in the Caucasus General Field Marshal Prince Vorontsov, it merged with the *Zakavkazskiy vestnik* newspaper ten years later and survived until 1918. Officially supported, the newspaper was a private enterprise that left the editors a relatively wide leeway: they could publish their own, as well as administrative opinions; this means that the information was more or less objective. Moscow and St. Petersburg newspapers and magazines relied on the newspaper for information from the Caucasus, accompanied by official statements or reports. It should be said that the information the Moscow and St. Petersburg press extracted from the newspaper was original; it was equidistant from the positions of imperial power and the Armenian national-religious extremists and reflected the point of view of the man-in-the-street, who equally feared the military, the police, and terrorists when they went out into the streets and started shooting.

Despite their semi-official status, the editors could not suppress information that became known anyway from other sources and was widely discussed abroad. Armenians who were Russian subjects were involved in the mass anti-government disturbances in the eastern vilay-

¹² See: R. Mustafaev, op. cit., p. 11.

ets of the Ottoman Empire, which became even more vehement in the spring of 1904, as soon as the snow in the mountains melted. The newspaper was brimming with information about these criminal activities, from which I have selected pieces that adequately described the degree and the scope of Russian Armenians' involvement in what the Fedayis were doing in the Ottoman Empire and the way this affected life in Russian Transcaucasia. On 26 August, 1904, the newspaper (No. 227) posted the following reports in the section dealing with international events: "CONSTANTINOPLE. 22 August. Some of the ambassadors stationed here received telegrams sent from Van to Armenia informing them that, on 19 August, a group of 150 Armenian revolutionaries led by a Russian Armenian had entered Van to cause disturbances on the day of the sultan's accession. They occupied and plundered one of the city's quarters and started a fight with Turkish troops. Thirty-five houses were burned down, 41 lives were lost on both sides. To avoid retribution, 2,000 Christians fled to the monastery. The insurgents opened fire on the Turkish troops in front of the house near the French consulate. We have no further information, however the British and American consultants in Van, on an inspection tour in their regions, were recalled. Zinoviev (Ivan Zinoviev [1835-1917], Privy Councillor of State; from 1897 to 1909, Ambassador of Russia to the court of the sultan; from 1909 on—member of the Council of State.—O.K.) had a two-hour talk with the Great Vizier."

"CONSTANTINOPLE. 20 August (delayed). The Russian government has reinforced its defenses along the Caucasian border, since, recently, deserters have been joining Armenian gangs in great numbers. There are rumors that the transit of weapons for the Armenian committees was discovered in Alexandropol, that burial ceremonies were used for the purpose, and that the weapons were concealed in graves."

"CONSTANTINOPLE. 24 August. There are rumors that the situation in the Vilayet of Van is still causing concern because of the disturbances stirred up by Armenian Chetniks (Chets or Chetniks—a blanket term for the Christian and Armenian insurgents in the Ottoman Empire.—O.K.), but, according to information from reliable sources, it cannot be described as dangerous. According to information supplied by the Bitola wali, there was a clash between Armenian Chets and the troops the other day."

Three pieces of information supplied by the Istanbul correspondent of the *Kavkaz* newspaper and published in the same issue suggest that in the summer of 1904 Armenian extremists in both empires had achieved a high degree of coordination and cooperation. The fact that the information of 20 August was delayed (according to the editors' comment) and was published below the piece dated 22 August points to the following chronology. On 19 August, a group of Armenian extremists, led by a "Russian Armenian," attacked the city. The same, or the next, day, Russian Ambassador Ivan Zinoviev was called to the Great Vizier Mehmed Adil Ferid Pasha for a two-hour talk; no declaration of protest (which normally lasts for quarter of an hour) was made. The border between the two countries was temporarily closed. Russia started a police operation to stem illegal trade in arms and armaments in its part of the region, especially in Alexandropol (Gumri), the main base from which the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District received artillery ammunition. This means that the governments of both countries and the Russian Imperial Administration in the Caucasus were not merely concerned about unbridled Armenian extremism in the Southern Caucasus, but also took consolidated measures to defuse the threat on both sides of the border.¹³

The 19 August, 1904, Armenian attack on the Turkish town of Van dyed in political colors was an act of terror; scheduled to coincide with another anniversary of Sultan Abdul-Ha-

¹³ For more details, see: O.Yu. Kuznetsov, "Armianskiy natsionalno-religioznyy ekstremizm v Rossiiskoy imperii v nachale XX veka (po materialam periodicheskoy pechati Kavkaza)," *IRS-Nasledie, Mezhdunarodny azerbaidzhanskiy zhurnal*, 2014, No. 4 (70), pp. 52-58; No. 5 (71), pp. 48-54.

mid II's ascension to the throne, it was an effort to mar the state holiday with mass riots, plunder and murders so as to discredit the supreme power of the monarch and the nation's religious leader (he doubled as the caliph of the faithful Muslims) in the eyes of the ordinary people. The attack was, in a way, an echo of Armenian ethnoconfessional extremism and can be described as a transnational crime since, according to the newspaper report, it was led by a certain "Russian Armenian." The information that appeared in the Russian press pointed to another immanent feature of Armenian terrorism, i.e. its intimate connections with ethnoconfessional Armenian Gregorian extremism—the main practical content of ecclesiastical guidance of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the early twentieth century.

A year before the events described above, in the late summer-early fall of 1903, the Russian Administration in the Caucasus learned from its own experience about the close interconnection and interaction between Armenian national-religious extremism and transnational terrorism. This was when the imperial decree of 12 June, 1903, which moved the property and finances of the Armenian Gregorian Church under state control, was enacted. The full official title of the provision of the Cabinet of Ministers endorsed by a decree of H.I.M. was On Concentrating the Administration of the Properties of the Armenian Gregorian Church in Russia in State Organizations and on the Transfer of the Funds and Property of the Above Church Used to Support the Armenian Gregorian Church Schools to the Ministry of Education.¹⁴ The property and money of the Armenian Gregorian Church were transferred "from clerical management" to the minister of land and state property (real estate) and the minister of internal affairs (finance), while the "Armenian Gregorian Church retained the right of ownership of the property and the money." The property enumerated in the law proved to be unexpectedly long and did not harmonize with the Church's spiritual preordination. The minister of land and state property acquired control over "lands populated and unpopulated, no matter what they are called and how they are used, forests, meadows, pasture lands, fisheries, etc.," as well as "all houses and buildings that belong to the Armenian Gregorian Church, clergy, and spiritual organizations of this faith and are not used for the living or economic needs of the clergy and the above-mentioned organizations." In other words, the state spread its control to the so-called "non-core assets" of the Church. In the Soviet Union, the term "confiscation" was used to describe this initiative of the Imperial Government, however without any tangible reason. It was suggested by Armenian intellectuals to justify the terrorist acts of Hunchak and Dashnaktsutium fighters against the Russian imperial authorities, allegedly carried out in defense of the property of the Armenian Apostolic Church, which was the moving force of Armenian terrorism in Russia at the time.

Early in the twentieth century, the Armenian clergy combined their confessional duties with banking activities and usury. They regulated monetary flows and capitalized surplus funds by means of different, and not always legal, methods. One of the points of the 1903 law hints: "Property and money acquired by the above organizations in the form of donations or testamentary gifts will be administered in the way described above." From that time on, the top crust of the Armenian ethnicity could no longer practice more or less legal tax avoidance, while the Church could no longer use its money for commercial purposes. This turned the Armenian Gregorian clergy from the masters of life and a dominant influence on their ethnicity into bureaucrats on the state's payroll and put them on an equal footing with the clergy of all the other confessions and faiths practiced in the Russian Empire.

This explains why all the attempts of the imperial administrators to enact and implement the law were opposed at the local level by the Armenian clergy and all other social groups.

¹⁴ See: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoy imperii. Sobranie tret'ye. 1881-1914*, Vol. XXIII, 1903. Otd. I. State print shop, Saint-Petersburg, 1905, No. 23156, pp. 778-779.

After correctly assessing the law as a real threat to their habitual way of life and main source of their comfortable existence, they were determined to fight it. In his Most Devoted Report on the Administration of the Caucasian Territory, Vicegerent of the Caucasus Cavalry General Count Illarion Vorontsov-Dashkov wrote the following:

“The Armenian people, who do not know the clergy as a special social estate, but who elect its members from among their own ranks, are closely related for purely historical (not only religious) reasons with the interests of the clergy. This explains why the moral feelings of the people were hurt when church properties were transferred to state administration and why nearly all the people rushed to join the revolutionary movement, regardless of their class or status. All the Caucasian and probably Russian Armenians were indirectly involved (either by means of funding or sympathizing) in the terrorist acts against those representatives of the state who were involved, in one way or another, in confiscating church property. The transfer of church property created fertile ground for the propaganda of liberation ideas among the Russian Armenians used by Dashnaktsutiun, a revolutionary Armenian society set up to liberate the Armenians who were Turkish subjects from the power of Turkey, and which so far limited its activity in Russia to raising funds, buying weapons, and conscripting volunteers ready to fight in Turkey. Today, the idea of independent Armenia as the home of all Armenians nursed by individuals has spread far and wide in the Caucasus. According to the information available to the administration, local Dashnaktsutiun committees are operating everywhere where there is an Armenian population. The Armenians openly sympathize with all terrorist acts; this is obvious to the extent that the disturbances of the Kutaisi Gubernia (where there are no Armenians) are ascribed to them, to say nothing of the political assassinations in which Georgians are involved and in which bribes could have been used. The false rumors about the Armenians’ revolutionary sentiments that caused the transfer of church property to the state raised a wave of revolutionary feelings in the Armenian masses. The local administration, however, refused to go to the roots of evil. It limited itself to repressions in the form of arrests and deportation of all those who openly challenged the transfer. This swelled the ranks of the discontented.”¹⁵

After losing its levers of financial control over its congregation, the Armenian Gregorian Church sought moral support among coreligionists in other countries in the hope of being able to persuade Emperor Nicholas II to repeal the law. The imperial government stood its ground. On 2 December, 1903, *Kavkaz* (No. 320) published a telegram from Istanbul: “CONSTANTINOPLE. The Russian embassy reported that, in response to the patriarchate’s request, the government confirmed that the decision about church property was irrevocable.” The top Armenian hierarchs had no choice but to start a full-scale terrorist war against the authorities of the Russian Empire in the hope of returning the lost right to uncontrolled disposal of church property, or, rather, collective property of the Armenian ethnicity. The meaning of the law was distorted to dupe ordinary Armenians who remained blindly devoted to the Church and the clergy. Etchmiadzin armed itself with Hunchak, its “retribution tool”; on 6-9 February, 1905, its fighters stirred up a huge ethnoconfessional conflict in Baku and Balakhani that went down in history as the Armenian-Tatar slaughter and started another bout of Armenian national-religious extremism in Russian Transcaucasia. Very soon the clashes spread to other regions of the Central Caucasus: on 20-21 February, Erivan (Yerevan) had its share of mass disturbances; on 11-15 May, they spread to Nakhchivan and Ordubad; on 8-9 June, they appeared in the environs of Etchmiadzin; on 2-3 August, they reached Aghdam; on 16-19 August, they came to Shusha; on 19-20 August, they were repeated in Baku; on 18-20 November, they unfolded in Elizavetpol (Ganja); and on 22-25 November, they raged in Tiflis. Armenian-Muslim po-

¹⁵ [I. Vorontsov-Dashkov,] *Vsepoddanneishaia zapiska po upravleniiu Kavkazskim kraem general-adiutanta grafa Vorontsova-Dashkova*, State print shop, St. Petersburg, 1907, pp. 8-9.

groms went on and on in the countryside of Russian Transcaucasia throughout 1905 until 22 July, 1906. Azeris, Kurds, and Meskhetai Turks were involved on the Muslim side. According to American researcher Tadeusz Świątochowski, 158 Azeri and 128 Armenian settlements were razed to the ground and between 3 and 10 thousand people (according to different sources) were killed.¹⁶

These clashes were not terrorist acts; they were driven by national-religious extremism, which differs from terrorism in terms of its criminal-legal nature and qualification. Indeed, the opposing sides were involved in what can be described as regular combat operations waged by volunteers, 800 to 1,000 on each side. The final clash between Armenians and Transcaucasian Muslims took place on 20-22 July, 1906 at the Diktan-Gurun stow not far from Askeran and Shusha in Nagorno-Karabakh. Following this incident, the sides asked Military Governor of Karabakh General Goloshchapov to broker the end of the pogroms.¹⁷ This indicates that the Russian Administration in the Caucasus, with no adequate assets and forces to change the situation, was wisely keeping the fighting sides at equal distances. It opted for an “armed neutrality” of sorts and patiently waited until the ardor of the sides had abated and the most active and stubborn opponents had been killed.

The materials of the Senate inspection of Baku and the Baku Gubernia (which Nicholas II instituted after the slaughter of February 1905), carried out by Senator and Privy Councillor Alexander Kuzminskiy (he and Leo Tolstoy were married to sisters), show that the slaughter of 1905-1906 had been provoked by the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church who wanted to regain control over the church property and money. An excellent investigator, it took him no time to find evidence that Armenian extremists of Hunchak had started the ethnic pogroms across Transcaucasia on the instigation of the top hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Church people made no secret of it: no less than infringements on their religious feelings were needed to push the illiterate and cowardly Armenians into action. The Senate commission established that on 1 January, 1904, that is, a year before the tragic events of 1905, a so-called Union of Hunchak Members had published a leaflet which said that “our Czar wants to take away church property,” which makes it absolutely clear why “the Radiant (Catholicos) orders not to obey the Czar.”¹⁸ In other words, Armenian Patriarch Mkrtych I elected in 1892 at a meeting of all Armenians deliberately added political hues to the national-religious extremism of his congregation to be able to dispose of church (read: the Armenian people’s) property and finances as he saw fit.

Several attempts (some failed and some successful) on the lives of top figures of the Russian Administration in the Caucasus carried out in the early twentieth century should be described as outcrops of anti-Russian and anti-imperial national-religious extremism and acts of terror. Chief Commander in the Caucasus Infantry General Prince Golitsyn, who was one of the main initiators and authors of the law of 12 June, 1903, survived the attempted murder organized by three Armenians on 14 October, 1903 with honors. Formally, from the legal point

¹⁶ See: T. Świątochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 39.

¹⁷ For more details about the Armenian-Tatar slaughter, see: V.F. Maevskiy, *Armiano-tatarskaia smuta na Kavkaze kak odin iz fazisov Armianskogo voprosa*, Print shop of the Headquarters of the Caucasian Military Corps, Tiflis, 1915; T. Świątochowski, op. cit.; *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism*; L. Villary, *Fire and Sword in the Caucasus*, T.F. Unwin, London, 1906.

¹⁸ [A. Kuzminskiy,] *Vsepoddanneishy otchet o proizvedennoi v 1905 g. po Vysochaishemu povelenniu senatorom A.M. Kuzminskim revizii g. Baku i Bakinskoi gubernii s prilozheniem Vsepoddanneishei zapiski ot 26 dekabria 1905 g., sodержashchei glavneishie vyvody Otcheta o proizvedennoi v 1905 g. po Vysochaishemu povelenniu senatorom Kuzminskim revizii g. Baku i Bakinskoi gubernii*, Russian State Archives of Sociopolitical History (RGASPI), rec. gr. 543 (Collection of manuscripts kept in Tsarskoe Selo Palace, 1863-1916), inv. 1, f. 402, sheets 18-19.

of view of that time (and of our times, for that matter), it was an act of terror, albeit an amateurish act of terror that looked more like a stickup than anything else. Three Armenian militants armed with pistols and daggers attacked the prince on the Kojori Road outside Tbilisi. Aided by his coachman, the 65-year-old prince beat them off with his walking stick. The Prince had a long list of commanding posts in the Russian army and Cossack troops: in 1861-1864, he fought in Abkhazia; was commander of the 14th Grenadier Tiflis and Life-Guard Finland regiments and Appointed Hetman of the Urals and Orenburg Cossack Troops. In this instance, religious fanaticism alone was obviously not enough to kill him. Later, investigators of the Secret Police Department at the Baku Gendarmerie found out that the attempts on the life of Prince Golitsyn had been organized by G. Hovannessiants, drilling foreman at the oil fields of well-known oil industrialist A. Mantashev and a member of the Baku cell of Hunchak.¹⁹ *Kavkaz* published a detailed report about the circumstances and the wounds and injuries received by the prince, his wife, and Cossack Sergeant Dmitry Siplivenko, who doubled as the prince's coachmen, in two issues: on 14 October, the day of the failed attempt on the prince's life (No. 275) and on 14 November, when investigation was completed (No. 303). The prince received six stab wounds in the head, while the coachman was wounded by a bullet in the leg. The attackers exchanged fire with the local Georgian noblemen who hastened to the prince's rescue and the mounted police, which killed one of the militants and heavily wounded two others, who died later the same day. On 14 November, the *Kavkaz* newspaper informed its readers that they belonged to the "lower classes of the Armenian population."

The failed attempt on the prince's life told the spiritual leaders of Armenian extremists in Russian Transcaucasia that artisans, shop assistants, and peasants, even armed with pistols and daggers, were no equal to regular officers or the police. The answer was obvious: only well-armed professional fighters with vast criminal experience could do the job. The training ground was close at hand: the eastern regions of Turkey where the separatist movement of the local Armenian population was in full swing. It was from that territory that Fedayis trickled into Russian Transcaucasia to train Armenian volunteers who had gotten a taste for fighting in the Armenian-Tatar slaughter of 1905-1906. This confirmed the transnational nature of Armenian terrorism.

The second resounding act of terror took place on 11 May, 1905 which cost Civilian Governor of the Baku Gubernia Privy Councillor Prince Mikhail Nakashidze his life. On the next day No. 121 of the *Kavkaz* newspaper carried a telegram of its correspondent from Baku:

"BAKU. 11 May. Today, at 3:15 PM Governor of Baku Prince M. Nakashidze who was driving home in a carriage after his visit to Baku Interim Governor General Prince Amilakhori was killed by a bomb thrown into his carriage at the corner of Mikhailovskaia St., opposite the Metropol Hotel. His servant and two Tatars who were nearby were also killed, the coachman was heavily wounded. The assassin escaped." He was identified later as Drastamat Kanaian, an active member of Dashnaksutiun where he was known as Dro. On 17 May, 1905, the same newspaper published an obituary (No. 126) which started with the words: "Baku Governor Prince Mikhail Nakashidze, villainously murdered on 11 May, belonged to a princely family of the Kutaisi Gubernia." A semi-official publication, the newspaper said nothing about the political underpinnings of this terrorist act.

This assassination became the apogee of a series of crimes against members of the city police and Russian Administration in Transcaucasia who "had been sentenced to death" by fighters of the ARF Dashnaksutiun for their alleged encouragement of those who, according to the leaflets the terrorists scattered in the city, had been killing Armenians during the ethnic pogroms

¹⁹ See: I.S. Bagirova, *Politicheskie partii i organizatsii Azerbaidzhana nachala XX veka (1900-1917)*, Elm, Baku, 1997, p. 206.

in Baku in February 1905. The list also included Head of the Baku Police Captain Deminskiy, police commissioner Captain Mamedbekov, Inspector Sultanov, and district police inspectors Prince Mikeladze and Shakhtakhtinskiy” (*Kavkaz*, No. 83, 29 March, 1905). I have written above that assassinations and failed assassinations of policemen cannot be classified as crimes of terror. (They are qualified as encroachment on the life of law-enforcement officers in their line of duty.) I deem it necessary to stress the point for two reasons: first, the police officers were listed as “sentenced to death” together with top state officials, which means that their murders can be classified as acts of terror; second, this case is the best illustration of wishful thinking when historical facts are shamelessly distorted. This means that the “i’s” should be dotted and the “t’s” crossed: biased interpretations should be set right and the objective truth revealed.

District Police Inspector Prince Mikeladze of the proscription list was the first to perish at the hands of Armenian terrorists on 16 March, 1905. On 29 March, 1905 *Kavkaz* (No. 83) reported:

“District Police Inspector Prince Mikeladze was murdered on 16 March at around 10:00 AM when riding in a carriage with Constable Eremushkin. He was attacked by six criminals armed with revolvers in the main street leading to the Black City, who killed him and the constable. The criminals attacked from both sides of the carriage, which explains how one of them was wounded by his own accomplices. They took his revolver and disappeared, leaving behind the wounded man with a broken bone, who called himself Gurjidge. Later the same day, his roommate, who said his name was Tsiskarov from the Kutaisi Gubernia, was also detained.” There is no need to say that these two, who called themselves by Georgian names, were ethnic Armenians.

Four days before, on 12 March, 1905, Dashnaksutiun fighters made an attempt on the life of police commissioner Captain Mamedbek Mamedbekov, who escaped death thanks to self-control, determination, and professional skills. Here is what *Kavkaz* had to say about this:

“Several days ago, police commissioner Mamedbekov was informed that several suspicious people had been loitering near the governor’s garden waiting for someone, probably the governor. On 12 March, he was told once more that the same people were sitting in Sadovaia St. probably waiting for someone. Upon reaching the street, Mamedbekov saw six people sitting on a bench. Four of them rose and moved aside, while two remained sitting. The policeman invited them to follow him to the precinct. They agreed, but when they reached it, they pulled out revolvers and started shooting; simultaneously, someone started shooting behind Mamedbekov. Seizing one of the attackers by the throat, the policeman pushed him into the yard, while Tatars, who came out as soon as they heard the shooting, detained the wounded fighter, while the third was detained by a constable near the governor’s garden on the instructions of the same Tatars. The fourth was killed when he tried to escape the Tatars and policemen. The fighter detained by Mamedbekov, who turned out to be an Armenian from Quba, was wounded in the stomach. The detained and the killed were all Armenians; each had two large revolvers and cartridge-bags around their waists full of ammunition.” Azeri-Armenian clashes looked imminent, which forced the Interim Governor General of Baku Prince Amilakhori, respected by the local people, to come to the place of the incident to defuse the tension.

In this way, Captain Mamedbek Mamedbekov practically liquidated the fighting group of Dashnaksutiun, which explains why no one else from among the Baku police “sentenced to death” was murdered. Prince Nakashidze was killed by Armenian terrorist Kanaian, who had been called to Baku from Pyatigorsk for the purpose. Armenian researcher Eduard Oganessian, however, did not hesitate to write that in 1905 all the policemen “sentenced to death” had been killed by Armenian fighters.²⁰ In fact, all of them remained on the lists of the Baku city police until 1917.

²⁰ See: E. Oganessian, *Vek borby: ocherk 100-letnei istorii dashnakskoy partii i natsionalno-osvoboditelnoy borby armianskogo naroda*, in 2 vols., Vol. I, Phoenix, Moscow, Munich, 1991, p. 51.

Seventy-five years later, ideologists of the Armenian Diaspora declared that the Armenian fighters had triumphed in their open confrontation with Russian police officers. But there was no triumph—they merely concocted, *post factum*, another myth about the invincible and omnipotent ARF Dashnaksutiun. The fact is: its fighters were killed by dozens in the Russian Empire; they never got a chance to come close to the targets of their terror. The case described above is one of the examples.

Another resounding assassination of a Russian political and military leader in the Caucasus is also associated with ARF Dashnaksutiun. I have in mind the murder of commander of the 2nd Caucasian Cossack Division Lieutenant General Maksud Alikhanov-Avarskiy, who in 1905-1906 was consistently quenching local riots and ethnic clashes during the so-called Armenian-Tatar slaughter, which made him a target of hatred of the Armenian nationalists and the Armenian Gregorian clergy. He was killed by two homemade bombs on 3 July, 1907 in Alexandropol in the Bebutov St. when he was driving back from the officer reunion of the 80th infantry Kabarda Regiment of General Field Marshal Prince Baryatinskiy. In 1870, he together with the officers and soldiers of this regiment had taken part in the Khiva expedition and was, therefore, always welcome among the officers.

The investigation carried out by the Security Department of the Tbilisi Gendarme Administration failed. Investigator of the Novocherkassk District Court Titular Counselor Nikolay Lyzhin, however, who was looking into what Dashnaksutiun was doing in the Province of the Don Cossack Host (the Armenian population of the city of Armavir were descendants of the Armenians removed from the Crimean Khanate in 1773 under the Karasubazar Peace Treaty of 1 November, 1772 between the Russian Empire and the Crimean Khanate), identified not only those who had carried out this terrorist act, but also those who had organized it. It was Khachatur Amirov Kevorkov, alias “Governor General” or Khecho, head of the so-called Organ of Intimidation of the Eastern (Russian) Bureau of Dashnaksutiun. This post made him the leader of all the Armenian terrorists operating in the Russian Empire. It turned out that Prince Alikhanov-Avarskiy was murdered by Martiros Charachukhantz and Drastamat Kanaian (Dro), aided and abetted by Karekin Pastermadjian (Garo) (who was involved in the hostage-taking at the Ottoman Bank and supplied the terrorists with explosive devices made in his chemical laboratory in Tiflis).²¹ The fact that evidence of the terrorist act of 3 July was found one thousand kilometers from the place it was committed meant that Armenian terrorism had developed into a ramified and well-organized transnational structure that spread far and wide across the Russian Empire to places with even a negligible number of ethnic Armenians.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, Armenian terrorists carried out much fewer resounding acts of terror. On 21 September, 1907, Armenians joined forces with Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs) to assassinate head of the Chancellery of the Commander of the Kuban Region and Appointed Hetman of the Kuban Cossack Host Collegiate Councillor Semen Rudenko. Armenian fighters were not personally involved in the act of murder, but shifted the dirty work onto Alexander Morozov, one of the SRs. They merely supplied him with two revolvers. After killing Rudenko with four shots, he also deprived two policemen, a warrant officer of the railway battalion, and a watchman of the Armenian Gregorian Church of their lives, committing suicide in the aftermath of this criminal drama.

Rudenko was respected and appreciated as a good official and was loved and respected as editor of the non-official part of the local newspaper *Kubanskije oblastnye vedomosti*; so it comes as no surprise that the assassination raised a wave of indignation among the Kuban Cos-

²¹ For more details, see: R.N. Ivanov, *General Maksud Alikhanov: Triumf i tragedija*, Epokha, Makhachkala, 2003; “Taynoe stanovitsia iavnyim cherez 100 let (iz istorii armianskogo terrorizma),” *IRS-Nasledie. Mezhdunarodny azerbaidzhansky zhurnal*, No. 1 (19), 2006, pp. 44-46.

sacks who, not having much confidence in the police and gendarmes, started their own investigation. The military promptly achieved outstanding results. In the spring of 1908, Dashnaktsutiun fighters were arrested in great numbers in Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar) and Armavir: over 20 active fighters were detained within a few days. The Kuban Dashnaks responded with an attempt on the life of Appointed Hetman of the Kuban Cossack Host Major General Mikhail Babych. Saveliy Tarasov, one of the leaders of the Armavir department of Dashnaktsutiun, went to Tiflis to seek assistance from Khachatur Kevorkov (Khecho), but the enterprise failed. On the way back, Tarasov was captured by the Cossack guard. Interrogated with the use of hardly legal methods, he revealed the names of all the terrorists in the Kuban Region. Forty-seven more terrorists were put behind bars.²² Armenian industrialists and merchants hired the best lawyers of Moscow and Rostov-on-Don, their services being paid for through the Armenian Gregorian Church. The money came from the Baku oil industrialists Ter-Gukasov brothers (Abram, Arshak, and Pogos), as well as Stepan Lianozov, Alexander Mantashev, Levon Zubalov, Mikael Aramiants, Arakel Tsaturov, and the Azov-Don and Tiflis commercial banks that stood behind them.

The supreme power of the Russian Empire, which relied on the operational services of the law-enforcement agencies, had no illusions about the role Etchmiadzin of the Armenian Apostolic Church played in the criminal activities of transnational Armenian terrorism. The situation was beyond repair: in the early twentieth century, the riotous sentiments among the Armenians had spread far and wide, while the fact that rapidly developing Russian capitalism badly needed the money of Armenian industrialists and bankers made them practically untouchable. On 13 May, 1904, Prince Grigory Golitsyn wrote to Minister of Internal Affairs Vyacheslav Plehve (who was soon thereafter assassinated by a radical SR) about the situation in Russian Transcaucasia: “Catholicos is the true head and source of inspiration of this (Dashnak.—O.K.) movement; all others act in his name,” while “the Vagarsharat (Etchmiadzin—residence of the Catholicos.—O.K.) department of the Caucasian Armenian Revolutionary Committee has become part and parcel of the legal Chancellery of the Catholicos through which the Catholicos maintains contacts with the revolutionaries (Dashnaks.—O.K.)”

Prince Golitsyn knew what he was writing about. At the early stages, an inventory of church property carried out under the law of 12 June, 1903 revealed certain facts that the Russian Administration in the Caucasus could hardly palate. After arriving at the Church of St. Gregory the Illuminator to carry out the inventory of church property, the officials of the Baku Gubernia Court of Exchequer were unpleasantly surprised to discover in the chancel (!) a cache of fire and cold arms. The same day their colleagues made a similar discovery in the Surb Nishan Church in Kars. The provosts of both churches were arrested; this triggered mass rallies of armed Armenians dispersed by the use of force.²³ This means that in the early twentieth century transnational Armenian terrorists used the parishes of the Armenian Apostolic Church for their criminal purposes, while the Church, if not directly involved, actively abetted them, cooperated with them, and legalized their criminal activities. There is every reason to call it an umbrella of its radically-minded followers.

Two years later, when Prince Golitsyn left the Caucasus after the attempt on his life and the wounds he received, Head of the Police in the Caucasus Major General Evgeniy Shirinkin (former head of the palace police in St. Petersburg), after arriving in the Caucasus as one of the team of the “third” Vicegerent of the Caucasus Cavalry General Count Illarion Vorontsov-

²² For more details, see: L.I. Karapetian, “Iz istorii armianskikh politicheskikh partiy na Kubani v nachale XX veka,” in: L.I. Karapetian, *Armine Severnogo Kavkaza*, Collection of articles, Tsentri Pontiyisko-Kavkazskikh issledovaniy, Krasnodar, 1995, pp. 90-91.

²³ See: R. Mustafaev, op. cit., p. 11.

Dashkov, wrote to his chief on 9 January, 1906: “The Armenian Catholicos has issued special documents to the Dashnaks with his stamp, authorizing them to collect donations in favor of the Armenians who had suffered in Turkey. In fact, the collected money was used by the Dashnaksutiun organization.”

In his report to the Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior of 23 October, 1908, Colonel P. Eremin, head of the Tiflis Gubernia Gendarme Administration, revealed, to the fullest extent, the ties between the Armenian Church and Armenian terrorists: “According to the available information, Archimandrite Koryun was a member of the Elizavetpol Central Committee of the Dashnaksutiun Party and, at the same time, belonged to the Patorik organization in the Etchmiadzin Synod chaired by notorious revolutionary Bishop Ashot. Archimandrite is one of the biggest and most dangerous figures in the local cell of Dashnaksutiun. According to the information supplied by our agents, he issued death sentences for Captain of the Corps of Gendarmes Apel, Lieutenant Colonel of Border Guards Bykov, Lieutenant Colonel of the Shusha Police Sakharov, Ensign Loladze, and many others. Koryun was especially harsh with the Armenians who refused to recognize the authority of Dashnaksutiun; many of them were murdered on his initiative.”²⁴

This evidence is especially important; it reveals the true nature of the relations between the Armenian terrorists of ARF Dashnaksutiun and the ordinary Armenians. By way of summing up information supplied by generals and senior officers of the law-enforcement agencies of the Russian Empire, we can say that in the early twentieth century the absolute majority of the Armenians in Russian Transcaucasia had no warm feelings toward the Dashnaks. They regarded them—and with good reason—as oppressors, plunderers, and violators. The hierarchs and common clergy of the Armenian Apostolic Church, very much concerned about the loss of control over church property and money, mobilized their authority among their followers to persuade them to accept the Dashnaks as protectors of the interests of the Armenian ethnicity. “Love” was planted by different methods up to and including political terror and physical extermination of those followers of the Armenian Church who refused to obey its injunctions. As lucrative or revenge killings, not acts of terror, they are not discussed here.

The murder of Lieutenant General Alikhanov-Avarskiy and the events in the Kuban Region invigorated the investigation of what Dashnaksutiun was doing in the Russian Empire. Initiated on a formal pretext, the criminal case against Armenian terrorists was entrusted to Nikolay Lyzhin (mentioned above in connection with the investigation of the murder of Alikhanov-Avarskiy). The formal pretext was created by the squabbles inside Dashnaksutiun and the struggle for power and money. In May 1905, on the crest of discontent and riots in the Russian Empire in 1905-1907, the Council of Dashnaksutiun drafted a new program that formulated a new task—a Transcaucasian Federative Democratic Republic as part of the Federation of other Russian Republics (implemented, for a short time, after the February coup of 1917). Gabriel Keshishiants, one of the leaders of the fighters known as *zinvors*, was dead set against the new program and the U-turn (the previous program envisaged a monoethnic republic in the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire): he feared losing control over the money poured into the so-called liberation struggle of “Western Armenians” against the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim population. Early in 1907, Dashnaksutiun, which met in Vienna for its fourth congress, disbanded the units of *zinvors* that took orders from the Military Council headed by Gabriel Keshishiants. He flatly refused to obey; this triggered persecution of his supporters who from that time on had to avoid both the law-enforcers of the Russian Empire and their former party comrades. On 10 July, 1907, the Dashnaks, after tracking down Keshishiants in Armavir, tried

²⁴ V. V. Akunov, “Fidainy i zinvory ili boytsy nevidimogo fronta,” available at [http://www.redov.ru/istorija/fidainy_i_zinvory_ili_boicy_armjanskogo_nevidimogo_fronta/p1.php].

to murder him to teach others party discipline. He was wounded and several of his fighters were killed. The investigation was entrusted to Nikolay Lyzhin, who raised this criminal case of local dimensions to the imperial level. Thus, a trivial criminal case became a case of the Dashnaksutiun Party.

It was very soon established that the Dashnaks had moved money through a “legal channel”—a trading company of Ivan Shaposhnikov from Nakhchivan-on-Don, who traded with the Ottoman Empire and Balkan countries. As soon as Lyzhin had grasped the transnational nature of the Dashnaks’ criminal syndicate, his powers became unlimited. From that time on, he could demand all types of information from the South of Russia and Russian Transcaucasia. While the police in Novocherkassk were investigating the criminal case of Dashnaksutiun, on 11 December, 1908, in Tiflis, zinvor fighters murdered several undercover agents of the local secret police department. Searches in the flats occupied by Minasian, Ogajanov, the Edigorov brothers, and other members of Dashnaksutiun revealed a huge number of documents, the content of which went far beyond the case of the Tiflis murders. Another center of investigation into the activities of Dashnaksutiun was set up. The documents were too important to be left to the police: the Eastern (Russian) Bureau of ARF Dashnaksutiun invested 10 thousand gold rubles (a huge sum at that time) in their recovery or destruction.

The scope of the Dashnak File was huge: on 28 March, 1909, Nikolay Lyzhin sent an order to Tiflis to organize searches and arrests of 192 people suspected of compliance with the zinvors. After a while he issued another order, under which searches were carried out in eighteen more cities of the Russian Empire and 241 suspects were arrested. By mid-January 1909, about 1,000 had been detained or arrested; 696 of them were released for unknown reasons. The bill of indictment signed on 28 May, 1911 contained 159 names. The case was examined by the Special Department of the Ruling Senate. On 20 January, 1912, the reading of the bill of indictment was completed; hearing of the witnesses began the next day. In mid-March, the court was ready with its sentence: 103 were acquitted; 52 were sentenced to different terms in prison. In view of the preliminary detention, many of them were immediately set free, while four were sentenced to hard labor.

The efforts undertaken by the military, the police, task force officers, and investigators in 1907-1911, along with the court sentences, dampened the zeal and efficiency of Dashnaksutiun. In Russia, Armenian nationalists did not reappear as a new terrorist threat until seventy-five years later. The rest of the world became aware of the renaissance of Armenian terrorism in Western Europe and North America 15 years earlier—in the mid-1970s; more on this below.

I want to close this chapter with the following conclusions:

First, Armenian terrorism has been transnational from its very first days: it relied on the adepts of the Armenian Gregorian Church living in all corners of the world, primarily in the Ottoman and Russian empires, the Balkans, France, and the United States.

Second, the Armenian Apostolic Church, which spared no money or effort to support Dashnaksutiun and Hunchak, two terrorist organizations, financially and organizationally, was one of the important factors behind the steadily growing aggressiveness of transnational Armenian terrorism at the turn of the twentieth century. The Armenian Church used political terror to force the Russian Administration in the Caucasus to retreat from its policy of secularization of church property and funds envisaged under the law of 12 June, 1903.

Third, inspired by the support the Armenian Church extended to transnational Armenian terrorism, big industrialists and traders of Armenian origin poured money into terrorist activities. The legal—industrial, banking, usury, trade, and church—capital merged with criminal capital. In this way, the financial and economic activities of Armenians all over the world became criminalized.

Fourth, the ideology of political terror and the practice of terrorism based on the spiritual and moral authority of the Armenian Apostolic Church became part of the ethnic psychology, philosophy, and lifestyle of the Armenians passed on from one generation to another. This makes it a threat to the contemporary world order.

I will demonstrate that these conclusions are objective and reliable in the following chapters of this historico-criminological study.

CHAPTER FOUR

TERRORIST TRANSIT: LOS ANGELES-SYDNEY-BAGHDAD- BEIRUT-VIENNA-PARIS

(Crimes of Armenian Terrorists
in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century)

Transnational Armenian terrorism reached its peak in the last quarter of the twentieth century or, to be more exact, in the 1970s-1990s, which was when it developed from a real threat to individual countries to a real threat to the whole of mankind. In less than twenty years, Armenian terrorists carried out over 300 terrorist attacks in 20-odd countries. Over half of them were not acts of psychological deterrence or a reminder of the Armenians' nagging geopolitical problems. They were terrorist acts in the true sense of the word, causing death, pain, and destruction. Armenian extremists committed more crimes of terror and caused more casualties than all the other terrorist nationalist structures from certain West European and Middle Eastern countries put together, operating at the same time. I primarily have in mind the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA—Basque Country and Freedom), as well as Palestinian terrorist organizations: the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, As-Sa'iqa (Vanguard for the Popular Liberation War), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. At that time, these movements were less active than the Armenian nationalists.

As far as I know, most foreign authors have not yet agreed on the starting point of the orgy or even bacchanalia of Armenian terrorism in the 1970s-1990s. There are two equally well-grounded and, therefore, equally plausible points of view. Turkish and many of the European political scientists agree that the murder of Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Santa Barbara (suburb of Los Angeles, California, U.S.) Mehmet Baydar (49 years old) and Vice Consul Bahadır Demir (31 years old) committed by Karekin Yanikian on 27 January, 1973 in the Baltimore Hotel was the "starting gun" that launched the race of Armenian terrorists across countries and continents.¹ Yanikian, a gradu-

¹ This opinion can be found in: F.G. Dashdamirov, *Armianskiy terrorism i separatizm: "Pokroviteli i dvoynoy standart,"* Ganjlik, Baku, 2005; A. Djangir, *Terrorism: vchera, segonia i naveki: proekt "Chetvertaia mirovaia vojna,"* Azerbaijan, Baku, 2003; "Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva: XIX-XXI vv.," in: *Kratkaia khronologicheskaja entsiklopedia*, Compiled by A. Mustafaeva [*et al.*], Human

ate of Moscow University, Soviet émigré, and relatively popular author, enticed his victims to the hotel with a promise to transfer certain objects of art to the Turkish government. Instead, he shot both diplomats in the hope that court hearings would help him establish, in legal terms, the fact of the so-called Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire confirmed by surviving eyewitnesses. District Attorney David D. Minier managed to keep the hearings to the fact of murder—the notorious genocide was not mentioned. In July 1973, the federal court of Santa Barbara sentenced the terrorist to life imprisonment. Eleven years later, mortally ill, he was released and died within a month. His name became the symbol with which ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) started its terrorist activities in the Middle East and Europe; until the fall of 1975 it assumed responsibility for crimes of terror as Group of Prisoner Karekin Yanikian.

There is a different point of view found in a declassified report of the Directorate of Intelligence (U.S. CIA) titled *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat*² (see Appendix 3A). The authors of this document believed that Armenian terrorist attacks did not increase in scope until 1975 and were directly connected with the civil war in Lebanon, which lasted for 15 years—from 1975 to 1990. This looks more plausible for several reasons; the military-technical explanation looks more solid than the political scientific, legal, and historical arguments.

First, the special services and law-enforcement agencies of all countries oppose terrorist activities in their territories by enlisting agents from among terrorists and carrying out other operational measures. This pushes terrorists resolved to carry out large-scale terrorist activity to territories free from external control. In the past and today, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other countries, in which the threat of terror is still very high, were used and continue to be used as a safe haven for terrorists. Armenian terrorism developed and matured in the last quarter of the twentieth century in Lebanon, where Armenian nationalists could concentrate, train, and distribute, among the countries with Armenian diasporas, hundreds of experienced street fighters who could act individually or in small terrorist groups. Armenians congregated in Bourj Hammoud (the Armenian quarter of Beirut) where they set up volunteer units (militia) to train terrorists.

Second, the civil war transformed Lebanon into the biggest black market of arms and weapons. Anyone could buy anything (small arms, explosives, hand grenades, and even anti-tank and anti-air missiles) and transport anything out of the country through the international airport of Beirut and sea ports of Lebanon without much trouble. The black market dealt in weapons and armaments, which the opposing religious and ethnic groups received, in the first few weeks of the war, from weapon depots of the local army (which received its armaments from French companies); it also used armaments delivered directly from Israel, the United States, Syria, and Iran, which supported one of the sides. This means that the fighters of Armenian terrorist organizations based in war-torn Lebanon had enough weapons and could rely on steady supplies.

Rights Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, Elm, Takhsil, Baku, 2013; Y. Alexander and K.A. Myers, *Terrorism in Europe*, Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1982; *Armenian Terrorism: A Threat to Peace*, Akdeniz University, Research Center for the Study of Atatürk Reforms and Principles, Antalya, 1985; M.A. Birand, *Lisanda Ermeni Terörö*, And Kartposatal ve Yayınları, Ankara, 1983; K. Guron, *The Armenian File*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985; F.P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991; A. Kurz and A. Mirari, *Irrational Terror or Political Tool*, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, 1985; O.E. Lutem, *Armenian Terror*, Institute for Armenian Research, Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies, Ankara, 2007; *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism*, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, Washington, 1999, etc.

² See: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*, available at [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005462031.pdf].

Third, the civil war made it much easier to move around the world under the guise of volunteers of Armenian charities of all sorts bringing humanitarian aid to Armenians trapped in Lebanon. There they bought weapons and technical devices indispensable for their terrorist activities and left the country as refugees. The ease with which ethnic Armenians could cross the Lebanese border amid the chaos of the military-political conflict gradually transformed the Armenian criminal groups into transnational terrorist groups. This, in turn, made the task of the special services of the European countries and North America expected to oppose Armenian terrorism in their territories much harder.

Fourth, the wartime chaos made it much easier for the Armenian Apostolic Church and philanthropic organizations of the Armenian Diaspora to move money (camouflaged as financial donations) and other material assets to terrorists and escape the control of the special services and law-enforcement agencies.

The above suggests that the military-political factor of the civil war in Lebanon helped transform Armenian terrorism from scattered individual crimes into an ethnocriminal phenomenon. This should not be taken to mean that Armenian extremists provoked the civil war to realize their geopolitical plans. On the other hand, we should not ignore the fact that they fully tapped the favorable conditions it offered. In the 1970s, Lebanon became the point from which transnational Armenian nationalism spread far and wide across the world.

Judging from what Andrew Corsun, one of the U.S. State Department's leading analysts of terrorism, wrote in August 1982 in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, he completely agreed with the above. He pointed to Lebanon as the seat of contemporary Armenian terrorism: "*Although the Armenian community (approximately 200,000) in Lebanon had flourished and played a vital role in Lebanese life, by the 1970s they became caught-up in the internecine fighting that had overtaken Lebanon. When the Phalangists (Catholic Christian rightists) decided to use the Armenian section of east Beirut, known as Bourj Hammoud, to launch their attacks against the adjacent Muslim section called Naba'a, a split resulted within the Armenian community. Some Armenians felt that they had a duty to take up arms on behalf of their Christian brothers, while others, mainly left-wing Armenian youth through their close contact (via the universities and the proximity of their neighborhoods) with their Palestinian counterparts, realized they shared a similar situation—they had lost their land, had a large diaspora community, and the use of legal methods to bring their cause to world attention had failed.*"

Andrew Corsun concluded his article by saying that the Lebanese capital was a seat of transnational Armenian terrorism. He minced no words to say that "*ASALA is based in west Beirut and JCAG, in east Beirut,*"³ something which was well known. This is one more confirmation that in the last quarter of the twentieth century transnational Armenian terrorism was rooted in the Middle East, from which it arrived in Soviet Transcaucasia in the late 1980s, obviously strongly affected by the American special services and their West European colleagues.

In Russia, as well as in the Soviet Union, the subject of transnational Armenian terrorism remains taboo. Many people knew and still know about it, but prefer to avoid the subject. This means that we have to turn to foreign (American, Israeli, and Turkish) sources in search of adequate explanations of this historico-criminological phenomenon. There can be no doubt that Armenian terrorism is an international social phenomenon. Most of what has been written about Armenian terrorism is limited to descriptions and chronologies of terrorist acts committed by Armenian nationalists in different countries. Fewer authors undertook an analysis and statistical

³ A. Corsun, "Armenian Terrorism: A Profile," *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 2065 (Washington, D.C.), August 1982, pp. 32, 35, available at [<http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.319510012285091;view=1up;seq=141>].

systematization of terrorist acts perpetrated by Armenian extremist and terrorist groups. An even smaller number not only systematized and described the biggest acts of transnational Armenian terrorists, but also studied this historico-criminological phenomenon. Since these works constitute no more than one-tenth of the bibliography compiled by the present author, we should learn the names of those who made the greatest contribution to the study of transnational Armenian terrorism in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Andrew Corsun leads the list with his pioneering article “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile,” which started the study of this criminological phenomenon in the United States and, later, in the rest of the world.

Research Paper of the Directorate of Intelligence (U.S. CIA) mentioned above, which offers a more detailed specialized study of the problem of transnational Armenian terrorism, should also be mentioned.⁴

In his monograph *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, Francis Hyland analyzed the consequences, as well as the driving forces and mechanisms behind terrorist acts.⁵ When carefully compared, the structure and content (including semantic analysis) of individual elements in this book and the Research Paper suggest with a great degree of probability that Francis Hyland was, if not the author, then the editor of the latter. This means that the facts and conclusions found in his book are trustworthy.

Michael M. Gunter’s “Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism,” which appeared in 1985 in the *Conflict* journal,⁶ should also be mentioned. The works mentioned above summed up what was achieved by the Americans (mainly civil servants) who studied transnational Armenian terrorism.

Turkish author Omer Engin Lutem arrived at similar conclusions in his *Armenian Terror*,⁷ best described as a successful compilation of the above-mentioned American works supplied with facts and figures related to the later events of the 1990s and early 2000s. This is more than enough to present an adequate and complete picture of Armenian terrorism of the last quarter of the twentieth century.

The authors mentioned above—political scientists, analysts of special services (not infrequently the same people)—believe that the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) demonstrated more activity than the other extremist Armenian organizations. According to the Directorate of Intelligence of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, these organizations were legally and morally responsible for the absolute majority of terrorist acts of the 1970s-1990s. ASALA and affiliated operational groups (which not infrequently used their own names) were responsible for 115 out of 165 registered terrorist attacks, while JCAG and its branches carried out 34 terrorist attacks. These official figures can be found in *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia*.⁸

The U.S. special services used two different terms for terrorist acts: the term “terrorist attacks” was applied to terrorist acts which caused casualties or damaged property; “acts of terror” described terrorist acts carried out to deter, they claimed no lives and damaged no property. The table attached to the Research Paper contains 304 terrorist acts committed between

⁴ See: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*.

⁵ See: F.P. Hyland, op. cit.

⁶ See: M.M. Gunter, “Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism,” *Conflict Quarterly*, 5, Fall 1985, pp. 31-52.

⁷ See: O.E. Lutem, op. cit.

⁸ See: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia...*, sheet 9.

January 1975 and December 1983 out of which 164 are described as terrorist attacks (Russian criminal legislation qualifies similar crimes under Art 213(1.b) as hooliganism: “Hooliganism, that is, a gross violation of the public order manifested in patent contempt of society and attended by reason of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred”). This means that ASALA led in terms of the number of terrorist attacks, while JCAG took first place in terms of the number of acts of terror.

The geographical range of Armenian terrorist acts is very wide, which confirms the transnational nature of the Armenian terrorist threat in the last quarter of the twentieth century. According to the materials of the Directorate of Intelligence (U.S. CIA), Armenian terrorists of ASALA and JCAG, as well as of related extremist and terrorist groups, committed the highest number of terrorist acts in France, Switzerland, Italy, the U.S., and Lebanon. Turkey, Iran, the U.K., Spain, and the FRG⁹ were less frequently attacked. On the whole, Armenian terrorists committed crimes in 22 countries, including the Soviet Union. The American special services doubted the reliability of the information related to the Armenian terrorist acts in the Soviet Union and did not include it in their research study (this information has been moved to the next chapter).

The list of countries in which Armenian extremists committed their crimes is very impressive; the list of cities that had their share of Armenian terrorism is not short either: Los Angeles, Beirut, Vienna, Paris, Frankfurt am Main, Cologne, Essen, Zurich, Istanbul, Athens, London, Brussels, Madrid, Ankara, Rome, Geneva, Copenhagen, The Hague, Milan, Amsterdam, Bern, Marseilles, Lyon, New York, Interlaken, Strasbourg, Sydney, Tehran, Anaheim, Baghdad, Bern, Lausanne, Hollywood, Cambridge, Ottawa, Dortmund, Toronto, Lisbon, Rotterdam, Burgas, Boston, and Belgrade. Research Paper of the Directorate of Intelligence (U.S. CIA) describes these cities as places of Armenian terrorist attacks in 1975-1982. In fact, the geographical range was even wider. The list should include Moscow and Baku. The chronologically arranged list (some of the cities suffered from terrorist acts more than once) suggests that in the 1970s-1990s the evil spirit of Armenian terrorism was rushing all over the planet (this brings to mind Goethe’s Mephistopheles, Lermontov’s Demon, or the legendary Ahasver [Wandering Jew]) and, unable to satisfy its spite and cruelty, caused death, destruction, pain, and suffering.

The table of terrorist acts committed by Armenian fighters in West European capitals compiled by analysts of the U.S. CIA and reproduced in this book as Appendix 3A shows that both ASALA and JCAG claimed responsibility for the most outstanding crimes, such as the murder of Turkish Ambassador to Austria Daniş Tunalıgil, who was assassinated in his office (22 October, 1975), and Turkish Ambassador to France İsmail Erez, killed by gunfire in his car along with his driver Talip Yener (24 October, 1975); Necla Kunalp, wife of the Turkish Ambassador to Spain, and her brother, a retired Turkish Ambassador Beşir Balcıoğlu were killed by gunfire while driving in a car (2 June, 1978). Spanish chauffeur of the Turkish Embassy, Antonio Torres, died later from his wounds. This means that either one of the two terrorist structures deliberately claimed the doubtful honor of murdering Turkish diplomats (officially protected by international law) to impress sponsors from among the Armenian nouveau-riche, or the murders were perpetrated by the “rivaling” structure or by professional killers (which is much more probable) paid by the functionaries of ASALA and JCAG (which cast doubt on their integrity as understood by their rich patrons).

The above does not mean that only the ASALA and JCAG fighters should be blamed for the crimes of 1970s-1990s committed in many of the European capitals and ten-odd European,

⁹ See: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia...*, sheet 8.

North American, and Australian cities. Terrorists of the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), and the New Armenian Resistance (NAR), likewise, were guilty of acts of terror on both sides of the Atlantic.

It is believed that the ARA was a result of re-branding of JCAG in 1983. Its fighters were responsible for six conspicuous terrorist acts against diplomats of the Republic of Turkey stationed in West European countries and the United States; they captured the Paris office of Air Canada and committed suicide after the failed attempt to seize the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon (Portugal).

In October 1999, the FBI arrested Chairman of the Armenian National Committee of America Mourad Topalian. He was accused of the bombing of the Turkish Mission in front of the U.N. building and as the JCAG leader. The charges of terrorism were dropped by the U.S. Government after the plea-bargaining and his admission of some of the charges; he reached an agreement with the prosecutors, pleading guilty to charges of storing illegal explosives and owning two machine guns, and on 24 January, 2004, was sentenced to 37 months in prison and 3 years on probation. (In Russia, this is called “release on parole” and is accompanied by a set of administrative measures applied to the released person, who continues serving the term under different conditions.—*O.K.*)

Between 1977 and 1983, the New Armenian Resistance committed anti-Turkic crimes in Belgium, Italy, France, and Switzerland. Unlike other Armenian terrorist groups, NAR attacked British, Israel, and (occasionally) Soviet offices (there are 11 established facts of such attacks and 3 facts of prevented crimes of terror), which killed or wounded no fewer than 10 people.

Appendix 1 offers concise information about all of the terrorist structures mentioned above and other extremist organizations of Armenians.

In the 1970s-1990s, the Armenian Diaspora held first place in the international terrorist community in terms of number of terrorist organizations and affiliated terrorist groups and cells (responsible for ideological, financial, technical, and operational support) known to the special services of the so-called Western world. It was responsible for a larger number of terrorist acts than all the terrorist groups put together and was much more superior to them in terms of organization and structure. In fact, all the Armenian public organizations tied by common ethnicity (the Warsaw Treaty countries being the only exception) were involved, in one way or another, in the criminal activities of the organizations of transnational Armenian terrorism enumerated above. By the last quarter of the twentieth century, they had spread to half of the world and controlled all the structures of the Armenian Diaspora. This should not be taken to mean that all ethnic Armenians scattered across the world are abettors of terrorism. It means that those who belonged to Armenian public structures and paid membership dues helped, albeit indirectly, to commit terrorist acts and terrorist attacks and shared the ideological conviction in the name of which these acts and attacks were perpetrated.

Andrew Corsun and the anonymous analysts of the Directorate of Intelligence (U.S. CIA) spoke about revenge on the authorities of the Republic of Turkey for the so-called Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire of the early twentieth century as the main motive and driving force behind Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-1980s. This totally unfounded conclusion, repeated many times over and accepted all over the world, became the cornerstone of Armenian national ideology of the twentieth century. The logic of the operational and detection activities of all the special services, including the CIA, relied on the motive of criminal activities as the most convincing argument for the persecution, the courts, and the press. This was done for the purpose of formal legal qualification and understanding of the essence (based on their own psychologically rigid stereotypes natural in people engaged in detection and investigation) of the crimes committed by Armenian terrorists. American analysts preferred revenge for the mass deaths of Armenians that happened seventy-five years earlier and for which the authorities of

the third country (that had disappeared from the map) were believed to be responsible as the most likely reason non-damaging to their personal careers. Indeed, it demonized the terrorists and added value to their own efforts in the eyes of the public. This explanation, which had nothing to do with reality, was eagerly accepted by the judicial structures, the press, and the political elites of the countries in which these crimes were committed, since it excluded corporate, party, national, and state interests. Armenian terrorism, absolutely illogical from the point of view of West Europeans or North Americans, remained the evil the struggle against which and triumphs over which brought promotion, awards, and bonuses.

People looked at Armenian terrorists as aliens who settled scores with their enemies everywhere they could attack them without causing trouble for the host country and its people. Their crimes, which looked safe and far removed and had nothing in common with habitual offences, attracted the public and stirred up the compassion and imagination of West Europeans and Americans. The declared aims of Armenian terrorists were far removed from the demand for social reforms or restructuring the world by force proclaimed by the left extremists of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) of Germany, the Brigade Rosse (BR) of Italy, the Action Directe (AD) of France, who operated at the same time and who, unlike ASALA and JCAG, did not rob banks and murder members of the autochthonous elites. Armenian terrorists never shook the political, social, or economic pillars of the countries where they committed their crimes; this explains why the ordinary people and the establishment did not perceive them as a threat; their crimes stirred up emotions and tickled nerves.

As distinct from the Islamist extremist movements that operate in the Arab countries of Western Asia and North Africa, Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-1990s was not a mass movement; at all times, the number of activists never exceeded several dozen. CIA analysts did not try to assess the human potential of Armenian terrorism: they knew that the primitive tactics of bombings and hostage-taking required small groups or even individual terrorists, who could not change the world order. The Armenian militants who called themselves Fedayis did not aspire to change the world—they wanted to attract the attention of the world community to the so-called Armenian genocide, the dominant factor of Armenian self-identity and ethnopsychological type. This means that political terror and the means used by Armenian terrorists were not an aim, but a component of the anti-Turkish campaign intended to maintain the interest of Western Europe and North America in the intellectual activities of other members of the Armenian Diaspora through shocking and scandalous acts of terror.

This also means that an integrated and objective picture of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-1990s requires a clear understanding that its organizers and ideologists did not want to liquidate the Republic of Turkey, as a superficial observer might imagine. It was a component part of Armenian political extremism, which was and remains the ideology of the political establishment of the Armenian Diaspora and the Republic of Armenia. To a certain extent, it can be described as a precursor of contemporary Islamic extremism (at least, in Russia), which uses terror to raise the degree of political exaltation among those who support extremist ideas.

It should be said that the organizational structures of Armenian terrorists were very similar to those of the terrorist nationalists of European countries who operated at the same time: Óglaigh na hÉireann (the Irish Republican Army, IRA) and the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). The IRA used terror to detach Northern Ireland from the U.K., while the ETA wanted to separate the Basque Country from Spain and France. They either set up political structures, seemingly unrelated to them, or even demonstratively detached from terrorist acts; they publicly denounced these acts as inhuman and criminal and yet justified as an acceptable form of national-liberation struggle in specific historical conditions, or they described themselves as the “action wing” of corresponding political structures, although never admitted to this in courts. In other words, delimitation of the terrorist methods, extremist ideology, and the structures that

supported them was the most typical feature of European nationalist terrorism obvious to the authorities, press, and man-in-the-street. The IRA frequently posed as an ally of Sinn Féin, the party of the Irish Unionists-Socialists, while the ETA spoke of itself as the “action wing” of Batasuna (Unity), a nationalist party with socialist hues that operated in the Basque Country in the north of Spain and in Navarre (southern France). Both parties, however, resolutely denied any contacts with these terrorist structures. Terrorism and nationalist extremism were obviously moving apart; in the final analysis, each became a crime in its own right with independent *corpus delicti* in the codified criminal legislation of most countries. All well-known European national terrorists who regarded their crimes of terror as a tool of struggle for political ideals promoted and popularized by organizationally separate structures had a lot in common. In this sense, Armenian terrorism did not differ from Irish or Basque terrorism: terrorist acts were not an aim in themselves but an instrument of ideological propaganda.

On the other hand, the Basque and Irish nationalists had one party and one action wing, while the Armenian Diaspora had two political structures (parties)—Hunchak and Dashnaktsutium—locked in the struggle (not infrequently armed struggle) for a place in the sun and money. I wrote in Chapter Three that Hunchak was set up in 1887 in Geneva by a group of Armenian students from Russia; in 1903 it became a Social Democratic Party that actively cooperated with the Bolsheviks. It disbanded itself in 1923 and united ideologically and organizationally with the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutium set up in 1890 in Tiflis as a radical nationalist party of Armenian bourgeoisie proclaimed a sovereign national state of Armenians in the eastern vilayets of the Ottoman Empire its aim. At first, the Ottoman Empire was not ready to share its power over the Armenians either with other nationalists or with Bolsheviks from Soviet Russia or the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Despite their considerable and even fundamental ideological disagreements on certain theoretical and practical issues related to the aims and prospects of their activity and struggle, both (Hunchak and Dashnaktsutium) regarded terrorism as an effective and, under certain conditions, the only method of struggle. These theoretical disagreements were big enough to keep the majority of their members disunited; their leaders could not come to an agreement on a coalition, probably because they were reluctant to pool their sources of money and share their agent networks. This explains why their fighting structures—ASALA of Hunchak and JCAG of Dashnaktsutium—acted as two independent trends in the mainstream of transnational Armenian terrorism throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Very much like the Irish and Basque terrorists, ASALA and JCAG, as well as the local terrorist (or operational) groups affiliated with them or acting in their names, distanced themselves from the political and religious-public structures of the Armenian Diaspora. They managed to preserve this illusion throughout the 1970s-1990s: neither the officials of the U.S. Department of State (Andrew Corsun, in particular) nor analysts of the special services could establish or prove, no matter how hard they tried, direct cooperation between these structures. At the same time, they were fully aware, and never denied, that there was an ideological construct shared by all Armenian political extremists and terrorists. They were convinced that revenge for the so-called Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire during World War I should be taken on the people of Turkey and the Azerbaijan Republic and that it would be a fair and realizable act of retribution in the name of all Armenians (including those who lived in the Armenian S.S.R. or were scattered across the world). Here is how Andrew Corsun described the ideological position of ASALA and JCAG:

“While Armenian extremists have carried attacks under 19 operational names, the main terrorist groups are the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). On the surface, these two groups

appear to be united by a common goal. However, a closer look at their communiqués, and targeting, reveals that their methods and objectives are quite different.

“Unlike ASALA, which is Marxist oriented and adheres to the philosophy of Scientific Socialism, JCAG appears more closely aligned with the policies of the right-wing Dashnag party. The goals of the Dashnag are to reclaim their lost homeland, as specified in the treaty of Sèvres, and to seek reparations and recognition of the crimes committed against their people by Turkey; and they seek a solution similar to Germany’s admission of guilt and reparations to Israel after World War II. JCAG, in its communiqués, appears to strive for these same goals. Following the assassination of the Turkish Ambassadors to Vienna and Paris in October and December of 1975, respectively (the murders occurred on 22 and 24 October, 1975, respectively.—O.K.), JCAG in a follow-up communique entitled ‘To all the Peoples and Governments’ wrote: ‘Let the world realize that we will lay down our arms only when the Turkish Government officially denounces the genocide perpetrated by Turkey in 1915 against the Armenian people and agrees to negotiate with Armenian representatives in order to reinstate justice’...

“Whereas JCAG’s stance on the Armenian question appears compatible with traditional Armenian political beliefs, ASALA, whose communiqués are replete with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric, considers the Armenian question part of the international revolutionary movement, and they seek closer ties with Soviet Armenia.”¹⁰

The above shows that by mid-1982, the U.S. State Department still had no idea about which of the Armenian structures backed ASALA; it looked to be nothing short of an autochthonous organization. The analysts of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence were of the same opinion; the analytical report said the following about the origins of ASALA: “ASALA appears to be a group of young revolutionaries in their twenties and living or having lived in Lebanon. An ASALA terrorist captured in 1982 said that ASALA was organized along military lines into what he called brigades or divisions. Until recently we knew little about the ASALA decision-making process or the identities of the leadership core. Apparently a central committee—whose location is unknown—oversees the group’s activities. ASALA originally used a support apparatus—overt, legal groups—which, in our view, probably provided surveillance, propaganda, and logistic assistance for ASALA terrorist operations. These support groups—Popular Movements for the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (PMASALA)—were active in Paris, London, and Ottawa.”¹¹

Early in the 1980s, analysts of the American special services and the Department of State could not imagine that ASALA was the action wing of the Armenian Social Democratic Party Hunchak, which had been keeping a low profile since the mid-1930s in the countries where Armenians lived. The organizational structures, however, of this, once the biggest, party of the Armenian national revolutionary intelligentsia, which preserved its organizational structures in the Middle East (after the party disbanded itself in 1923 in Soviet Russia), served as the foundation for the Armenian militia units of Bourj Hammoud in Beirut during the civil war in Lebanon and encouraged the formation of the terrorist groups of ASALA. This means that nationalism still dominates Armenian mass public conscience, while all the other ideological intellectual constructs associated with individual party-public placement in society play secondary roles.

The different party foundations and, correspondingly, different political ideologies determined the significant differences in the criminal strategies of the two largest Armenian terrorist organizations detected by analysts of American special services. They followed in the footsteps

¹⁰ A. Corsun, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

¹¹ *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia...*, sheet 9.

of Andrew Corsun, one of the U.S. State Department's leading analysts of terrorism, who delineated the terrorists of ASALA and JCAG. Corsun wrote:

"Because ideology affects the operational strategy of a terrorist group, JCAG concentrated its operation solely on Turkish interests. The one possible exception was the January 1980 triple bombing of the offices of Swiss Air, TWA, and British Airlines in Madrid. At first JCAG claimed credit for the bombing, but in a later phone call to the local press, the caller said that JCAG was not responsible for the bombing and, in fact, condemned it.

"As the group name implies, of the 22 operations carried out by JCAG, 10 of the operations were assassinations (resulting in 12 deaths), 6 were attempted assassinations, and 6 were bombings...

"While ASALA has done its share of assassinating Turkish officials (nine), nevertheless, half of their bombings are directed against Western targets. The group, operating under various ad hoc commando names, has taken it upon itself to carry out 'military operations' against any country which attempts to jail or try one of its commandos. Examples of this can be seen with the arrest on 3 October, 1980, in Geneva of two Armenian extremists—Suzy Mahseredjian and Alex Yenikomechian—who were arrested after a bomb they were making accidentally exploded in their hotel room. Until their eventual release on 12 January, 1981, and 9 February, 1981, respectively, ASALA ... in a 4-month period carried out 18 bombings against Swiss interests worldwide in an effort to force the Swiss to release their comrades. The two extremists received 18-month suspended sentences and were barred from Switzerland for 15 years.

"Switzerland is not the only country that has been targeted by ASALA; Italy, France, and most recently Canada have been victims of ASALA's wrath. On 31 May, 1982, three alleged ASALA members were arrested for attempting to bomb the Air Canada cargo building at Los Angeles International Airport. It is suspected that this bombing was in retaliation for the 18 and 20 May arrests of four alleged ASALA members/sympathizers by the Toronto police."¹²

The above and the conclusion this information suggests mean that the article was written and published in August 1982 when the wave of transnational Armenian terrorism was just beginning to rise. The storm of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-1990s was still to come, but what Corsun wrote hints at the far from calm situation in the world.

Eight or nine months after Corsun's article had been published, analysts of the American special services wrote about the contradictions between ASALA and JCAG in the 1970s-1990s in much more specific terms:

"From its inception, the ARF (here and elsewhere, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun is meant.—O.K.) has aligned itself with whoever provided the best opportunity for an autonomous Armenian state. Since the end of World War II, the ARF has held a conservative, anti-Communist ideology and has been involved in violence against both the Turks and the Soviets, whom they hold responsible for the destruction of the Armenian Republic in 1920.

"Our analysis and a large body of evidence indicate that JCAG is the action wing of the ARF. We suspect that the ARF created a military wing to counter the emergence of the Marxist-Leninist ASALA, which was probably drawing the more radical, violence-prone youth away from the ARF. Competition between JCAG and ASALA has been keen during the past few years. Several terrorist attacks against Turkish interests have been claimed by both groups, and the success of one group sometimes seems to spur the other to act. We have also seen a few instances of members defecting from one group to the other, presumably not out of ideological conversion, but simply to have greater opportunities to conduct operations against the Turks.

¹² A. Corsun, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

The prominent English-language publication Armenian Reporter cites the August 1983 conviction in Los Angeles of an ASALA member—the son of a prominent ARF leader—as evidence of the growing disenchantment and desertion of Dashnag youth to more active radical groups such as ASALA.

“JCAG has operated predominantly against Turkish targets. Its attacks—usually assassinations of high-ranking Turkish diplomatic personnel conducted in public places during daylight hours—exhibit boldness, professionalism, and meticulous planning and training. JCAG employs surveillance/countersurveillance techniques to ensure the success of its operations. Its infrequent bombings of Turkish facilities, which appear to be conducted as warnings to Turkish diplomats, are followed within two or three months by assassination attempts.

“In contrast to ASALA, JCAG has not yet conducted or threatened to conduct reprisal attacks to force the release of captured operatives, who are considered ‘un-uniformed soldiers’ by JCAG. We believe JCAG assassins—only rarely apprehended—are recruited and trained within the ARF Youth Federation on a one-time ‘kill’ basis. After an assassination, the JCAG operative is seldom used again in a terrorist operation.”¹³

These words point to the very contradictory nature of the opinions and assessments offered by the American expert community when it comes to identifying the level of operational-tactical and operational-technical training of Armenian terrorists. This can be clearly detected in Andrew Corsun’s article and Research Paper of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence. The disparities are probably explained by the fact that the Department of State (which employed Corsun) concentrated on the theoretical aspects of the so-called Armenian question. Its officials generalized, systematized, and analyzed the primary information that arrived from other countries. The special services concentrated on the practical sides of terrorist activities: organization, motivation, and realization of criminal activities. These different approaches are best illustrated by two quotations. In 1982, Andrew Corsun wrote the following about the “applied” aspects of Armenian terrorist acts:

“Whatever the reason, since returning to the scene in 1975, Armenian terrorists have claimed responsibility for over 170 incidents which includes the assassination of 21 Turkish diplomats and / or family members, and 10 attempted assassinations of Turkish diplomats. Although the tactic of assassination has been used repeatedly, the majority of their operations have been bombings which are simple in construction and design. Unlike the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which favors remote control devices, Armenian terrorists have been partial to a Czechoslovakian manufactured plastic called Semtex-H. In the overwhelming majority of cases, this device is set at such an hour to cause property damage and not cost lives.

“Operationally Armenian terrorists must be viewed as unsophisticated in comparison with other groups since they have never shown the inclination or ability to hit a hard target. The only exceptions were the seizure of the Turkish Consulate in Paris on 24 September, 1981, and the attempted assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam on 21 July, 1982, both of which failed. In the seizure of the consulate, the four terrorists eventually surrendered without any of their demands being met. In Rotterdam the consul general, who was traveling to work in an armored car and escorted by two police vehicles, was attacked by four terrorists. The assailants opened fire with automatic weapons—which proved ineffective against the armored car—and as they attempted to flee the area, one of the attackers was shot and captured. Their bombings and assassinations required the minimum of logistical planning.”¹⁴

The analysts of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence were of a higher opinion of the professional adequacy of Armenian terrorists. Good professionals, they appreciated the level of pro-

¹³ *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia...*, sheet 2.

¹⁴ A. Corsun, op. cit., p. 32.

fessional training of the Armenians, their practical skills in surveillance/counter-surveillance, intelligence, and cryptography, to say nothing of how they handled arms and explosives, and their good knowledge of pyrotechnical and technical means and materials. This knowledge, skills, and habits mean that nearly all the Armenian fighters were trained not in primitive camps for conscripts, but in special schools or camps under the supervision of officers of military intelligence or experienced instructors from among officers of the special services. The Armenian terrorists were professionals (or, at least, near professionals) of the chosen occupation; they were trained on a regular and consistent basis, which cannot be said about volunteer units, territorial militia, or other militarized structures (such as private security structures). The high level of operational-tactical and operational-technical training that the fighters of the Armenian terrorist groups invariably demonstrated could be assured either by corresponding specialists from the United States, other NATO countries, their colleagues from the Soviet Union, or the WTO countries. From this it follows that throughout the latter quarter of the twentieth century, transnational Armenian terrorism was not an autochthonous phenomenon created by the Armenian Diaspora or its ideologists. It was a serious instrument of the military and political East-West confrontation during the Cold War. This explains why the slogans under which terrorist acts were perpetrated had little in common with the true aims of the true organizers of the terrorist activities and their true sponsors.¹⁵

We should pay particular attention to a fact of fundamental importance: Andrew Corsun's article quoted above and Research Paper of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence coincided with a series of events, which points to direct ties between them (the article was published in August 1982, while the Research Paper was compiled in the first quarter of 1983). The article coincided with and the later analysis was suggested by the invasion of Southern Lebanon by the armed forces of Israel that took place in July-September 1982, as well as by the raids of the Arab quarter of Beirut carried out by armed units (Phalangists)—the Lebanese Catholic Christian rightists—that ended in the grievous Sabra and Shatila massacre to the northeast of the Lebanese capital. (This armed conflict is known in Israel as the Lebanese War of 1982, or Operation Peace for Galilee.) Israel invaded Southern Lebanon to destroy the organizational-political and military-technical infrastructure of the PLO and relatively numerous PLO-controlled Palestinian terrorist groups. The infrastructure of ASALA and JCAG in eastern and western Beirut, respectively, also had their share of strikes since they closely cooperated with the PLO in training fighters. Early in the fall of 1982, defeated by the Israelis, the PLO political and financial structures moved to Tunis; while ASALA and JCAG moved their military components to Syria. I have written above that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon split the local Armenian community. Some of them took up arms to fight side by side in the streets of Beirut with the Phalangists (who were the allies of Israel). Others, mainly supporters of ASALA, sided with the PLO: despite superficial, and mainly imaginary, religious antagonism, the Armenians maintained close personal, financial, operational, and agent contact with PLO members. In this way, transnational Armenian terrorism became an organic component of international terrorism.

In the 1970s-1980s, Hagop Hagopian, ASALA spokesman and ideologist, was the key link of terrorist cooperation between the Armenian and Palestinian structures. Francis Hyland described him and his terrorist feats in one of the sections of his *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*.¹⁶ I have already written that this author can be trusted since his authorship or, at least, editorship can be detected in Research Paper of the CIA Directorate of

¹⁵ Michael Szaz offered detailed information about this in his widely known article "Armenian Terrorism and the East-West Conflict," *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Winter 1983, pp. 387-394.

¹⁶ See: F.P. Hyland, op. cit., pp. 57-60.

Intelligence. His information about the Armenian-Palestinian terrorist cooperation in Lebanon in the 1970s-1980s looks highly competent; I will rely on it further.

When assessing the role of Hagop Hagopian in the history of the Armenian terrorist movement in the 1970s-1980s, the author described him as a catalyst of transnational Armenian terrorism, and a much more powerful catalyst than Karekin Yanikian, who murdered two Turkish diplomats in Santa Barbara in January 1973. During the first couple of years of its activities, ASALA used his name as a banner. Francis Hyland wrote about Hagop Hagopian (the name, according to Francis Hyland who used it in inverted commas throughout his book, was an alias):

“For several reasons, including operational security and, probably, an attempt to inflate estimates of ASALA’s membership, the ASALA leader used a number of operational names. These included Hagop Hagopian (Agop Agopian); Mihran Mihranian, Vahram Vahramian, Bedros Havanassian, Abduh Mohamed Qasim, Henri Titizian (also reported as Tezinyan), Minas Ohanessian, Noubar Hovhanessian, and Haroutioun Takoushian. The appellation he apparently preferred, however, and the one he used inside ASALA, was ‘Mujahed’ (Warrior). It was by this nom de guerre that the members of ASALA knew him” (p. 57). (Francis Hyland uses this name throughout the book together with the other, best known alias.)

He wrote about “Hagopian” as the son of an Arab man and an Armenian woman, born in Iraq, and was very skeptical about his moral and ethical qualities: *“A number of sources reported that Hagopian, himself, claimed to have engaged in revolutionary activities prior to the first attack committed in the name of ASALA (the bombing of the World Council of Churches facility in Beirut on 20 January, 1975). The purpose of these revolutionary activities was to develop his skills as a revolutionary/guerrilla fighter. In the November/December 1983 issue of the ASALA publication Armenia, Hagopian relates that he led the 6 February, 1974 attack on the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait. None of the group of Palestinian commandos, Hagopian claimed, knew that they were led by an Armenian. The chapter on ASALA contains details of the incident. Hagopian certainly made no attempt to avoid publicity after the inception of attacks under the name ASALA. As much as any other member/leader of a terrorist group of the time, Hagopian, under a variety of names, was a regular contributor to his group’s magazine Armenia. He also participated in radio broadcasts, and gave a number of interviews to journalists from European and Middle Eastern publications. His appetite for publicity, according to another high-ranking ASALA member ... and author of “The Reality,”¹⁷ extended even to taking credit for attacks conducted by other Armenian terrorist groups. His flair for the dramatic was evident even in the manner in which he faked his own death in 1982. Not satisfied to have the group simply issue a statement claiming his demise, Mujahed chose the time during a telephone interview by Le Matin in July of 1982, with the sound of Israeli artillery in the background, to have colleagues claim that the Israeli barrage had bestowed ‘martyrdom’ on Mujahed”* (p. 58).

Hagop Hagopian was a conceited person prone to self-advancement; according to Francis Hyland, who we can trust, he was extremely secretive and had a taste for the tyrannical style of governance. This is typical of leaders of all criminal, not necessarily terrorist, groups. These personal traits and his pathological desire to remain in command at all costs ended in disagreements within ASALA: *“The dispute within ASALA finally erupted on 15 July, 1983, when the ASALA dissidents actually carried out assassinations of two ASALA leaders—Khatchig Havarian and Vicken Aivazian—at an ASALA camp in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley”* (pp. 58-59). At the early stage of ASALA (which began with the bombing of the World Council of Churches facil-

¹⁷ See: “The Reality,” *Armenian Reporter*, 24 January, 1985.

ity in Beirut on 20 January, 1975), they were Hagopian's closest comrades-in-arms. "Predictably, Mujahed's initial reaction was to blame Turkey and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, rather than admit to either personal or organizational failure" (p. 59); "in a final frenzy of retribution, Mujahed searched for and located a number of ASALA dissidents whom he believed responsible for the 15 and 16 July killings of Aivazian and Havarian. While publicly blaming the CIA and Turkey's MIT, Mujahed traced Garlen Ananian and Aram Vartanian to Damascus, Syria, and, on 16 August, executed both men" (p. 53). He did not want to be blamed for his personal involvement in the first two murders, which echoed far and wide in the Armenian Diaspora. It seems that by staging public executions of his rivals, Hagopian was copying the American mafia: by that time he had abandoned his earlier image of a "fighter for people's happiness."

In his private life too, he tended to succumb to down-to-earth temptations and hedonistic pleasures, preferring these to the asceticism of a professional revolutionary whose life was dedicated to lofty ideas: "Glimmers of suspicion surfaced later over allegations of misappropriation of ASALA funds by Mujahed. The inability to account for almost eleven pounds of gold bullion collected in the Iranian-Armenian communities, and suspicions that it may have financed the purchase of a hotel near Athens, added to the discontent within ASALA" (p. 59). After being forced to flee from Beirut along with Palestinian comrades in 1982 as a result of the Israeli attack on the south of Lebanon and the raid by armored and mechanized infantry formations of the Israeli Defense Forces, "Mujahed allegedly became a frequent traveler. Reports from a number of sources indicate that Mujahed shuttled between the Middle East, primarily Damascus and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, with lesser time spent in Libya, and Europe. In Europe, he admitted having been in France in 1983, rebuilding his shattered operational network there, and is reported to have also been in Berlin. Mujahed's favorite place, however, apparently was Greece. In addition to an affiliated political organization, The Popular Movement for ASALA, a number of colleagues from Beirut also were ensconced in Athens. Encouraged by the feeling of relative safety arising from the political climate in the Greece of Andreas Papandreou, Mujahed also reportedly established at least one front firm, Middle East Book Distribution, to handle laundered ASALA funds. He also allegedly enjoyed the nightclubs of the Piraeus district of Athens, in the company of some of his lieutenants and local dance hostesses. In addition to a house in the Glyfada area of Athens and the Popular Movement office in the Neos Kosmos District, Mujahed also reportedly had several apartments in the area behind the Acropolis" (p. 59).

Hagop Hagopian's life story is the best confirmation that business, politics, and crime in the top crust of the Armenian Diaspora were never separated. This means that transnational Armenian terrorism not only pursued lofty ethnopolitical aims, it was not alien to the mercantile tasks addressed either; not infrequently, business deals were accompanied by violence against former comrades-in-arms.

"Finally, on 28 April, 1988, elements probably from within the Armenian terrorist movement ended what "The Reality" had termed a reign of terror. At 4:30 AM, a man and a woman emerged from an apartment building in the Paleo Faliron suburb of Athens and walked toward a nearby car. The man never reached the car, intended to take him to the Athens Airport for a flight to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Two hooded men emerged from a nearby van, armed with sawed-off shotguns. Seeing them and realizing their intent, the man turned and ran back toward his home. The two men opened fire, knocking their target to the ground, then fired again at close range with the sawed-off shotguns (known as lupara traditionally associated with Cosa Nostra, the Italian organized crime group dominant in Sicily.—O.K.)" (pp. 59-60). This allowed the Greek police to classify the murder as purely criminal rather than political.

Francis Hyland, who was either a CIA officer or was employed by American special services as an expert or an editor, supplied a huge amount of information about ASALA terrorist and operational activities and structure.

On the other hand, I can hardly agree with him when he writes that ASALA spoke of itself as a political organization with a corresponding program of action. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia was devised and set up as a clandestine terrorist organization, its true purpose camouflaged by political slogans, declarations, and communiqués. This requires no further explanations or specifications.

Francis Hyland wrote further: “*The view that ASALA presented to outsiders was of a tightly knit group, but one that had a Central Committee comprising several members... The style of leadership was said to be ‘collegial’... Structurally, ASALA was said to be divided into two branches, a political one with the responsibility for recruitment and indoctrination, and a military branch to carry out operations. Like most of the secretive organizations of the era, ASALA was said to be organized in the classic terrorist cell structure much like the Irish Republican Army*” (pp. 29-30). To ensure the continued existence and activities of clandestine fighters stationed in different countries, ASALA set up affiliated sociopolitical structures—societies or parties—scattered across the world, but operating under the same name—Popular Movement for ASALA or ASALA-Popular Movement (PMASALA or ASALA-PM). Organizationally, all the ASALA-PM branches were accountable to the political directorate and transferred to it the money they received from sponsors, weapons, and explosives, as well as operational information and intelligence. In fact, ASALA not only copied “the classic terrorist cell structure much like the Irish Republican Army,” but also borrowed certain methods from special services and ethnocriminal groups of the Cosa Nostra or Camorra type. This was logical and natural: these American-Sicilian and American-Neapolitan structures had accumulated a wealth of experience throughout the many decades of their activities. It should be said, however, that Hagop Hago-pian could not generalize and use this experience without special training or expert support. No one doubted that ASALA was, partly, a brainchild of the experts of secret wars.

This is confirmed by the fact that Michael Gunter described and Francis Hyland later specified in his *Armenian Terrorism* the ways and methods through which ASALA received money and material-technical support: “*The key word with regard to ASALA’s funding is ‘variety.’ At various times, according to a number of sources, ASALA employed diverse tactics, receiving support in various forms from various sources. ASALA received support from Armenians, non-Armenians, groups, and states. The support was sometimes given freely, sometimes grudgingly, sometimes fearfully. The support was both financial and ‘in kind’—weapons, explosives, training facilities*” (p. 32). ASALA solicited funds from the Armenian communities throughout the Diaspora under the slogan of the struggle for the liberation of Armenia; the richest members of the Armenian Diaspora in different countries were its main targets. Here is what Hyland wrote: “*Vicken Charkhutian, who was charged with two others in the attempted bombing of Air Canada’s Los Angeles terminal in May of 1982, was also charged with attempting to extort \$150,000 from the Armenian-American owners of a chain of carpet stores in California. Ironically, Charkhutian’s attempt to bomb Air Canada was in retaliation for the arrests in Canada of four Canadian-Armenians on charges of attempting to extort funds from wealthy Canadians in the Toronto area*” (pp. 32-33). This means that, in the 1970s-1990s in North America, ASALA terrorists had not moved far from the ways and methods employed by ASALA terrorists in the early twentieth century in the Ottoman and Russian empires.

Extortion was not enough to maintain the scope of ASALA activities; it also relied on the assistance extended by foreign states that used Armenian terrorism in their interests. In Lebanon, the Armenian fighters could always count on dwelling, food, training, office facilities, communication means, print shops, weapons, and explosives supplied by the Palestinians.

Libya, Syria, and Iran gave money and allowed the conscription of local Armenians or followers of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Much has been written about this in Research Paper of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence.

ASALA could expect money from ASALA-PM, the members of which were involved in drug trafficking and drug trade in Western Europe.¹⁸ The main accusations came from Turkish authors, the impartiality and adequacy of which cannot be completely trusted. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that in several European countries, ASALA supporters were sentenced for their personal involvement in illegal drug trafficking, which points to ASALA's indirect involvement in this business. There is no evidence that ASALA earned money through drug trafficking. I tend to agree with Francis Hyland, who wrote: "*The most famous of the cases, and the one most often cited, is the Shoemaker's Gang in Sweden and Denmark. The twenty-four people arrested in October 1981 for narcotics smuggling included nineteen individuals of Armenian heritage; names such as Vartanian, Zamazanian, Kasapian, and Keshishian tend to stand out in Scandinavia. Although firearms, ASALA publications, and documents said to 'prove' membership in Armenian terrorist organizations were found in the homes of two of those arrested, Swedish authorities were unable to establish a link between the Shoemaker's Gang and an Armenian terrorist group*" (p. 33).

Young Armenians trying to survive in war-torn Lebanon of 1975-1990, attracted by ASALA's obvious financial sustainability, formed the bulk of the action wing or ASALA's directorate. "*Simply bringing together numbers of like-minded individuals to consider a topic of common concern, whether they are academicians, volunteer firefighters, or budding revolutionaries, is an extremely effective recruiting tool. In the case of ASALA, such an opportunity occurred in 1979, when the First Armenian Congress was held in Paris. The gathering served as an opportunity for French-Armenians to contact the organization. Alek Yenikomshian was a key nexus in the development of such contacts*" (p. 34). ASALA relied on moral and physical coercion to draw individual members into terrorist acts. Francis Hyland (close to American special services) offered the following example: "*Levon Ekmekjian, the surviving commando from the August 1982 Ankara attack, told his Turkish interrogators that he joined ASALA because of 'pressures' put on him by two men he identified as Mahram Arabian and Minnas Simonian*" (ibidem).

When conscripting new fighters and supporters, ASALA functionaries took special pains to prevent penetration of agents of foreign special services; members of the rivaling Armenian political and terrorist structures—ARF Dashnaktsutun and JCAG which it funded—were especially unwelcome. All potential volunteers or conscripts were rigorously checked and liquidated if the slightest doubt arose that they belonged to the special services or "rivals." Francis Hyland offered the following as an example: "*'Walk-ins' were not received well by ASALA, probably because of the fear of penetration by, among others, the Tashnak Party. Garlen Ananian, literally a 'walk-in' from Iran in 1983, arrived in Syria, only to be locked in a small room for two months, refused permission to return to Iran, beaten, and finally shot to death*" (p. 34).

American analysts identified three periods in ASALA's terrorist activities they called phases. The first began in early 1975 and lasted until early 1980; the second lasted from early 1980 to the fall of 1981, and the third from the fall of 1981 to July 1983.

During the first period, the action wing of ASALA was led by Hagop Darakjian; his first political assassination made ASALA widely known outside the Armenian community of Lebanon. On 16 February, 1976, he, armed with a silenced pistol, killed Oktar Cirit, First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy, in an amusement arcade in Beirut's Hamra district. For a while he

¹⁸ For more details, see: *International Terrorism and Drug Connection*, Collection of Reports, Ankara University Press, Ankara, 1984.

remained ASALA's terrorist No. 1 and led the organization's activity throughout almost the whole of 1976, while Hagop Hagopian was recovering from the wound he received from Israeli agents as punishment for his previous terrorist activities. By 1979, Darakjian's organizational involvement and operational effectiveness had dropped considerably due to leukemia.

The second period began with the advent of new people who received permission to be involved in operations and leadership; the newcomers, born outside the Middle East and Maghreb, figured prominently in ASALA's terrorist activities. Suzy Mahseredjian, Monte Melkonian, Pierre Gulumian, Mardiros Jamgotchian, and Khatchig Havarian shouldered the task of heading individual spheres of terrorist and other activities. Hagop Hagopian was left to look after administration and funding. During 1980, ASALA established its first permanent contingent in a training camp in Lebanon; little by little, ASALA took on more of the trappings of an organization—real estate, office space, and sustained personnel recruitment effort. This was when ASALA established contacts with the Armenian National Movement of France and organized ASALA-PM groups in North America, and also resumed contacts with Armenian nationalists in Iran (who had gone underground after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in this country). Suzy Mahseredjian helped establish contacts with the Armenian community of France, while an organizational relationship between ASALA and Armenian activists in Iran, Canada, and Great Britain was established largely due to the efforts of California-born Monte Melkonian.¹⁹ It was their efforts that transformed ASALA from a group of Armenian terrorists based in Lebanon and partly in Syria into a transnational terrorist structure that spread its influence to Armenian diasporas in practically all countries of the world.

New people, new resources and, hence, new possibilities increased the number of attacks on Turkish facilities (diplomatic missions, tourist companies, offices of Turkish airlines) and raised them to a higher level. It was the newcomers who organized and carried out the assassination of Turkish Administrative Attaché in Greece Galip Özmen and his daughter Neslihan Özmen in Athens on 31 July, 1980; his wife and two sons were wounded. On 5 August, 1980, they attacked the Turkish Consulate in Lyon, France; on 26 September, 1980, they wounded the Turkish Press Attaché in Paris; on 4 March, 1981, Reşat Moralı, Turkish Labor Attaché, and Tecelli Arı, Religious Affairs Official, were assassinated in Paris. So-called Operation Van can be described as an apotheosis of the second stage of ASALA's terrorist activities. Four Armenian fighters (Vahgen Sislian, Hagop Gulfian, Khevork Guzelian, and Aram Basmajian), all of them born in Lebanon, captured the Turkish consulate in Paris. The terrorists, who operated as Iegiya Keshishian Group (to honor the Armenian drug trafficker earlier arrested in Sweden and suspected of cooperation with ASALA terrorists), held the building for 15 hours; they seriously wounded Consul Kaya Inal and security man Cemal Özen, who later died in a hospital.

This resounding and successful operation of ASALA fighters concluded the second stage. The situation in which it was carried out, along with later events, neutralized its leaders and the coordinators of the terrorist acts. On 3 October, 1980, after the premature detonation of a handmade bomb, Suzy Mahseredjian (coordinator of criminal activities in France, Switzerland, and Luxemburg) and Alek Yenikomshian (head of the ASALA political wing) were arrested in a hotel room in Geneva. On 17 March, 1981, Hagop Darakjian, head of ASALA's action wing, died of leukemia; on 11 November, 1981, Monte Melkonian, who replaced him, was arrested in France.

The organization responded with a series of terrorist attacks on Swiss and French facilities (the chronology of which can be found in Appendix 2). Terrorists attacked public places in Switzerland and France, the offices of their airlines, banks, and other Swiss and French com-

¹⁹ See: A. Kurz and A. Mirari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool*, Jerusalem Post, Jerusalem, 1985, p. 37.

mercial structures in other countries, accompanied by demands of the immediate liberation of Mahseredjian, Yenikomshian, and Melkonian. This had nothing in common with the stated aim of “happiness of the Armenian people in its historical homeland,” but instead, brought to mind criminal wars waged by criminal syndicates and governments of certain countries of Central and South America or Central Africa. In the fall of 1981, the world, European, and even Armenian public began gradually learning to regard ASALA not as a patriotic organization waging a national-liberation struggle by means of methods of revolutionary violence, but as a band of extortionists and killers headed by power-hungry paranoiac Hagop Hagopian.

The third, and final, period began in late 1981 and ended in July 1983, when the organization fell apart. Israel’s invasion of Southern Lebanon (also known as Operation Peace for Galilee) pushed the organization to the brink of physical survival and forced it to move to much safer Damascus. The loss of organizational and technical infrastructure and of a larger share of the funding from the Armenian community of Lebanon caused a deep internal crisis in ASALA and, as could be expected, intensified the authoritarian trends among the leaders, who dangled carrots and relied on the stick. Hagop Hagopian and his cronies, Vicken Aivazian and Varoujan Garbidian, murdered several ASALA fighters fed up of their tyrannical methods. Arsen Vartanian, murdered on 21 October, 1981 for allegedly absconding with funds and weapons, was the first victim of the period of “internally directed violence.” In February 1982, Hagop Hagopian ordered the execution of Hamo Moskovian, responsible for contacts with the youth, who was suspected by his “elder comrades” of cooperating with the Lebanese police and security forces. The next member to be killed, a blind man named Nishan, had been locked in a cell by Hagop Hagopian on suspicion of conspiring with Hamo Moskovian and executed with 35 rounds of pistol fire directed at Nishan’s head, neck, and chest. Soon after, in June or July 1982, Sarkis Kiulkhandjian, known as Khomeini among the Armenians and who had done a great deal of work in *Hayastan* (Armenia) magazine published by this terrorist organization, was murdered by Hagop Hagopian with a single round to the back of the head for refusing to continue working without payment. The attempted murder of Ara Toranian, the leader of the Armenian National Movement, ultimately discredited ASALA in the eyes of the world Armenian Diaspora. On 21 March, 1983, the detonator mechanism on a bomb attached to his car malfunctioned. Less than two weeks later, a package bomb intercepted by Canadian authorities on its way to Haroutiun Kevork, leader of ASALA-PM, a formerly sympathetic group of Canadian-Armenians, was the last straw.

Francis Hyland, who compared the methods, content, and results of the terrorist activities of ASALA and other transnational groups of Armenian terrorists (JCAG, ARA, and NAR in particular), offered the following ironical comments about ASALA and its methods: “*ASALA’s operations, consisting mainly of assassinations and bomb attacks, are carried out by small squads, typically comprising two to four ASALA members. The consensus of a number of counterterrorism specialists was that those tactics made ASALA only marginally effective in the military sphere. A U.S. State Department analysis (we mean Corsun’s paper mentioned above.—O.K.) termed ASALA ‘unsophisticated’ in comparison with other groups, citing the fact that ASALA had never demonstrated the ability to hit a ‘hard’ target. The only exceptions cited were the takeover of the Turkish Consulate in Paris on 24 September, 1981—the so-called “Van” Operation—and the attempted assassination of the Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam on 21 July, 1982.*” However, a 1985 study by counterterrorist authorities characterized ASALA overall as less effective than JCAG/ARA. “*Specifically on assassinations, ASALA was judged to be neither as likely to attempt them nor as proficient as JCAG/ARA. ASALA, the study concluded, was more likely to use explosive devices than was JCAG/ARA; however, ASALA’s bombs were not as reliable nor were they as powerful. On a number of occasions ... the devices malfunctioned... ASALA was also more likely than JCAG to use a*

large car bomb, according to the study, a result of the training provided by Palestinian and other Arab groups” (pp. 37-38).

The above suggests that ASALA was seeking effects rather than efficiency; its terrorist attacks were ill organized and ill prepared, which means that Hagop Hagopian set up ASALA as a commercial enterprise, rather than a serious political or terrorist structure. Its terrorist acts and attacks carried out by half-baked terrorists, who came cheaply, provided him with the opportunity to seek donations from the Armenian diasporas scattered across the world. In fact, after several years of functioning (or malfunctioning), ASALA became a source of personal enrichment for Hagopian and some of his cronies (who escaped assassination at his hands). This transformation of a terrorist organization into a commercial structure of political terror inevitably caused its degradation and decline, a graphic illustration of the fact that commercialization of an idea leads to its profanation and degradation.

There was another aspect of ASALA’s terrorist activity that blackened its image in the eyes of the Europeans (who, in the beginning, sympathized with the idea of Armenian national statehood in the Republic of Turkey). I have in mind what Hyland called “retributive bombing campaigns,” the practice of organizing explosions in the offices of European official or commercial structures in European countries or outside them, accompanied by demands to liberate fighters arrested for involvement in terrorist acts or preparations for terrorist acts. These acts had four distinctive features: first, they were never aimed at the legal property of commercial structures or businesses of the Republic of Turkey that, in fact, belonged to European legal persons. Second, the “retributive bombing campaigns” were carried out by one or several fighting groups that never called themselves ASALA, but used different names that pointed to the political aims each particular group was pursuing through its terrorist acts. Third, terrorists no longer sought attention to their demands to liberate their comrades-in-arms; they sought maximum material damage and maximum loss of life. Fourth, when their demands to liberate their comrades were fulfilled, the attacks did not stop. A wave of aftershocks of a sort followed, which means that each of the operational ASALA groups continued its terrorist acts until it had run out of material and technical resources.

The first major retributive bombing campaign of this sort was carried out on 3 October, 1980 by ASALA fighters against the Swiss Government for the arrest of Alek Yenikomshian and Suzy Mahseredjian. The two had been assembling an explosive device in a Geneva hotel room when a malfunction occurred. In the British vernacular, Alek and Suzy “scored an own goal,” with Alek losing his left hand and his sight. Their arrest and imprisonment was followed by a series of eighteen bombings by the 3rd of October Group, the ASALA *nom de guerre* of the moment. They were aimed at the courthouse in Bern and offices of Swissair company in different countries of the world (a complete list of the targets can be found in Appendices 2 and 3A).

The authorities of Switzerland retreated under the pressure: Alek and Suzy were sentenced on parole, set free, and banned from Switzerland for the next 15 years. A year later, Switzerland regretted it had been so lenient.

The second round of “retributive bombing campaign” against facilities that belonged to the legal persons of Switzerland (inside and outside the country) was caused by the arrest of Mardiros Jamgotchian, who, on 9 June, 1981, assassinated Turkish Consulate Secretary Mehmet Savaş Yergüz in Geneva. The terrorists supported their demands with a series of 15 bombings, the range of which even reached the United States. They demonstrated the global transnational nature of Armenian terrorism. The operational ASALA group, which called itself the 9th of June Group, was responsible for five more bombings, making a total of twenty, following Jamgotchian’s sentence in December of 1981 to fifteen years in prison. This time the Swiss authorities refused to retreat and brought the court procedure to its lawful and logical conclusion; this convinced the terrorists that further attacks were useless.

France had its share of “retributive bombing campaign” as a way to force its authorities to liberate the fighters arrested in its territory. I have already written that, on 24 September, 1981, four Armenian terrorists captured the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in France, took 50 hostages, and held them for 15 hours. Two Turkish diplomats were heavily wounded. After the arrest of the terrorists, the September France Group, an ASALA *ad hoc* operational group, launched a series of bombings; this went beyond the thin line that separated “ideological” terrorism from “criminal” and caused casualties (the group bombed McDonalds in Paris and attacked passengers on a pleasure boat with hand grenades).

The biggest “retributive bombing campaign” unfolded in support of Monte Melkonian, ASALA’s Terrorist No. 2, who was wanted by Interpol as a suspect in the attempted assassination on 25 October, 1981 of Second Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Rome Gokberk Ergenekon and arrested at Orly Airport in Paris when he tried to board an international flight under the false name of Dimitriu Giorgiu. The group that undertook the task of “retributive bombing” and called itself the Orly Group committed 18 acts of bombing across the world (a complete list can be found in Appendices 2 and 3A)—in Western Europe, Western Asia, and North America—to become additional confirmation that Armenian terrorism of the last quarter of the twentieth century was a transnational phenomenon: it could commit crimes anywhere in the world where Armenians lived, while the Diaspora was the breeding ground of its potential.

The special services of the United States and Canada delivered the first serious blow on ASALA when on 8 April, 1982 one of its groups gravely wounded Trade and Commercial Counselor of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa Kemaletten “Kani” Gungor with three rounds of pistol fire. The investigation of the attempted assassination of the diplomat protected by international law led to the arrests of Haroutiun Kevork, Haig Balian, Haig Karakhanian, and Melkon Karakhanian in Toronto on 18 and 20 May, 1982. ASALA responded with the method tested in Switzerland and France: it knocked together an operational group out of Armenians living in North America to start a bombing campaign to persuade the Canadian authorities to set free the arrested fighters. The result was disastrous: the police and FBI investigators found and defused an explosive device at the Air Canada terminal in the airport in Los Angeles (California, U.S.). Three out of four members of a Los Angeles-area ASALA cell—Hratch Kozibioukian, his wife, Siranouche, and Varant Chirinian—were arrested. The leader of this group, an Iraqi-Armenian U.S. citizen, Vicken Charkhutian, fled to Lebanon, where he became the closest crony of Hagop Hagopian; later he moved to France. The American Armenian Diaspora lost Charkhutian, the key ASALA bomb-maker in North America, as a result of which “the military potential in North America was almost completely stifled.”

In the summer of 1982 in France, ASALA made another, and as it turned out last, attempt at “retributive bombing” when Charkhutian was arrested by the French authorities at the U.S.’s request. Pierre Gulumian, ASALA’s chief bomb-maker in France, began yet another bombing campaign under the revived name of the “Orly Group.” All the attacks were organized in crowded places so as to kill as many people as possible; his first attack, on 20 July, 1982, did not produce the desired effect; on 24 July, only two persons were wounded, while on 30 July, Gulumian was killed during the premature detonation of the third handmade device. The French police, responding to the explosion, discovered that Gulumian’s villa was also used as an arms depot for Palestinians who lived by means of street robberies; Pierre’s brother, Katchadur, and another resident, Charles Sansonetti, a Corsican, whose wife was of Armenian heritage, were arrested.

Terrorist acts in civilian airports did nothing for ASALA’s reputation either. I have already written about an averted explosion in the logistic terminal of Air Canada at Los Angeles airport, which deprived the North American ASALA branch of its operational network. This was the first, but not the last, Armenian terrorist act in a civilian airport. There were at least two

others that caused numerous casualties. The first was carried out in Ankara's Esenboga Airport on 7 August, 1982, leaving 10 dead and 71 wounded. A two-man commando team led by Zohrab Sarkissian and assisted by Levon Ekmekjian, traveling on false Egyptian passports, managed to set off a grenade and open submachine-gun fire. Sarkissian died in the Turkish counterattack and Ekmekjian was hanged on 29 January, 1983 after an extended interrogation and trial. While the Turkish authorities were investigating the terrorist attack, ASALA planned and carried out an attempt to liberate Levon Ekmekjian by exchanging for him the Turkish Ambassador to the U.K., who should have been taken hostage. Zaven Bedros, a Syrian-Armenian with no training or experience, armed with a pistol and several hand grenades, was sent to London where he was arrested by British authorities in his London hotel. On 22 January, 1983, a week before Ekmekjian's scheduled execution, ASALA made another, absolutely ridiculous attempt to put pressure on the Turkish authorities. On 22 January, Apraham Tomasian entered the Turkish Airlines office in Paris and hurled two grenades. Fortunately for those in the office, Tomasian had been supplied by ASALA with offensive, stun-type grenades rather than the anti-personnel, fragmentation-type, and they did little damage beyond frightening those in the office. Tomasian was arrested, tried, and sent to prison, but ASALA did nothing to liberate this clumsy oaf.

The most resounding of the ASALA's crimes took place at Orly airport on 15 July, 1983 when a bomb exploded in front of the check-in counter of Turkish Airlines, killing 8 people (four died on the spot, while the other four died later in hospital) and injuring 55.

Two of the eight killed were Turks; the others were four Frenchmen, one Swede, and one American. The bomb contained half a kilo of Simtex and synthetic explosive produced in Czechoslovakia connected with four portable gas cylinders, which explains the bad burns of the victims. The police detained 51 persons associated with ASALA; eleven of them were brought to the prosecutor's office; six, including Varugan Karapetian, the main executor, were charged with organizing and carrying out the terrorist act. He admitted his guilt and said that the bomb had exploded prematurely: it was expected to explode in the aircraft during the flight from Paris to Istanbul. He also said that the bomb had been made in the apartment of his friend Havaness Semirchy. At the airport, Karapetian asked one of the passengers to check in one of his cases on the pretext of having too many and paid \$65 for the service. The bomb in the case exploded on the check-in platform, which saved several hundred lives. Soon, another Turkish Armenian, Nair Soner, was arrested in the port of Marseilles, where he had arrived by train from Paris in the hope of leaving France by sea. As an expert in electronics, he had bought the gas cylinders and made the bomb. The terrorist act in Orly was a transnational crime, while the citizenship of its victims made it an international crime.

At the court hearings held in Créteil, a suburb of Paris, Karapetian withdrew the testimony he had given during the interrogation and, along with the other accused, insisted that he was not guilty. On 3 March, 1985, the jury trial adjudged Karapetian guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Two of his abettors were sentenced to different terms: Nair Soner, to 15 years in prison, and Havaness Semirchy, to 10 years. The jury explained the lighter sentences by attenuating circumstances (both had pleaded guilty and given testimonies against Karapetian).²⁰ In 2001, after 17 years in prison, Karapetian was released and deported from France to Armenia. On 4 May, 2001, he was received by Prime Minister of Armenia Andranik Markarian, who was highly satisfied with his release. Shortly before that, Mayor of Yerevan

²⁰ For more details, see: *Terrorist Attack at Orly, Statements and Evidence Presented at the Trial: 19 February-2 March, 1985*, University of Ankara, Ankara, 1985; *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism*; A. Vatandaş, *ASALA Operasyonları Aslında Ne Oldu?* Alfa Yayınları, Ankara, 2005; D.J. Whittaker, *Terrorists and Terrorism in the Contemporary World*, Taylor & Francis, Routledge, 2004.

Robert Nazarian promised Karapetian, a “merited master of ASALA terror,” employment and housing.

The terrorist act in Orly exacerbated the fundamental contradictions among the ASALA leaders on methods and tactics. To be more exact, this was a clash between terrorist No. 1 Hagop Hagopian and terrorist No. 2 Monte Melkonian over complete control, their deliberations about methods and tactics being a smokescreen. On 15 July, 1983, the terrorist organization split into a group of renegades headed by Melkonian that called itself the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia-Revolutionary Movement or ASALA-RM, a “revolutionary” (read terrorist) organization, and a group remaining loyal to Hagop Hagopian. After losing many of its members and sources of funding, the group Hagopian set up in 1975 was gradually declining. The younger members did not miss the chance to move forward and, free from the somber shadows of past mistakes and failures, begin anew (for the history of ASALA-RM, see below).

In the 1970s-1990s, the mainstream of transnational Armenian terrorism was not limited to the odious Armenian Diaspora of Lebanon that had completely compromised itself in the eyes of the rest of the world. It included several other groups of lesser scope, yet comparable effects, and a far from positive stamp on history. The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, the action wing of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutium, came second in terms of number of terrorist acts. Unlike ASALA, JCAG was integrated into the Armenian Diaspora to a greater extent and even enjoyed the direct support of the local branches of Dashnaksutium scattered all over the world or, at least, across the places where Armenian commerce and entrepreneurship were present. It was also encouraged by the Armenian Apostolic Church and its structures in Europe and North America.²¹ Its hierarchs avoided direct identification with its followers who cooperated with JCAG; they never helped those who were arrested, brought to court, and convicted, although they never tried to prevent these crimes, that is, they tacitly approved of the JCAG terrorist methods. In this sense, JCAG was more Westernized than ASALA; it did not follow Palestinian and other Arab terrorists, who fought against Israel, but sought inspiration during the earlier period of Dashnaksutium, viz. the turn of the twentieth century, when officials, military, and policemen of the Russian and Ottoman empires were murdered in huge numbers (see Chapter Three). This means that, unlike the slightly marginalized ASALA, JCAG preferred the traditional or even fundamentalist ideology of transnational Armenian terrorism. JCAG terrorism of the last quarter of the twentieth century was not as mass-oriented, but operationally more efficient than the “brutal” methods of ASALA.

As an official action wing of ARF Dashnaksutium, JCAG had to share its nationalist ideology, while its fighters had to clothe each of their terrorist acts in political garb. The attitude of JCAG and ASALA to the Soviet Union was very different. The former and Dashnaksutium were profoundly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian and held Soviet Russia, along with the Republic of Turkey, responsible for the death of the Dashnak Republic of Armenia on 2 December, 1920.²² ASALA, on the other hand, regarded the Soviet Union as a friendly state and believed that the Soviet Armenians should join the independent Armenian state when it became a fact in the territory of the Republic of Turkey. This loyalty is easily explained by Soviet support of the PLO, which, in turn, extended material and technical aid to ASALA.

Throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, JCAG kept a low profile in the mainstream of transnational terrorism and preferred to remain in the shadow of ASALA. JCAG assumed responsibility for its first terrorist act on 22 October, 1975, nine months after the first

²¹ See: Y. Ternon, *The Armenian Cause*, Caravan Books, New York, 1985, pp. 196-197.

²² See: *Ibid.*, p. 93.

official terrorist act of ASALA. Dashnaksutiun needed time to set up a terrorist structure of its own; it wanted to keep it under strict control so as “to stem the flow of young males to ASALA” and local cells of Hunchak, hugely popular among the Armenians of the Middle East, especially compared to other parts of the world.²³ This means that Dashnaksutiun had no choice but to set up JCAG as a countermeasure designed, if not to oppose, then to subdue the effect of ASALA as a radical terrorist group. In fact, it was a very natural response to the radicalization of the socially active part of the Armenian Diaspora. This trend could not be banned, therefore it had to be directed at a higher organizational level and through tighter discipline, which made JCAG terrorist attacks more complicated, or even more refined operationally and tactically; they were much more expensive and much more effective too.

A comparison between the ASALA and JCAG terrorist acts reveals fundamental tactical differences. ASALA fighters, as amateur pyrotechnics, preferred bombs, while JCAG mainly relied on small arms (pistols, machine guns, or submachine guns); its fighters followed in the footsteps of their historical and ideological predecessors of ARF Dashnaksutiun—they preferred individual, not collective, terror and never wanted to operate in crowded places (something which the ASALA fighters never took into account in the first half of the 1980s: not infrequently, their terrorist attacks killed casual bystanders). JCAG terrorists never missed a chance to leave a “black mark” (a piece of cloth with its name or symbol) to assume responsibility. ASALA preferred to inform the world about its involvement by calling the media by telephone.²⁴ The two rivals used their own and very distinctive methods; this made it impossible for them to claim the doubtful glory of committing a political crime perpetrated by the rival. On the other hand, this did not exclude a tug-of-war—each was seeking publicity at the expense of the other, of which I have written above.

The JCAG fighters preferred Turkish diplomats and their families (that is, Turkish citizens protected by international laws) as targets of their terrorist attacks. The preferable tactics involved shooting them in cars with diplomatic number plates when they stopped at traffic lights. Two fighters approached the car from both sides; one of them shot through the door at the diplomat who normally rode in the front seat, while the second positioned himself slightly behind on the driver’s side to be ready to kill him if he tried to escape or catch the killer. Francis Hyland, who was close to the American special services, wrote that out of 21 attempts on the lives of Turkish diplomats, two-thirds were made by JCAG fighters (before it became the Armenian Revolutionary Army) using the tactics described above.²⁵

It should be said that these tactics required a lot of time and intensive operational preparations: the diplomats’ itinerary had to be checked and rechecked, their routes verified, and the intensity of traffic on the selected street or at the relevant crossroads appraised. This means that the fighters were taught to carry out surveillance and counter-surveillance; several pairs of fighters had to be trained for each terrorist act so as not to be taken unawares if the victim changed the route or moved faster than expected. Success depended mainly on luck: the terrorists had to wait for days, weeks, or even months for the victim to reach the designated place at the designated time. This method is better described as an exhausting hunt that required a lot of strength and willpower and in which success or failure depended on the fighters’ personal moral qualities and their readiness to endure privations and whims of fortune. The JCAG fighters were obviously better trained than their ASALA colleagues; they were better motivated and, therefore, caused much more trouble for the law-enforcement agencies and special services.

²³ See: F.P. Hyland, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

²⁴ See: A. Kurz, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

²⁵ See: F.P. Hyland, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

I have already written that unlike ASALA, JCAG limited the involvement of each particular fighter to one terrorist act; its fighters could not expect support if they failed at the preliminary stage or were arrested after the act of terror. They were trained for one specific act, the level of training being close, but not equal, judging by the failures of JCAG fighters, to that achieved by the special services. The JCAG terrorist acts required much more money and much more effort than the ASALA crimes of terror. Dashnaksutiun had to pour money into terrorist activities and rely on the public, political, and terrorist structures of the Armenian Diaspora throughout the world.

Fighters used machine guns in the streets and at crossroads; in some cases, the JCAG terrorists used handmade explosive devices that were more complicated than those employed by ASALA (its terrorists sometimes relied on primitive alarm clocks to detonate the device). On 8 July, 1979, air-burst bombs were used in three simultaneous attacks: “at the office of the Turkish Labor Attaché, the Turkish Bureau of the OECD, and at a Turkish Tourism Information Office, all in Paris.”²⁶ On 20 November, 1981, a similar device was used by JCAG fighters in the office of the Turkish Consulate in Los Angeles. On 20 June, 1984, in Vienna, a car, better described as an air-burst bomb loaded with several kilos of explosives, killed Erdoğan Özen, Trade and Labor Attaché at the Turkish Embassy in Vienna. This means that the JCAG fighters were superior to ASALA fighters when it came to subjective training and technical equipment.

The higher professional level of the JCAG fighters is explained by the organizationally superior selection and training structures that relied on the Dashnaksutiun party structure and all sorts of legal organizations of Armenian youth functioning in many countries around the world. The Armenian Youth Federation (AYF), which functions in the United States, was and remains the most active among them, its stated aim being preservation of national and cultural specifics among the younger generation of the American Armenian Diaspora with the help of cultural and sports events. “All five JCAG members convicted of possession of explosives in the October 1982 attempt to bomb the Turkish Consulate in Philadelphia are known to have been AYF members.”²⁷ Hampig Sassounian, another JCAG assassin, had been closely connected with AYF before he assassinated Turkish Consul Kemal Arıkan. He was brought to court and sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder.²⁸

Many of the JCAG terrorist attacks in the United States failed because of inadequate communication among the members and the absence of a system of direction and control at the stages of planning and preparation for terrorist acts. Fighters and their leaders naively believed that international telephone communication guaranteed the safety of their contacts. In fact, late in the 1970s, the American special services established total control over telephone communication, including exchanges between Armenian terrorists. In this way, they prevented crimes of terror and identified practically the entire terrorist network of JCAG in North America. This prevented explosions at the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey in Philadelphia in October 1982, as well as the blowing up of a commercial cargo airplane in Los Angeles airport (Vicken Hovsepien, head of the Californian JCAG cell was arrested when trying to plant an explosive device). This means that the successes of the American special services were based on technical equipment and maximum possible control of the public and private lives of people in different countries. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, American technical equipment was (and remains) superior to West European, to say nothing of that of the Middle East or Western Asia. This explains why Armenian terrorist acts in the United States were few and

²⁶ E.F. Mickolus, *Transnational Terrorism: A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1980, p. 764.

²⁷ M.M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1986, p. 78.

²⁸ See: Y. Ternon, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

far between, while their number in Western Europe was counted in the hundreds. In other words, the number of crimes of terror is inversely proportional to the authorities and information and technical possibilities of the special services in the particular country.

This does not mean that JCAG fighters never tried to camouflage their criminal activities; however, their efforts remained amateurish: they merely copied the primitive methods used by their colleagues from ASALA. The favorite way to avoid responsibility was to use different names; JCAG operational groups often relied on this method to prevent successful investigation of their crimes. *“In connection with three operations, all assassinations, the JCAG/ARA is known to have given a name to the commando unit. Its first attack, the 22 October, 1975 assassination of the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna [Daniş Tunalıgıl], was proclaimed as an action of the ‘Boldikian Group’; JCAG/ARA announced that the killings in Madrid of the wife of the Turkish Ambassador to Spain [Necla Kuneralp], [her brother,] a retired Ambassador [Beşir Balcioğlu], and their driver, on 2 June, 1978 had been carried out by the Ohannes Kazandjian Group; finally, the 12 October, 1979 murder of the son of the Turkish Ambassador to The Hague [Ahmet Benler] was attributed by the JCAG/ARA to the Kevork Tchavouche Group.”*²⁹ These primitive tricks could dupe no one; investigating officers tracked down the true culprits and denounced them; the criminals were punished. The JCAG leaders, however, did not drop the bad habit: on 14 July, 1983, the organization changed its name to the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) to signify that this transnational terrorist structure had entered a new stage of its activities. After the re-branding (which coincided with the split in ASALA), JCAG/ARA went on with its terrorist activities until the beginning of the 1990s when its fighters acquired a chance to use their talents in a different part of the world (see Appendices 2 and partly 3A for the list of JCAG/ARA crimes).

In 1983, another organization of Armenian terrorists—the New Armenian Resistance—left the stage. Most American and West European authors believe that NAR was another name for JCAG/ARA, under which it operated in Western Europe. There is a different opinion, however, that it was the operational pseudonym of ASALA fighters who attacked targets associated in one way or another with the Soviet Union. These conclusions are nothing more than idle deliberations. So far, there is no reliable information about the true forces behind this name.

Francis Hyland offered his own opinion about NAR’s origins and “feats”: it had been set up as an anti-Soviet terrorist group to contribute to the Soviet Union’s disintegration and to remove the Armenian S.S.R. from its jurisdiction so as to set up, in its territory, an independent Armenian monoethnic state.³⁰ This happened in 1991. He went on to explain that his opinion was not popular among many of his colleagues, but he remained convinced that NAR’s operations in Western Europe had been caused by the desire to avenge the rout of the nationalist, anti-Soviet, and Russophobe National United Party (NUP) of Armenia. One of its leaders, Stepan Zatikian, organized a series of terrorist acts in Moscow. On 8 January, 1977, unknown perpetrators detonated at least one explosive device in the last carriage of a Moscow subway train, the first act of terror in Soviet history, followed by an attempted terrorist act in the lobby of the Kursk Railway Station in Moscow in October 1977. He initiated another series of terrorist acts with the use of 17 handmade explosive devices (more about the criminal activities of the NUP in the Soviet Union in the next chapter).

On 30 January, 1980, the NAR (which sometimes called itself New Armenian Resistance for the Liberation of Armenia) issued a communiqué under a verbose and high-sounding title “Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact—National Independence, National Sovereignty, and Territorial Integrity in a Reunified, Independent, and Socialist Armenia” to mark the first anniver-

²⁹ F.P. Hyland, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁰ See: Ibid., pp. 77-85.

sary of the execution of the Armenian terrorists who blew up the carriage of a Moscow subway train in 1977. The document offered a somewhat chaotic denunciation of the Soviet nationalities policy:

*“The fundamental enemy of the Armenian people is—we could not forget it—fascist Turkey ... but we could not ignore the anti-Armenian nature of the repression which strikes the patriots in Soviet Armenia... The fact that the U.S.S.R. supports certain progressive national liberation movements should not deter us from admitting that within its borders, the Soviet Union respects neither the fundamental democratic liberties nor the rights of the people living within those borders... In the case of Armenia, the U.S.S.R.’s behavior is socialist in words but imperialist in facts... The so-called ‘friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union’ ... is a mere mask meant to conceal the reality of the Russian yoke that afflicts our country... Armenia is a zone of tensions but also a zone where the interests of American imperialism and Russian social-imperialism force them to come to terms with each other lest they destroy their respective areas of domination. It would be illusory to think that the building of a reunited, independent, and socialist Armenia could be achieved by negotiations between the two superpowers... The road to national unity goes inevitably through the struggle of the people to drive away all the foreign occupation forces from the Armenian soil and through revolutionary struggle to expel their lackeys and allies from eastern and western Armenia.”*³¹

This is a clear and lapidary description of the geopolitical and geostrategic aims the sponsors of transnational Armenian terrorism posed themselves in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In clearer terms, this meant: maximum involvement in the destructive processes in the social and political life of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey to achieve their disintegration and isolate and reunite the territories of ethnic Armenians into a united, monoethnic, and socially-oriented state. This was the first public admission of the Armenian terrorists’ anti-Soviet intentions and their readiness to enter into a temporary union with any of the Soviet Union’s military-political enemies. Armenian nationalists were prepared to liquidate it in exchange for guaranteed complete control over the areas of compact settlement of ethnic Armenians. This was, in fact, a declaration of war. In 1980, the NAR fighters confirmed this by carrying out two terrorist attacks at the Aeroflot office in Brussels and the information bureau of the Soviet Embassy in France.

On 14 May, 1977, the NAR moved onto the terrorist scene with a bomb explosion in the office of a Turkish travel agency in Paris, lightly wounding the watchman. The earlier unknown Youth Action Group claimed responsibility; later it identified itself as an NAR member. On 3 January, 1978, NAR fighters planted a bomb in a mailbox of the financial adviser of the Turkish Embassy in Belgium that badly damaged his apartment. The same day, the NAR tried to bomb a Turkish bank in London; the device did not detonate and was defused by the security of the bank and the British police.³² An eleven-month hiatus followed. On 6 December, 1978, the NAR fighters tried to bomb the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey in Geneva, causing a lot of damage. The handmade devices used in Geneva and later in Orly were identical. I have already written that the device, which contained several hundred grams of explosives, was “enhanced with bottled gas cylinders secreted in a briefcase.”³³ This means that both were made either by the same person or by different people under identical instructions and that there was close information and logistic contacts between different and relatively autonomous Armenian terrorist groups, rivaling for political influence and Armenian money. This can be

³¹ Y. Ternon, op. cit., p. 202.

³² See: E.F. Mickolus, op. cit., p. 767.

³³ Y. Ternon, op. cit., p. 201.

taken as one more confirmation of the transnational nature of Armenian terrorism in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

*“Over a year passed before the next NAR attack, the ‘twin’ bombings of the British Airways and El Al offices in Rome on 9 December, 1979. After less than two weeks, however, the NAR claimed to have assassinated a Turkish Counselor, Yılmaz Çolpan, from the Turkish Embassy in Paris. The JCAG/ARA also claimed to have carried out the 22 December, 1979 assassination. Also on 22 December, the NAR took responsibility for the bombing of the Turkish Airlines office in Amsterdam”*³⁴ (it seems that all Armenian groups, and not only JCAG and Dashnaksutium, were drawn into a stiff competition for the glory of successful terrorists). More information about terrorist crimes perpetrated by NAR fighters can be found in Appendices 2 and 3A.

The year 1983 marked a turning point in the history of transnational Armenian terrorism; it had lived through radical ideological and qualitative changes, better called transformations. I have already written that on 14 July JCAG, the “action wing” of the ARF Dashnaksutium, assumed the name of the Armenian Revolutionary Army. The next day, a qualitatively new structure detached itself from ASALA under the name of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia-Revolutionary Movement (ASALA-RM). It was approximately at the same time that the New Armenian Resistance for Liberation of Armenia, which had several highly publicized bombing series to its name, left the stage. The fact that the structural changes occurred at the same time means that it was not a coincidence, but a consistent and logically performed operation designed to consolidate the various trends and branches of transnational Armenian terrorism. They had to become accountable to a single center expected to channel their activities toward a fundamentally different aim—resurrection of legendary Greater Armenia—close to the hearts and minds of the Armenians. It seems that starting in 1983, Armenian nationalists and their radical wing pushed aside the Republic of Turkey as their main enemy to concentrate on the Soviet Union, its northern neighbor. The Armenian nationalists expected that if and when the Soviet Union disappeared from the map of the world, its territory would be divided among the Union republics according to the administrative borders. In this way, the Armenian ethnicity would acquire territory on which it would recreate its statehood to move further into the territories of its neighbors: Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and, possibly, Iran and Russia.

This fully coincided with the geostrategic plans and geopolitical interests of the United States and its NATO allies, which had finally acquired an efficient tool of struggle for achieving military-political hegemony and world domination. It would be naïve to believe that these were spontaneous plans. Chapter One offers a detailed history of studies of transnational Armenian terrorism as a phenomenon of ethnic criminality. For five or even seven years, the analytical structures of the American special services and the Department of State, as well as kindred research structures scrutinized all the aspects of this phenomenon from different angles to finally conclude that its aggressive potential might have been channeled against the Soviet Union.

The political leadership of the Soviet Union and its state security structures were well aware of the quest of their geopolitical opponents: both the Soviet and the American special services dealt with the same people who craved for money and fame. At the turn of the 1980s, the Soviet and American, as well as the allied special services were locked in a struggle for ideological or operational influence on the Armenian terrorist groups. It seems that 1983 marked the temporary borderline, on which the CIA established its, if not total control, then domination over all segments of transnational Armenian terrorism tied together by the idea of a “crusade

³⁴ E.F. Mickolus, op. cit., pp. 768-769.

against the Soviet Union” to detach Armenian S.S.R. and turn it into a seat of military and political instability that would threaten the continued existence of the Soviet Union as a federative state.

It should be said that all secret wars have their heroes. The American secret services, locked in active opposition to the Soviet secret services, managed to bridle the mainstream of Armenian terrorism mainly thanks to the efforts of one man, Monte Melkonian, an American citizen and the most prominent figure, or at least No. 2, in the history of Armenian terrorism. He had graduated from the school of terrorist activities in Bourj Hammoud, the Armenian quarter of Beirut. Born in Visalia (California) near Fresno, he graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, where he majored in the history and archeology of Asia Minor. In 1993, he was posthumously made “Hero of Artsakh” and in 1996 National Hero of Armenia. Graduation from the University of Berkley opened a new and important stage: he graduated not with a Masters in history, as could be expected, but with a Masters in *artium liberalium*, a document frequently used by professional agents of the special services of North America and Western Europe. According to his official biography published by the Armenian Hayazg Information Foundation, he spent several years as a young man in Spain (where his father served at an American airbase). In 1975, after graduating from university, he arrived in Beirut as a teacher of an Armenian school in Bourj Hammoud precisely at the time when the country was embroiled in a civil war. Upon arrival, he joined the local volunteer detachment (militia) and was soon promoted to a commanding position.

In 1980, he joined ASALA, and a year later he replaced Hagop Darakjian (who died of leukemia) as leader of the ASALA action wing. He organized and supervised several resonant terrorist acts that earned him popularity among terrorists and in the Armenian Diaspora. The most famous and the most respected terrorist act within ASALA was the 24 September, 1981 takeover of the Turkish Consulate General in Paris, the Van Operation, which produced an enormous amount of publicity. On 11 and 14 November, 1981, Melkonian was twice arrested by the French police on the suspicion of organizing the assassination attempt on the Turkish Ambassador to Italy. ASALA responded with a series of 15 bombings in France and other countries—from Switzerland to Iran—of real estate belonging to French legal persons. Finally, he was released due to insufficient evidence and deported from France to Lebanon. In 1982, he, together with other ASALA fighters, helped the PLO military to rebuff the Israeli Defense Forces’ invasion of South Lebanon and the raid on Beirut. This distracted him for a while from terrorist activities. In 1983, when Israelis destroyed the administrative and technical structures of ASALA in South Lebanon, Melkonian snatched leadership in the terrorist organization from Hagop Hagopian by setting up ASALA-RM geared at the interests of the United States and its NATO allies. In 1985, when on tour in Western Europe where he went to pick up the contacts earlier established by Hagopian, he was arrested by the French special services for crossing the border with a false identity card. Later, accused of illegal possession of weapons and given a cumulative six-year jail sentence, he was released on parole after three-and-a-half years and deported to Yemen. The head of the security structures of the Armenian S.S.R., who took Melkonian for a loyal supporter of the republic’s leadership, helped him move to Nagorno-Karabakh to become the leader of the Armenian terrorists who poured into the area from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and other countries of the Middle East. These criminal elements closed ranks around Monte Melkonian to use violence and provocations to paralyze the state and party machine of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. They also provoked ethnic clashes between Azeris and Armenians that developed into an anti-Soviet uprising accompanied by partisan warfare against the regular units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. More details about transnational Armenian terrorism and its role in provoking and fanning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be found below.

I deem it necessary to conclude this historical survey of Armenian terrorism in the last quarter of the twentieth century by attracting the attention of my readers to the question of whether ASALA cooperated with the Soviet security structures, at which Andrew Corsun hinted in his article which appeared in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*. However, he convincingly asserted: “*Although there have been reports of links between Armenian terrorists and Greek Cypriots, Greeks, and even the Soviets, outside of the assistance that ASALA has received from the Palestinians, there is no proof that Armenian terrorists are plugged into any international terrorist network.*”³⁵ At the same time, several American and West European authors write, without any plausible confirmation, that these contacts did take place in the 1980s.³⁶ It is highly interesting to point out that despite the sharp ideological and military-political confrontation between the “capitalist” West and the “socialist” East during the Cold War, officials and official publications of the United States and its NATO allies never pointed an accusing finger at the Soviet Union and its allies, even though they had unassailable facts that some of the attacks and their repercussions played into the hands of the Soviet special services and the Soviet political leaders. The Armenian Secret Army Research Paper declassified in 2013, for example, says that in 1979 ASALA fighters committed several terrorist acts in the interests of the Soviet Union. It says in particular: “*ASALA has tried to arrange an agreement with Italy to halt the emigration of Armenians from their traditional homelands in the Soviet Union. ASALA called for the closure of all emigration centers in Italy on 22 December, 1979 when the group attacked a Rome pension that housed Armenian emigrants. Hagopian claimed in a February 1982 interview that an agreement had been reached under which ASALA would not conduct attacks in Italy except against Turkish targets. In return, the Italians would close the emigration offices within six months. Although Hagopian later said that the Italians reneged by simply moving the offices and changing their names, there have been no more ASALA attacks in Italy.*”³⁷ This fragment from an operational document of the mightiest (at that time) American special service compiled in late 1982 is brimming with unfounded facts and slyness. In 1978, the U.S. government passed a decision to help 400 thousand ethnic Armenians resettle from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to the United States, in order to train adequate number of secret agents to organize subversive activities against the Soviet Union. The Soviet political leaders and state security structures knew this and, in order to prevent the outflow, drew up a confidential decision of the C.C. C.P.S.U. of 27 December, 1978 On Intensifying Work among Armenians Living Abroad. It has not been declassified, however certain recently declassified Soviet documents refer to it³⁸ (this is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five of this book). The anonymous author or authors of Research Paper of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence knew that his/their government was actively implementing a program of immigration of ethnic Armenians and that the Soviet special services were, just as actively, opposing these efforts. These authors did not allow themselves even the slightest hint at operational cooperation between ASALA and the Soviet special services when writing about the attack by ASALA fighters on “the Rome pension that housed Armenian emigrants.” They rightly believed that this and similar actions fully corresponded to the aims and logic of undercover operations, one of the tools of all secret services. The anonymous author left the contacts between the KGB of

³⁵ A. Corsun, op. cit., p. 35.

³⁶ See, for example: J. Aras, *Chetvertaia mirovaia vojna: informatsionno-analiticheskiy spravochnik po negosudarstvennym voenizirionnym sistemam*, AST, Astrel, Tranzitkniga, Moscow, 2003, p. 638; E. Feigl, *A Myth of Terror, Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, Edition Zeitgeschichte, 1986, p. 60.

³⁷ *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia...*, sheets 7-8.

³⁸ For more details, see: O.Yu. Kuznetsov, “Delo ‘Vzryvnika’: armianskiy politicheskiy terrorizm v SSSR (novye aspekty istorii terroristicheskikh aktov v Moskve 8 ianvaria 1977 goda,” *IRS-Nasledie, Mezhdunarodny azerbaidzhanskiy zhurnal*, No. 6 (72), 2014, pp. 50-57.

the Soviet Union and Armenian nationalist fighters to journalists, who were not bold enough to hold forth on these contacts without sufficient evidence.

Erich Feigl, an Austrian author and filmmaker, who wrote about such contacts in his *A Myth of Terror, Armenian Extremism*, and a friend of Trade and Labor Attaché at the Turkish Embassy in Vienna Erdoğan Özen assassinated by Armenian nationalists on 20 June, 1984 (the book is dedicated to his memory), could have relied on Turkish diplomatic sources, which he completely trusted. He demonstrated a lot of caution when formulating his conclusions and offered no dates, names, or events that speak of suppositions rather than concepts. His statements might turn out to be sheer propaganda with not a shred of truth behind them, or objective facts with no firm foundation to stand on. My personal position on this ambiguous issue is equally ambiguous.

When summing up the history of the evolution of Armenian terrorism in the last quarter of the twentieth century, I have to admit the presence of several logical constellations that led to the objective interaction of individual structural elements of this criminological phenomenon. It should be said that Armenian terrorism of the last quarter of the twentieth century was a multidimensional and multifaceted phenomenon, the polyvariety of which was rooted in previous historical experience and largely predetermined the Armenian terrorists' *modus operandi*. When planning and carrying out their terrorist acts, the fighters of all the Armenian terrorist groups had to bear in mind their possible effect on the man-in-the-street and the media, not infrequently to the detriment of their efficiency. Likewise, they had to act in the way that brought to mind earlier terrorist attacks and adjust their traditional national hues to later periods. This means that Armenian terrorism was an instrument used to achieve specific *ad hoc* aims.

History has demonstrated, for example, that Hagop Hagopian, who set up ASALA, turned it into a commercial structure geared at political terror. He earned money for himself and his closest circle by committing crimes that harmonized with the collective ideas of the Armenian Diaspora, prepared to pour money into ASALA as long as its crimes corresponded to its expectations. The leaders of JCAG/ARA, financially dependent on the ARF Dashnaktsutjun, had to remain within the limits outlined by its ideology and ethics. This explains the ideological biases of Armenian terrorism of the last quarter of the twentieth century, which could spread beyond the narrow ideology of recreating national Armenian statehood.

Ideological biases, or even extreme ideological narrow-mindedness, forced Armenian terrorists to seek temporary allies, irrespective of their hues, and set up temporary coalitions if they brought the cherished aim closer, on the one hand, and permitted unlimited choice of means and methods, on the other. Armenian terrorists were never too fastidious in their choice of allies—they formed *ad hoc* unions with other terrorist groups or even special services and relied on the material and technical resources and money offered by third countries or their special services. Transnational Armenian terrorism was extremely flexible when it came to selecting the means needed to achieve the aim (which remained the same).

It should be said that there was an interconnection between the terrorist practices of Armenian fighters and the ideology of the Armenian Diaspora: the former translated into reality the dreams and hopes of the latter and, on the other hand, readjusted the content of these dreams by means of their practical activities. The analysts of the American special services exploited this interconnection through the terrorists of ASALA-RM led by Monte Melkonian. They preserved the ideological dominant—monoethnic Armenian statehood—and shifted the paradigm of collective conscience from Eastern Turkey to Soviet Transcaucasia, which was the beginning of end of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE BLASTERS AND BUS FILES

(“Spontaneous” Armenian Political Terrorism in the U.S.S.R. in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century)

The official ideology of “proletarian internationalism” preached equality of all the Soviet peoples, formal state equality, and internal sociocultural sovereignty of all state-administrative units allowing all nations and nationalities to preserve and develop their ethnic (folklore) specifics reduced to folk dances and songs. In the Soviet Union, people were not divided according to their nationality; this means that there were no visible roots of nationalist radicalism and extremism, let alone terrorism as their monstrous manifestation. It was a country in which the friendship of peoples and mutual enrichment of ethnic cultures and languages were not empty declarations, but everyday realities at the national, republican, regional, and even local levels. In the Armenian S.S.R., however, nationalism on the brink of chauvinism, barely concealed from the country’s political leaders, was a way of life.

This was a natural and inevitable product of the prevailing ethnic mentality rooted in the historically not very distant past when Armenians had not been a people or an ethnicity, but a polyethnic Armenian Gregorian religious sect scattered across Western Asia among its Muslim (Turkic and Arabic) population, nowhere an ethnic or religious majority. Several centuries of survival as a scattered people in alien milieus taught Armenians to seek consolidation to preserve their self-identity as part of their ethnic psychology. So it is no wonder that Soviet power failed, after half a century of efforts in the Armenian-populated territories of Transcaucasia, to transform the Armenians’ nationalist into an internationalist mentality, or even start pushing them in that direction.

As Soviet citizens, the Armenians had to accept alien ethnic elements in their monoethnic community, but a relatively large share (more about this below) refused to comply. It was this openly nationalist milieu that produced individuals who for ideological reasons or because of mental derangements or social problems performed extreme, read criminal, acts. They did this to inform the world about themselves and their ideals. Committed by loners, these terrorist acts had nothing to do with the real social and political context in the Armenian S.S.R. in the epoch of so-called developed socialism (the 1970s-1980s), or with the sentiments of

its citizens. However, as an intellectual moving force, they were part and parcel of Armenian ethnicity and its national mentality.

Here I will concentrate on the historico-criminological, rather than ethnopsychological aspects of Armenian terrorism and substantiate my arguments with information about three crimes of Armenian terrorists widely discussed by the media and extensively covered in reminiscences of eye-witnesses. I am talking about three criminal acts perpetrated by Armenian terrorists who were Soviet citizens and did not hesitate to organize explosions, two of which produced numerous casualties, while the third was prevented by a lucky chance. The first of the three planned terrorist acts took place on the evening of 8 January, 1977 in Moscow subway; the second, on the morning of 8 September, 1984 in a bus in Baku, while the third was prevented at the eleventh hour late in October 1977 in the lobby of the Kursk Railway Station in Moscow. Armenians (all of them Soviet citizens), not Chechen or Islamic terrorists, were the first to kill people in the Soviet capital.

In the last fifteen years, freedom of speech and the Internet have made information about the terrorist acts committed by Armenian nationalists in Moscow easy to acquire. We all know now that the explosions in Moscow killed seven and crippled 37. Here I will not dwell on information easily available from the Internet and concentrate on historico-criminological information outside the reach of the public.

Let's begin at the beginning. On 8 January, 1977, at 5:33 PM, a homemade bomb exploded in a subway train between the Izmaylovskaya and Pervomayskaya stations (the navy blue line of the Moscow subway); half an hour later, at 6:05 PM, a similar bomb was detonated in a food store in Dzerzhinskiy (now Bolshaya Lubianka) Street; five minutes later a third bomb went off in another food store on 25th of October (now Nikolskaya) Street. The blasts in the food stores in the heart of Moscow did not kill anyone and wounded only a few; all the deaths and injuries were produced by the explosion in the metro train. The number of casualties was relatively small due to the combination of lucky chance and the terrorists' lack of skill. The bomb detonated when the train was driving along an above-ground stretch; part of the shock wave went into the open through the broken windows. In the center of Moscow the improvised solid explosive devices contained no "enhancements" (nails, glass, or metal fragments); the effect was psychological rather than damaging; people were injured by broken glass, plaster, and street garbage. The last two amateurish attempts at terrorism provided the key to the entire series.

Investigation of the criminal case codenamed the Blasters File in the KGB's classified documents went on for a year. All of the perpetrators were arrested, exposed, and brought to trial. The first terrorist attack in the Soviet Union after World War II was organized by Stepan Zatikian from Yerevan. He had been on the KGB's radar since 1966 as the founder of the ultra-nationalist National United Party of Armenia (NUPA). In Moscow he acted together with artist Zaven Bagdasarian and Akop Stepanian, a worker at the Yerevan Electromechanical Plant. The investigation team proved that they had been involved in another terrorist act in Moscow late in October 1977 in the lobby of the Kursk Railway Station.

The tragedy at the railway station was averted by sheer chance and passengers' vigilance. After buying tickets for the Moscow-Yerevan train, the criminals went out leaving behind a bag with their personal belongings and three (!) improvised bombs. Placed next to a heap of bags and cases of two Daghestani families with children who were waiting for their train, the bag remained unnoticed by the militia checking passengers' documents. One of the Daghestanis, however, opened the abandoned bag and, scared by what looked like a bomb, brought it to the local militia station. The urgently called experts identified the content as a bomb, the delayed action detonator of which was attached through an intricate relay to a dead (as it was later discovered) battery. This explains why the bomb that should have been detonated half an hour

earlier remained in the bag.¹ This was classified as an attempted terrorist act rather than preparations for a terrorist act: it failed because the passengers were vigilant and the criminals careless, not because the terrorists had retreated at the last moment. This saved the lives of the passengers waiting for their trains in the lobby and gave the taskforce officers and investigators the clues necessary to find, expose, and detain the terrorists.

It was established that the terrorist acts had been carried out for political reasons and were committed by Armenian nationalists, all of them NUPA members naïve enough to believe that, after declaring a war of terror against the Soviet Union “for the liberation of Armenia from Russian domination,” they would be able to unite and head “the entire national-liberation movement” of the Armenian Diaspora in other countries, up to and including ARF Dashnaktsutium, what remained of the Armenikan and Hunchak parties, and the Armenian terrorist groups that lived on their money. Zatikian and his cronies were not idealists or idle dreamers: they wanted to be recognized as leaders of all the Armenians. Outside the Soviet Union, those who knew about them dismissed their ideas as idle dreaming. In the Soviet Union, this was interpreted as a political crime graver than terror: for the ideologists of the C.P.S.U., the leaders of the Communist Party of the Armenian S.S.R. were leaders of all the Armenians; there was no place in this arrangement for the “self-appointed leaders” from the NUPA.

This is not idle speculation, it is based on solid facts. When the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was moving to its end and immediately after it, in March and June 1945, the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. took certain diplomatic measures to force the Turkish government to transfer to the Soviet Union several provinces in eastern Turkey that, until 1918, had belonged to the Russian Empire and to Russia under the Provisional Government.² This means that the Soviet government agreed with the demands of the Armenian nationalists who belonged to the ARF Dashnaktsutium and, unintentionally, revived Armenian nationalism in Transcaucasia stifled by the repressions of 1937-1939. Soviet pressure that went on from 1945 to 1950 produced no effect and even pushed Turkey into NATO. This failure buried the hopes of a revived Greater Armenia (even if under the red banner) and stirred up hatred of Soviet power and the Russians, who personified Soviet power in the minds of the Armenian intelligentsia. Soviet-Turkish relations of 1945-1950 were extremely important for the entire region. It became abundantly clear that the Soviet Union, driven by political ambitions and geopolitical interests, was seeking wider territories in the Southern Caucasus and that it would not tolerate any political organizations in the region (the NUPA), except those controlled by the Communist Party of Armenia and, through it, by the Political Bureau of the C.C. C.P.S.U.

Let us go back to the Blasters File.

The gravity of the crimes committed by Zatikian, Bagdasarian, and Stepanian, as well as their obvious political bias, meant that their case went directly to the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. The hearings took place between 16 and 20 January, 1979; the court sentence was read on 24 January; the accused were found guilty and sentenced to death; on 30 January, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. declined their appeal; later the same day they were executed.

¹ For a more detailed description of the improvised explosive device, see: V.N. Udilov, *Zapiski kontrrazvedchika. Vzgljad iznutri*, Iaguar, Moscow, 1994, p. 122.

² A. Sotnichenko studied in detail the history of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey (for more details, see: A.A. Sotnichenko, “Sovetsko-turetskie diplomaticheskie otnoshenia v gody Vtoroy mirovoy voyny: politicheskie mify i realnost,” in: *Istoricheskie, kulturnye i ekonomicheskie svyazi mezhdur Turtstey i Rossiey. Materialy mezhdunarodnogo simpoziuma. Stambul, 5 April, 2012*, Compiled by O.Iu. Kuznetsov, Turkish-Russian Cultural Center, Moscow, 2012, pp. 98-114.

Strange as it may seem, for twenty-five years now, everything written about this crime, and even the documentaries, did not rely on documents, but on the memoirs of top KGB officers and their ideological opponents—dissidents of all sorts ranging from liberals to nationalists. The memoirs of First Deputy Chairman of Central KGB General of the Army Filipp Bobkov³ should be mentioned first; there were also the memoirs of Deputy Head of the Operational-Investigatory Directorate of Central KGB Major General Vadim Udilov⁴ (who headed the KGB operational group working on the Blasters Case). Their opponent Academician Andrey Sakharov⁵ defended and even justified the crimes of the Armenian terrorists; Alexander Tarasov, one of the leaders of clandestine Neocommunist Party of the Soviet Union, was of the same opinion.⁶

According to the classification of Prof. Daniel Field, outstanding American student of memoirs as a historical source,⁷ the memoirs of Sakharov and Tarasov belong to the so-called “expanded life stories” category written to demonstrate the author’s emotional response or subjective reaction to certain events that, in most cases, were beyond their will or desire. The memoirs of Bobkov and Udilov, on the other hand, can be described as chronicles: the authors concentrated on describing and explaining (with frequent reference to documents) their actions. In other words, the KGB generals who investigated the crimes of the Armenian terrorists in Moscow were “creators of history”; they wrote about what actually happened, while the dissidents were passive onlookers who described their response to what had happened to them without understanding the roots of their misfortunes. This explains their different opinions.

Sakharov and Tarasov recollected that, until the end of the summer of 1977, they and other dissidents had been subjected to unprecedented psychological pressure to find out whether they had been involved in the crimes of terror. Bobkov and Udilov wrote in their memoirs that, until late October 1977, the investigators had still needed more information; they had been contemplating five versions, the Armenian footprint being of secondary importance. Andrey Sakharov supported Zatikian because his brother-in-law Paruyr Hayrikian, another prominent Armenian nationalist and NUPA member, was also arrested. Other political prisoners feared that they might be accused of being involved in the explosions in Moscow, mutual assistance and even mutual responsibility being on the list of their convictions. It should be said that the emotional side of the memoirs of both dissidents was prompted by the fear for their lives rooted in their past experience and the very natural desire to settle scores, rather than to be fair. This natural desire should be accepted and respected. Not burdened by negative emotions, Bobkov and Udilov believed that what the security structures had done was just and therefore correct. This makes their memoirs more or less unbiased.

Some of their assessments of people and circumstances, however, are contradictory or even incompatible. Udilov writes about Zatikian as a person embittered by numerous failures, craving for fame and being driven by this passion rather than by ideological convictions; his accomplices were putty in his hands. Bobkov, on the other hand, writes about him as a confirmed terrorist and ultra-nationalist ready to act for the sake of his ideas. He wrote in his memoirs that Zatikian and his group had acted under the direct command of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the action wing of Dashnaksutiun.

³ See: F.D. Bobkov, *KGB i vlast*, Veteran, Moscow, 1995.

⁴ See: V.N. Udilov, op. cit.; idem, *Terakty i diversii v SSSR: stoprotsentnaia raskryvaemost*, Algoritm, Eksmo, Moscow, 2011; The Blaster operation is described in the first half of Chapter Ten “Rozyisk” of Udilov’s *Zapiski kontrrazvedchika* and the chapters “Terrorism-77” and “Taras Galiuk: Terrozashchitniki” in *Terakty i diversii v SSSR*.

⁵ See: A.D. Sakharov, *Vospominania*, in 2 vols., Prava cheloveka, Moscow, 1996.

⁶ See: A.T. Tarasov, “Ostap Bender, Norinski i ia,” available at [<http://www.panorama.ru/gazeta/1-30/p30tar.html>].

⁷ See: D. Field, “K tipologii memuarnykh istochnikov (po materialam revolyutsionerov-narodnikov),” in: *Problemy istochnikovedeniya i istoriografii. Materialy II nauchnykh chteniy pamiati akademika I.D. Kovalchenko*, Russian Political Encyclopedia, Moscow, 2000, pp. 270-284.

This is hardly true. First, ASALA as a terrorist structure was pushed into the limelight on 20 January, 1975 by the explosion in the office of the World Council of Churches in Beirut (Lebanon) when it acted as a support group of prisoner Karekin Yanikian. It was later, on 8 February of the same year, that it assumed responsibility for the blast in the Turkish tourist center in the Lebanese capital; two weeks later, on 20 February, it organized another terrorist act, this time in the Beirut office of Turkish Airlines in support of the same Karekin Yanikian. In October 1975, it shifted its terrorist activities to Europe under the same name. It invariably attracted the attention of the special services in different parts of the world, the CIA being the most efficient and mightiest among them, which immediately started gathering information about ASALA and its terrorist activities. Part of the file related to its first terrorist acts was declassified on 30 April, 2013.⁸ It is highly improbable that, after starting their terrorist activities in the Middle East, the Armenian nationalists needed only two years to set up an efficient network in the Soviet Union, divided from the rest of the world by the Iron Curtain.

Second, we should bear in mind that Bobkov presented his personal assessment to exclude all accusations of negligence bordering on criminal carelessness. As head of the Fifth Directorate within the KGB in 1969-1989, he had been responsible for counterintelligence and struggle against ideological diversions. He and his Directorate should have been ready to oppose anti-Soviet activities of a non-military nature and were expected to keep an eye on everyone who nurtured ideas different from those that were officially accepted. This included absolutely all dissidents ranging from harmless writers, who, having failed to join the Union of Writers of the U.S.S.R., united into informal groups of all kinds, or members of religious sects to circles of aggressive nationalists (the NUPA was one of them). Set up in 1966, the NUPA was one year older than the Fifth Directorate. In 1968, its organizers and active members (who were either close neighbors or relatives) were convicted and found themselves in a forced labor camp for political prisoners in Mordovia. In 1972, after serving their terms, they returned to Yerevan under administrative supervision. This means that Zatikian and his accomplices (who were the responsibility of the Fifth Directorate) committed three terrorist acts and almost committed a fourth because of the negligence of General Bobkov's subordinates; this cast doubt on the general.

Third, in his memoirs, the general wrote that "Chairman of the KGB at the Council of Ministers of the Armenian S.S.R. Yuzbashian interfered in the operational search actions." This is not completely true: in 1977, the year when Zatikian, Stepanian, and Bagdasarian committed their terrorist acts in Moscow, the Armenian KGB was headed by Grayr Mikhaelian. He was removed a year later, probably on the strength of information obtained by the investigatory team and the court sentence. Colonel Marius Yuzbashian replaced him; before that he had headed the Fifth or "Middle Eastern" network of residents of the First Main Directorate of the Central KGB. In this capacity, he could not interfere in the investigation. He was a member of external intelligence, while Bobkov headed the political counterintelligence service. Throughout the entire history of the Soviet secret service, the two departments were at daggers drawn. This means that Bobkov was merely settling old scores and, in an effort to justify himself, was shifting the responsibility onto certain external forces and unscrupulous colleagues.

It should be said in all justice that there is indirect evidence that the NUPA had contacts with ASALA. High-ranking and highly competent General Bobkov has written about this in his memoirs. What he wrote about Yuzbashian is highly significant. Before being appointed head of the KGB at the Council of Ministers of the Armenian S.S.R., Colonel (later Lieutenant Gen-

⁸ See: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*, available at [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005462031.pdf]. The document can be found in Appendix 3A of the present edition.

eral) Yuzbashian headed the resident network in the Middle East and personally knew the leaders and most active fighters of ASALA living in the Armenian quarters of Beirut and other Lebanese cities, the scene of the civil war of 1974-1990. He was recalled and appointed head of the KGB of Armenia, either to ensure cooperation between the Central KGB and ASALA, or to stem infiltration of Armenian extremism and terrorism from the Middle East into the Armenian S.S.R. The two tasks might have been related, while the blasts in Moscow merely urged the KGB to add vigor to its efforts.

On the other hand, the memoirs and their analysis are not enough to acquire a more or less complete picture of the KGB operation codenamed Blasters. We also need the documents of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia and the Armenian KGB, which had to respond to the death sentence of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. and execution. On 6 March, 1979, the Bureau of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia met for a sitting attended by twelve top republican officials (G. Voskanyan, V. Galumian, K. Dallakian, L. Nersesian, M. Muradian, R. Arzumanyan, P. Anisimov, E. Astsatryan, F. Sarkisian, M. Arzumanyan, K. Demirchian, and M. Yuzbashian, who informed them about the state of affairs). The sitting adopted a decision (protocol No. 126/53)⁹ that carried the stamp of highest confidentiality: "Top secret. Special importance. Special file." It summarized the political assessments of the Zatikian file and formulated the special tasks of the republican power structures.

After paying the usual tribute to Marxism-Leninism and its ideals as was the custom in the Soviet Union, the authors got down to business. They assessed the situation that had made Armenian terrorist acts possible and pointed out: "*Despite the fact that the heinous crime perpetrated by Zatikian and his accomplices is exceptional and was prepared and carried out by the three plotters in strict secrecy, the Bureau of the C.C. C.P. of Armenia believes that the preparations for and realization of these criminal designs became possible because of the blunted political vigilance and complacency of certain people, the very low level of ideological and educational work among certain categories of people, the lack of adequate control and the failure to adopt certain measures in relation to loafers who violate the norms of the socialist way of life, and also due to the negligence of the republican KGB.*" Translated into common language, this meant that the republic's party, political, and security structures had done nothing to prevent the crimes or deprive the organizer and other criminals of freedom of action. Point 3 of the document said: "*Obligate the KGB at the Council of Ministers of the Armenian S.S.R. (Comrade M.A. Yuzbashian) to elaborate and carry out all the necessary measures to disclose in time and discontinue extremist intentions and other hostile designs of individual negative elements and to pay particular attention to the struggle against repeated crimes.*" This means that Major General Yuzbashian was expected to justify himself in writing.

After receiving clear orders, the KGB and its head set about drafting a document to be presented at the next secret sitting of the Bureau of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia; on 14 March, the "strictly confidential, to be returned" document was sent to Head of the General Department of the C.C.C.P. of Armenia S. Shekoian. It testified to the fact that when headed by Grayr Mikhaelian the republican security structures had paid little or no attention to the "ideologically harmful" manifestations of nationalism, and even encouraged them by its inattention. The following excerpt sounds very convincing in this respect:

"It would be highly instructive to examine the way that brought ZATIKIAN to his villainous act and find those who helped him.

⁹ This document was published for the first time in my article "Delo 'Vzryvnika': armianskiy politicheskiy terrorizm v SSSR (novye aspekty istorii terroristicheskikh aktov v Moskve 8 ianvaria 1977 goda)," *IRS-Nasledie*, No. 6 (72), 2014, pp. 50-57.

“A brief prehistory. In the last twelve years, the Armenian KGB has exposed and liquidated more than 20 illegal anti-Soviet nationalist groups set up under the impact of hostile Western propaganda. About 1,400 people proved to be partially or fully involved in anti-Soviet activities.

“The republican security structures, in full accordance with the party instructions, paid and are still paying particular attention to crime prevention and regarded arrests as an extreme measure. The share of the arrested among those who were involved in anti-Soviet activities was 4.3%. ZATIKIAN, a member of one of the nationalist groups that called itself NUP (the National United Party), was among the arrested. The party was set up by Haykaz KHACHATRIAN, born in 1918, a freelancer (in 1978 he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison for a criminal offence). When he learned about the Moscow explosions and the role ZATIKIAN played in them, he called himself his ‘spiritual father.’

“In 1968, ZATIKIAN was arrested and sentenced (as we have written above) to four years in prison. Those who arrested him found a document called ‘Terror and Terrorists’ that he wrote himself to justify extremism as a method of struggle against the Soviet state.

“While in the correctional labor colony and later in prison (where he was sent for systematic violations of the regime and his negative influence on other prisoners who had chosen the road of correction), ZATIKIAN not only showed no signs of correction, but nurtured ideas about more severe methods of hostile activities.

“It should be said that ZATIKIAN revered the Dashnaks and invariably referred to them during interrogation in court as ‘a holy party.’

“STEPANIAN, one of ZATIKIAN’s cronies, was also involved in anti-Soviet nationalist gatherings. He was officially warned in 1974 in full accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of 25 December, 1972. This warning did not sober him up and did not prevent his involvement in the crime.”

This means that Stepan Zatikian was not an ideological rebel. He was a terrorist, pure and simple, ready with ideological justification of the crimes he had committed and had planned. This was fully confirmed by his “Terror and Terrorists” pamphlet. Even before his first arrest in 1968 (not in 1975, the date supplied by above-mentioned Paruyr Hayrikian, Zatikian’s brother-in-law), he had been ideologically ready to commit crimes of terror. On the other hand, strange as it may seem, he was arrested only for “anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation.” Paradoxically, the memo supplied by Chairman of the Armenian KGB Yuzbashian said nothing about the administrative supervision or operational preventive measures that should have applied to Zatikian for five years following his release. After all, the republican security structures were fully aware that Zatikian was potentially dangerous because of his extremist convictions. It is equally surprising that most of the activists of the routed NUPA were sent to prison for four years (Stepan Zatikian and Paruyr Hayrikian among them), while Haykaz Khachatrian, who founded this anti-Soviet organization, was sentenced to eighteen months in prison under a criminal charge that allowed the convict to serve his term in the region where he lived.

The same document describes the amount of work done by the operational and investigatory structures of the Central KGB: *“In the course of the case-related operational and investigatory actions we gathered numerous demonstrative and other evidence; we interrogated about 750 victims and eye-witnesses, carried out 140 expert appraisals and over 100 searches of the criminals’ apartments, and gathered convincing evidence of their complicity in the blasts.”* There is an important point in these statistics: most of the operational and investigatory actions were carried out not by the Armenian KGB officers, but by their colleagues who arrived from Moscow and other KGB territorial structures (within the borders of contemporary Russia). Major General Udilov, who went to Yerevan as head of an operational-investigatory group of the Central KGB, wrote in his memoirs that the officers of the Armenian security

structures, acting under the direct instructions of First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia Karen Demirchian, did nothing to help their colleagues. They interfered in the operational and investigatory efforts even though the search of the apartments of Zatikian, Bagdasarian, and Stepanian revealed contact elements and explosives for at least 17 more (!) bombs.¹⁰ This means that, in contrast to their Armenian colleagues, the officers of the central state security structure did all they could and mobilized all resources to find and detain Zatikian, Bagdasarian, and Stepanian. Their competence and their obvious desire to fulfill their duty contrasted with the incompetence and negligence of their Armenian colleagues; this could be classified as betrayal of the interests of the state and aiding and abetting terrorists amid the threat of extremism in the Armenian S.S.R.

All information about these heinous and outstanding (for their time) crimes should be made known to the public; this means that all relevant materials should be declassified. Until this is done, the memoirs of the top KGB officers and their political opponents will remain the only source of information.

To sum up, on 8 January, 1977, Zatikian, Bagdasarian, and Stepanian organized an explosion in the Moscow subway and set off two homemade bombs in food stores in central Moscow. They had three more bombs ready to be detonated at the Kursk Railway Station (the tragedy was prevented by chance) and enough spare parts and explosives to make 17 more bombs, 23 (!) “Infernal Machines” in all. They deliberately synchronized their crimes with the school holidays (when children from all parts of the country come to Moscow to the “Kremlin New Year Tree” event) in the hope of causing not only material, but also psychological damage. The blast at the Kursk Railway Station was timed to coincide with the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, an important date in Soviet times accompanied by grandiose celebrations attended by top officials of the allied countries. We should not forget that by that time Zatikian had already written his “Terror and Terrorists” pamphlet that justified crimes of terror. He and his cronies were moved by ideology rather than rabid nationalism.

At the turn of the 1970s, they were active members of the NUPA guided, according to the first version of its program, not only by nationalist, but also anti-Soviet and Russophobic ideals. Beginning in 1979, Paruyr Hayrikian was its only leader; in 1990, he transformed it into the National Self-Determination Alliance. Never an active supporter of national-terrorism, he insisted, in the Armenian media, that he had been shocked by the crimes of his brother-in-law. He was a liberal nationalist, but the fact that his political structure stemmed from the NUPA made him indirectly involved in the crimes of terror in Moscow and guilty of the deaths they caused on 8 January, 1977.

In his report of 14 March, 1979, based on his contribution to the sitting of the Bureau of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia held on 6 March, Yuzbashian not only supplied information about the Blasters File, but also shed light on certain geopolitical processes unfolding in the mid-1970s inside the Armenian Diaspora. Ten years later, they triggered the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Karabakh War of 1988-1994. The chairman of the KGB at the Council of Ministers of the Armenian S.S.R. informed the republic’s political leaders:

“We are very concerned about Armenians living abroad; here I will dwell on one relevant issue. The processes unfolding in the Armenian communities, as well as the events taking place, are invariably related to the situation in the republic. Our opponents, the United States in particular, are actively involved in brainwashing the Armenians living abroad and encouraging Armenian immigration. Today, there are 600 thousand Armenians living in the United States.

¹⁰ See: V.N. Udilov, op. cit., pp. 124-128.

“The U.S. Department of State acquired the Armenian Bureau; the University of Columbia is contemplating an Armenian Cultural Center, both prompted by anti-Soviet considerations.

“It is planned to increase the Armenian community in the United States to 1 million, which will have very serious consequences for us. Today, the anti-Soviet nationalist Dashnaktsutiun Party is the best organized force in the Armenian community abroad. For many reasons (experience, good knowledge of the situation, no language barrier, etc.), it presents the greatest danger for Armenia.

“This explains why the decision of the C.C. C.P.S.U. of 27 December, 1978 on invigorating contacts with Armenians living abroad is very important; it will prove instrumental in curbing the efforts of the American Administration to spread its influence far and wide among the Armenians living abroad.”

This means that, since the mid-1970s, two main geopolitical players, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were locked in a struggle for the hearts and minds of the Armenians. Neither the political leaders, nor the secret services of either country made a secret out of this. The classified document on invigorating contacts with Armenians living abroad issued by the C.C. C.P.S.U. means that NATO was determined to use the Armenians, Soviet Armenians in particular, to destabilize Soviet Transcaucasia as the first step toward the destruction of the Soviet Union. This explains the undisguised interest of the American special services and their allies in transnational Armenian terrorism. Organizational structures and lavish funding were the logical extension of this interest. In fact, in the latter half of the 1970s, NATO recognized Armenian nationalism and transnational terrorism, its hypertrophied form, as its striking force in the struggle against the Soviet Union.

To succeed, American and West European intelligence had to recruit a certain number of native Armenians into their ranks. With this aim in view, the United States used the Armenian Diaspora to spread information that it would welcome up to half a million Armenians from the socialist camp countries in the United States. Americans needed several thousand hand-picked fighters who could be brainwashed and trained before sent back, first to the Turkish and later to the Soviet Transcaucasia to wage guerrilla warfare at the first opportunity. It was expected that, driven by their ethnopsychological specifics, the Armenians would start an internecine war between the Karabakh and Yerevan Armenians and, later, a wide-scale war against the Azeris that would undermine the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization it headed. Those who planned this proved right.

Another terrorist act carried out on 8 September, 1984 in Baku, capital of the Azerbaijan S.S.R., was instigated by Armenian extremists; it showed that the plans nurtured by NATO had become a reality long before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. That day, a homemade explosive device went off in a bus (route 106, state registration number 90-11 AGT) at about 1:50 PM, while it traveled along Narimanov Avenue. Four people were injured, one of them later died in the hospital. The echo did not spread beyond the Azeri capital; the republican and Union media carried no information. Very much like in Moscow this time, too, the perpetrators were found pretty quickly, but the investigation proved long and difficult. On 15 March, 1985, the terrorists were brought to court and sentenced by the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan S.S.R.

The Baku and the Moscow terrorist acts differ in one, but very important, respect. While the documents on the Blasters File remain classified and a more or less complete picture could only be gathered from bits and pieces of information found in different sources (mainly memoirs), the Bus File (codenamed by the investigators of the Baku terrorist act) has been declassified. The policy of informational openness of the Azerbaijan Republic made access to the sentences fairly easy on the strength of a written inquiry and explanation of the purpose for

requesting this information. A photocopy of the sentence can be found in Appendix 3B of this book.¹¹

The Judgment in Criminal Case No. 43-1985 regarding the explosion in the bus on route 106 in Baku gives enough details of this terrorist act: the way it was prepared by the co-plotters, the scheme, the way the homemade explosive device was set off, the names of the victims, and the extent of damage. There is no need here to dwell on these details as they are not directly related to the historico-criminological nature of transnational Armenian terrorism discussed here.

In a nutshell, the factual side of the crime was the following. Armenian nationalist Ghenrikh Vartanov instigated Igor Makhovskiy, a Russian student at the Electromechanical Department of the Azizbekov Azerbaijan Institute of Petrochemistry, to make an electric detonator for a homemade explosive device that he later put together from several component parts and then detonated. Speaking in court, Makhovskiy admitted that he had known the detonator was intended for a bomb used, to quote the court sentence, “to kill a great number of people” in a bus, but had dismissed this as a joke. A thorough study of the document reveals that Vartanov had ordered the bomb case and spent several months buying the necessary ingredients. Makhovskiy, however, refused to accept the truth. When the tragedy occurred and people were killed and injured, Vartanov and Makhovskiy became accomplices in the terrorist act, although their subsequent fates proved very different. Makhovskiy was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment (he shall serve the first five years of punishment in prison and the rest in a correctional labor colony with a reinforced regime), while Vartanov was released from criminal liability as a schizophrenic and committed to a mental hospital.

The description of the terrorist act itself occupied one paragraph in the court sentence:

“On 8 September, 1984, at approximately 12:00 PM, Vartanov wound up and set the timer of the electromechanical gadget of the explosive device to go off in two hours, wrapped it in two copies of Pravda newspaper of 30 August, 1984 and went to the bus terminal located near the collective farm market in the settlement of Montino in Baku where he placed the device between the seats of the 5th and 6th rows of an articulated Ikarus-28001 passenger bus, state license plate 90-11 AGT, traveling route No. 106. At approximately 1:50 PM, when the bus, carrying 19 passengers (12 of them in the front where the bomb had been planted), was traveling along Narimanov Avenue, across from the Polytechnic Institute, the device exploded, mortally wounding passenger F. Surkhalizade (who later died in the hospital), gravely injuring G. Mansurova and T. Mekhtieva, and slightly injuring E. Zorin.”

The operational and investigatory actions demonstrated that two mutually exclusive options might have been possible if the people involved had acted adequately. The terrorist act could have been avoided if F. Surkhalizade, its only victim, had demonstrated caution and quick-mindedness; her negligence proved fatal for her. Before she died in the hospital, she said that she had seen a newspaper bundle probably forgotten by one of the passengers. She sat down next to it and even tried to unfold it to look inside. Not interested in a technical device, she remained seated next to it. This was her death sentence.

More people might have been killed if Khalkovskiy (a machinist at the plant) had made the bomb case in precisely the way Vartanov had ordered it. However, he decided not to bother following the instructions to the tee, but used guess-work, while not concerning himself too much about the quality. Lucky for him, though, he kept the technical diagram Vartanov gave him. Early in October 1984, that is, a month after the blast, he was interrogated as a witness: the fragments of the case pointed to cast iron SCh 15 1412-79, while the size of the bomb case corresponded to the blanks used at the Neftemash experimental plant. The rest was easy.

¹¹ Judgment of the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan S.S.R of 15 May, 1985 in the Case of Igor Makhovskiy. Archives of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic, File 43-1985, sheets 373-379.

Khalkovskiy pointed to Vartanov, who pointed to Makhovskiy. The criminal duo was detained. According to the court sentence, on 18 October, 1984, the investigators had ordered another explosive-technical expert examination to confirm what Makhovskiy had said about the circumstances in which he made the detonator. It means that by that time, he had been arrested and started talking, and now his evidence required a procedural consolidation.

Khalkovskiy's negligence kept him on the brink of being ranked among the accomplices: the complicated forensic examination of the bomb fragments revealed that "the case of the explosive device and the lid do not correspond to the technical diagram submitted by Khalkovskiy. The back of the case is 1.6 times thicker; the bottom 2.3 times thicker, while the side of the lid is 0.6 mm thicker. This was why the homemade explosive device merely fell apart: if made strictly in keeping with the diagram, the fragments could have inflicted wounds of various degrees of severity." Khalkovskiy's negligence significantly reduced the bomb's destructive capacity. This saved many lives and helped him to escape criminal liability.

When reading the investigation document, one cannot but wonder whether Vartanov and Makhovskiy had worried about what would happen to them after the explosion. It appeared that they were naively or even childishly convinced that no one would look for the perpetrators and certainly find them. For instance, Vartanov never bothered disposing of the three aircraft wheel rims he had used to prepare the pyrotechnical mixture, but left them in the yard of his house, while Makhovskiy, after finishing his part of the criminal task, put what remained of the wire and the container of epoxide-based adhesive in the dumpster next to his home, convinced that they would never be traced to him. This childish negligence was explained by the fact that Vartanov was a schizophrenic, while Makhovskiy was naïve enough to see his friend as a "man of words and not of deeds," as he put it himself.

The Vartanov-Makhovskiy case is very interesting in terms of what Soviet citizens thought about extremism and terrorism. While Armenian Vartanov, very aware of belonging to the Armenian ethnicity and its specific features, was prepared to kill, Russian Makhovskiy saw the dangerous enterprise as a game that stirred up feelings and remained convinced that everything would work out. There is no doubt about the state of Vartanov's psyche, but he was not a fool. Unable to make an electric detonator, he befriended, as though by chance, Igor Makhovskiy, a student of the Institute of Petrochemistry, won his confidence, and drew him into his criminal adventure. It remains unknown whether he really needed Makhovskiy or was merely looking for someone with the knowledge indispensable for his plans. Makhovskiy was a disposable tool to be used and discarded. In this sense, he was not an accomplice but another of the terrorist's victims. The cruelty of the act of terror he had contributed to echoed in his life with the cruelty of the law.

This means that most people in the Soviet Union were not prepared, due to their upbringing or psychological makeup, to accept acts of terror as normal, let alone be personally involved in them; they found it hard to imagine that anyone would be willing to kill in such a perfidious and cruel manner.

According to Major General Vadim Udilov, people used explosives to settle personal scores, but only Armenian terrorists resorted to depersonalized and cruel crimes.

I would like to conclude this part of the history of Armenian terrorism in the Soviet Union in the 1970s-1980s with a discussion of another sociopolitical aspect that contributed to the rise of this phenomenon. I am talking about the social and political atmosphere in the Armenian S.S.R. at that time, or even earlier. The censorship carried out by the state security structures never allowed the true picture of the state of affairs in this Soviet republic to reach the media; this means that we should look for more truthful information in foreign, émigré, and anti-Soviet publications. With their ideological wrapping removed, they offer fairly objective information.

In 1987, Mikhail Kheifets, a research associate at the Center for Research and Documentation of East European Jewry, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, issued his book *Voennoplenny sekretar: Povest o Paruyre Ayrikiane* (POW Secretary: A Tale about Paruyr Hayrikian). In 1997, the leaders of the Republic of Armenia published the most flattering excerpts in Yerevan, while its full version appeared in Kharkov in 2000.¹² The author wrote about what his hero thought about the NUPA, the terrorist acts in the Moscow subway and in the center of the Soviet capital carried out by Zatikian and his group, and the social and political situation in Soviet Armenia after World War II. The book can be described as memoirs about memoirs, a very specific and previously unknown genre. Kheifets and Hayrikian became friends when serving terms for anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation in the same camp for political prisoners in Mor-dovia. The first edition of the book appeared in the Middle East and was primarily addressed to Armenian nationalist fighters from Lebanon and Syria who were readying for an invasion of Soviet Transcaucasia to offer them Hayrikian as the best possible leader.

Mikhail Kheifets, who wrote his book nearly ten years after his release from camp, relied on what Hayrikian had told him about the meeting held in the republican House of Political Education in Yerevan on 24 April, 1965 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the military-political operation in the Ottoman Empire against the Armenians (later called the “Armenian genocide”). This was when an unsanctioned rally in one of the districts of the Armenian capital was dispersed by the militia. The organizers and the most active participants were detained and later sentenced to several days of administrative arrest. These people, there were several dozen of them, later closed ranks as the new anti-Soviet, anti-Communist, and Russophobic part of the Armenian nationalists. This means that although their names had been known to the Armenian security services since 1965, the security services never interfered with what the most active among them were doing and, therefore, did not try to prevent their organizational and political consolidation. This means that even if the NUPA was not set up by the Armenian KGB, it was set up and was acting with its connivance.

This explains why General of the Army Bobkov and Major General Udilov wrote in their memoirs that their Armenian colleagues had openly opposed the operational and investigatory actions carried out by the Central KGB officers who arrived in Yerevan to investigate the blasts of 8 January in Moscow. Vadim Udilov wrote in his memoirs that Zatikian and his accomplices had been arrested on 6 November, 1977 after the search, on 5 November, in the homes of Zatikian, Bagdasarian, and Stepanian that revealed parts of explosive devices and explosive ingredients. What happened later can be described as convincing evidence of the public and political context and state of mind in the republic.¹³ Early on 6 November, First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia Karen Demirchian called Udilov to prevent the arrests of the terrorists. Several hours later he left for Moscow to take part in the celebration of the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and could not, therefore, supervise what was happening in Yerevan. Upon arriving in Moscow, however, he complained about what he called “the arbitrariness of General Udilov and his operational group” to KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. Early on 7 November, First Deputy Chairman of the Central KGB General of the Army Semen Tsvigun, who served in 1963–1967 as chairman of the Azerbaijani KGB, called Udilov and demanded an explanation. After hearing his detailed report, he sanctioned the arrest. This would have been a very risky enterprise had not General Udilov and his group possessed conclusive evidence obtained in strict conformity with the regulations of criminal procedure. The next day, Demirchian, having returned from Moscow, drove straight to the office to de-

¹² See: M.R. Kheifets, *Voennoplenny sekretar: Povest of Paruyre Ayrikiane*, ONS, Yerevan, 1997; M.P. Kheifets, *Izbrannoe*, in three vols., Vol. 3, *Ukrainskie siluety; Voennoplenny sekretar*, Folio, Kharkov, 2000.

¹³ For more details, see: V.N. Udilov, op. cit., pp. 128–131.

mand an explanation from General Udilov; confronted with the entire set of evidence, he had to abandon the terrorists to their fate.

The above suggests that the NUPA was not a self-organized political structure of confirmed Armenian nationalists, but a successful project of the then political leaders and state security structures of the Armenian S.S.R. set up to keep an eye on all spontaneous nationalist movements in the republic. This explains why in 1968, when the NUPA was routed, its founder Haykaz Khachatryan, as was mentioned above, was sentenced to eighteen months in prison under a criminal charge that allowed the convict to serve his term in the region where he lived; the others brought to court on the same charges were sent to a correctional labor camp in Mordovia for 4 years.

According to Kheifets, who relied on what Hayrikian had told him, after serving their terms the most confirmed NUPA members decided to restore the party, minus the anti-Communist and Russophobic clauses of its program, while preserving the extremist and nationalist statements intact. This brings to mind the nationalist Pamiat (Memory) Society operating in the R.S.F.S.R. approximately at the same time. Its members were persecuted by the security structures, but were invariably supported by public structures like the All-Russia Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments and the All-Russia Znanie (Knowledge) Society. In fact, the reorganized NUPA was expected to play a similar role in Armenia—rally local spontaneous nationalists to channel their activities in positive directions. The explosions on 8 January, 1977 in Moscow buried the project. It comes as no surprise that the report of Chairman of the Armenian KGB Marius Yuzbashian quoted above was brimming with bitterness or even vexation. Zatikian and his accomplices had disrupted the plans of the Communist leadership of the Armenian S.S.R. to use Armenian nationalism, and the terrorism that accompanied it, in the interests of the Soviet Union. The Armenian leaders had to start from the beginning: they needed new forms and means to influence the Armenian Diaspora. The concept was probably outlined in the still classified decision of the C.C. C.P.S.U. On Intensifying Work with Armenians Living Abroad (or probably the document contained a recommendation to elaborate the concept).

The above means that the status of the Armenian S.S.R. in the Soviet Union differed greatly from the statuses of the other republics. While in all the republics, the smallest shoots of political nationalism (that is, extremism) were cruelly and mercilessly uprooted and ethnic specifics were reduced to folk dances and songs, in Armenia, political nationalism was abetted and encouraged. This was done deliberately to increase, as the Political Bureau of the C.C. C.P.S.U. expected, the Soviet Union's geopolitical impact among the Armenians living abroad, particularly in the Middle East where the Soviet Union was locked in a bitter struggle for domination with the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

Under Soviet power, which opposed all manifestations of religious feelings, Armenia was the only republic that unveiled monuments to pagan deities and heroes of Armenian epics with great pomp. This was done to maintain the archetypical features of national self-identity, even though it contradicted the canons of the Armenian Gregorian Church. The leaders of Soviet Armenia ignored this: they wanted to push the Armenians into neo-paganism to create an ideological basis for their geopolitical designs. The following were the most popular monuments:

- Vahagn the Dragon Slayer, created in 1964 and erected in 1969 on Lenin Prospekt (today Mashtots Prospekt); in the mid-1970s it was moved to the Moskva cinema next to the House of Artists where it remained for some time before being returned to its original site.
- The Hayk Nahapet (Hayk the Tribal Chief) monument of hammered copper was made by sculptor Karlen Nurijanian in 1972 and erected in the Nor-Nork District of Yerevan.
- Torq Angex, another monument of hammered copper, made in 1982 by the same sculptor, represents a legendary pagan superman; it was erected not far from the Hayk Nahapet monument.

This series of monuments to pagan Armenian heroes could not be erected without the agreement or even direct instructions of the republic's top figures. This, in turn, speaks volumes about the ideology imposed on the Armenians. Armenian Communists were pagans, which points to a direct interconnection between vehement revolutionary ideas, including Communism and nationalism, and the pagan archetypical worldview. This also means that the Armenians could not abandon the idea of their exclusiveness as a God-chosen nation, typical of paganism, and explains why they are more often than other nations inclined to rely on extremist ideas and terrorist methods in social life and politics. The Soviet Armenian intellectuals interpreted Torq Angex as a monument to Zatikian and his accomplices and other Armenian terrorists. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, postcards showing the monument were sold in places of compact Armenian residence in other countries to collect money for ASALA terrorist activities.

Here is another formerly classified document of the Soviet special services that confirms what I have written above about the patronage the party and political leaders of the Armenian S.S.R. and First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia Karen Demirchian personally extended to Armenian terrorists. In 1994, G. Podlesskikh and A. Tereshonok published their book *Vory v zakone: brosov k vlasti* (Crime Lords: A Leap to Power).¹⁴ This unique book is based on authentic documents of KGB officers who were planted in the criminal milieu during the years of Soviet power; these documents offer a clear and objective picture of the social and political context in Armenia on the eve of the Soviet Union's disintegration when the terrorist activities of local nationalists, openly abetted by the republican leaders, developed into a nationwide problem. Here is the complete text of a report written by Captain M. Malyshev, senior special agent of the Central KGB in the Irkutsk Region.

"I, senior special agent of the KGB Directorate of the U.S.S.R. for the Irkutsk Region Captain M. Malyshev, worked for three years in places of detention to ensure counterintelligence supervision of the special contingent of prisoners who occupied high posts in the structures of power and governance and, on the strength of this, knew state secrets. They worked in the structures of Communist Party and Soviet power and held high posts in the law-enforcement agencies and in the economy.

"The results of the efforts to prevent disclosure of secret information by these people are registered in classified file No. 100; the attempts at information gathering by former Prosecutor of Moscow Sarkhovatov and other people were disclosed and curtailed. These people intended to send secret information to foreign special services. The efforts of former officials of the public prosecutor structures and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia to set up anti-Soviet clandestine structures were suppressed, etc.

"In the course of my operational information gathering, I discovered facts of unlawful conviction of certain officials who can be described as victims of slander and deliberate disinformation designed to remove them from the scene in order to conceal serious crimes. The real perpetrators still hold high posts in state structures. I have established that criminals were involved in the attempts to remove honest officials to ensure the interests of corrupt bureaucrats.

"A more detailed study of the case of Serobian, a former official of the public prosecutor office of Armenia sent to prison for bribery, revealed the following:

"In 1976, a certain Garik Tigranovich Katvalian and two other veterans were informed by their friends that a group of Armenians were making an explosive device to organize terror-

¹⁴ See: G. Podlesskikh and A. Tereshonok, *Vory v zakone: brosov k vlasti*, Khudozhestvennaia literatura Publishers, Moscow, 1994.

ist acts in Moscow. This information, which contained the names of those involved in the preparations for the terrorist acts, was sent, in written form, to the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Armenia. The explosions in the subway and other public places in Moscow caused numerous casualties. Katvalian asked Serobian, an official of the public prosecutor office of Armenia, to help him expose certain officials of the republic's party and Soviet structures, including First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia Demirchian, the public prosecutor of the republic, and other top officials involved in criminal activities.

"Serobian helped them write a letter about the abuses in the republic. Sent to the C.C. C.P.S.U. and Chairman of the Central KGB Yuri Andropov, it produced an unexpected effect. All those who had written the letter, including Serobian, were accused on false pretexts, put on trial, and sentenced to long terms in prison. They all were sent beyond the Urals, to the city of Irkutsk.

"According to information supplied by Chairman of the KGB of Armenia Yuzbashian, Serobian was put under close supervision as a person involved in undermining the social and state order by gathering false information about party and Soviet leaders.

"In January 1987, a certain Malenkov came to the colony to meet Serobian at the request of Paylak, an Armenian crime lord who had served a term in the Krasnoyarsk Territory in Siberia. Malenkov told Serobian that Paylak and his people had done a lot to compromise him and that Paylak had regularly met with Demirchian and other republican leaders to discuss ways and means of removing the objectionable people. As a cautious person, Paylak recorded these talks and transferred the tapes to Malenkov for safekeeping. In 1981, Demirchian decided to put Paylak, who had become too dangerous, behind bars. Paylak was arrested and sent to prison. According to Malenkov, while in prison Paylak tried to use the precious records wisely; he invited Serobian to join the "game," who, suspecting another provocation, refused.

"There was most likely an information leak about the existence of the tapes. KGB Chairman Yuzbashian, acting on Demirchian's orders, spared no effort to find and confiscate the tapes. He sent the wife of a former officer of the Armenian KGB, who was serving a term for bribery, disguised as a journalist to glean information from Serobian and promised to release her husband in exchange. Our special agents, misinformed about the true purpose of the meeting, were involved in providing operational support. Yuzbashian's agent failed: Serobian refused to talk no matter how hard she tried."¹⁵

No further comments and no moralizing are needed: the party and Soviet elite of the other Soviet republics were of a more or less similar frame of mind. The document quoted above, however, contains information directly related to my subject and, therefore, cannot and should not be ignored. It follows from Captain Malyshev's report that the top political leaders of Soviet Armenia and heads of the Armenian special services had learned from secret service veterans about the planned terrorist acts in Moscow long before the appointed date of 8 January, 1977. Nothing was done to prevent the explosions or to suppress extremist activities in the republic. Instead, First Secretary Demirchian did a lot to dispose of those who knew of the planned terrorist acts by sending them to prison so that they could no longer spread information about Zatikian and other terrorists, to say nothing of the leaders of the anti-Soviet NUPA. This makes Karen Demirchian not only an assisting offender who tried to protect the Armenians from severe punishment. Acting in this way, he encouraged other terrorists and fanned extremism among the Soviet Armenians. As a *de facto* abettor of terrorism and the terrorist acts in Moscow, he should have been put in the dock together with Zatikian and his accomplices. Unfortunately, this was impossible in the Soviet Union.

¹⁵ G. Podlesskikh and A. Tereshonok, op. cit., pp. 157-158.

By a quirk of fate, former First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Armenia Demirchian, who, according to Major General Udilov, had tried, with unrivalled zeal, to save the terrorists from being tried and sentenced to death, was killed 22 years later, on 27 October, 1999, by another Armenian terrorist Nairi Umanian in a terrorist attack on the Armenian National Assembly, of which he was chairman. To quote the wise and just words of one of the gospels: "...with the measure you use, it will be measured to you" (Matt. 7:2).

CHAPTER SIX

THE FIRST TERRORIST WAR

(Transnational Armenian Terrorism and the 1988-1994 Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh)

In his *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects* published early in 1991, Francis Hyland, closely connected in some unidentified capacity with the CIA, wrote that transnational Armenian terrorism would shift its attention from the Republic of Turkey (which had remained the target throughout the 1970s-1980s)—“the primary focus of the next wave, surprisingly, might not be Turkey”¹—to the Soviet Union and that the “Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan,” the population of which “has rallied and rioted in response to oppression by the Muslim majority,”² would become the epicenter of Armenian terrorist activities: twelve months before the Soviet Union’s disintegration, Hyland pointed to “Armenian terrorism” as the main threat to the country’s unity.

Chapter 9 of his book, “The Prospects,” points to the circumstances and forces that shifted the aims and caused a split in the ranks of ASALA as the starting point. In the summer of 1983, its action wing became an independent organization of transnational Armenian terrorists called ASALA-RM (where RM stood for “Revolutionary Movement”) with Monte Melkonian, an American citizen and terrorist No. 2 in the history of transnational Armenian terrorism of the twentieth century as its head. Shortly before that he had been released on parole from a French prison, where he was serving a sentence for illegal possession of weapons and illegal crossing of the state border, and deported to Yemen.

Here is another telltale coincidence. The New Armenian Resistance (NAR), another Armenian terrorist organization, left the stage in February 1983 (presumably as a result of dissolution) at almost the same time ASALA-RM appeared (to be more precise, four months before that). Three years later, in 1986, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG for short) followed suit. For two decades, it had been “competing” with ASALA, earned its grievous fame in the 1970s-1980s, and pressed by the Turkish security services had to change its name to

¹ F.P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991, p. 89.

² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) in 1982. Members of the terrorist groups, which disintegrated or fell into lethargy or slid into a latent state, joined the ASALA-RM, for terror had been and remained the meaning of their lives and their only profession. In the spring of 1988, in Athens, the structural organization and consolidation, as well as centralization of the leadership of terrorist activities of Armenians ended with the murder by persons unknown of Hagop Hagopian, the founder of ASALA and its long-time leader, before he could reach the car that was to take him to Athens airport for a flight to Belgrade and probably on to the Soviet Union.

These facts, their chronology, logic, and continuity suggest that since 1980 or even earlier, since 1977 (when NUPA terrorists carried out a series of terrorist acts in Moscow and planned another series of crimes of terror), the CIA had been seeking a dominant position in the Armenian terrorist structures. Planted in ASALA, Monte Melkonian, a CIA agent of inordinate terrorist skills and vast knowledge, soon reached the very top of the “action wing” to supervise the planning and implementation of everything called “combat operations” (read: terrorist attacks); this made a split in ASALA an easy job. The ideologically strongest and best-trained fighters were brought together into a new structure under the new and yet familiar name of ASALA-RM. Its predecessor had fought the Turks and their leaders; the new structure was spearheaded at the Soviet Union and its citizens. Thus, in the mid-1980s, the excellently planned and brilliantly implemented operation made transnational Armenian terrorism a new and, as it turned out later, very efficient Cold War tool of American imperialism.

This sheds new light on what transnational Armenian terrorists and their leaders thought about the Soviet Union and the Armenian S.S.R. as its part. According to Francis Hyland, at a press conference in 1978, Hagop Hagopian was still talking about the Soviet Union as a friendly country. In 1982, ASALA fighters, probably on instructions from the KGB, attacked the temporary accommodation centers of ethnic Armenians on the road from Southeastern Europe to the United States (California).³ Even if not instigated by the Soviet special services, this attack fully corresponded to the Soviet intention to oppose the U.S. Armenian-related immigration policy. This meant that ASALA under Hagop Hagopian was completely loyal to the Soviet Union and its leaders.

The NAR turned out to be the only structure of Armenian terror that allowed itself to carry out two attacks on Soviet commercial facilities: in 1980, it bombed the office of Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, in Brussels, and, the same day, the Soviet Embassy’s Information Section in Paris. The West European expert community tied this to the execution of three Armenian NUPA members who two years earlier had set off three explosive devices—two in the heart of Moscow and one in the Moscow subway. In my opinion, these attacks on Soviet facilities abroad should be interpreted not as acts of revenge for the criminal proceedings against Armenian nationalists in the Soviet Union, but as provocations, “reconnaissance in force” or “*ballon d’essai*” of sorts carried out not to challenge the Soviet leadership and intelligence services, but to draw a response from the socially active part of the population of the Armenian S.S.R. to such criminal actions of their foreign coreligionists and fellow compatriots. As far as I know, the public remained indifferent or probably secretly pleased; American and West European analysts started talking about the Armenians’ immanent nationalism and religious messianism that came before the ideology of proletarian internationalism imposed by the Party-Soviet leadership of the U.S.S.R. This meant that the terrorist groups of the Armenian Diaspora wishing to destroy the Soviet Union through national conflicts could count on supporters in Soviet Armenia. Nagorno-Karabakh, the scene of the first terrorist war in human history that began in

³ See: *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 61.

1988, was the epicenter of the destructive processes carried out with the help of transnational Armenian terrorism.

According to Hyland, transnational Armenian terrorism finally became a Cold War tool when on 11 August, 1988, Paruyr Hayrikian, an ideologist of Armenian nationalism in the Soviet Union, was deported from Yerevan to Addis-Ababa (Ethiopia).⁴ I have already written that he was highly respected in the Middle East, the home of a large Armenian Diaspora that, encouraged by Soviet émigré dissidents in the 1970s-1980s, had been producing terrorists in great numbers. There is not enough information to say that the facts and events described above were parts of the plan drafted and consistently implemented by the American special services together with their Armenian colleagues. I can only say that the above cannot be excluded: too many events looked deliberately synchronized. In other words, Armenian nationalism, which was never resolutely opposed by the state security structures of the Armenian S.S.R., developed into a destructive force that, properly funded and properly staffed with terrorists raised and trained by the Armenian Diaspora controlled by the American special services, became one of the main factors that destroyed the unity of the Soviet Union republics in the fire of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh was the first terrorist war unleashed by the American special services using the money of the Armenian Diaspora and carried out by Armenian nationalists (either members of the Armenian Diaspora or Armenian Soviet citizens) against the U.S.S.R. The active involvement of units of Armenian militants from other states, all of them part of transnational Armenian terrorism, turned the conflict into a war on terror. Staffed with fighters trained by the ARF Dashnaksutiun and the Armenian Social Democratic Hunchak Party, these units remained bitter antagonists in peacetime and closed ranks in the face of a common enemy.

The self-names or operational names of the illegal armed units of Armenians foreign citizens who fought in Nagorno-Karabakh against the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and, later, against the militia units and voluntary units of the armed forces of the Azerbaijan Republic are well known.

The Hunchak Party organized its members from Lebanon and Syria into a Ments Murad unit named in honor of Ambartsum Boiachian, better known as Ments Murad, or Murad the Great, one of the leaders of the so-called Armenian Hayduk movement of the late nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire. Lebanese Khevork Guzelian, an ASALA fighter who followed Monte Melkonian to ASALA-RM, knocked together a unit that he headed throughout the campaign in the mountain part of Karabakh; its 40 to 60 fighters (and never more!), who used automatic small arms, heavy machine guns, and 88mm company mortars, were known among the separatists as a battalion.⁵ This illegal armed unit fought in the Martakert direction (the Mardakian Front of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in the Armenian sources). Battle losses, as well as losses through sickness were replaced with volunteers (Yerkrapah) from Armenia and the Middle East; on the whole, up to 200 foreign citizens and as many as 50 citizens of Armenia fought in the unit at different times.

The Arabo unit (also called a battalion), the most battle-worthy in the armed forces of Armenian separatists, was named after Arakel, nicknamed Arabo, an Armenian Hayduk, who lived in the late nineteenth century in the eastern part of Turkey. The unit was formed in 1989 in Yerevan on the initiative of Dashnaksutiun leaders out of the party's members who were citizens of Syria and Lebanon, had fought in the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990), and were involved in the armed clashes with Syrians and Israelis in the Bekaa Valley in the 1980s.

⁴ See: F.P. Hyland, op. cit., p. 87.

⁵ See: S.T. Sarkisian, *Entsiklopedia Artsakh-Karabakha*, Petropolis, St. Petersburg, 2005, pp. 96, 189.

Headed throughout this time by Lebanese Manvel Egiazarian and armed with automatic small arms, heavy machine guns, 88mm company mortars, cars, and light armored vehicles, it specialized in reconnaissance and sabotage. The unit hit the pages of the newspapers when, in the small hours of 26 February, 1992, it slaughtered 613 women, old people, and children in the town of Khojali. Its original strength of 250 fighters was cut down to 180-200 by fighting in the Shahumian and Martuni districts of Azerbaijan in the spring of 1992. On 28 June, 1992, the unit was encircled not far from Askeran and practically destroyed: 166 terrorists were killed; the unit commanders and its leader Manvel Egiazarian fled. Later he was killed, or probably executed, under unknown circumstances.

In 1989, Kharo Kakhkegian, a U.S. citizen born in Aleppo (Syria) with ample (nearly ten years) fighting experience in the ranks of the U.S. Special Forces (Green Berets), also known as Spitak Arch (White Bear), knocked together the Crusaders (or White Crusaders) unit out of citizens of Western and Southeastern Europe. It fought in Nagorno-Karabakh during the conflict's most active phase; armed with heavy and light automatic weapons its members, better described as transnational terrorists, specialized in reconnaissance, sabotage, and capture of strategically important facilities; they were most active in the spring and summer of 1992 in Martuni, Hadrut, Martakert, Lachin, and Kalbajar.⁶ On 26 June, 1993, in Martakert (near the village of Magauz), the unit lost its commander, suffered irrecoverable losses, and was disbanded.

The special purpose battalion Shushi was staffed mainly with members of the Armenian Diaspora and headed by Jirayr Sefilian (nicknamed Jiro) born in Beirut (Lebanon). In the 1980s, during the civil war in Lebanon, he fought in militia formations of the Armenian quarter Bourj Hammoud in Beirut; an active member of the Lebanese ARF Dashnaksutiun, he was trained and later trained others in training camps of ASALA and then ASALA-RM in the Bekaa Valley close to the Israeli-Syrian border. In 1990, he arrived, together with Monte Melkonian, in Armenia as an instructor in reconnaissance and sabotage and helped organize Armenian Yerkrpah volunteer units sent to fight in Nagorno-Karabakh. Early in the spring of 1992, he united foreign Armenian mercenaries (the lucky survivals of the rout during which the Azeri army defeated several of their combat units, including the Arabo unit) into a separate assault unit for the operation codenamed Wedding in the Mountains that captured Shusha on 8-9 May, 1992.

Unlike many of the Armenians from foreign countries who fought in the Karabakh war of 1988-1994, Jirayr Sefilian was not killed in battle. Demobilized in the rank of lieutenant colonel and having become integrated into the political mainstream of Armenia as one of the members of the opposition movement, he never abandoned his former habits of a terrorist fighter. In 2006, he tried to raise an armed riot, failed, and on 10 December was arrested together with his accomplice Vardan Malkhasian, accused of public calls to carry out a violent regime change and sentenced to eighteen months in prison for illegal possession of firearms.

According to different sources, between 4,000 and 6,000 Armenians (citizens of Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Russia, Ukraine, Greece, Bulgaria, the U.S., and France) fought in Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas of the Azerbaijan Republic. They were experienced fighters who had been involved in combat operations or trained in illegal armed units. According to the criminal legislation of Russia, they are guilty of crimes under Art 208 of the Criminal Code of the RF "Organization of an Illegal Armed Unit, or Participation in It." This crime belongs to crimes of terror, therefore all combat operations in Nagorno-Karabakh fought by Armenian citizens of third countries (who never were Soviet citizens), not by local Armenians or even Armenians

⁶ See: *Ibid.*, p. 168.

living in the Republic of Armenia (which could be classified as the right of nations to self-determination), can be regarded as a terrorist war started by the political and organizational structures of transnational Armenian terrorism (see Appendix 1) controlled by the American special services since the early 1980s.

Not all supporters of the ideas of transnational Armenian terrorism arrived in Karabakh as rank-and-file fighters or even subordinate commanders. Some of them spoke of themselves as organizers of the armed struggle first against the Soviet Union and, later, against Azerbaijan. I have already written about Monte Melkonian who in the late 1980s moved Armenian terrorists from the Middle East to Soviet Transcaucasia. In 1990, he came to the theater of war as head of the so-called Patriotic Detachment and tried to put together on its basis armed units from among the local people. In 1991, he had the so-called Martuni unit under his command, which operated according to the hybrid principle used by the big colonial powers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (the U.K., France and Russia): commanders were conscripted from among tested foreigners, while the ranks were comprised of local Armenians. Private military companies of the United States also used this method of conscription, which they tested in Nagorno-Karabakh. As distinct from other commanders of the illegal Armenian armed units that fought in Nagorno-Karabakh, Monte Melkonian invariably tried to organize all-arms units complete with reconnaissance and sabotage, rifle, tank and artillery units, the range and military potentialities of which went far beyond the knowledge and skills of the trained Orientalist archeologist, as he called himself. He was killed on 12 June, 1993 in a banal fire exchange with an outpost of the Azeri military; the secrets of his contacts with the U.S. special services were buried along with him.

International terrorists Khevork Guzelian, Monte Melkonian, Kharo Kakhkegian, and Jirayr Sefilian not only set up and headed armed units, they also consulted and helped organize Soviet Armenians, some of them born in Georgia and Russia, into Yerkrpah volunteer units. To avoid unnecessary popularization and glorification of Armenian separatism, I will limit myself to a list of illegal armed units and their numerical strength to demonstrate the scope of the Armenian nationalism and separatism reared by transnational Armenian terrorism in Soviet Transcaucasia at the turn of the 1990s:

- Tigran Mets, 380 fighters;
- Sasuntsi David, 500 fighters;
- Andanik Zoravar, 400 fighters;
- Vrejaruner, 200 fighters;
- Dashnaksakanner, 200 fighters;
- Aydat, 200 fighters;
- Nart, 300 fighters;
- Mush, 300 fighters;
- Ashot Erkat, 250 fighters;
- Malatia-Sebastia, 200 fighters;
- Parapants martikner, 300 fighters;
- Razdan Unit, 200 fighters;
- Black Panther, 150 fighters;
- Cobra, 100 fighters;
- Tsegakron, 150 fighters.

This means that throughout the war, there were from 4.5 to 6 thousand people fighting on the side of the separatists; this figure corresponds to the number of Armenian militants who

arrived from abroad. In other words, there was one Armenian foreigner for each Armenian separatist who was once a Soviet citizen. To be more exact, the foreigners were international Armenian terrorists who had arrived to fight the Soviet Union, not to revive Greater Armenia. This confirms what I said in Chapter Three: the Armenian nationalist movement, regardless of its slogans, was an imperialist movement, since it had been seeking and continued to seek *Lebensraum* and resources to ensure the further existence of the Armenian ethnicity and consolidate it as the people of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

While the legal nature of terrorist acts committed during the Karabakh war by the Armenians from foreign countries does not arouse any doubt, the legal nature of crimes that look like acts of terror is fairly ambiguous. Criminal actions carried out during hostilities that cause considerable material and technical damage (explosions, arson, etc.) can be qualified either as terrorist acts or as acts of sabotage. Their aims, however, relate them to different articles of the Criminal Code of the RF. Art 205 describes acts of terrorism as “the carrying out of an explosion, arson or other actions intimidating the population, and creating the threat of human death, of infliction of significant property damage or the onset of other grave consequences, for the purpose of influencing the taking of a decision by authorities or international organizations, and also the threat of commission of the said actions for the same purposes,” while sabotage according to Art 281 is “perpetration of an explosion, arson, or of any other action aimed at the destruction or damage of enterprises, structures, transport infrastructure facilities and transport vehicles, or vital supply facilities for the population, with the aim of subverting the economic security or the defense capacity of the Russian Federation.” Sabotage is not a crime of terror, therefore it does not belong in this book. It is not always possible to draw a line between the two crimes, since their methods are practically identical, so it comes as no surprise that sabotage is sometimes qualified as a terrorist act, and vice versa.

The interpretation of what happened in Nagorno-Karabakh does not avoid similar errors. We should bear in mind that the Armenian side never regarded what it was doing as terror, even though, according to the criminal legislation of the Russian Federation and most other countries, it was involved in terrorist activities. The Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic published a list of criminal acts of the Armenian side, which the ministry’s officials qualified as terrorist.⁷ For the reasons described above, I cannot agree with their qualification of some of the crimes as acts of terror. They should be related to Part 2 of Art 105 of the Criminal Code of the RF, point (k) of which classifies “crimes committed by reason of political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or by reason of hatred or enmity with respect to some social group” as murder or sabotage. The list of terrorist acts (the qualification of which does not raise any doubt) committed by Armenian separatists in Azerbaijan during the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh is impressive enough:

- 12 December, 1988 —seventy-seven Azeri volunteers going to Armenia to help the victims of the earthquake perished in an IL-76 aircraft downed by a Stinger missile near the town of Gugark (the Spitak District of Armenia);
- 12 December, 1988 —a Stinger missile downed an AN-24 aircraft of the U.S.S.R. Air Force near the city of Spitak killing its two pilots;
- 16 September, 1989—five people were killed and 25 injured by an explosion in a passenger bus going from Tbilisi to Baku;
- 13 February, 1990 —thirteen people were injured by a blast in a passenger Shusha-Baku bus at the 105 km mark of the Yevlax-Lachin highway;

⁷ [<http://www.mns.gov.az/ru/pages/107.html>].

- 24 March, 1990 —a diesel locomotive and three freight cars were blown up at the 364 km mark of the Norashen-Baku railway damaging 150 m of rails;
- 11 July, 1990 —eight people were killed and 23 injured by an explosion in a bus going from Terter to Kalbajar and in several trucks carrying sacks of vegetables;
- 10 August, 1990 —seventeen died and 16 were injured in a LAZ bus (state registration number 43-80 AGF) blown up on the Şəmkir-Ganja highway near the Nadel village (Khanlar District);
- 10 August, 1990 —twenty people were killed and 30 injured by an explosion in a bus going from Tbilisi to Aghdam;
- 15 September, 1990—two people were injured by a bomb that went off in the TV and Radio Center of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region in the city of Khankendi (Stepanakert);
- 30 November, 1990—two people were injured in a bus carrying militiamen from Shusha to the Khankendi airport that was blown up in the Aga korpu area of Askeran District;
- 14 March, 1991 —three people were killed and four injured by a blast in a bus going from Aghdam to Shusha;
- 30 May, 1991 —eleven people died and 22 were injured near Khasaviurt (Daghestan) in an explosion in the Moscow-Baku train;
- 31 June, 1991 —16 passengers were killed and 20 injured in a passenger train Moscow-Baku blown up at Khasaviurt (Daghestan);
- 8 September, 1991 —six people died and 36 were injured in an explosion in a bus going from Aghdam to Qaradağlı;
- 20 November, 1991—twenty-two people were killed in a MI-8 helicopter carrying members of the International Peacekeeping Mission shot down near the village of Qarakend (the Khojavend District);
- 8 January, 1992 —twenty-five passengers on the *Sovetskaia Kalmykia* ferry (now *Akademik Topchubashov*) going from Krasnovodsk (Turkmenistan) to Baku were killed and 88 injured during an explosion;
- 28 January, 1992 —all the passengers (41 people) and crew of 3 were killed in a civilian helicopter going from Aghdam to Shusha shot down not far from Shusha;
- 28 February, 1993 —eleven people were killed and 18 injured in a passenger train Kislovodsk-Baku blown up at Gudermes in Chechnia;
- 2 June, 1993 —nobody suffered in a passenger car blown up on a side track of the Baku Railway Station;
- 1 February, 1994 —three people were killed and 20 injured by an explosion in the Kislovodsk-Baku train at the Baku Railway Station;
- 9 February, 1994 —no one was hurt in a blast in a freight car on a side track of the Khudat station;
- 18 March, 1994 —34 people died on board a Lockheed S-130 Hercules plane of the Iranian Air Force downed near Khankendi;
- 13 April, 1994 —three people were killed and three injured in a Moscow-Baku passenger train blown up at the Daghestanskie Ogni station in Daghestan;
- 3 July, 1994 —thirteen were killed and 42 injured by an explosion in a metro train in Baku between the 28 May and Ganjlik stations.

Most of terrorist acts enumerated above were committed far from the theater of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, so they did not pursue military-technical, let alone military-strategic tasks and were never intended to lower the level of battle-worthiness of the Azerbaijan Republic and its armed forces. Committed to demoralize the people and the country's leaders, they can be described as crimes of terror. The investigation, which was far from easy, did not reveal the culprits. If terrorists are apprehended, the law-enforcement agencies can rely on the investigated crimes to reconstruct the means and methods of all other crimes of terror either planned or carried out. This fully applies to the sentence of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic of 22 July, 1994 with respect to Igor Khatkovskiy, a citizen of Russia, who was sentenced to 8 years in prison for the terrorist act carried out at the Baku Railway Station on 2 June, 1993. Later he was interrogated as a witness in the criminal case of Jahan Oganessian, Ashot Goloian, and Boris Simonian (discharged officers of the National Security Directorate [NSD] of the Republic of Armenia and FSS of Russia) who helped Armenian terrorists gather information and organize acts of sabotage. They were accused of illegal trade in firearms and illegal crossing of the state border of the Russian Federation. The sentence was passed by the Tambov Garrison Military Court on 11 March, 1996 (the text can be found in Appendix 3C). The sentence passed by the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic on 29 April, 1998 in the case of Azer Aslanov, accused of carrying out the terrorist act in the Baku subway on 3 July, 1994, and published here for the first time (see Appendix 3D), offers all the details of the preparation for and execution of this terrorist act. All the terrorist acts enumerated above had much in common at the planning and implementation stages, which means that transnational Armenian terrorism has certain common and highly specific features.

First, the two disclosed and, therefore, all the terrorist acts carried out in Azerbaijan in the 1990s were planned by officers of the special services of Armenia or, to be more exact, of the department of intelligence services in enemy territory of the National Security Directorate (later Ministry) of the Republic of Armenia. All these crimes were committed when the Alma Ata Agreement of 1992 on the abandonment of intelligence and reconnaissance by the special services of the CIS countries in each other's territories had been signed and enacted. The documents related to the Khatkovskiy and Aslanov cases testified to the fact that officers of the NSD of Armenia had enlisted supporters and bought explosives in Russia, or moved them across its territory. This means that the Armenian special services violated the laws of Azerbaijan and Russia, as well as Yerevan's obligations under the Alma Ata Agreement.

Second, to remain in the shadows, officers of the Armenian special services preferred not to enlist Armenians or citizens of the Republic of Armenia for terrorist acts in Azerbaijan and Russia. Khatkovskiy and Aslanov were used as terrorists, as well as a source of political and military-technical information (this is clearly stated in both indictments). This means that these cases can be described as violations of Armenia's international-legal obligations within the CIS.

Third, those who planned the terrorist acts counted on a psychological effect rather than physical damage and never expected military-political or military-strategic consequences. Aslanov succeeded because, before being taken prisoner by the Armenians involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, he had served in the rank of captain of the Soviet and, later, Azerbaijan army. Khatkovskiy was a dilettante and acted accordingly; he was too inefficient to be worth the financial and material resources spent on him.

Fourth, the extremely low efficiency (from the military point of view) of the terrorist acts, as well as the exposure and arrest in Moscow of all the members of the intelligence and subversive group of the NSD of Armenia headed by Lieutenant Colonel Oganessian (who were later sentenced by the Tambov Garrison Military Court), convinced those responsible for national security that terrorist attacks were useless. This probably explains why in 1994 the criminal acts committed by transnational Armenian terrorists were discontinued.

The Armenians did not limit themselves to terrorist acts and crimes of terror committed by illegal armed units comprised of foreign citizens and formed in the territory of Armenia. During the Karabakh war, the Armenian side in the conflict committed other crimes, some of which could be classified as “armed rebellion.” The instances when the Azeri side committed this kind of criminal act were not registered. According to Art 279 of the Criminal Code of the RF, those who actively participate in an armed rebellion for the purpose of overthrowing or forcibly changing the constitutional system, or of breaching the territorial integrity of the country shall be held criminally liable.

However, Armenian servicemen of the 2nd battalion, 336th motor rifle regiment, 23rd motor rifle division, 4th Army of the United Armed Forces of the CIS commanded by Major Seyran Oganian disobeyed the order. They captured several armored vehicles and on 25 February, 1992, moved against the Azeri units of territorial self-defense in the city of Khojali causing numerous civilian deaths. This can be clearly classified as armed rebellion: acting without orders, servicemen captured armament and armored vehicles, sided with the Armenians in the Armenian-Azeri conflict in Karabakh, and contributed to the efforts to change the constitutional order and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. They acted as abettors of the international Armenian terrorists fighting to detach this territory from the rest of a sovereign country. Strange as it may seem, the law-enforcement agencies of the Azerbaijan Republic qualified the mass murder of civilians in Khojali, which followed immediately after the armed rebellion in the 336th motor rifle regiment, as genocide, widely exploited by the government officials and the public for propaganda purposes; the armed rebellion, however, remained unqualified from the point of view of the criminal law, even in words.

The steps taken by the Supreme Command of the United Armed Forces of the CIS indirectly confirm the fact that an armed rebellion had taken place. On 3 March, the 336th motor rifle regiment was removed from the place of its permanent deployment in Stepanakert (Nagorno-Karabakh) to the Gardabani military base (Georgia), where it was disbanded as a rebellious military unit involved in a crime against the peace and security of humanity. All officers and warrant officers were dismissed, while conscripted servicemen were moved to other units. Seyran Oganian, who had headed the rebellion, found safety among the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh, became a warlord, and was promoted to commander of the “self-defense army” of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Today, Colonel General Oganian is Defense Minister of the Republic of Armenia. This fact shows that the illegal armed units of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh, which form the “Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army,” have been integrated into the armed forces of Armenia and, in fact, can be described as an occupation corps in those parts of the Azerbaijan Republic that have been detached from it in the course of the Karabakh conflict. This also means that the people guilty of the terrorist crimes committed during the Karabakh war are national heroes of Armenia and occupy high posts.

Oganian is not the only one. There are others whose careers began in illegal armed units in Nagorno-Karabakh; they are former warlords (guilty under Russian criminal law of the crimes described in Art 208 of the Criminal Code of the RF). Lieutenant General Manvel Grigorian is one of them. In 2000-2008, he was deputy defense minister and head of the Yerkrapah Volunteer Union. Its members were directly involved in fighting the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan and the National Army of Azerbaijan. In 1988-1992, Grigorian was a fighter and a warlord of the so-called Etchmiadzin Unit; in 1992, he joined the armed forces of Armenia as commander of separate motor rifle battalion; in 1996, he was promoted to Major General and four years later, to Lieutenant General. Early in 2008, he was removed from his post during the political crisis caused by the results of the presidential election on 19 February, 2008, which Levon Ter-Petrossian, the first president of the Republic of Ar-

menia, tried to challenge. Speaking at a rally, he said that certain generals, including Manvel Grigorian, were on his side. Grigorian, who had been under house arrest until the inauguration of President Elect Serzh Sargsian, was allowed to resume his public activities and reclaim his post as head of Yerkrpah.

There is any number of people among the Armenian military commanders who not only have terrorist acts, but also military crimes to their names. Lieutenant General Haykaz Baghmanian, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Armenia, is one of them. In 1988, as commander of a battery stationed in Sardarabad, he transferred all weapons and military property of the Soviet Army at his disposal to militants of Armenian illegal armed units fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1991, as chief of staff of the so-called Martuni Unit, Haykaz Baghmanian served under the command of Monte Melkonian, a U.S. citizen and international terrorist. In 2003, he joined the armed forces of Armenia as commander of the 2nd Army Corps; later he was transferred to the Defense Ministry. Today, he is responsible for coordination between the Armed Forces of Armenia and the illegal “Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army.”

Generals guilty of crimes of terror (participation in illegal armed forces) committed during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have risen to command posts in the Armed Forces of Armenia and in other armed units of the republic. Lieutenant General Levon Eranosian, Commander of the Police Force and First Deputy Chief of the Police of the Ministry of the Interior of Armenia, is one of them. He rose to these heights from a fighter of the so-called Etchmiadzin Unit (where he served together with Manvel Grigorian). In 1992, he was admitted to the armed forces of Armenia and climbed up from deputy commander of a battalion to commander of an army corps; in 2001, he was promoted to Major General; and in 2013, he was appointed to his present post. This creates a paradox—a former terrorist has become the chief fighter against terror.

The list of Armenian generals with the experience of warlord of illegal Armenian armed separatists behind them is very long. Today, this experience opens many doors in Armenia. This means that the illegal armed units of the separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh are being integrated into the armed forces of Armenia and that all those involved in terrorist crimes (either foreigners or local people) have been rehabilitated and released from criminal liability.

When writing about the involvement of Oganian, Baghmanian, Grigorian, and Eranosian in terrorist crimes, I cannot bypass in silence the fact that practically all the top officials of the Republic of Armenia were involved in similar crimes in 1988-1994. President Serzh Sargsian and Robert Kocharian, who filled this post before him, were warlords of the units of Armenian separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1988-1994, both those staffed with local people and those staffed with foreigners. According to Robert Kocharian’s official biography, in 1988 he was secretary of the local cell of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan at the Karabakh Silk Factory and also the leader of the Miatsum (Unification) public movement, the aim of which was to detach Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and join it to Armenia. In plain words he was an ideologist and a leader of Armenian separatism from 1992. In August 1992, with the Armenian invasion of the valley part of Karabakh, he was appointed chairman of the State Defense Committee, prime minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and, hence, leader of Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan, the striking force of which consisted of illegal armed units. In 1989, President of Armenia Serzh Sargsian, the then head of the propaganda department of the Stepanakert City Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and Assistant First Secretary of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Az.S.S.R., was appointed chairman of the Committee of the Self-Defense Forces of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic with operational command of all the units of Armenian separatists and international terrorists in Nagorno-Karabakh concentrated in his hands. He is personally responsible for the armed riot

of the 2nd battalion of the 336th motor rifle regiment that took place on 25 February, 1992 and caused numerous civilian casualties in Khojali the following day. The practically identical life stories of the second and third presidents of the Republic of Armenia show that in the Soviet Union the Communist leaders of the Armenian S.S.R. and other territories with a predominantly Armenian population did not share the official ideology of proletarian internationalism; they secretly, yet actively encouraged nationalism and extremism among the local Armenians, who later hailed and supported the ideas of transnational Armenian terrorism.

It comes as no surprise that these means and methods (which proved ineffective as means and methods of warfare) survived the Soviet Union and the active phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to become tools of struggle among various groups of the Armenian elite. Despite the very limited knowledge about this type of crime, I can mention some of them:

- On 8 August, 1998, in Yerevan unknown people killed Prosecutor General of Armenia Ghenrikh Khachatryan;
- On 10 December, 1998, unknown killers murdered Deputy Defense Minister of Armenia Vaghram Khorkhoruni;
- On 9 February, 1999, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Commander of Internal Forces Artsrun Margarian was killed in the street by a direct shot.

These crimes of terror qualified by the Criminal Code of the RF according to Art 277 as “encroachment on the life of a statesman or a public figure, committed for the purpose of terminating his government or any other political activity, or out of revenge for such activity” were the prelude to the most noted act of terror in the recent history of the Republic of Armenia. I have in mind the mass killing of leaders and deputies of the National Assembly (Parliament) and several ministers of the government of the Republic of Armenia accompanied by hostage-taking that took place on 27 October, 1999.

That day, at 5:15 PM five armed people—Karen Hunanian, Eduard Grigorian, Vlam Galstian, and Derenik Bejanian led by Karen’s elder brother Nairi Hunanian—burst into the assembly hall of the National Assembly and opened fire on the deputies and ministers. They killed Chairman of the National Assembly Karen Demirchian, Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian, Vice Speakers of the National Assembly Yuri Bakhshian and Ruben Miroian, Minister for Operational Matters Leonard Petrossian, and deputies Armenak Armenakian, Mikael Kotanian, and Henrik Abramian, injured deputies Ermine Nagdalian, Andranik Manukian, Armen Khachatryan, Edmond Tsaturian, Jirayr Gevorkian, and Emma Khudabashian, as well as Minister of Privatization Pavel Kaltakhchian, and took the following people hostage: Minister of Justice David Arutiunian, Minister of Agriculture Gagik Shakhbazian, Minister-Head of the Government Office Shagen Karamanukian, Minister of Education Eduard Kazarian, Minister of Culture Roland Sharoian, Minister of State Incomes Smbat Ayvazian, Minister of Transport Ervand Zakharian, Minister of Communications Ruben Tonoian, Minister of City Planning Hrayr Hovhannisian, Minister of Finance Levon Barkhudarian, Minister of Nature Protection Gevorg Vardanian, and deputies of the National Assembly. The terrorists set some of them free later on the same day, while another forty remained their hostages.

According to one of the hostages, Minister of Justice David Arutiunian, the terrorists considered their actions to be a “small revolution” and pointed to Vice Speaker Vazgen Sarkisian, head of the Yerkrpah Volunteer Union and one of the leaders of international Armenian terrorists, who had taken part in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as their main target. The new generation of Armenian terrorists believed that he “had deprived the Armenians of dignified life” and repeated that “after removing him from the scene, they would set up a provisional government the next day to ensure a new and better life for the country.”

The trial began on 15 February, 2001 and lasted until 2 December, 2003 when the first instance court of the Yerevan Tsentr and Nork-Marash communities passed judgment. The six accused— Nairi Hunanian, former journalist and head of the band, his brother Karen, along with Grigorian, Galstian, Bejanian, and Ashot Kniazian—were sentenced to life imprisonment. Gamlet Stepanian was sentenced to 14-year imprisonment. They were found guilty under several articles of the Criminal Code of Armenia, including high treason and terrorism.

Three of all the accused terrorists died in prison: according to the official version, Norayr Galstian died of an electric shock, Vram Galstian, the uncle of the Hunanian brothers, committed suicide, while Gamlet Stepanian died of heart failure.

Nairi Hunanian insisted in vain that he had been the only organizer and the leader of the crime; a separate criminal case against the unknown organizer was opened on 11 July, 2000. The investigation lasted for four years and failed; in November 2004, the case was closed. At the same time, former deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia Musheg Movsosian, accused of complicity with the terrorists and released from responsibility for want of proof, died in a car crash. Several of the witnesses left Armenia only to die abroad under suspicious circumstances. Tigran Nagdalian, Chairman of the Council of the Armenia Public TV and Radio Company (who according to lawyer O. Yunoshev was involved in doctoring the video materials related to the events of 27 October, 1999), was assassinated in Yerevan on 28 January, 2002.⁸

This means that the terrorist act of 27 October, 1999 left no influential politicians who could have opposed usurpation of power by the so-called Karabakh clan, the members of which can be described as separatists and international terrorists guilty of numerous crimes of terror committed in Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent areas of Azerbaijan. The boomerang of transnational Armenian terrorism thrown at Azerbaijan returned to Armenia, the “historical homeland” of the Armenians, which had in fact become a colony of the notorious Artsakh, a quasi-state on occupied Azeri land.

By way of conclusion, I want to point out that, by historical standards, not much time has elapsed since the end of the active phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. People who committed crimes of terror during the Karabakh war of 1988-1994 are in power in Armenia. So it stands to reason that they prefer to suppress the truth about what happened at that time. This means that a comprehensive and full investigation of this problem should be left to future generations of historians.

⁸ [<http://www.kavka2-uzel.ru/articles/232322/>].

CHAPTER SEVEN

NATIONAL-RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND POLITICAL TERRORISM OF NATIONALISTS AS THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND THE ETHNOGENESIS OF ARMENIAN ETHNICITY

(Essay on Sociopolitical History)

Until 1991, the Armenians did not have full-fledged national statehood. This means that from the point of view of most of the classical and contemporary teachings about the state and law they, at no time, were a political nation, that is, a state-forming ethnicity. Deliberate destruction of the Soviet Union partially orchestrated from abroad gave the Armenians the opportunity to form the sovereign Republic of Armenia, which has been functioning for a quarter of a century now.

Two-and-a-half thousand years ago, the Kingdom of Greater Armenia existed, a fact confirmed by numerous artifacts recovered by an archeological endeavor in the western part of Asia Minor. To my mind, the Republic of Armenia of our days with its formally democratic regime cannot be described as a legal heir to theocratic Greater Armenia in the same way as Israel, the contemporary Jewish state, is not an heir to Hellenic Judea. Both republics differ in many respects from their semi-legendary theocratic predecessors of antiquity. There are cultural, spiritual, and religious ties between the past and present, but this should not be taken to mean that there was or is legal succession between these two Armenian states, which allegedly establishes the right of the Armenians to territories outside the state borders of the Republic of Armenia recognized by international law.

The Dashnak Republic of Armenia of 1918-1920 can be hardly regarded as a more or less comprehensible effort at building and maintaining the national statehood of the Armenians. From the first day of its existence (28 May, 1918), it was no more than the seat of a regional armed conflict, which it stirred up itself by moving against its neighbors one by one. With no more or less adequate structure of state administration and more or less coordinated economic infrastructure, the leaders of Dashnaktsutjun, after seizing power in the new state, launched a military campaign against the republic's neighbors in an effort to resolve domestic problems by taking their property and resources. Armenians acted in the best traditions of the nomadic armies led by Genghis Khan. This proves beyond a doubt that at that time the Republic of Armenia had no even marginally efficient state institutions.

Here is proof of the above. In November-December 1918, the Armenians moved against the Georgians to gain control over Samtskhe

Javakhetia and Akhalkalaki, its center. Beaten off by the Georgians (who, to tell the truth, had Germany and later the U.K. on their side), they retreated. In mid-May 1919, having failed in Georgia, the Armenian nationalists moved toward Nakhchivan, part of the recently proclaimed (by Azeris) Araz Republic, liquidated by the Armenian forces after a month of fighting. Local clashes continued from mid-May to 10 August, 1919 when the sides signed a truce, under which Azerbaijan restored its military control over Nakhchivan. Hostilities were rekindled in March 1920 in Zangezur and Nagorno-Karabakh where Armenians and Azeris lived side by side. After 28 April, regular units of Soviet Russia joined the struggle on the side of the Azeris. As could be expected, the Dashnaks were defeated in early August and the territory of the contemporary Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic returned to the jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan according to a letter of Chairman of Nakhchivan Revolutionary Committee M. Bektashev to Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Nariman Narimanov. Defeated in the east, the government of Armenia composed of members of Dashnaksutiun sealed its fate. Turkey, which until the Sovietization of Azerbaijan was guarantor of its security and state sovereignty, attacked Armenia in the south and returned the lands Armenia had occupied in 1918 to Turkey's jurisdiction. In the war with Turkey, which lasted from 23 September to 2 December, 1920, the Republic of Armenia ruled by the Dashnaks suffered a crushing military and political defeat. The Armenians avoided just retribution from their Transcaucasian neighbors (which had earlier been victims of Armenian attacks) by removing from power the terrorists of Dashnaksutiun (its member Drastamat Kanaian, Defense Minister of Armenia, was involved in the assassination in 1905 of Prince Nakashidze, Governor of the Baku Gubernia and, in 1907, of Maksud Alikhanov-Avarskiy, Governor General of the Tiflis Gubernia). On 2-3 December, 1920, Armenia became part of Soviet Russia, thus saving its administrative legal sovereignty and avoiding the fate of a Caucasian nation without a legal status because of its small numerical strength.¹

The defeats the Dashnak Republic of Armenia suffered in the wars of 1918-1920 were determined by the level of social development of the Armenian ethnicity of the early twentieth century. At that time, social organization of the Armenians was not developed enough to build an efficient statehood. This, in turn, can be explained by the social history of the Armenians in the Middle Ages and Modern Times, when practically all the leading political nations of our time were taking shape.

In the fifth century, the Armenians began living in the Diaspora spread across the entire Muslim ecumene: Persia, the Ottoman Empire, including the territories now occupied by the Balkan states (from the late fourteenth century onwards they belonged to the Ottoman Empire), those areas of North Africa that remained under the empire's protectorate, and the Crimean Khanate, one of the vassals of the Sublime Porte. The Ottoman and the Crimean-Tatar administrations considered the Armenians to be millet at-Arman, a self-administered group of non-Muslims or *zimmi*. In the Ottoman Empire, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Jews belonged to the same category; they formed their own millets (a religious corporation of Orthodox Christians who were subjects of the Empire was called millet at-Rum). In other words, in the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian, just as the East- or West European and Judean, identity was rooted in confessional rather than national affiliation—not blood, but religious kinship, and the corresponding church rites.

¹ For more details about the history of the Dashnak Republic of Armenia, see: *Istoria natsionalno-gosudarstvennogo stroitelstva v SSSR, 1917-1978*, in 2 vols., third revised edition, Vol. 1: *Istoria natsionalno-gosudarstvennogo stroitelstva v SSSR v perekhodny period ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu (1917-1936)*, Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1979; R.G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times*, in 2 vols., Vol. II: *Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century*, Palgrave Macmillan, Los-Angeles, 2004; A.T. Minassian, *La république d'Arménie. 1918-1920: La mémoire du siècle*, Brussels, 1989.

Under the Shari'a, the legal cornerstone of the Ottoman and Persian empires, non-Muslims could not own land and fill official posts relating to feudal land ownership. They were excluded from civil service, be it administrative, military, fiscal, quartermasters, etc. and were obliged to pay *jizya* (the money thus collected was used to maintain the army and buy weapons). At first (at the time Muslims had conquered certain territories), *jizya* was interpreted as "redemption money" paid by *zimmi*. As the Islamic state was gradually becoming a centralized hierarchical structure, *jizya* acquired the meaning specified above. In this way, the interests of the state and its non-Muslim population were counterbalanced—the state kept its janissary troops, which protected all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their faith, while the non-Muslims preserved their religions and independent churches by helping maintain the armed forces or local administrations that had janissary units under their command.

Jizya was strictly per capita and was collected in all Islamic countries. To guarantee its collection, it was gathered by the hierarchs of religious corporations who were duty bound to keep the lists of their co-religionists living either in the empire or its individual districts. In other words, fiscal obligations were officially imposed upon any church (there are no churches in Islam) either Orthodox, Catholic, or Armenian Apostolic—it had to register its followers and collect annual *jizya*, which went either to the treasury of the sultan (in Istanbul and in Rûm, the empire's European domains in the Balkans), or to the treasuries of *walis* or *pasha*, rulers of provinces (*vilayets*) who were accountable to the sultan for the way the money was used. This made the non-Muslim clergy in the Islamic countries an intermediary of sorts between official power and their religious communities, that is, a semblance of administrative power.

This meant that non-Muslims in the Muslim countries lived under administrative and police control of the local authorities not favorably disposed to non-Muslims; on the other hand, they were legally subordinated to their own clergy—the material prosperity of each member of non-Muslim confessions and that of his family directly depended on the clergy. This prompted the conclusion that in the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate, the non-Muslim clergy had much wider powers and rights than their Muslim colleagues; they were much more involved in state and public life of the empire than the clergy in the Christian countries. The Armenian Apostolic priest elected or invited by the community fulfilled the following three functions: his priestly functions, which made him part of the church hierarchy; administrative functions as the headman directly involved in the developments inside the community; and fiscal functions as the official who contacted local Muslim administrations through tax collection. He controlled all channels of interaction between the local ethnoreligious community and the outside world. In plain words, its members totally depended on him. This pattern of everyday life of the Armenian ethnicity in the Ottoman Empire survived for at least five centuries, which explains the exceptionally great role of the Armenian Apostolic clergy in everyday and public life of the Armenians as members of one of the *millet*s of the Ottoman Empire.

In the Persian Empire, the Armenian Apostolic clergy had much less power—with few exceptions (a fairly small sect of Zoroastrians), *jizya* was collected by the local administrations according to the lists supplied by Armenian priests. It was a per capita and, partly, an income tax (at least in the eighteenth century). The Christian areas of Eastern Transcaucasia (Kartli-Kakhetia and Guria), though vassals of the Persian shahs, were completely autonomous in the administrative and religious respect and, therefore, paid no *jizya*. This explains why tax collection among the Armenians living in the inner areas of the Persian Empire was administratively similar to tax collection in other parts of the empire. The role of the Armenian clergy was limited to supplying lists of their co-religionists. This also meant that, as subjects of the Persian shah, the Armenians had much wider opportunities for social and economic development than the Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire.

The Armenians were absolutely free in the domains of the Crimean khans, which stretched (including along the territory of the peninsular per se) from contemporary Transnistria to Malaya Kabarda. In his *Tahiri-i Kyrym* (History of Crimea), Ottoman statesman and writer of the latter half of the eighteenth century El Haj Muhammed As Seyyid Nejati Effendi (during the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish War he served as quartermaster of the Crimea Corps routed in the fall of 1772) described everyday life of the local people. Each Armenian had to pay *jizya* of one *kurush* (one piaster) a year²; it was, in fact, a business license. After buying it, an Armenian could go into any type of economic activity, including slave trade and communal baths. Under the Karasubazar Peace Treaty of 1 November, 1772, Crimea became a vassal of the Russian Empire, its Armenian population being forced to move to the vicinities of Rostov-on-Don where they founded the city of Armavir. The Russian Empire acquired a large group of traders and artisans; after losing its Armenian trading and working population, the Crimean Khanate joined or was joined to Russia in 1783.

The above concise historical and ethnographic survey shows that in the Islamic ecumene, the Armenians were not a united people, but rather a multinational religious sect that brought together people from different ethnic and social groups. They lived in different countries and throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries gradually moved to the Russian Empire. Massive and organized resettlement of Armenians from Persia to the Russian part of Transcaucasia after the war of 1826-1828 and from the Ottoman Empire after the war of 1828-1829 can be described as part of the contribution the countries defeated by the Separate Caucasian Corps had to pay Russia. The change of the country did not affect either the morality or way of life of the members of this religious corporation. This interpretation of emigration of the Armenians living in different Muslim countries to Russia suggests that they preserved very specific relations inside the corporation rooted in many generations who had lived in these countries. Armenians remained loyal to them when dealing with the local Russian (Cossack or Malorussian) populations and never bothered to establish contacts with co-religionists who arrived from other Muslim countries.

The Armenian immigrants brought their way of life, customs, and beliefs, which differed greatly from the local ones, to their new homeland on the Don, in Taman, the Northern Caucasus, and Transcaucasia (Akhalkalaki and the Lori valley). This attracted much academic and administrative interest. In 1830-1831, Russian troops moved up to a third of a million Armenians from the Ottoman Empire to Russian Transcaucasia; two years earlier, in 1828, about 50 thousand were moved out of Persia; half a century earlier, no more than 15 thousand were moved out of Crimea.³ In this way, the Erivan Khanate (a Russian gubernia since 1828) acquired a predominantly Armenian population. The same can be said about Samtskhe Javakhetia (now part of Georgia), previously homeland of the Muslim Mingrels.

The Armenians and Muslims had much in common with respect to their lifestyle and habits, although the Armenians were much more religious. In the last third of the nineteenth century, their religious identity was the only thing that distinguished them from the semi-nomadic Muslim peoples whose primitive lifestyle and primitive economic activities were more or less similar to their own. This raised the authority of the Armenian Apostolic clergy even higher than in the Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate. In Russia, they established

² See: M. Nejati Effendi, "Zapiski Muhammeda Nejati Effendi, turetskogo plenogo v Rossii v 1771-1775 gg., Transl. from the Turkish and introduced by V. Smirnov," *Russkaia starina*, 1894, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 113-114; No. 4, pp. 179-208; No. 5, pp. 144-169 (here quoted from: *Russkaia starina*, No. 4, p. 183).

³ For more details, see: O. Kuznetsov, "Nashestvie ili iskhod? Pereselenie arмян v Zakavkazie v 1830-1831 gg. v trudakh russkikh voennykh istorikov vtoroy treti XIX-nachala XX stoletia," *IRS-Nasledie: Mezhdunarodny azerbaidzhanskiy zhurnal*, 2012, No. 5 (59), pp. 56-61; No. 6, pp. 32-37.

relations between their multinational congregation and the local authorities; after settling in Russia, the Armenians remained a polyethnic religious sect guided by their clergy and its hierarchy. This situation was further consolidated by the fact that a large part of the autochthonous Turkic population of Transcaucasia was officially “Armenized,” so to speak. This primarily refers to the numerically smaller peoples (Tats and Udins) who belonged to the Armenian Apostolic Church long before the arrival of Armenians from the Ottoman and Persian empires.

According to Marx, “social being determines consciousness”; this can be fully applied to the nature and content of the religious world outlook of the Transcaucasian Armenians in the last third of the nineteenth century. Unaware of the Marxian formula, Lieutenant General Nikolay Dubrovin, an outstanding military historian, ethnographer, Perpetual Secretary of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Military-Teaching Committee at the General Staff of the Russian Imperial Army followed it when describing the religious rites of the Transcaucasian Armenians in Volume 1 (Part 2) of his multivolume *Istoria voyny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze* (A History of War and Russians’ Rule in the Caucasus). According to what he wrote a century-and-a-half ago, the Armenians were not “specific” Christians denying some persons in the Trinity but common pagans who worshipped a pantheon of gods. Obligated to follow the rules and norms of official and bureaucratic political correctness prominent in the past very much like today, Nikolay Dubrovin wrote:

“Even though the Armenians embraced Christianity long ago, they moved certain traits of pagan rituals to the newly acquired religion. They made sacrifices to Mihr, patron of heroes fighting in the war who brought victory to the most courageous and daring... In our days, the Armenians celebrate Mihr either on the day of the Meeting of the Lord or on the eve. The feast is celebrated either inside the church or outside it, in the open...”

“Many of the Armenians worship the sun, called Arev in Armenian. No matter what, there are still people who call themselves arevardi, that is, sons of the sun. Dying people are laid so that they face the east; the same applies to the dead when they are laid in the coffin. Burials are performed before sunset. The Armenians also worship Anahita, the goddess of wisdom and glory who, as believed, patronized the Armenian Kingdom. Every year, when the roses are in full bloom, the Armenians celebrated the day of this goddess. This is called Vartavar. On that day, the Armenians decorated temples, statues, public places, and even themselves. Today, the Armenians honor the goddess by decorating altars and sprinkling people gathered in the church with holy rose water.”⁴ This was what happened in the Armenian countryside (today the territory of the Republic of Armenia) in the last third of the nineteenth century!

Anyone who loves the Armenians and knows enough of the humanities may object to the above by saying that this phenomenon called syncretism was typical not only of the Armenians, but of practically all Christian churches. This is true. In his *Yazychestvo drevnikh slavian* (Paganism among Ancient Slavs), Academician Boris Rybakov wrote that religious syncretism was prominent during the transition from clans and tribes to the state when the upper crust embraced a monotheist religion as its ideology, while the grass roots remained pagan. This was typical of the Eastern Slavs in the tenth and up to the fourteenth century, the period when pre-Mongol and Golden Horde Rus was gradually becoming Christian. The same went on among the Transcaucasian Armenians in the mid-nineteenth century. This meant that earlier in their history they had no experience of national statehood, which makes Armenian deliberations about the lost Greater Armenia an ideological myth. The Armenian religious leaders have been using it for the last few centuries to establish and maintain their moral and financial control over their co-religionists. Christian and Armenian syncretism are very different in one respect—the

⁴ N.F. Dubrovin, *Istoria voyny i vladychestva russkikh na Kavkaze*, in 8 vols., Vol. 1, Part 2, N.I. Skorokhodov print shop, St. Petersburg, 1871, pp. 409-410.

former is a cult of a sacrifice. “For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life” (John: 3:16). This means that Christianity requires no material, let alone human, sacrifices. The cult of Mihr, the Armenian analogue of the great Olympian god of war Ares or Roman Mars, requires sacrifices, which contradicts Christianity and Christian ethics. Armenian theologians, past masters of scholastics, knew that, but either accepted or deliberately encouraged this practice that coincided with their corporate interests.

My conclusion about the Armenians as a polyethnic religious sect or an ethnoreligious corporation that existed throughout the nineteenth and even in the early twentieth century was supported by Procurator of the Etchmiadzin Synod A. Frenkel, who presented his well-known memorandum about the state of affairs among the Armenians of the Russian Empire to the Holy Governing Synod in 1907. There is no reason to doubt his competence—his post presupposed that he performed the functions of a state inspector of the administrative and economic activities of the hierarchs and clergy of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the territory of Russia. In other words, he knew much more than any other official of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Empire (between 1836 and 1917, the Armenian Apostolic Church was administratively guided by the Ministry’s Department of Foreign Faiths). There is no reason to doubt what he wrote about the social structure of the Transcaucasian Armenians in the early twentieth century.

“Historically, Greater Armenia adopted Christianity in the fourth century; in the fifth century, it lost its political independence and was ruled for some time by Persians (Zoroastrians), Byzantium, Arabs, Seljuk Turks, and other conquerors. Different parts of what was Greater Armenia were divided among conquerors and lived, developed, and created their own special and church relations maximally adjusted to the state order of their rulers. They gradually lost contact among themselves; for this reason each part insisted on the purity and unaltered nature of the dogmata of the Armenian Apostolic faith; the language, rights, and customs lost much of their national traits. In fact, the Turkish, Egyptian, Persian, and Indian Armenians, even if we look at our Transcaucasia alone, demonstrate a very interesting fact—the Armenians of Tiflis (Georgian influence), the Armenians of Akulis, Elisavetpol, and Karabakh (Persian influence) and the Armenians of Akhaltsikhe and Akhalkalaki (Turkish influence) can barely understand each other; marriages between them are very rare.

“The historical fate of the Armenian nation has proven incontrovertibly the complete inability of this nation to create its own independent state, a state organism; its absolute inability to perceive the true principles of higher civilization, since for several millennia not one luminary of science and art has been registered. Greater Armenia of the old times did not leave us a single code of national laws, not counting the Code of Laws of learned monk Mkhitar Gosh, a pathetic compilation of the laws of Moses, Byzantine, and bits and pieces of Armenian folk customs.”⁵

The state of affairs described above can primarily be explained by the very specific social and legal status of the corporation of the Armenian Apostolic clergy in the social system of Armenian religious-ethnic society, which exhibited two very specific features that distinguished it from its colleagues of other churches and confessions. First, membership in this corporation was never hereditary because of strict celibacy. The priests of the Armenian Apostolic Church

⁵ Russian State Historical Archives (hereinafter RGIA), rec. gr. 821 “Department of Spiritual Affairs of Foreign Faiths of the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Empire,” inv. 7 “Armenian Apostolic Faith. 1836-1917,” f. 96 (180/139) “Notes and Information about the Armenian Apostolic Church in Russia and Its Clergy, about the Activities of the Etchmiadzin Synod and the Attitude to It of the Catholicoi of All Armenians, about the Property and Religious Structures, etc. 1864-1911,” sheet 254.

had no legal children; this means that there were no hereditary Armenian Apostolic priests in the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires, in which the principles and norms of the feudal law were strictly observed. The corporation reproduced itself by drawing fresh forces from all the social groups of the Armenian religious community (millet). Priests of any confessions were expected to be well versed in the religious affairs and know much more than the basics of literacy and bits and pieces of science. Knowledge of the dogmata of the faiths and church services were a sort of educational census that distinguished the priests from the other members of the same church—the congregation and the laity, which depended on their much more educated spiritual pastors. Adequate education required and requires today a fairly long period of learning—from five to ten years; this means that ordinary people who had no money to support themselves while studying stood no chance of becoming priests. For centuries, the corporation of Armenian Apostolic priests was replenished with younger sons or nephews of trading families, that is, the social group that concentrated the wealth of the Armenian ethnoreligious corporation, the prototype of the Armenian ethnicity. This explains why throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Armenian clergy was replenished from among the trade and usury social stratum across the Russian Empire, particularly the Transcaucasian provinces and districts.

The social status and way of life of the Armenian clergy was strongly affected by the fact that by the early twentieth century it had accumulated public property of the Armenians (not as an ethnicity but as a religious sect) in the form of legal right to this property or direct and indirect management. Not infrequently, Armenian families entrusted their property to the clergy or agents of the church hierarchy. This property was unrelated to either religious or any other confessional activities; it was, in contemporary terms, commercial real estate set up to derive profit. Transferred to the church, it was exempt from taxation, which increased its profitability. This meant that Armenian industrialists and traders were functioning under much better conditions than the other entities of business activities, particularly the Russian national bourgeoisie taking shape at the turn of the twentieth century. This practice was not invented in Russia—it was brought to it by Armenian migrants from the countries where they had lived for many centuries. According to contemporary Armenian authors, early in the twentieth century the Armenian Apostolic Church owned property in the Russian Empire amounting to the huge sum of 113 million rubles,⁶ mainly formed by private donations or exploitation of commercial real estate.

In 1901, Chief Commander in the Caucasus Infantry General Prince Golitsyn pointed to this glaring injustice, which was damaging the economy of his region and the fiscal policy of the state in this part of the empire. He initiated a draft law On the Introduction of Direct Administrative Fiscal Control of the Russian Empire over the Property of the Armenian Apostolic Church not used for religious purposes and unrelated to the life of the clergy or burial rituals. For a year-and-a-half, he pushed his draft law through the corridors of power so that it should be approved and adopted by Emperor Nicholas II. On 12 June, 1903, the imperial law was enacted—it presupposed transfer of a great part of property and money of the Armenian Apostolic Church to state control.⁷ Formally, the law was a document of the Committee of Ministers confirmed by His Imperial Majesty, its full title being On Concentration of Management of the Property of the Armenian Apostolic Church in Russia in Government Departments and on the Transfer of Funds and Property of This Church Used to Ensure the Functioning of the Armenian Apostolic Church Schools to the Ministry of Public Education.⁸

⁶ See: L.I. Karapetian, “Iz istorii armianskikh politicheskikh partiy na Kubani v nachale XX veka,” in: *Armiane Severnogo Kavkaza*, Collection of articles, Center for Pontic-Caucasian Studies, Krasnodar, 1995, p. 92.

⁷ For more details about this law, see Chapter Three of the present edition.

⁸ See: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii. Sobranie tretye. 1881-1914*, Vol. XXIII, 1903, Otd. 1, State print shop, St. Petersburg, 1905, No. 23156, pp. 778-779.

Under this law, the Russian state established its direct control over the real estate and money that belonged to the Armenian Apostolic Church by transferring them “from the management of the clergy and spiritual structures of this confession” to the management of the Minister of Agriculture and State Property (the real estate) and the Ministry of the Interior (finances); the “Armenian Apostolic Church preserved its right to this property and capital.” Translated into common language, this meant that the government had finally decided to inspect the property not taken into account before in order to avoid possible financial machinations by the uncontrolled Armenian clergy. The law transferred “the property and capital of the Armenian Apostolic churches, monasteries, spiritual organizations, and educational establishments”, that is, the property of the churches, consistories, eparchies, schools, and other church structures to state control. The property enumerated in the law did not coincide with its religious character. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and State Property was expected to assume management of “lands populated and unpopulated, irrespective of their status, as well as individual forests, meadows, pastures, fisheries, etc.,” as well as “all houses and structures that belong to the Armenian Apostolic churches, clergy, and spiritual structures of this confession and are not needed for everyday use by the clergy and the above-mentioned structures.” In other words, the state established control over all “non-core assets” unrelated to religious activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church.

The Church and the hierarchs and clergy retained control over church property: “The land under the buildings of churches, monasteries, chapels, etc. and under the buildings occupied by hierarchs, spiritual departments, city and village clergy and spiritual educational establishments; the land within church and cemetery fences and, finally, the plots of land used by clergy, as well as orchards, kitchen gardens, and pastures, but no more than three *desyatinas* (1 *desyatina* was equal to 10,925 square meters.—*Ed.*) at each church, not used for profit.”

The law of 12 June, 1903 demonstrates that in the early twentieth century the Armenian Apostolic Church was a feudal landowner that concentrated in its hands the right of property (if not the right of ownership, then the right of using and disposing) of at least part of the basic means of subsistence of the agricultural population that belonged to all sorts of Armenian territorial religious communities. In fact, throughout its functioning under the jurisdiction of the Russian imperial powers (that is, starting with the second third of the nineteenth century), the church hierarchy represented a social organization of the Armenian ethnoreligious corporation patterned on late feudal society. As distinct from the Ottoman and Persian empires, in the Russian Empire, the clergy of the Armenian Apostolic Church not only fulfilled administrative and fiscal functions when dealing with the official authorities, but was also the owner of land and other real estate of commercial nature. This means that *de facto* it played a social and economic role typical of that played by the *beks* and *agalars*, hereditary landed aristocracy among the Transcaucasian Muslims. In fact, the Armenian monks differed but little from *moafs*⁹ in terms of their legal status; priests in ordinary, from *agalars*; deans of churches, from *beks*; hierarchs (bishops and archbishops) from *khans* with the functions of a *naib* (administrator of provinces and districts). This means that in the Russian Empire the Armenian Apostolic Church not only symbolized but was the feudal hierarchy of the Armenian religious corporation within which the congregation—villagers and not very numerous city dwellers—were reduced to the role of serfs in the countryside or tax-paying population in cities and towns obliged to work for the state and the Church.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Armenian Apostolic Church functioned as a banking and usury structure for its own ethnicity. It regulated money flows and

⁹ Moafs in Azerbaijan were small landowners freed from taxes in exchange of military service with their own equipment; weapons were supplied by the state. In this respect they were similar to the Cossacks of Russia.

accumulated the financial surplus of the Armenian people not necessarily by legal means. The following place in the law of 12 June, 1903 hints that the Russian authorities knew about these financial irregularities: “The above order should also be established in the sphere of property and capital donated or bequeathed to these structures.” The Armenian Apostolic Church observed and continues to observe celibacy. This meant that in the absence of direct and legal heirs, it had to appoint members of large rich families to religious posts which donated large sums to the Church. This was tax evasion pure and simple, since the money transferred (donated) by a merchant to a priest never left the same family. In fact, at the turn of the twentieth century, the Armenian clergy members were not only feudal lords or even big landowners, but also typical members of the bourgeoisie who shamelessly used the church capital accumulated from donations of the credulous congregation to make themselves and their relatives rich. In this respect, the holy order of an Armenian Apostolic priest opened up wide vistas of commercial activity uncontrolled either by the state or the ethnoreligious corporation of the Armenians, who were nothing short of slaves for their priests anyway. Taken together this guaranteed prompt enrichment.

The transfer of church money to state control deprived the top crust of the Armenian ethnicity of more or less legal methods of tax evasion; from that time on the Armenian Apostolic clergy could no longer use church money for commercial purposes, which transformed them from “masters of life” with a dominant influence into common bureaucrats kept by the state on an equal footing with the clergy of all other confessions of the Russian Empire. In other words, the law of 12 June, 1903 deprived the Armenian Apostolic clergy of the exclusive social and economic status to which it had been accustomed and also brought about two very important consequences. On the one hand, the clergy called on its congregation to fight the Government of the Russian state to force it to annul the offending law and restore the *status quo ante bellum*. This raised the first wave of Armenian national-religious terrorism. On the other hand, adoption and implementation of the law of 12 June, 1903 made it impossible for the Armenian Apostolic clergy to combine two social and economic principles—feudal (land-ownership) and bourgeois (trade). In the changed social and political conditions, this dualism slowed down the development of the Armenians as an ethnoreligious corporation by inviting administrative sanctions and even repressions, to say nothing of criminal extra-economic activities of a small group of Armenians (which took shape in the late nineteenth century) who justly considered the Armenian Apostolic Church to be an impediment to national development and progress.

Chronologically, secularization of church property coincided with an upsurge of the Armenian anti-government movement in the Ottoman Empire. Its first shoots became obvious in the 1890s. It was not the Armenian Apostolic Church that organized and inspired protests—its privileged position gave it no reason to be displeased with the imperial authorities. The breeding discontent was the doing of fighters of all sorts of Armenian national-revolutionary organizations that appeared late in the nineteenth century not without help from Britain, Russia, and France. I am referring in particular to Hunchak (Bell), a Social Democratic Party set up in 1887 in Geneva by a group of Armenian students from Russia and Dashnaksutiun, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation set up in 1890 at a constituent congress in Tiflis out of basically extremist groups of Armenian members of Narodnaya Volya, Marxists, and anarchists. There was also the Armenikan Party set up in the Ottoman Empire in 1885 in the city of Van. These parties were determined to establish an Armenian republic in Eastern Anatolia (the Ottoman Empire’s Asian part) using every possible means and methods, including terror against the Turks in Transcaucasia and Western Asia and those members of the Armenian religious corporation who refused to cooperate with them.

Points 8 and 11 of the section entitled “The Means [of Revolutionary Struggle]” of the first version (1894) of the Dashnaksutiun political program looked at terror as one of the important instruments of revolutionary change.¹⁰ The program invited to “expose the members of power structures, turncoats, traitors, usurers, and all sorts of exploiters to terror” and “plunder and ruin government offices.” The documents of the Hunchak Party differed but little from the above and defined the aims as “propaganda, agitation, terror, organization, and peasant and worker activities.”¹¹ From the very beginning, the Armenian nationalists considered terror to be the most effective and most frequently used instrument of revolutionary struggle for Armenian national statehood in Eastern Anatolia. It implied that it should be used against the Turks and Armenians who sided with the Turks. This was not a slip of the tongue—in the specific economic, social, and political conditions of the early twentieth century, in which the Armenians lived and developed their ethnicity (the process described above in greater detail), terror was the most efficient method to push Armenians into revolutionary struggle.

In his 1907 memo mentioned above, Procurator of the Etchmiadzin Synod of the Armenian Apostolic Church A. Frenkel wrote: “*Until the eighteenth century when Russia started moving into the Near Muslim East, the absolute majority of the Armenians divided between Turkey and Persia never objected to Muslim power. Their situation was not worse than that of all other subjects of the sultan and the shah. The Armenians promptly found their niches in the ruling and financial spheres of their conquerors and practically monopolized trade and crediting.*

“The Muslim rulers recognized the sovereignty of the Armenian catholicoi in the religious sphere. Armenian history knows many patriarchs who, supported by Turkish zaptys and Persian farrashes (tax collectors.—O.K.), extorted huge sums from their congregation. One can imagine that this very specific arrangement flattered the Armenians’ national pride since the omnipotent Catholicos created an illusion of the head of the people.

“Neither the Turks nor Persians interfered in the common Armenian law and order of self-administration of small units.

“The first third of the nineteenth century marked by a rise in the national awareness of many numerically small peoples could not but leave its mark on the Armenians. This is supported by the following: the series of successful wars Russia waged against Turkey and Persia, which ended in the alienation of several provinces with an Armenian population, kindled the hope among the Armenians of finally shedding the Muslim yoke. National self-awareness among the Armenians developed along the lines common to all other subjugated peoples. Patriots and public figures concentrated on restoring and creating literature, national theater, and art and stirring up national pride through examples (albeit apocryphal) of the courage of ancestors, etc.”¹²

The above suggests that neither in the Ottoman nor Persian empires were the Armenians assimilated in the administrative and religious respect. What is more, they were fully integrated into the empires’ economic life and even monopolized several economic branches. We should bear in mind, however, that the social and economic success of members of the Armenian religious corporation was limited to families of traders and usurers closely related to the hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church. Since these entrepreneurs and industrialists also used church money in their commercial activities, they enriched the church hierarchy. The latter did nothing to educate the congregation morally or intellectually—the ignorance and social

¹⁰ For more details, see Chapter Three of the present edition.

¹¹ *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement*, 1963, p. 110 (quoted from: J. McCarthy and C. McCarthy, *Turks and Armenians: A Manual on the Armenian Question*, Committee on Education, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, Washington D.C., 1989, p. 33).

¹² RGIA, rec. gr. 821, inv. 7, f. 96, sheet 258.

backwardness of the ordinary people guaranteed them domination over the co-religionists, the cornerstone of their economic (trade and usury) might.

The Armenian clergy and the merchants and usurers connected with them were not ready to pay for realizing the idea of an Armenian republic in Eastern Anatolia, which would have buried their theocracy and plutocracy. Violence and extra-economic coercion were the most adequate instruments to be used to push them onto the road of struggle for this idea. By this I mean methods of personal terror that could be described as terrorism if aimed at state or public figures (the Armenian Church hierarchs belonged to the latter category). The Armenian nationalist revolutionaries were fully aware that to set up an Armenian republic in Eastern Anatolia they must fight the Ottoman Empire and primarily the bigotry and all the other negative traits of the ethnoreligious mentality of the Armenians. The revolutionaries were open about their choice of terror as the main instrument of shaping and educating the Armenian ethnicity.

To be implemented, Armenian national statehood with a republican form of governance in Turkish Transcaucasia needed civil society as the social cornerstone of a new monoethnic state. To achieve this, it was necessary to transform the polyethnic Armenian religious corporation or sect into a united people brought together not by religious, but by a qualitatively different (material) principle unrelated to religious metaphysics. The road to it lay through an alternative reality of the Armenians being free from the omnipresent and omnipotent Armenian Apostolic Church. In other words, the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries had to invent and realize a method through which they could replace the Armenian Apostolic Church in the Armenian ethnoreligious corporation. In this way, they would gain two strategic advantages. On the one hand, this plan did not require additional forces and assets. It was enough to replace the members of one social corporation (Church) with the members of a political corporation to destroy the old and erect a new social structure. The competence of the leaders and those whom they led remained practically the same. On the other hand, control over the congregation would give the revolutionaries control over the church hierarchs and church property (at least the part unrelated to religious functions and activities). In fact, the Armenian revolutionaries intending to realize their political ideal of an Armenian national state had to pursue an administrative policy in relation to the Armenian Church similar to the one the Russian Empire pursued in the Caucasus in line with the law of 12 June, 1903.

The above suggests that to succeed the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries had to completely modernize the Armenians to transform them from a polyethnic religious sect still living in the late nineteenth century into a full-fledged ethnicity or people, the self-identification of whom rested on social and political rather than religious dominants. At that time, the Armenians had no dominants that could be used as common moral (or, at least, intellectual) landmarks. The revolutionaries had to formulate them and impose them on the Armenians (still a religious sect) in order to rule out all possible sociopolitical alternatives to a monoethnic republic in Transcaucasia. Destruction of the Armenian way of life in the Muslim environment was the first step toward the desired goal; a blood feud between Armenians and Muslims was stirred up; the Armenian territorial religious communities forgot their local specifics and self-sufficiency to pool forces, this time not for religious reasons. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Armenians began closing ranks in the face of collective responsibility for the atrocities committed by their co-religionists against the Muslims in the Ottoman, Russian, and Persian empires. So-called blind terror was used to replace religious with national consolidation. In 1895-1907, the Armenian nationalist fighters of the Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun parties ignited religious and ethnic clashes in the Armenian settlements; they attacked Muslim villages, plundered them and, at opportune moments, killed the local people, mainly women, children, and old people, the easiest prey.

The list of crimes of this sort is well known; it appeared in numerous publications of Turkish and Azeri authors,¹³ so there is not much sense in quoting it here. These crimes had several common or even typical features which, taken together, can be described as “criminal specifics” that pointed to the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries and distinguished them from similar crimes perpetrated by political extremists (anarchists, members of Narodnaya Volya, Revolutionary Social Democrats, and others) in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Historical evidence points to five important typical features present in all crimes of the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries known to history, which they committed in the relatively short period of time.

First, they operated in the Ottoman and Russian empires in localities where Armenians lived in compact communities and where the share of them was relatively small (no more than 10 to 15 percent). There were no Muslim pogroms in the Erivan Gubernia of the Russian Empire with a predominantly Armenian population. This meant that the Hunchak and Dashnaktsutun fighters preferred localities where Armenians were on their side, albeit unwillingly, and could be subjected to administrative and military repressions, which they were unable to resist, for helping criminals. Villages with predominantly Muslim populations were shelled or set on fire; local people were killed in great numbers with exceptional or even deliberate cruelty; the troops dispatched to restore law and order were shelled from Armenian villages. The earliest provocations of Armenian nationalists took place in the Ottoman Empire and go back to July-August 1894 when they stirred up an Armenian-Turkish conflict in Sassoun, a mountainous area of what is now Turkish Kurdistan. On 18 September, 1895, mass riots, in which small arms were used, flared up in Bab Ali, an exclusive area of Istanbul where the palace of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II was located. A month later, clashes between Armenians and Turks and pogroms shattered the environs of Akhisar, Trabzon, Bayburt, Bitlis, and Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia (Turkish Transcaucasia). It was at the same time that Armenians rioted in Zeytun (today Süleymanlı on the southern Mediterranean coast of Turkey); a month later, Armenians clashed with Turks and Kurds in the southeastern provinces (vilayets) of the Asian part of the Ottoman Empire—Diyarbakır, Arabgir, Urfa, Malatya, Kharberd, Sivas, Ayntap, and Maraş.

The ideologists of Armenian nationalism from among the leaders of Hunchak and Dashnaktsutun expected that these crimes would isolate the Armenians from the other local peoples and invite retributions from their Muslim neighbors and repressions from the imperial authorities. The Armenians had to stop feeling like part of the local social landscape to become aware of their responsibility for the crimes committed by others. The feeling of religious conformism, highly developed among the Armenians, was replaced with a feeling of collective involvement in criminal activities and collective responsibility for them, no longer as members of a religious corporation, but as an ethnicity. In fact, these crimes should have changed the paradigm of the Armenians’ national-religious self-awareness and taught them to regard themselves as a new social and political entity, a people led by a party of nationalists.

I do not claim the honor of pioneering the thesis that the crimes of the Armenian nationalists in villages, towns, and large cities with predominantly Muslim populations and seemingly accidental murders of peaceful people were intended as provocations in the hope of inviting repressions against the Armenians to widen the gap and stir up antagonism between them and the local people.

¹³ See: R. Mustafaev, “Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva (XIX-XX vv.),” in: *Kratkaia khronologicheskaia entsiklopediia*, Elm, Baku, 2002; B. Nadjafov, *Litso vraga. Istoria armianskogo natsionalizma v Zakavkazie v kontse XIX-nachale XX v.*, Elm, Baku, 1993; “Prestupleniia armianskikh terroristicheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva: XIX-XXI vv.,” in: *Kratkaia khronologicheskaia entsiklopediia*, Compiled by A. Mustafaeva [et al.], Human Rights Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan, Elm, Takhsil, Baku, 2013; F.P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1991; *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism*, Assembly of Turkish American Associations, Washington, 1999.

This honor belongs to William L. Langer, an American who wrote *The Diplomacy of Imperialism* published in 1951, in which he argued that the revolutionary leaders of Armenians probably expected to draw attention to the Armenian question through the sufferings of the Armenians caused by their terrorist activities.¹⁴ Half a century later, Walter Laqueur said the same in his *Age of Terrorism* and *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*. He has concretized the idea that the Armenian revolutionaries of the 1880s-1890s expected that their attacks on the Turks would invite cruel reprisals which, in turn, would radicalize the Armenians and probably invite a West European intervention of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ I completely agree with both authors—they put in a nutshell the tactics of the Armenian nationalists of the turn of the twentieth century and correctly identified their place among the other methods of struggle in the context of the ethnogenesis of the Armenians among the other peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

Second, the fighters of Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun committed their crimes (at least in the Russian Empire) in places populated by Armenians who had moved in the 1830s from the Persian Empire or who earlier belonged to its political orbit. This is confirmed by the so-called Armenian-Tatar massacre of 1905-1906; the term belongs to Vladimir Mayevskiy, an official of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, who between the 1880s and 1914 served as vice consul in several administrative centers in Eastern Anatolia. In this capacity, he could observe the inner mechanisms of the notorious Armenian question present in the domestic and foreign policies of the Russian and Ottoman empires. During World War I, as an official for special missions in the office of the quartermaster general at the headquarters of the Caucasian Front, he consulted the Russian military command on how to rule the occupied territories of the Ottoman Empire. In 1915 he published his book *Armiano-tatarskaia smuta na Kavkaze kak odin iz fazisov Armianskogo voprosta*¹⁶ (The Armenian-Tatar Discord in the Caucasus as One of the Phases of the Armenian Question), in which he arranged the facts and looked into the causes of the Armenian-Azeri conflict of the early twentieth century. (Until 1926, the Azeris of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were officially called Transcaucasian Tatars.)

The tragic events of that time claimed about two thousand lives; the harshest clashes took place in Baku in February and August 1905 and in Nakhchivan in May 1905. Armenians and Azeris also clashed in Tiflis (Tbilisi), Elizavetpol (Ganja), and Shusha, that is, in areas populated by Armenians who moved there in the 1830s from Persia. They refused to regard the Erivan Armenians who had come from the Ottoman Empire and replenished the ranks of Dashnaksutiun fighters as belonging to the same ethnicity or even as their co-religionists.¹⁷ The nationalists of Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun worked hard to draw them into the orbit of terror; they were much crueler than in the Ottoman Empire, where the enmity between the Armenians and Turks was much more obvious than in the Russian part of Transcaucasia. Those who moved to the Central Caucasus from Persia were higher up the social ladder in Persia; after moving to Russia, they remained higher socially, culturally, and economically than the former

¹⁴ See: W.L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism. 1890-1902*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1951.

¹⁵ See: W. Laqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, Little, Brown, Boston, MA, 1987; idem, *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2000.

¹⁶ See: V.F. Mayevskiy, *Armiano-tatarskaia smuta na Kavkaze kak odin iz fazisov Armianskogo voprosta*, Printed in the Print shop of the Caucasian Military District, Tiflis, 1915.

¹⁷ This is explained by the continued existence in the early twentieth century of several religious centers with the functions of autonomous administration of individual parts of the ecumene of this ethnoreligious sect. There was the Etchmiadzin Catholicosate, formally the leading element in the structure of the Armenian Apostolic Church; there were also autocephalous Sis Catholicosate and Istanbul Administration of the Bishopric, which *de facto* were not subordinate to the Etchmiadzin Synod (for more details, see: P. Werth, "Glava tserkvi, poddannyy imperatora: Armianskiy katolikos na perekrestke vnutrenney i vneshney politiki imperii, 1828-1914," in: *Konfessia, Imperia, natsia: Religii i problema raznoobraziia v istorii postsovetskogo prostranstva*, Compiled and edited by I. Gerasimov, M. Mogilner, A. Semenov, Novoe izdatelstvo, Moscow, 2012, pp. 165-206).

Turkish Armenians. They did not need the Armenian Apostolic Church to fit into the region's social and economic context. This meant that this part of the Armenian ethnicity (which can be conventionally called Baku-Karabakh) remained isolated in its everyday life. In order to draw it into the new emerging ethnicity, the ideologists and fighters of Hunchak and Dashnaksutium provoked clashes between Armenians and Azeris. Though highly damaging (in 1905, according to American Turcologist Tadeusz Świątochowski, the clashes in the territory that is now the Azerbaijan Republic ruined 158 Azeri and 128 Armenian settlements¹⁸), they were not enough. A series of murders of highly placed Russian officials, which transformed the ethnic regional conflict into a nationwide one, did the job.¹⁹

Third, at the turn of the twentieth century, hierarchs of the Armenian Apostolic Church conspired with the Armenian nationalists to organize criminal acts in the Ottoman and Russian empires for the sake of transforming the Armenian ethnoreligious corporation into a single nation. Church officials allowed fighters of Hunchak and Dashnaksutium and their sponsors to use churches and houses belonging to the Church and rented them out to keep weapons and explosives. The earliest fact of this cooperation is dated 18 June, 1890, when the Ottoman gendarmes found a store of small arms in the Surb Astvatsatsin (Holy Mother of God) Church in Erzurum. In an effort to prevent the discovery of the crime, local Armenian extremists killed one of the gendarmes and lost 20 of their fighters in an exchange of fire. In 1903, in the course of the inventory of the possessions of the Armenian Apostolic Church under the law of 12 June, 1903, weapon storages were found in Armenian churches. The first of them was discovered purely by chance by officials of the Baku Gubernia Court of Exchequer (Ministry of State Property) on 2 September, 1903 at the Church of St. Gregory the Illuminator in Baku.²⁰ The find confirmed the suspicion that the Armenian hierarchs were prepared to commit the bloodiest of crimes to preserve the property they owned or managed. They were prepared to arm and raise their congregation against the Russian Empire, the officials of which were benevolently disposed to them.

The Armenian Church, which allowed the Armenian nationalist revolutionaries to draw it into anti-government activities and which rebuffed the attempts of the imperial government to establish control over church property and money through large-scale Armenian Muslim pogroms in Russian Transcaucasia, lost much more than it gained. After allowing Hunchak and Dashnaksutium to use churches and commercial real estate, the Church could not re-establish its control, even though in 1907 the law of 12 June, 1903 had been annulled on the insistence of Vicegerent of the Caucasus Count Vorontsov-Dashkov. The Armenian revolutionaries established their control over the church property and money in a way similar to what the Russian Empire supposed to do. The types of control differed in one very important respect—the Russian Empire preserved *de jure* and *de facto* the Church's right to property on real estate and money and merely demanded detailed reports of their use. The functionaries and fighters of Hunchak and Dashnaksutium pushed the Church aside and used its real estate and money as they saw it fit. Moreover, the leaders of political groups of Armenian nationalists snatched the status of spiritual and intellectual leader of the Armenians from the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Church was left with the function of a representative of the Armenian ethnicity, which it lost when the Russian and Ottoman empires were replaced with secular Bolshevik Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey. Ideological domination was moved from the Church to the political institutions of the Armenians, an inevitable and civilizationally determined shift. Moreover, it meant that the process of social transformation of the polyethnic religious corporation of Ar-

¹⁸ See: T. Świątochowski, *Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1995, p. 40.

¹⁹ For more details about clashes and terrorist acts mentioned here and elsewhere in this chapter, see Chapter Three.

²⁰ See: R. Mustafaev, op. cit., p. 11.

menians into a new ethnicity had been completed. This happened after World War I, which supplied the Armenian people with another unificatory idea of a collective tragedy caused by military and political repressions of the Ottoman Empire in 1915-1916 against their ethnoreligious corporation, later described as “Armenian genocide.”

Fourth, the local structures of Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun combined revolutionary radicalism, national-religious extremism, and political terrorism with crimes against property—racketing, plundering, and extortions. Contemporary Armenian authors do not hesitate to write about this. L. Karapetian, for example, in his painstakingly researched article “Iz istorii armianskikh politicheskikh partiy na Kubani v nachale XX veka” (From the History of Armenian Political Parties in the Kuban Area in the Early Twentieth Century) offers amazing facts about the criminal activities of the Armenians in this region of the Russian Empire: “Expropriations and terror figured prominently in the tactics of Dashnaksutiun. There is a lot of archival information about the extortion of large sums. If the victims refused to pay, they were exposed to extreme measures. On 22 June, 1906, in Armavir, Ambartsum Ovnatov killed merchant N. Shakhnazarov who refused to pay 10 thousand rubles... In the Bezymianny District, Agasin encouraged expropriations from Russians. The committee received no more than half of the sum (this means that the extortionists retained the second half as compensation for their troubles.—*O.K.*)... The ranks of expropriators were swelling with provocateurs and blackmailers, which did nothing for the party’s image. This explains why in 1907 the problems of expropriations were repeatedly discussed at party meetings. However, it was decided to continue the expropriations under the party’s strict control, otherwise those who violated the rules of expropriation should either be expelled from the party or punished by death. In the summer of 1907, an unknown Armenian fell victim to this decision. Enokh Ter-Avetisians, one of the members of the Armavir group, was punished by death for appropriating party money.”²¹ This means that in the early twentieth century, revolutionary activities were funded by racketeering and extortion of money from their co-religionists and people of other nationalities who had the misfortune to be their neighbors. The fighters also lived on this “income.”

And, finally, fifth, the anti-government actions and the crimes of the Armenian nationalists of the late nineteenth-first decade of the twentieth century were of dual nature, which set them apart from other types of revolutionary activity of the time. On the one hand, they were ethnocentric, while on the other, transnational. This is explained by the fact that for a long time the Armenian ethnoreligious corporation remained scattered across many countries and was partly kept together by the ideological leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church. This meant that potential fighters could be found anywhere in the world to commit crimes to alienate the local Armenian community from local society.

Not infrequently, Armenian fighters born in Russian Transcaucasia committed crimes in the Ottoman or Persian empires. There are also documents saying that in the early twentieth century ethnic Armenians, citizens of the United States, came to the Caucasus to teach local fighters how to make and use explosives. The earliest incident of this sort is dated 29 August, 1903, when an Armenian John Nakhikian, an American citizen, came to Kars where in the apartment of a certain Tanoev (Taneev), not far from the barracks of the 155th infantry Quba Regiment, he killed himself and the apartment owner when making hand grenades out of hand-made explosives.²² The history of Armenian terrorism brims with similar examples. I selected this particular incident to demonstrate that, from the earliest days, Armenian terrorist revolutionary activities were of a transnational nature, state borders being no impediment. Procurator of the Etchmiadzin Synod A. Frenkel had the following to say about this in 1907: “*There are*

²¹ L.I. Karapetian, op. cit., pp. 89-90.

²² See: R. Mustafaev, op. cit., p. 11.

reasons to believe that between the thirties and eighties of the last century, our government at least ignored or probably found profitable close ties between the Armenian organizations of Russia and Turkey. Weapons, ammunition, huge sums of money, and Armenian volunteers freely crossed the border from Russia to Turkey.

“Political Armenian refugees found shelter in our border areas; today there are over 50,000 such refugees in the Caucasus. Half of these uninvited guests have no legal documents; most of the criminals in the Eastern Caucasus are Turkic Armenians. Indifference to the solidarity between the Russian and Turkic Armenian organizations has produced other dangerous fruit. For seventy years, three or four generations of Armenian youth were brought up on the idea of opposition to the government (even though it was the Turkish government); they were taught to think politically and became accustomed to the idea that struggle against the authorities was possible and even legitimate. When Armenian schools in the Caucasus were closed down, Armenian young people moved to Switzerland and Germany in huge numbers to return as accomplished socialists. The ideas of socialism are very popular among urban Armenians; an Armenian living in a city has no motherland to be proud of, only the bitter realization that his people remained in slavery for 1,300 years and that he is hated by all as a parasite. This historical legacy and national baggage make it easy to move to the International and preaching of unity of proletarians of all countries. The Armenian revolutionaries have acquired a pretext. In the 1980s-1990s, it became clear that dangerous ideas were planted in Armenian schools; it was noticed that there was an interconnection between the Etchmiadzin Patriarchate and the non-Russian autochthonous and foreign revolutionary organizations, as well as defects in managing the Armenian Church and monastery properties.

“Those who ruled the Caucasus at that time passed the well-known decision to close down Armenian schools; for the same reason, the Patriarch was deprived of his personal right to deal with questions of marriage, language, oaths of allegiance, expropriation of church property, etc. This was enough to raise the Armenian masses against the Russian government. By that time, the Armenian revolutionary forces had been trained well enough and were ready both morally and materially. In their leaflets, they merely replaced ‘Turkey’ with ‘Russia.’ Today, Turkish Armenians (Fedayis) cross the Russo-Turkish border into Russia very much like several years ago when the Russian Armenians brought weapons and moved volunteers into Turkey.”²³

Two factors made Armenian political criminal activity transnational. First, the Armenian nationalists could count on support and encouragement from the Russian Empire and many of the West European countries (France and Britain in particular). Seen from their capitals, Armenian political extremism looked like an organized force that could undermine the military, strategic, and geopolitical position of the Ottoman Empire in Western Asia and the Middle East to open the doors for consolidated European influence. Second, the Armenian Apostolic Church did a lot to consolidate the ranks of Armenian extremists: at the turn of the twentieth century, it transferred the revenue created from its property or the property it managed to Hunchak, which operated mainly in the Ottoman Empire, and to Dashnaksutun, which preferred to operate in the Russian Empire. These two extremist organizations would have hardly been successful without donations given by the Church. Encouragement of Armenian national extremism or at least the *laissez-faire* policy of the Russian Administration in the Caucasus ended with the Armenian-Tatar massacre of 1905-1906, which tarnished the political image of Russia in the Muslim world and damaged the economy of Transcaucasia practically beyond repair.

During World War I and immediately after it, the Armenians became completely isolated from their neighbors in the social and economic structure of Transcaucasia (both Russian and

²³ RGIA, rec. gr. 821, inv. 7, f. 96, sheets 260-261.

Turkish). This is explained by the armed conflicts the Republic of Armenia led by Dashnaktsutun was waging against its neighbors. The regular armed units of the Armenian nationalists were not so much fighting the regular armies of their enemies as murdering local Muslims in great numbers and plundering their property. They were especially active in Turkey and Azerbaijan. I will not cite facts and figures here to support the above; instead I refer my readers to other authors.²⁴ I will limit myself to saying that these crimes caused cruel retribution (by the military of the Ottoman Empire in particular) from the governments of the countries whose peoples were affected. The scope of military and police repressions against the rioting Armenian population in the rear of the field army did not allow the rioters to influence the course of war and its results. Later, these repressions and the related deportation of Armenians from the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Marmara coasts to the desert areas of Northern Iraq were described as “genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.” This, however, causes doubts for several reasons.

Without going into legal technicalities (at that time there was no legal term “genocide,” therefore suppression of mutinous population was not banned by international law), let me point out that the military-police operation began on 24 April, 1915, on the eve of an operation of the Entente in the Mediterranean. On 25 April, 1915, the united French, British, and Russian navy landed the Australian-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) of the British colonial armed forces on the Gallipoli peninsula. It was expected to move toward the European part of Istanbul. Soldiers of the Armenian worker detachments in the Ottoman marine fortresses and forts along the Dardanelles had been instructed to riot and block the coastal batteries to allow the united Navy of the Entente to enter the Sea of Marmara. On 19 April, German military intelligence informed the Turks about this. It was decided to act using military and police forces to prevent a riot and liquidate the organizers. This was done outside Istanbul and later around the largest coastal cities—Trabzon, Sinop, and Izmir.²⁵ This meant that the military and police operation against the Armenians in April 1915 was carried out to prevent an armed riot in support of the approaching enemy. Presented by Armenian authors, it was an act of malice against peaceful population.

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the so-called “Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire” developed into an Armenian unificatory idea that produced two important results in the course of Armenian ethnogenesis and final consolidation of Armenians. On the one hand, the idea created the dominant of ethnic or even ethnopolitical self-identification of the Armenians, no matter where they lived. On the other, the subject of the notorious genocide replaced the previously dominant idea of ethnoreligious unity of all Armenians. In this way, the Armenian ethnicity acquired a new organizational structure—the ARF Dashnaktsutun moved into the place occupied by the Armenian Apostolic Church, the consolidating structure until the early twentieth century. In 1920, Dashnaktsutun won the battle with the Hunchak functionaries and the Armenian clergy for the right to dominate the Armenian ethnicity. In this way, the

²⁴ See: V.F. Mayevskiy, op. cit.; R. Mustafaev, op. cit.; B. Nadjafov, op. cit.; “Prestupleniia armianskikh terroritcheskikh i banditskikh formirovaniy protiv chelovechestva: XIX-XXI vv.”; S.A. Rustamova-Takhidi, *March 1918 g. Baku. Azerbaidzhanskie pogromy v dokumentakh*, Indigo-Press, Baku, 2009; idem, *Kuba. April-May 1918 g. Musulmanskie pogromy v dokumentakh*, Indigo-Press, 2010; F.P. Hyland, op. cit.; T. Świętochowski, op. cit.; *The Armenian Atrocities and Terrorism*.

²⁵ For more details, see: A.G. Bolnykh, *Morskie bitvy Pervoy mirovoy: Tragedia oshibok*, ACT, Moscow, 2002; A.K. Kolenkovskiy, *Dardanellskaya operatsia*, Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo, Moscow, Leningrad, 1930; J.S. Corbett, H. Newbolt, *Naval Operations: History of the Great War Based on Official Documents*, in 5 vols., Longman, London, 1920-1931, 1938, 1940; A.Mc. Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, Perennial Classics, 2002; E. Falkenhayn, *Die Oberste Heeresleitung, 1914-1916 in ihren wichtigsten Entschlüssen*, E.S. Mittler, Berlin, 1919; A.E. Montgomery, *The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War I*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.

Armenians discarded the old garbs of sectarian religious unity typical of feudalism and moved toward political unity under the leadership of a political institution, a party of organized minority that imposed its will on the non-organized majority, a natural and, therefore, inalienable part of the bourgeois world order.

For three quarters of a century, punishment of the Turkic people for the Armenian nationalists' own inability to acquire national statehood in 1910s-1920s remained their *idée fixe* and the criterion of the political mainstream, against which the subjective (individual) or even collective adequacy was measured. In other words, all those who accepted "Armenian genocide" as part of the contemporary history of the Republic of Turkey were hailed as friends of the Armenian ethnicity, while those who refused to accept this idea were subjected to intellectual or even financial obstruction. This preserved the monochrome "friend-foe" idea of the world, another confirmation of the rigidity of the psychological ethnosocial attitudes of the bulk of the Armenian ethnicity. At the same time, other peoples acquired an image of Armenians that they found hard to accept. The Armenians became even more isolated and lost all chance of becoming assimilated with the rest of the world. In fact, this is a new stage in the evolution of the ethnic psychology of the Armenians. In the past, the feeling of collective responsibility for the crimes committed by a small and closely knit corporation of nationalist revolutionaries against Muslim people was artificially imposed on the entire nation. Today, there is a feeling of collective resentment of the retribution for the earlier crimes.

The idea of "Armenian genocide" has another important feature, which moves it from the social political to the historico-criminological sphere. Practically throughout the entire twentieth century, from the early 1920s to the early 1990s to be more exact, the Armenians exploited the mythologeme to justify their continued terrorist and other criminal activities, not only against the Republic of Turkey and its citizens, but also against those countries and nations of Europe that fought and punished the Armenian nationalists. This meant that propaganda of the responsibility of the Turks and Azeris for the so-called Armenian genocide that allegedly took place in the 1910s justified and still justifies and even encourages terrorism of Armenian nationalists. In the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century, they committed 300 crimes (not counting the military crimes committed during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh).²⁶ This contradicts Art 1 of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Opposition to Extremist Activities of 25 July, 2002 No. 114-FZ,²⁷ which describes "public justification of terrorism" as extremism. This makes the thesis of "Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire" an outcrop of extremism; indeed, it remains prominent in the history of the Transcaucasian peoples and for many years has been provoking nationalist Armenian terrorism in many countries.

Those who study the propaganda of this thesis should pay attention to its commercial aspect, which has not yet received the attention it deserves. Closer scrutiny will reveal certain absolutely legal mechanisms of funding Armenian extremist activities and its self-reproduction as any other successful commercial enterprise. A fundamental work by Candan Badem *Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question*²⁸ published in two languages offers a survey of the efforts poured into the propaganda of the "Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire" all over the world. The author has collected and annotated 4,450 titles in Turkish, Russian, English, French, German, Armenian, and several other languages published in different countries between the end of the nineteenth century and 2006 dealing with various aspects of Armenian-Turkish confronta-

²⁶ See: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*, available at [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005462031.pdf].

²⁷ See: *Sobranie zakonodatelstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii*, 29 July, 2002, No. 30, Art 3031; 8 July, 2013, No. 27, Art 3477.

²⁸ See: C. Badem, *Türk-Ermeni Sorunu Bibliyografyasi* (in Turkish) and *Bibliography of Turkish-Armenian Question*, Aras, Istanbul, 2007.

tion in the Ottoman Empire, which is described as the Turkish-Armenian question in contemporary Turkish historiography (an alternative to the Armenian thesis of “genocide”).

An analysis of the materials collected between the two covers shows that nearly half of the books (over 2,200 titles) dealing with the Turkish-Armenian question/Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire were published between 1975 and 1995, the years when ASALA (The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide) were especially active. It was during these two decades that one book per week on the history or contemporary state of Turkic-Armenian and Armenian-Turkic confrontation was published somewhere in the world. This can be described as the biggest propaganda operation that brought money to those who organized it, the ideological impact of which, however, being much more modest. The ASALA and JCAG terrorist activities made the books, which explained the reasons behind the terror, very popular; books by different authors were published in huge numbers, which made the publishers and authors rich. It seems that several scores of acts of terror, which cost very little, produced an impressive commercial effect in the form of over two thousand books on this very specific subject. Placed in the context of macroeconomics, this was one of the most efficient global promotion campaigns of commercial products of media and printing industry in the history of mankind.

It is hardly moral to look at Armenian terrorism as a commercial enterprise—this will insult the memory of its victims. However, the fact that the ASALA and JCAG terrorist activities added to the commercial success of these books confirms that Armenian terror was used not only for ideological and political purposes, but also (unintentionally) for social and economic purposes, including those that brought money. The ASALA and JCAG cannot be likened to ethnic criminal groups of the Cosa Nostra or Camorra type—these were purely economic enterprises without ideological or political ambitions (even though the ethnic traditions of the autochthonous population of Naples and Sicily were very prominent). The ASALA and JCAG fighters structuralized the Diaspora and the relations inside it; on the other hand, they built a social hierarchy dependent on social origins and services to the ethnicity as a whole and the social groups inside it.

By the latter quarter of the twentieth century, political terrorism had developed into a consolidating factor. The Armenian Diaspora had to close ranks around the transnational organizational structures of Hunchak and Dashnaksutun, which provided the ideological (“responsibility of the Turks for the Armenian genocide of 1915”) and political protection of the illegal activities of ASALA and JCAG. In this way, the Diaspora was transformed from a network of local marginal communities, which hoped to preserve their national and cultural identity, into a global political corporation strong enough to address the centuries-old task of building a monoethnic Armenian state in Transcaucasia. It had the main social prerequisite—structurally organized people ready to fight for its statehood and the corresponding status of a political nation. A war of terror as an instrument used to address this geopolitical task was launched by the Diaspora’s fighters first against the official authorities of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. (1988-1990) and, later, against the Azeri people and the developing social structures of the Azerbaijan Republic (1990-1991). After a while this war developed into a full-scale conflict between the two states (1991-1994); the hostilities were suspended, but the causes and repercussions (Armenian occupation of a large part of the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic) have not yet been defused by political and diplomatic means. The Armenian aggression of 1988-1994 against Azerbaijan can be described as an apogee of the process of social transformation of the Armenian people from a polyethnic religious sect (the century-long social development of which remained at the level of clan and tribal relations) to the state of a fully-fledged political nation, which set up and preserved for a fairly long time its monoethnic statehood.

By way of summing up the above, we should recognize that for a century-and-a-half, the Armenian political nation took shape to the accompaniment of shooting and explosions, a road dotted by political assassinations and terrorist acts. Social transformation and modernization of the Armenian people were driven by national-religious extremism and political terror; otherwise, it could not have leapt from the Early Middle Ages into industrial society within one century, a very short period by historical dimensions. This feat of unrivaled or even revolutionary intensity claimed hundreds of thousands of Armenian, Muslim and European lives.

This was an objective historical process that cannot be described as bad or even reprehensible—each political nation has travelled its own path and exhibited its own specific features, which set it aside from all others. The Russian nation developed through passionate Orthodox messianism coupled with the idea of reviving the empire of Genghis Khan under the scepter of a Christian monarch. The German nation was built “by iron and blood,” as the first Chancellor of German Empire Otto von Bismarck put it. The American nation is, in fact, a mercantile conglomerate of European émigrés, British slave traders, and the slaves they gradually brought to North America. The Armenian nation, as we know it, appeared on the political map of the world twenty-five years ago. It is a logical product of national-religious extremism and political terrorism consistently carried out from the last quarter of the nineteenth to the late twentieth century. This is how it will be described in all textbooks of recent political history some fifty years from now.

CONCLUSION

THE DIASPORA, POWER, AND MONEY: THE ARMENIAN TERRORISM PHENOMENON

This book is probably unique in that the author explains the meaning of its title in the conclusion rather than in the introduction. However, I think this literary technique is justified, since the reader first had to receive and digest a certain amount of information before being able to understand the conclusions of my study. Moreover, this is the first time the history of Armenian terrorism in the world, and in Russia in particular, is being studied in Russian historical science, and in humanitarian science in general, not only by a researcher from Russia, but by someone who is an ethnic Russian. This fully explains both my impartial attitude toward the terrorist attacks committed by Armenian extremists at different times throughout the twentieth century outside Russia and my internal aggressive response to the terrorist acts that Armenian militants committed against the Russian Empire at the beginning of the last century and then against citizens of the Russian Federation during the 1990s. The rather acerbic and even aggressive evaluation of these facts in this book is a natural response aroused by the pain felt for those victims and losses this country has suffered at the hands of international terrorists in general and their Armenian transnational henchmen in particular.

So the time has come to tell you why I define Armenian terrorism, which at first glance seems to be strictly national, as “transnational.” Before answering, I need to make an important point. I am not the pioneer of this thesis. Michael M. Gunter, an American researcher, was the first to define it, albeit indirectly, in the form of an intellectual provocation in the title of his article “Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism.” He did not use this definition again in any of his many works that followed, although I think that it, like no other, gives the most precise description of the essence and nature of Armenian terrorism. And in order to make this clear to my readers, I am going to have to delve into linguistics.

In contemporary Russian, the definition “transnational” is translated from the English as “international,” but this translation is not entirely appropriate and does not fully express the semantic content and subject matter of this word. The English word “international” is closer to the Russian concept of “existing between peoples, nations,” while the

word “transnational” defines something alien that passed “through a nation,” affecting it from the inside without entering into an intrinsic and therefore natural relationship with it. Armenian terrorists throughout the twentieth century committed crimes in around twenty countries of the world, passing “through” them, without concerning themselves about the footprint they left there. It is like oil and water, which never mix biologically, but which, if they do meet, impair each other’s consumer properties and qualities. Armenian terrorism is also transnational because it does not relate to one nation of the world, not even to the Armenians themselves, who suffered no less, and perhaps even more than others, at the hands of their fellow countrymen who chose terrorism as a tool for achieving political domination in their ethnicity and for ensuring their personal material prosperity.

Nevertheless, I must bring your attention to an important fact that largely defines the essence and predetermines the transnational nature of Armenian terrorism, which most people have ignored during the last twenty-five years. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenians never had a national state, invariably living in scattered diasporas, as an ethnic minority in a Muslim ecumene. Moreover, their spread throughout the countries of the Old World was inseparably related to the increase in the might of the Ottoman Empire and its territorial conquests (Armenians were very often employed in the Janissary Corps).

In these conditions, their religious unity was the only way for them to retain their identity, which the millet system (self-governed religious communities of people of other faiths) in the Ottoman state fully served. This was an administrative tool for keeping account of their numbers, levying taxes, and distributing natural state allowances. Not only did the Armenians have millets in the Sublime Porte, Russian Orthodox believers, Catholics, and Jews also had them, but the difference between the latter and the Armenians was that they all had coreligionists beyond the Muslim ecumene, while the Armenians were forced to live within it, in their places of residence without mixing either with the indigenous population, primarily with Muslims by faith, or with the representatives of other millets who comprised the ethnoreligious majority in certain regions of the Ottoman Empire (for example, Russian Orthodox believers traditionally prevailed over Muslims and the representatives of other confessions in the Balkan vilayets [provinces] of the Ottoman state). So feeling that they did not belong anywhere, the Armenians acquired a “transnational” character, while retaining their religious unity (and as a result, ethnic unity if we mean the public and legal reality of the Ottoman state) via the national fabric of other nations who formed the majority in their traditional places of residence. For this reason, Armenian terrorism also had a transnational character from the moment it emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. And this stands to reason, since the social base on which it rests, the Armenian Diaspora, was transnational. So my potential opponents and critics should not think I am using this definition in a negative sense, for it is a fact and an objective reality and fully reflects the conditions in which the Armenian ethnicity existed as a religious millet in the Muslim world for the last millennium.

The transnational nature of patrimonial ethnic life and the diaspora existence of the Armenian ethnicity predetermined terrorism as the main tool in its fight for political self-identification and self-determination. The Armenian ethnicity did not objectively have any other option but terror for declaring its claims. In recent history, anti-colonial or national liberation wars against foreign occupants have been waged by peoples who constituted the ethnic or ethnoreligious majority in their places of residence. The majority factor gave the insurgents the opportunity to establish control over all the resources—human, material-technical, natural, and so on—of the territory for the self-determination or liberation of which the war was being waged, thus fully providing the armed struggle with the financial support it needed. However, the Armenians have never been the ethnic majority in any country or region of the world (apart from the Armenian S.S.R. as part of the Soviet Union), and so they could not objectively take control

over a sufficiently large territory in order, relying on its natural resources, to wage a full-fledged war to attain their national statehood. In these conditions, terrorist activity as a resource-saving and the most economic form of armed attack on the enemy was the only way at their disposal to ensure political realization of the nationalist aspirations inherent in every ethnicity. In other words, they had no other choice but to engage in terror in their political struggle for national self-determination. And it appears that the founders, or ideologists, of all the political organizations of Armenians understood this very well, which is why they never hesitated to talk openly about terrorism as the only possible form of political struggle. In the specific historical conditions of the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries in the regions of Western Asia and Transcaucasia, the Armenian nationalists essentially had no other efficacious means of influencing the broad masses of Armenians, who were indifferent to any kind of social or political activity. So Armenian nationalism in the twentieth century could essentially be nothing but terrorist in nature. And this was in no way due to the psychological characteristics of the ethnicity, as everyone is trying to insist today and as certain Turkish and Azeri authors claimed throughout the last quarter of the twentieth century, but to the actual living conditions of these people, who never had a historical homeland.

As mentioned above, the Armenian ethnicity formed in the alien national and religious environment of Turkic Muslims in the form of Millet-i Arman—a self-governed religious community that people became part of according to the formal and legal attribute of faith, and not ethnic origin. Therefore, in the traditional understanding of an Orthodox person (and Christian in general), the Armenians were not a united nation, but a polyethnic religious sect, closer in traditions and customs to Judaism than to canonical Christianity. The Armenian millet in the Ottoman Empire (just like the Armenian Gregorian Church in the Russian Empire) was a centralized administrative and spiritual hierarchy that had property, resources, and a predominant political regime of theocracy—power of the clergy. Since any centralized church hierarchy, regardless of its confessional affiliation, proceeds from the principle that “any power is from God” (the clergy’s supremacy over the congregation is also based on this), the Armenian Gregorian religious leaders could not objectively (and probably did not want to) head the struggle for state-political institutionalization of the Armenian ethnicity and its transformation from a national sect into a political nation. This would have meant breaking the traditional value system and world order, as well as the Armenian Gregorian Church losing its dominant position with respect to its congregation. Moreover, in the Armenian ethnicity, the church was the custodian of the people’s consolidated capital, performing the triple function of treasury, bank, and tax office. Therefore, the Armenian nationalists could not successfully realize their political ideas without establishing control at the first stage over church property and the national capital at the disposal of the church, thus ensuring financial support of the Armenian national revolution and struggle for statehood. So a situation had to be created around the church that required the church hierarchs to turn to the radical nationalists for assistance and protection from an external threat, after transferring them part of the church’s capital and property.

To use Marxist-Leninist terminology, this development of events fully corresponded to the model of spasmodic revolutionary human development through a consistent change in socioeconomic formations. Clerical theocracy in the history of the Armenian people embodied the period of feudalism with its strict class determination of the social status of each individual in the social, and partially property, hierarchy. Terrorism was a tool for easing the transition from the religious feudal way of life of the Armenian church-society to the national and bourgeois way of life of a nation-society, when man’s place in the social hierarchy of the ethnicity no longer depended on origin or one’s subjective attitude to the church hierarchy, but on personal initiative and the position occupied in relation to it (meritocratic) in the hierarchy of the nationalist and party-political structure that corresponded to the new, bourgeois, nature of so-

cial relations within the Armenian ethnicity. It can essentially be said that in the specific historical conditions of the transition of the Armenian people from a millet or religious sect to a political nation, personal participation in terrorist activity was the only possible form of subjective social institutionalization in the changing system of social relations for the representatives of the lowest social ranks of the Armenian ethnicity. Whereby, with respect to Russian twentieth century history, this kind of revolutionary transition within the Armenian ethnicity happened twice—at the beginning and at the end of the century, that is, on the eve of and immediately following the downfall of the Russian Empire, as well as on the eve of and immediately after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Paradoxically, at the end of the twentieth century in former Soviet Armenia and the territories adjacent to it populated primarily with ethnic Armenians, the same sociopolitical processes of forming a new national elite occurred as they had three quarters of a century prior to this. There was not a big difference between these two identical processes, there was only a change in the names of the political structures governing Armenian society with which the radical nationalists had to fight using their customary methods of political terrorism. Whereas at the beginning of the century the unwieldy, clumsy, stagnant, and dogmatic hierarchy of the Armenian Gregorian Church fell under their control, by the end of the century, they gained control over the hierarchy of the Communist Party of Armenia, which fully corresponded to the above description of its own functional inefficiency, the dogmatic thinking and stagnant decision-making mechanisms of which reminded us the flagrant examples of theocracy. We can essentially say that Russia saw history repeated in a specific geographic region.

The revolutionary-terrorist transition from the feudal-theocratic organization of the Armenian ethnicity to the national-bourgeois that occurred at the turn of the twentieth century in no way changed the internal organization of its life. Moreover, it could not change it in principle, since the external conditions of the life of these people had essentially not changed. Right after the end of World War I, more than half of the ethnic Armenians found themselves scattered throughout diasporas again, while their “national home,” which had been artificially created by the authorities of the Russian Empire in the 1830s in Transcaucasia, was under the power of the Soviets. Suffice it to say that the ideology of proletarian internationalism of this power in no way correlated with the idea of the Armenian national radicals about building their own monoethnic state with a republican form of rule in order to put an end to the supremacy and theocracy of the religious leaders once and for all. For the most part, the restructuring of the world in the 1920s in no way affected the Armenian people, despite all the attempts they made to become a political nation by acquiring their own statehood. This fact forcibly predetermined the conservation of the previous forms of ethnocultural interaction inside the Armenian Diaspora, although on an essentially different ideological basis. The downfall of the Ottoman and Russian empires, within which the Armenians were treated as a millet or sect, forced the latter to become a nation with all the institutions of civil society inherent in it, which the Armenians had no experience of in their history. The revolutionary transformations in the previous world order destroyed the lifestyle of the Armenian ethnicity that existed before, which was based on church hierarchy. However, new geopolitical conditions, in which qualitatively new forms of public self-organization could be developed, did not emerge in its place. This eventually led to the emergence of the radical national parties Hunchak and Dashnaksutium in the feudal Armenian ethnicity, which took the place of the Armenian Gregorian Church and its theocratic hierarchy (although perhaps they were not initially pursuing this goal).

In other words, it can be said, to quote the Bible, that “new wine was poured into old wineskins”: the structure of the Armenian ethnicity had not changed, only the power determining the people’s worldview had changed. Whereas to be considered an Armenian in the Ottoman or Russian Empire the canons of the Armenian Gregorian Church had to be recognized

and a tithe paid for its upkeep, in the conditions of the bourgeois world order in Western Asia, the place of the church hierarchy was occupied by structures of nationalist organizations that also began uniting the Armenians living in the Diaspora into a single national organism, albeit using values far from religious humanism, such as terror, racketeering, and other forms of criminal non-economic coercion. In other words, despite all the upheavals going on in the world, the structure of the Armenian ethnicity remained in its original form, only the ideological decoration and lord of its souls had changed—the clergy was replaced with national radicals. These radicals retained all the previous institutions of Armenian diaspora life for their convenience, primarily tithing, which, however, was no longer used for the needs of the church, but for the struggle to acquire national statehood. And to be more accurate, it was used to support terrorist activity, since the Armenians essentially had no experience of waging a national liberation struggle by any other means.

These transformations turned the Armenian ethnicity from a largely obedient congregation into a tax base for maintaining the existence of the quasi-national plutocratic structures that arose from the long-gone organizations of Armenian radical nationalists of the beginning of the twentieth century. This essentially explains the fierce struggle for control over the places of compact residence of ethnic Armenians in different countries of the world that unfolded first in the 1930s, and then in the 1950s between the fighters of the Hunchak Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun. These structures did not differ much in their organization and conduct from ethnic street gangs, or ethnocriminal groups, such as the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the Neapolitan Camorra in the U.S., known to us through fiction and movies. Essentially all the Armenian nongovernmental structures that existed and currently exist in the various diasporas, whether they want to admit it or not, are rudimentary forms of the former feudal theocracy that has now donned the mask of the ethnocratic oligarchy or plutocracy. This is precisely the structure of the Diaspora that Turkish, followed by European and Azeri, political science began to call *Armanstvo*, a specially coined term, thus terminologically contrasting the Armenian people, who for the most part are law-abiding, with the quasi-nationals acting on their behalf, or, to be entirely precise, the transnational plutocratic structures raking in all the organizational and resource inheritance remaining from Armenian theocracy and revolutionary nationalism.

This circumstance accounts for another characteristic of Armenian terrorism in its historical retrospect that qualitatively differs from other types of national terrorism known to us in twentieth century history—Basque, Northern Irish, Kurdish, Palestinian, and so forth. All of them relied on the human and resource capacity of the particular territory, having supporters and material resources there. Owing to its dispersion, the Armenian Diaspora, or to be more exact *Armanstvo*, was objectively deprived of such an opportunity, so the quantity, intensity, and efficacy of the terrorist attacks of the Armenian extremists directly depended on the resources and funds they could raise for maintaining their activity. Any sensible person understands that voluntary financing transnational terrorism in this world, without the desire to gain any macroeconomic preferences or benefits from it in the future, is something only isolated fanatics are capable of. But there are no such people among the Armenians, and never were, the Arab oil sheiks taking the lead in this matter. So the sole source of funding of Armenian terrorism could only come directly from the Diaspora, which deducted a percentage of its income to maintain the Armenian extremist organizations. This way of forming national capital was traditionally characteristic of these people and had become embodied in them since the existence of the Armenian ethnicity as a millet in the Ottoman Empire. At that time, however, the Armenian Gregorian theocracy managed these funds, whereas in the twentieth century, the fighters of Dashnaksutiun and Hunchak took this responsibility upon themselves. At the turn of the last quarter of the past century, they acquired the name of Justice Commandos of the Armenian

Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), respectively. Therefore, when carrying out terrorist attacks, they were constantly compelled to remember one essential point: to what extent would the money spent on committing each new act of terrorism correspond to the achieved result, and how would it affect the inflow of new donations.

The daily search for new sources of funding to maintain the existence and activity of the extremist (fighting) structures of Hunchak and Dashnaksutiun demanded specific people in the structures of these organizations who could coordinate financial issues on a daily basis, as well as provide the fighters with food, clothing, and other basic necessities. It stands to reason that this is not always how it was, and while preparing to carry out their attacks, Armenian terrorists had to earn their living as hired workers for whom acts of terrorism were a kind of hobby or religious ritual. Such people, certainly, could kill someone with a knife or gun, but they were incapable of carrying out a more technically complicated crime (for example, making a hand-made bomb from improvised materials and detonating it at the right time and in the right place). The documents of the American, Soviet, and Azerbaijani intelligence services published in this book repeatedly mention the lowest level of operative preparation of the terrorist attacks carried out by Armenian extremists. Such attacks had a certain psychological and emotional effect, primarily in the Armenian Diaspora itself, which for a certain time ensured an inflow of the capital so necessary for financing terrorist activity. But this was not enough to move to a qualitatively higher level of expeditious and technical preparation of crimes of terrorist orientation, which only professionals could ensure or, at least, semi-professionals who were not burdened with trying to make their daily living. This kind of people appeared in the ranks of the Armenian terrorists at the very beginning of the 1980s, which turned their organizations from interest clubs of laymen and amateur loners into battleworthy groups. This transformation is associated with the name of Monte Melkonian, a U.S. citizen, who essentially headed ASALA in 1983 and turned it, in a few years, from a terrorist network in deep stagnation into a serious fighting organization capable of waging large-scale guerrilla and even military operations in the territory of a third state.

All such transformations, naturally, required money, even a lot of money, which could not be provided by the charity of representatives of the Diaspora or commercial structures affiliated with them alone. It is stupid and senseless to dispute the fact that it is essentially impossible to legally finance a criminal community (and that is what any terrorist organization always is) for any length of time in any state where the legal system functions day after day according to the principle of the supremacy and rule of law. Therefore, to be able to carry out terrorist activity with a high degree of intensity and efficiency, Armenian terrorists had to resort to illegal sources of financing, by engaging in racketeering or organizing criminal groups controlled by them in the economy. Murdering their fellow countrymen for the purpose of extortion was the claim to fame of the Dashnaks in the U.S. in the 1920s. However, the severe punishments envisaged by American criminal legislation for such crimes compelled them to concentrate their efforts on fraud in the financial sphere, which it is more difficult for the law-enforcement agencies to combat. However, it appears that the American Themis reigns victorious in this sphere too, which is shown by the thwarting in 2014 by the American police in California of an Armenian ethnocriminal group (in the terminology of law-enforcement agencies of the U.S.—a street gang) under the self-name “Armenian Power,” specializing in medical insurance fraud of socially unprotected residents of this American state. In fact, I can say quite confidentially that throughout the twentieth century, Armenian terrorism was, on the one hand, a kind of driving force behind the development of the shadow economy of the Armenian Diaspora, promoting its development, while, on the other hand, it was the main consumer of the capital thus acquired, formed by means of the profit gained from shadow turnover. In other words, it was a

necessary element of the system of Armenian plutocracy, which, accumulating the funds of the Armenian Diaspora, invested them in the shadow sectors of the economy and used some of the profit gained from this to finance ASALA and JCAG, thereby legalizing them in the eyes of their fellow countrymen, while keeping most of it for themselves, thus increasing their personal wealth.

To be perfectly honest, Armenian terrorists never made any particular effort to mask the economic implication of their activity, openly stating the desire to receive money from an external source. The documentary evidence provided in this book clearly indicates that the main goal of the more than two hundred terrorist attacks committed by the fighters of ASALA and JCAG against diplomats, diplomatic institutions, and commercial structures of the Republic of Turkey in different countries of the world in the 1970s-1980s was not only to force the leaders of this country to recognize the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire (this demand was used as a political cover or camouflage for the main goal), but primarily to get them to pay monetary compensation to the Armenian Diaspora for the crimes allegedly committed previously against its representatives by the Ottoman authorities, as Germany did after World War II with respect to the Jewish state of Israel.

All the above-mentioned thoughts, arguments, and deductions bring me to one definite conclusion: throughout twentieth century history, Armenian terrorism always had an underlying economic cause and motivation. In other words, Armenian terrorism was never altruistic, mercantilism and pragmatism being its distinctive features. At the beginning of the century, it protected the corporate property of the Armenian people in the form of the property of the Armenian Gregorian Church, which the Russian state tried to take control over (but not to nationalize it as Armenian and pro-Armenian authors are fond of writing), according to the law of 12 June, 1903. Then, after the downfall of the Ottoman and Russian empires, it became a tool of economic consolidation of the Armenian Diaspora, which was constantly growing in number, but no longer around the institutions of the Armenian Gregorian Church, as in the past, rather around the structures of the Hunchak and Dashnaktsutiu parties, which had replaced the church structures in the life of the Armenian Diaspora in Europe and North America, leaving them the function of blessing and consecrating their activity. In the last third of the past century, Armenian terrorism became a tool for ultimately reinforcing total power of the Armenian plutocracy over all the representatives and commercial structures of the Armenian ethnicity and subordinating the Armenian minority living in the Soviet Union at that time to this power. In fact, throughout its history, Armenian terrorism has been a non-economic tool of the macro economy, after helping Armianstvo and the Armenian plutocracy to reach the state they are in today.

If the question is approached from precisely this viewpoint, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh was the apogee of Armianstvo's efficacious use of terrorist means for the macroeconomic purposes of its plutocracy. From the macroeconomic position, its main result was not the occupation by Armenian armed formations of Nagorno-Karabakh and the territories adjoining it belonging to the Azerbaijan Republic according to international law, the natural riches of which the Armenian side in the conflict has no opportunity to legally use, develop, or exploit today. The main economic result of this war was spreading the power of the Armenian plutocracy throughout the entire Armenian ethnicity, which lived separately in the Armenian S.S.R. as part of the Soviet Union and in the Diaspora. In other words, the main macroeconomic consequence of the Nagorno-Karabakh war was privatization of what had been Soviet Armenia until that time by the transnational Armenian plutocracy.

The act of terrorism in the Armenian parliament on 27 October, 1999, which ended in the premeditated murders of prominent Armenian politicians wishing to see their country free from the dictatorship of the Diaspora's establishment, was the culminating point of this process (even its ultimate apogee). Among the eight statesmen killed that day, it was Karen Demirch-

ian, Chairman of the National Assembly and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Armenian S.S.R, essentially the head of the republic, and Vazgen Sargsian, Prime Minister of Armenia, previously a writer, commander of volunteer units of the Armenian nationalists of Yerkrpah, which were at war against the armed groups of Azerbaijan in the years of the Karabakh war, and Minister of Defense of the country, who believed that it was the people of Armenia, and not the oligarchy of the Diaspora that should play the first fiddle in the life of the Armenian ethnicity. It was these two statesmen who posed a particular threat to the interests and ambitious aspirations of plutocracy of the Armenian Diaspora. These two politicians (and another six along with them, including two vice speakers of the parliament, two deputies and two ministers), enjoying the highest trust and authority in the country and standing up for the true and unconditional independence of Armenia, were killed because they had become a real obstacle to implementation of the plans of the plutocracy of the Armenian Diaspora to privatize the newly formed monoethnic country of the Armenians. In this sense, the tool of political terrorism aimed at ensuring macroeconomic interests performed its function to a tee: President Robert Kocharian and his entourage, comprised entirely of Karabakh Armenians, who came to power in Armenia subordinated the Yerevan Armenians and began using them in their interests and in the interests of the oligarchy of the Diaspora. This act of terrorism and its consequences showed once again that the ethnic and political affiliation of the victims is of no consequence to transnational Armenian terrorism if their activity interferes with the plans of the financial oligarchy of the Armenian Diaspora. The contemporary history of the Republic of Armenia, essentially the history of its stage-by-stage economic subordination to the Diaspora establishment, is the most graphic example of this.

The mechanism of this so-called privatization by non-economic means of war and the coercion associated with it was quite simple. At first the international Armenian terrorists (precisely international, and not transnational, since as ethnic Armenians, they were citizens of almost fifteen countries of the Middle East, Europe, and North America), with the connivance of the authorities of Soviet Armenia, penetrated into Nagorno-Karabakh where they were received by the local Armenian population, with the support of whom they organized an armed mutiny, overthrew Soviet power in the region, and *de facto* removed the territory of the region from under jurisdiction of the Azerbaijan S.S.R, after declaring the so-called “Artsakh Republic” there. Then, relying on local extremist Armenian nationalists, they carried out active ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population—Azerbaijanis, Meskhetian Turks, and Kurds—thus provoking the Armenian-Azerbaijani war and drawing some of the population of the Armenian S.S.R.—the future Republic of Armenia—into it. Victory in this war allowed them, on the wave of chauvinism, to bring natives from Nagorno-Karabakh to power in Armenia who had proven their loyalty to the political ideals and material interests of the transnational Armenian plutocracy and been tested in fighting the Azerbaijanis. This is how, first by means of terror and then by wars and politics, the former republic of the Soviet Union became incorporated into the orbit of its plutocracy’s macroeconomic interests. But in this newly formed country itself, the local population constituted second grade citizens, completely dependent on the external governance of the people from Nagorno-Karabakh financed by the Diaspora establishment. In fact, in the economic and political respect, present-day Armenia is not the historical homeland of the Armenians, as the first ideologists of *Armianstvo* at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century liked to think, but a kind of colony of the Diaspora, reliance on the material resources of which ensured the necessary stability in the polyethnic world alien to it, and, even worse, was way to legalize financial resources often illegally gained through the state budget.

The fate of Armenian nationalist and dissident Paruyr Hayrikian, well known in the Soviet Union, is the best graphic evidence of this. He spent more than ten years in Soviet prisons and camps for promulgating nationalist ideas and “anti-Soviet activity,” and after the collapse

of the Soviet Union, in the years of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, he was a local figure for a couple of years in one of provincial areas, after which he became an ordinary deputy of parliament, forgotten by all, whose voice did not mean anything. To somehow keep afloat in Armenian politics, on the eve of the country's next presidential election in 2012, after nominating himself to this post and realizing what little chance he had of success, he even decided to simulate an attempt on his own life, after being shot in the lung. Unfortunately for him, in a country where politics is defined by adherents of or even participants in political terrorism, but not the victims of terror, this PR move did not bring any electoral dividends, and he gained only a scanty number of votes. This person's example shows I was right by saying that not only the people of Azerbaijan became victims of the aggression of transnational Armenian plutocracy, but also the indigenous people of Armenia, who had not only lost their political sovereignty, but had also completely lost the opportunity to independently manage the natural resources at their disposal.

This transformation of the political, social, and economic lifestyle of the entire country automatically brought about a change in the ideological reference points and moral values comprising the worldview and world understanding of its inhabitants. Present-day Armenians have entirely lost the national and religious identity that characterized and united them a century ago. It stands to reason that the 70-year domination of atheistic Soviet power played an important and even key role in bringing about the metamorphosis by eliminating the church from public life and turning society from a sect into a political nation. However, the Soviet ideologue "proletarian internationalism" was transformed in the Armenian S.S.R. into the concept of "international nationalism," headed by the thesis of solidarity and unity of the Armenians living in different countries of the world, or to put it in ethnological terms, representing the Diaspora. The loss of the religious dominant in determining national identity objectively demanded replacement of "the standard of identity," compliance to which characterized the individual's subjective affiliation with *Armanstvo* and the Armenian civilization in general. In other words, a new national ideology was needed according to the principle "ours-theirs," which makes it possible to separate and segregate Armenians among the representatives of other peoples in their living conditions in the foreign-ethnic environment. This goal was served by ideas of traditional paganism (with its polytheism, pantheon of gods, and structure built on the patrimonial family), which were more primitive compared with religious doctrines, but easier to understand, explaining to the broad masses of the population the origin of the Armenians. In present-day conditions, these ideas have transformed into the ideology of national neo-paganism. The practice of political terrorism used by Armenian extremists throughout the twentieth century helped to revive the Armenians' pagan or, to put it in culturological terms, archetypal ideas of world order, since these explained from an irrational viewpoint the "higher meaning" of terrorism, making it clear to the perpetrators of the crimes the need for them to commit terrorist attacks as a continuation in present-day conditions of the battle between Light and Dark. This was embodied in Armenian mythology by Hayk—the progenitor of the Armenians, and Bel, the lord of Babylon, who pursued the Armenians in Old Testament times. We can essentially say that in the most recent history of the Armenian people, patrimonial paganism and terrorism always went hand in hand, whereby traditional pagan ideas were transformed into neo-paganism—a political ideology that justified and rehabilitated terrorism.

If we follow the logic of Marxist-Leninist theory, a change in any socioeconomic formation is inevitably accompanied by a change in elites, and the less resource-rich the territory or society, within the framework of which the social transformations take place, the higher the tension and intensity of the fight for resources (Charles Darwin called this the law of intraspecific competition among members of the same species). At such times in history, non-economic methods of violence in the form of national or religious terrorism often proved to be the most

effective tools of the struggle for power and repartition of property, and the more experience an ethnicity has in their use, the more often and willingly they are applied at crisis times in its history or the history of the region where it resides. In the twentieth century, the Armenians underwent four dramatic changes in their way of life: in 1918, when supremacy of the Armenian Gregorian theocracy was replaced by the dictatorship of the Dashnaktsutiun Party; in 1920, when the Dashnaks were exiled from the country by the Bolsheviks; in 1991, when Soviet power in Armenia was succeeded by national liberals led by Levon Ter-Petrossian; and in 1999, when as a result of an act of terrorism at the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, the political and administrative power in the country became concentrated in the hands of people from Nagorno-Karabakh who were active and voluntary executors of the will and protectors of the economic interests of the transnational Armenian plutocracy.

That is why so many Armenian politicians of the past and present have experience in terrorist activity. It is enough to remember Drastamast Kanaian, better known in Armenian historical literature under the pseudonym General Dro, who began his political career as a terrorist, after becoming famous for the murder of Governor of the Baku Gubernia Prince Nakashidze in 1903, and then the mass murders of peaceful Azerbaijanis in 1918. In 1920, he became war minister of the Dashnak Republic of Armenia, instigated two wars with Georgia and Kemalist Turkey, in which the Armenian army he led suffered two crushing defeats, after which he served the Bolsheviks for some time, before emigrating and ending his life journey in Morocco. Today in Armenia, he is considered a national hero, although with so many sins to his name, people in any other country where it is not the custom to say the names of war criminals and terrorists out loud would try to forget his “feats.”

Similar milestones can be found in the biographies of many politicians in the present-day Republic of Armenia. For example, the second president of this country, as “prime minister” of the self-proclaimed “Artsakh Republic” in the years of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, personally supervised the activity of the international Armenian terrorists from the Arabo, Aramo, and Patriotic Detachment groups in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. His successor to the post of president of Armenia Serzh Sargsian, as head of the Committee of the Self-Defense Forces of Artsakh in the same years and in the same place, personally gave orders to subunits of international Armenian terrorists to carry out combat operations and terrorist attacks against civilians and military formations of the Azerbaijan Republic. During his term as minister of defense, minister of national security, and minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Armenia, officers of this country’s military investigation and state security departments organized and carried out three acts and court-proven attempted acts of terrorism in the territory of the Russian Federation, about the preparation and commission of which he must have known as head of the corresponding department.

The question arises of why the transnational Armenian plutocracy needs present-day Armenia, a country with poor mineral reserves and a small population, aspiring, like the Old Testament Jews, to head into the dispersion? The answer is relatively simple from the viewpoint of macroeconomic analysis, but it lies in several vectors of understanding.

First of all, middle-aged people with a relatively good education acquired in Soviet times and ethnocorporative ties throughout the post-Soviet region are worth their weight in gold. In fact, the Armenian Diaspora rapidly expanded when the Soviet Union collapsed, so it was vitally important to establish ideological and economic control over its Soviet segment. This could only be done through “the historical homeland”—the Republic of Armenia. Whereby it was not essential that control be established by means of subordination or coercion. In the case of the Armenian Diaspora of the post-Soviet region, a “softer” option was applied to incorporate the ethnic elite into the transnational structures of the Armenian plutocracy. The financial leaders of the Armenian community of Russia, Ukraine, and other former republics of the So-

viet Union (both legal and criminal) were included in the Armanstvo establishment with the preservation and possibly even enhancement of their business resources. This kind of alliance was extremely advantageous to the financial circles of the “Soviet” segment of the Armenian Diaspora, since it gave them access on favorable terms to all the financial and material-technical resources of the rest of the Diaspora, which significantly increased this segment’s competitiveness in the domestic markets of its countries of residence. Transnational Armenian companies such as Ashan and Tashir owe their emergence in the Russian market and subsequent prosperity to this incorporation. But they could not do this directly (even in Yeltsin’s time), so they had to work through Armenia—Russia’s military-political ally.

The second motivation for establishing control over Armenia was the opportunity to legalize shadow money through it. It is no secret that almost half of the state budget of the present-day Republic of Armenia is comprised of financial subsidies from the transnational plutocracy of the Armenian Diaspora, which does not make it entirely clear what money in the state treasury of this country comes from taxation and what from subsidies. Nor is it clear what the sources of this money coming from abroad directly into accounts of the Central Bank of Armenia are. Since the Armenian state does not spend the donations received on the social needs of its citizens (they continue to live in permanent poverty), there is strong reason to believe that they are being redirected through this country to help develop the business of the Armenian Diaspora in the post-Soviet space in order to make it even more financially beholden to the old, European and American, diasporas. Ethnic Armenians who are natives of Nagorno-Karabakh and receive initial capital when they emigrate to start their own business are used in this way. So the social and financial resources of the Diaspora increase, thus ensuring even greater stability of the Armenian plutocracy or ethnocracy. In this sense, the war for Nagorno-Karabakh allowed it to increase its influence at least two-fold and transform quite successfully from a transnational into a global phenomenon. And Armenian terrorism has always been an effective tool in achieving these grandiose macroeconomic goals.

I must answer another question in order to do full justice to my description of Armenian terrorism as a tool in unleashing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: did the United States of America have something to do with this? As I wrote in the bibliographic review of the literature used in this book, and also repeatedly mentioned throughout its chapters, the answer can only be in the affirmative. Whereby this is not only my own opinion, but also the opinion of a whole group, even galaxy, of American researchers—Jeffrey Simon, David Rapoport, David Whittaker, and Francis Hyland, which was later repeated by many Azerbaijani authors. The expert assessments of these authors leave no doubt that the U.S. was interested in the Karabakh war and supported the international Armenian terrorists in their striving to provoke and unleash an Armenian-Turkic conflict in Transcaucasia. Thus the United States was pursuing its own goal, which was much more global than seizure by the Armenians of part of Azerbaijan’s territory. It was aspiring to destroy the Soviet Union, and a civil war in Soviet Transcaucasia was immensely conducive to achieving this goal, so it encouraged and subsidized it in every possible way. Transnational oil and gas corporations controlled by American capital were the main sponsors of this conflict. They not only wanted the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also Azerbaijan’s complete military defeat in this war, since only in this way could they gain access to the Caspian oil Azerbaijan needed to discover to have the funds to restore its statehood, economy, the social sphere, and armed forces. As we see, in the specific case of the Karabakh war of 1988-1994, the geopolitical and macroeconomic interests of the American transnational oligarchy and the plutocracy of the Armenian Diaspora coincided and so they stood united, making repeated use of the time-tested weapon of Armenian terrorism against Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijanis.

There is another thing that can only arouse natural concern in any respectable Russian citizen. I am talking about the intentional and systematic hushing up of the acts of terrorism

committed in the territory of Russia not by some fanatic terrorists, but by regular officers of intelligence services of the Republic of Armenia. We know of more than ten terrorist attacks carried out by the Armenian intelligence services against Russian citizens and transportation vehicles in the first half of the 1990s that cost dozens of human lives. But very few people know about and remember them in Russia today. Every year, on 3 September, Remembrance of the Victims of Terrorism Day is celebrated, during which the names of our compatriots killed by international terrorists are read out at civil commemoration and church services. But strangely enough, only those people killed by terrorists who commit their crimes under the slogans of radical Islam are remembered on this day, while the names of Russian citizens killed by officers of the Armenian intelligence services are passed over in silence. Such selectivity in the political assessments of the consequences of terrorism, when crimes committed by religious extremists are repeatedly remembered, while the crimes committed by ethnic extremists who are in the military service of foreign states are repeatedly hushed up, allows me to say that, by failing to remember and publicly condemn a whole series of crimes of Armenian terrorism in their territory, the leadership of the Russian Federation, albeit indirectly or covertly, as though rehabilitating it, is in fact encouraging Armenian extremists to commit new crimes. And this not only looks blasphemous, to say the least, in regard to its own people, but also contradicts common sense in general.

I am deeply convinced that in contemporary conditions it is impossible to fight against transnational terrorism selectively, opposing some and ignoring the actions of others. U.S. experience, where one hand encourages international terrorists in the countries of North Africa, the Middle East and Western Asia, while the other mercilessly destroys them, proves this once again. Unfortunately, the Russian Federation today is taking the United States' cue regarding historical memory of the crimes of transnational Armenian terrorism, thereby opening the way to its revival, including in the territory of its own country, in some districts of which ethnic Armenians (as, for example, in certain regions of the Krasnodar Territory) already comprise the majority of the local population today. Relying on the historical experience of the last century, it cannot be excluded that a new center of terrorist threat, this time with an entirely different national and religious social base, will not appear in the Northern Caucasus, in addition to the "Muslim" republics of the region.

In the current geopolitical conditions, Russia sees the Republic of Armenia as one of its closest military and political allies and economic partners, although some twenty years ago its intelligence services waged an active terrorist war against it. The current president of Armenia, Serzh Sargsian, was head of the State Security Department in the first half of the 1990s and, after its structural reorganization, became Minister of Interior and National Security of the Republic of Armenia. It was his subordinates, following his direct instructions, who blew up railway trains in Russia at the beginning of the 1990s. But today he calls Russia Armenia's main ally and defender. However, we still see no shadow of regret on his face for the orders he gave to commit terrorist attacks, or any hint of an attempt to apologize to Russia and its people for the crimes committed by the Armenian intelligence services. We only see a false smile and expression of complacency on his face, knowing that he is protected by the immunity of his status as the country's president and so can freely come to Russia on official visits without the risk of being brought to trial under Art 205.1 or Art 205.5 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation. All of this should arouse feelings of concern in true patriots of Russia. But we know of and remember all the crimes Armenian terrorists have committed against the people of Russia and are waiting for the moment to give everyone implicated in committing them their due. This book is the best reminder and confirmation of this.

It stands to reason that every Russian reading this book today is bound to wonder whether the historical heritage of Armenian terrorism, formed throughout the previous century,

poses a serious threat to Russia today. I think that the likelihood of such a threat is miniscule. However, it must be admitted that it is rather strange to see a country, the current political and military leadership of which personally planned and sanctioned a series of terrorist acts one-and-a-half decades ago in the territory of the Russian Federation, as a close geopolitical ally without demanding an elementary explanation and apology for deeds committed. It is unlikely that Armenian terrorism will be able to raise its head again in the short, or even mid-term, and there is a relatively simple explanation for this. As a rule, it is the marginal political forces that make use of terrorist means and methods in their struggle for power and financial influence. And when this is achieved, the terrorists suppress any such actions against themselves with particular cruelty and energy, the example of the Soviet Union being the most graphic and visible evidence of this. Any person who is familiar enough with the twentieth-century history of Russia knows that in the 1930s, all the members of the former revolutionary movement who in any way opposed the elite of the Bolshevik party that seized power in the country were exterminated or isolated from society. We see the same process, accompanied by political murders, in the recent history of the Republic of Armenia. Consequently, in the current conditions, there is no ideological and material foundations for reviving or forming a new wave of Armenian terrorism, whereby not only in Armenia itself, but also in the Armenian Diaspora, the establishment of which is enjoying new material benefits gained from its long-awaited consolidation into a single whole. However, keeping in mind historical experience, we cannot be complacent, since any open and resolute attack by the state on the business of the Armenian Diaspora in Russia could arouse a corresponding response from it, although such a development of events seems less than likely.

In this regard, I have no intention of demonizing the present-day Republic of Armenia or the majority of its population, repeating the popular phrase that supposedly all Armenians have terrorist inclinations. I am categorically against postulating such an idea, and I think it entirely inappropriate from the viewpoint of political and legal science. Terrorism in any form is an antigovernment illegal act, so no state can encourage it without incurring a wave of terrorist attacks upon itself. The terrorist acts committed by the Armenian intelligence services in the territory of the Russian Federation in the 1990s were a kind of aftershock of the Karabakh war of 1988-1994, from the waging of which the present political leadership of Armenia, personally stained by the blood of Russian citizens, suffered much greater loss than it acquired benefits. The war with Azerbaijan, which proved victorious for Armenia, has not been resumed, while Russia has assumed the mission of peacekeeper and acquired ample reason for ceasing its friendly relations with Armenia the moment its current political establishment refuses to follow the Kremlin's foreign policy. And until this happens, the subject of Armenian terrorism will remain dormant in Russia.

Nevertheless, we must remember that, even in its slumbering state, Armenian terrorism continues to be an effective tool of geopolitics and macroeconomics that could be awoken at any time...

AFTERWORD

RUSSIA'S ARMENIAN GAMBIT

(Thoughts on Current Events)

On 1 January, 2015, the Republic of Armenia joined the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, thus becoming part of a supra-national economic area enjoying free turnover of commodity, financial and human resources within the borders of the former Soviet Union and Russian Empire. It is clear that the idea of national and religious unity and even uniqueness, that has served as the intellectual basis of the Armenian people's public life in its most diverse forms, from religious to political, for the past 150 years, has completely failed and essentially proven to be impractical with respect to the existence and functioning of a monoethnic Armenian state. To avoid economic, political, and intellectual stagnation and regression, Armenia, along with all of its people, has been forced to abandon its ideas of national and religious exclusivity and become part of the diverse outside world. The intellectually developed and most pragmatic part of the Armenian establishment has finally understood that the Armenian ethnicity cannot live by egotistical national interests alone, since that would lead to self-isolation and subsequent degradation without any chance of retaining the status of a political nation. Today, the Armenians are objectively compelled to be part of the world, not for the sake of *Armianstvo*, but for the sake of the world itself, thus admitting the priority of universal values over egotistical national and religious interests. Without this, they cannot further preserve their statehood, for the sake of which they have shed so much of their own and other people's blood. Understanding and stating this fact means only one thing—the intellectual foundation of Armenian nationalism and its radical criminal derivative in the form of transnational terrorism has endured a complete fiasco. And before long the historico-criminological phenomenon of transnational Armenian terrorism will be nothing more than an obscure and bloody page in human memory to be remembered only as a lesson to be learned, but not as a guide to action.

Today the Republic of Armenia is not only a member of the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, but also a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Therefore, it is Russia's only truly strategic military and political ally and trade and economic partner in the Southern Caucasus.

It has occupied this place owing to Russia's targeted policy in this region, the foundation of which was laid in the middle of the eighteenth century. I have written about this more than once in several of my earlier publications, but I consider it necessary to summarize and systematize my thoughts on this subject again, especially since the geopolitical context, which dramatically changed in 2014-2015, makes it necessary to take a principally different look at Russia's strategic presence in the Southern Caucasus.¹

Russia made its ideological and military-political claims to the Caucasus and Transcaucasia in the last quarter of the eighteenth century when the so-called Greek project developed by Chancellor Count Alexander Bezborodko at the request of Empress Catherine II the Great began dominating in the Russian Empire's foreign policy aspirations.² The far-reaching Greek project envisaged military-strategic and ideological vectors, both of which predetermined, for many decades and even centuries, the southern vector of Russia's foreign policy, in which Transcaucasia played a significant, albeit not paramount role.

The accession of the Crimean Peninsula and all the continental territories of the Crimean khanate on the North Black Sea coast to Russia, which was ultimately completed in 1783, not only ensured the strategic security of the empire's southern borders by giving it access to natural boundaries (the Black Sea and the Dniester), but also began bringing Catherine the Great's far-reaching plans to fruition.

By this time, the Russian empress had two grandsons, Alexander and Constantine, the first of whom she was preparing for the Russian throne, bypassing the dynastic rights of her son, Grand Prince Pavel, while the second was to ascend to the Greek royal throne, even though Greece belonged to the Ottoman Empire at that time. The second grandson was not called Constantine by chance, this was the name of the last Byzantine emperor of the Palaiologos dynasty, whose daughter was the wife of Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan III of the Rurik dynasty (the predecessor of the imperial Romanov dynasty on the Russian throne). The newborn child (i.e. Grand Prince Constantine) was nursed by a Greek woman called Helene who taught him to speak fluent Greek. At that time, the Hellenic culture was all the rage in Catherine the Great's court. In her correspondence with Voltaire, the empress discussed the possibility of reviving the Greek culture in Europe, as well as restoring the Greek state with its capital in Constantinople (Istanbul), including by military means with the direct participation of Russia's land troops and fleet.³ The military-strategic vector of the Greek project so dear to Empress Catherine the Great envisaged winning back the Balkan Peninsula from the Ottoman Empire, as well as securing the Slavic-Orthodox Reconquista of Byzantium, or the Eastern Roman Empire, that had existed there previously but was already in the wake of Russian foreign policy.

Russia had been concentrating its main efforts on implementing the Greek project; however, its geopolitical sights happened to fall on the Central Caucasus and Transcaucasia due to the rivalry launched with variable success between the Persian Shahdom and the Ottoman Empire for domination in these regions that did not go beyond the boundaries of their adjacent areas. When it began its geopolitical expansion in the Balkan states, Russia never gave a thought to opening a second front against the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus or Transcaucasia, since it did not have the forces, assets, or resources to do this. It most likely turned its attention to this

¹ For more details, see: O. Kuznetsov, *Pravda o "mifakh" karabakhskogo konflikta*, Minuvshee, Moscow, 2013; idem, "Evolution of Russia's Geopolitical Interests and Priorities in Transcaucasia," *The Caucasus & Globalization*, 2012, Vol. 6, Issue 1, pp. 145-156; idem, "The Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: Is It a 'Clash of Civilization'? How Samuel Huntington's Theory Explains Its Culturological Dimension," *The Caucasus & Globalization*, 2013, Vol. 7, Issue 1-2, pp. 82-94.

² See: V.S. Parsamov, *Istoria Rossii: XVIII-nachalo XX v.*, Akademia, Moscow, 2007, p. 156.

³ See: V.S. Mirzекhanov, "Ideologia i diplomatiа Rossii v epokhu Ekateriny II: istoriografiа poslednikh desiatiletii," in: *Istoricheskie, kulturnye i ekonomicheskie svyazi mezhdru Turtsiei i Rossiei: Materialy mezhdunarodnogo simpoziuma, Istanbul, 5 April, 2012*, Compiled by O. Kuznetsov, Turkish-Russian Cultural Center, Moscow, 2012, p. 34.

region under the pressure of external conditions beyond its control. In 1768, King of the Georgian principalities of Kartli and Kakheti Heraclius II, whose predecessor Vakhtang VI had signed an allied agreement with Russian Emperor Peter the Great in 1722, asked Russia for military assistance in his fight against the Ottomans. In 1768-1772, a contingent of Russian troops functioned in the territory of present-day Georgia under the command of Lieutenant General Baron Tottleben, who was renowned for his courage in the battle field, unscrupulousness, adventurism, and penchant for intrigues at other times in his life. Despite a number of military achievements (including the capture of Kutaisi and the siege of Poti), his actions in Turkey did not produce any substantial political advantage for Russia, since he managed not only to fall out with Heraclius II of Georgia, but also to betray him, both during the battle against the Ottomans at Akhaltsikhe in April 1770 and by taking the side of the king's rivals in the fight for the Georgian throne.⁴ The only geopolitical benefit of the campaign of General Tottleben's contingent to conquer the River Kura was that the Russian military command received detailed military-topographic information about this region, making it possible to plan eventual combat operations in this territory in the future. It was essentially thanks to Baron Tottleben that Russia turned its sights to the Central Caucasus and Transcaucasia, although they did not immediately become a zone of its geopolitical interests.

Russia paid for establishing its military protectorate over East Georgia in 1783 and the latter's subsequent accession in 1801 to the empire with a series of wars against two strategic opponents in the Caucasus—the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Shahdom, armed opposition against which was facilitated by the constant border internecine conflicts between these two countries. These conflicts included the failed campaign of the Russian Kuban forces under the command of Colonel General Count Zubov in Northern Azerbaijan against the troops of the Persian shah, cut short due to the death of Empress Catherine the Great, the Russo-Persian wars of 1804-1813 and 1826-1828, and the Russo-Turkish wars of 1806-1812 and 1828-1829.

It was during the planning and course of these armed conflicts that the outlines of Russia's geopolitical interests and aspirations in the Central Caucasus and Transcaucasia began to emerge. The state borders of the empire came right up to these regions, and then absorbed them, after which it became vitally important to form a state ideology in the newly acceded territories.

Unlike Southeast Europe, the Central Caucasus was never an area of Russia's religious expansion, since it made no sense to spread Christianity as the foundation of its political domination in territories with a traditionally Muslim (previously pagan) local population. Those lands in which Christianity was historically widespread and where feudal social relations had already developed by the beginning of the nineteenth century were incorporated into the structure of the Russian state and society without serious consequences, impacting on the interests of only a few members of the ruling regional elite. It was more difficult to get the state-territorial formations of Transcaucasia with a traditionally Muslim population to swear their allegiance to the Russian Empire. However, this stands to reason since the local feudal governors personally retained their former administrative status all their lives (although losing their political sovereignty), while their heirs, successors, and confidants became Russian noblemen with all the ensuing property and class privileges. In fact, the transfer to Russian power in Transcaucasia in no way changed the traditional character of social-property and administrative-economic relations, so most of the population was indifferent to it. Graphic evidence of this was the apathetic attitude of the new Russian authorities to trade in *yasir*—live goods from among local Muslims even beyond the borders of the Russian Empire (especially girls and young women in the Turkish harems). In the newly acceded regions of the empire, trade in

⁴ See: V. A. Potto, *Kavkazskaia voina*, in five vols., Vol. 1, *S drevneishikh vremen do Ermolova*, Tsentrpoligraf, Moscow, 2006, pp. 128-132.

yasir was carried out freely in the rural Muslim communities, while the purchase or sale of yasir (slaves and serfs) was certified by special acts of Russian police officers with payment of duty to the state treasury.⁵ This procedure was absolutely identical to the one that existed in the Christian part of Russia regarding serfs, so the lifestyle of most of the local residents of the Caucasus and European Russia differed little. This all gives reason to confidently state that there was objectively no specific or local socioeconomic obstacles preventing Russia's colonization of the Caucasus.

There was only one aspect of Russian's colonization of the Central Caucasus that had a pronounced religious-confessional hue: the matter concerns the so-called Armenian question, which was discordant with Russia's entire policy in Transcaucasia and contradicted the logic of forming Russia's geopolitics in this region. I must point out that I consider this to be a religious-confessional, and not national element, since until February 1914, when the imperial law on freedom of religion was adopted, the concept "nationality" as an element of the formal and legal description of an individual did not exist in Russia, and it was replaced to a certain extent by the confession or faith the individual followed. So from the state and legal point of view, "the Armenian question" never existed in Russia and could not exist in principle. Therefore, I will use the term "Armenian Gregorian question" as a more correct definition of this issue.

Owing to the backwardness of Orthodox theology at that time, the secular representatives of the state-political establishment mistakenly perceived the Armenian Gregorian faith, which was a social-legal attribute of the Armenian ethnicity in the Russian Empire, as canonically related to Orthodoxy because of the similarity of its rituals and attributes. Without going into details regarding theological dogma, I will only point out that the Armenian Apostolic Church belonged to the group of Ancient Eastern Orthodox churches, did not participate in the Fourth Ecumenical Council, and did not adopt its resolutions. This is why its dogma is based on the resolutions of only the first three Ecumenical Councils and adheres to the pre-Colchis Christological doctrine of prelate Cyril of Alexandria, professing that Christ remains in two distinct natures, yet these two natures (Divinity and Humanity) come together within His one hypostasis (miaphysitism). The Armenian Gregorian doctrine differs from the Orthodox dogma in its denial of the Holy Trinity, which brings its adepts closer to the preachers of Judaism and the followers of various pseudo-Christian sects, Dukhobors, Molokans, and so forth. Therefore from the point of view of modern Christian theology (both Catholic and Orthodox, or even Protestant), Armenian Gregorian followers cannot be considered Christians in the true sense of the word. However, the Russian military and administrative authorities in the Caucasus did not pay much attention to the dogmatic features of this religion, seeing its followers as allies in the implementation of their military and political plans and ambitions in the Southern Caucasus. I can essentially claim that as early as the second quarter of the nineteenth century "the Armenian question" had become the fulcrum of Russian geopolitics in Transcaucasia and remained so for almost two centuries, right up until the beginning of the twenty-first century.

After taking the territory of the Central Caucasus away from Persia and the Ottoman Empire and securing itself the right to it for several decades, Russia engaged in an active resettlement policy in the relation to the Armenian Gregorians. They were moved from Persia and the Ottoman Empire to settle in the Transcaucasian lands newly acceded to Russia, about which there were special articles in the Treaty of Turkmenchay with Persia and the Treaty of Adrianople with the Sublime Porte. Thus the Armenians resettled *en masse* in Transcaucasia. According to the official Russian data, about 15,000 Armenian families amounting to a total of 90

⁵ See: N.M. Emelianova and M.Kh. Ekzekov, "Torgovye i kulturnye svyazi Rossiiskoi, Osmanskoi imperii i narodov Kavkaza v pervoi polovine XIX veka," in: *Istoricheskie, kulturnye i ekonomicheskie svyazi mezhdur Turtsiei i Rossiei*, pp. 45-47.

to 100 thousand people moved to Russia from the Ottoman Empire during the fall of 1829 and spring of 1830 alone. And this comprised only the migrants from the *pachaliks* (areas) of Erzurum and Kars.⁶ Approximately the same number of Armenians migrated two years earlier to the Russian Transcaucasia from Persia, and another 30 thousand from the district of Trabzon. In less than three years, the Armenian population of Transcaucasia increased by more than 300 thousand people. This one-time mass resettlement of the Armenians, sanctioned, organized, and financed by the Russian administration, can without doubt be considered the most graphic manifestation of Russian geopolitics in Transcaucasia.

Throughout the entire nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, “the Armenian vector” determined the priorities of Russian geopolitics in Transcaucasia. The general movement of the Russian troops in Transcaucasia in all the Russo-Turkish wars of that century can serve as additional proof of this, even though it is not entirely convenient from the military and strategic, but very explainable from the military and political viewpoint. The Russian military command considered Erzurum, and not Trabzon or Sinop, possession of which would have facilitated supply of the Russian troops fighting in Anatolia by sea, to be the main thrust and destination of the penetration deep into Turkish Eastern Anatolia in the last four wars with the Ottoman Empire (1828-1829, 1853-1856, 1877-1878, and 1914-1918). However, taking possession of the Turkish Black Sea coast was not a strategic task, which leads to the conclusion that it was Russia's geopolitical priority to take several regions from the Ottoman Empire that were very dubious from the military-strategic and economic viewpoint, but had a large percent of Armenian Gregorian residents. And this, in turn, makes it possible to say that, in addition to the Greek project, an Armenian project also existed in Russia for centuries, although no one drew attention to it.

Today there are no sufficient and reliable documentary data that directly equate implementation of Russia's Armenian project with the declaration of Great Armenia, the creation of which in the Ottoman Empire territories occupied by Russia during World War I was envisaged under the Armistice of Mudros of 30 October, 1918 and the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August, 1920 between the Entente countries and the Ottoman Empire. However, Russia's attempt to transfer the Turkish territories occupied by it to the Armenian nationalists after its unilateral withdrawal from the war under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 3 March, 1918 is proof in itself that the Armenian project previously lobbied by Russia and partly by France was still relevant after its military-political defeat in World War I. The only thing that stopped it was the victory of the supporters of Ghazi Moustapha Kemal Pasha Atatürk during the 1919-1923 Turkish independence war, a component of which was the Turkish-Armenian armed conflict of 1920 that resulted in the restoration of the future Republic of Turkey's state sovereignty over the regions of Eastern Anatolia occupied first by Russian troops, and then by Armenian armed groups, preserving, however, the freedom of that part of the former Russian Empire in the territory of which first the Armenian S.S.R. existed for 70 years, and now the independent and sovereign Republic of Armenia.

The above chronologically extensive but brief historical review of Russian geopolitics in the Caucasus in general and in Transcaucasia in particular makes it possible to say that Russia was responsible from beginning to end for the geographical localization and concentration of a considerable number of Armenians in the Southern Caucasus and the subsequent creation on this basis of, first, a national proto-state in the form of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, the existence of which was accompanied by and caused the social transformation of the ethnicity into a nation, and then a full-fledged national state in the form of the present Republic of

⁶ See: *Utverzhenie russkogo vladychestva na Kavkaze*, in four vols., Vol. 4 (Part 2), ed. by N.N. Beliaevsky and V. Potto, Ia. Liberman Publishers, Tiflis, 1907, pp. 453-454.

Armenia with transformation of its population and the entire Armianstvo of the world into a political nation, putting this national and religious sect today on a par with the leading nations and civilizations of the world. This was Russia's strategic and geopolitical project in the region, which it carried out for two and a half centuries, despite all the changes in the country's state system and political regime. Therefore, it is very naïve to believe that Russia will ever refuse to protect and preserve the sovereignty of its geostrategic child.

However, the continuation of its existence in its current form greatly contradicts the new geopolitical priorities of the metropolis, generated by the change in the world strategic environment. Today Russia is gradually making, if not a cardinal change, then at least a significant adjustment of its geopolitical priorities in the Southern Caucasus, organizing its geopolitics on principally different foundations and in accordance with current reality. Pragmatism in global economic and foreign policy issues in the Central and Southern Caucasus has replaced the former ideological determinism that had pronounced national and religious features. It is very obvious that Russia could not objectively change its foreign policy course so important to it in an instant. It needed strength, time, and political will to overcome the two-century inertia its previous course had generated. And it is political will that is manifested most prominently at present, although politicians in absolutely all the countries of the Central Caucasus intoxicated by the first significant anniversary, twenty years, of their national statehood prefer not to notice this, continuing to remain in the system of geopolitical coordinates customary to them.

In the two decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is Armenia, as the most stable and predictable newly formed state in the military-political respect, that Russia sees as its only ally in the Southern Caucasus. Moreover, it has a clear social organization built on the military model, in which the status of Yerkrpah-volunteer designates a person's place in society. In the 1990s, against the background of the consolidated striving of Armenia and Armianstvo in general to dominate in the Southern Caucasus, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, with their internal political clan internecine conflicts, seemed to be, and even were for some time, territories of permanent anarchy that it was often futile to deal with. Now the situation in the countries of the Central Caucasus has changed, and Russia is compelled to look for new partners for pursuing its course, not only in the Southern Caucasus, but also throughout Western Asia, to which this region geographically belongs.

Armenia is economically weak, being a recipient country throughout the entire contemporary history of its national statehood and existing due to the financial support of Russia and the Armenian Diaspora. Therefore it cannot continue to be Russia's strategic ally in the Central Caucasus and Southern Caucasus not only in the mid-term, but even in the short term. And Russia will be compelled to feed it out of a sense of honor and the feeling of responsibility a mother has for her child.

For several military and political reasons that have emerged in recent years in a series of unfriendly foreign policy demarches, the main one being the war in South Ossetia in 2008, Georgia cannot objectively fill the vacancy of Russia's geopolitical partner in the Southern Caucasus. This would be tantamount to a unilateral refusal to carry out the obligations assumed to other world power centers, which Georgia cannot objectively permit itself, despite its religious communality with Russia.

In terms of its economic, political, and military potential, Azerbaijan could well play the role of Russia's new geopolitical partner in the Southern Caucasus and, moreover, strive to become it by constantly increasing the volumes of trade and economic and military-political cooperation, including in global macroeconomic projects (which cannot be said of Armenia owing to its geographical location and isolation). However, in the political respect, it will not consent to this role in principle, remembering how the newly formed Russian Federation acted during the second phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 1988-1994.

Therefore, to preserve its strategic influence on the Central and in part on the Southern Caucasus in current conditions, Russia is compelled to look for allies beyond its borders. There are only two countries that fill the bill—the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Turkey, although the first is not well suited to the role of strategic partner in Western Asia owing to the specifics and unpredictability of its foreign policy and its dependence on the influence of the marked religious messianism of Iran's political and religious elite in the Islamic (especially Shi'ite) world. Thus, Russia deliberately chose the Republic of Turkey, relations with which have been developing tempestuously in recent years both at the state-political and the economic and humanitarian level (the supremacy of Sunni Islam in these two countries plays an important role in this rapprochement), as its geopolitical partner in Western Asia and the Central and Southern Caucasus. So it can be confidently stated that all of the Caucasian countries are having to reckon today with a tendency that has long been forming and is now being implemented in practice toward a change in Russia's geopolitical priority in the Southern Caucasus and throughout Western Asia, when a new Turkish, or even Turkic project is taking the place of the failed Armenian and Greek projects.

The strategic economic union of Russia and Turkey, which is acquiring new organizational features every day, will inevitably deprive the sovereign Caucasian states of strategic political influence not only on the world, but also on the regional arena, i.e. *de facto* depriving them of the opportunity to acquire any direct technical support from other world or regional power centers. Turkey's passive but strong and extremely specific assistance to Russia during South Ossetian armed conflict in August 2008 showed the whole world once again the willingness of its establishment to concede its geopolitical priorities in the Caucasus to Russia in exchange for raw and other economic preferences. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that after the European countries sabotaged the South Stream gas pipeline project during Ukraine's internal political crisis of 2014-2015, implementation of the international gas transportation project to supply natural gas from Russia to the Balkan countries was reoriented toward Turkey, after which it became Russia's global partner in the Black Sea-Caucasian Region. In recent years, the Russian-Turkish political and economic partnership has also been acquiring mutually beneficial ideological outlines in the form of the Eurasian ideology, which is being actively cultivated in the two countries not only at the political, but also at the scientific and academic level. In the short term, this will inevitably lead to the development of a mutually acceptable ideological concept of Slavic-Turkic Eurasian unity, in which there will be no place for the politically independent national-state and ethnoreligious interests of the Caucasian people. This ideological concept could quite easily oppose the ideology of transatlanticism that dominates today in the political life of Western Europe as the obedient satellite of the United States, which will inevitably entail a new configuration of the multipolar world.

Configuration of the Moscow-Ankara axis will significantly change (if it has not already) the alignment of forces in the Black Sea-Caucasian Region, for the normal functioning of transport infrastructure of which Turkey's geographical location is of paramount importance. However, the stability of this geopolitical structure will always be under threat owing to potential external influences. The only logically justified way to make this alliance stronger is to turn the axis or line into a different geometrical figure, for example, a triangle that would cover the entire space of the Black Sea-Caucasian Region, intercepting the main lines of communication. This would signify a natural development of events, even from the viewpoint of Euclidean geometry, since the triangle is the most stable geometric figure, independently forming a plane, and a much greater force is required to overcome its internal resistance than to bend a straight line. Baku could (and should) become Ankara and Moscow's only partner, and the formation of a Moscow-Ankara-Baku triangle will enclose the space from the Balkans to the Caspian Sea.

The only real obstacle hindering the implementation of this geopolitical project is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has existed for quarter of a century now and become the first terrorist war in human history conducted by international terrorism against the authorities and the people of a sovereign state (in our case Azerbaijan) resulting in the formation of a quasi-state called Artsakh. As mentioned above, Azerbaijan will never agree to a strategic and political union with Russia (even with the mediation of Turkey) until it stops rendering comprehensive support to Armenia's current political regime or takes effective steps to force the Armenians to liberate the territory of Azerbaijan occupied during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. If Russia really wants to become the tip of the new geostrategic Black Sea-Caucasian triangle, it will have to stop saying that settlement of this regional problem "is the topic of bilateral negotiations," the hopelessness and lack of prospects of which has been becoming increasingly obvious for the last decade. It must also exert the strongest pressure on the current Armenian establishment to put an end to the quasi-state of Artsakh existing at the expense of this country, as well as return the land it occupies today to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan.

The ruling circles of present-day Armenia, which in the past essentially represented a community of warlords of illegal terrorist (from the point of view of Russian federal legislation) armed formations of separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh and then totally estranged people from the Armenian S.S.R. from the power and financial resources of the state, will never agree independently or unilaterally to meet the requirements of international law. Terrorists who have disdained the law once will never adhere to it again in the future. The return of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan would mean political and, perhaps, physical suicide for them, and would also become the swan song of transnational Armenian terrorism's existence, sending it into oblivion and turning it into one more obscure page in human history. The present quasi-state of Artsakh is its crowning glory, its apotheosis, so to speak, the demolition of which would automatically mean the demise of the phenomenon which generated it too.

So that my readers can better understand this statement, I will give some explanations.

The victory in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh did not bring either Armenia, or Artsakh, any foreign political, military-strategic, or economic benefits. Moreover, the international community represented by U.N. institutions sees the Armenians as invaders and interventionists, which means that sanctions can be brought against Artsakh now or in the future. Such a possibility did not exist in the practice of international relations twenty years ago when the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was in its combat phase. Whatever the case, rationally speaking, the Karabakh war cost Armenia and Armenianstvo more than they gained from it. What is more, it continues to generate substantial financial losses today and will do so in the future. Therefore, for the Armenian side, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has a political and ideological priority, rather than a military-economic advantage, which means it can be described as a "conflict of identities," to use a phrase coined by Samuel Huntington. In other words, it was unleashed by the Armenians, in the interests of the Armenians, and for the sake of the fullest recognition and preservation of the national identity of the Armenians.

The gist of this conflict is absolutely obvious and entirely meets the goal the leaders of world Armenianstvo set themselves when they unleashed it. The thing is that the Armenians are one of the few ethnicities today, the majority of whom live beyond the territory of their state and political formation (meaning the Republic of Armenia). In other words, the number of people in the Armenian Diaspora not bound by citizen allegiance to their historical homeland is larger than the population of this state itself. Although ethnographers say that the exact number of Armenians in the world cannot be counted because of their diaspora dispersion, their numbers can nevertheless be estimated accurately down to the hundreds of thousands. There are almost eleven and a half million Armenians in the world today, whereby slightly less than three million are currently living in Armenia, which comprises two fifths of their total number,

while the others live in the Diaspora. So the Armenians needed a unifying factor to rally together their scattered numbers and consider themselves a single nation. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict fit the bill.

However, Russia's ally is not the Armenians, a political nation or people living in the Diaspora, but the Republic of Armenia, a state, whose citizens at best comprise a third of the representatives of this ethnic group. By helping Armenia and protecting it as its ally, Russia is not obliged to care for the whole of Armianstvo, especially since the larger part of it is now anti-Russian. While Armenia and Armianstvo remain inseparable, which is the rudimentary inheritance of the Soviet past, the problem of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will not be settled and stability in the Black Sea-Caucasian Region, which has acquired true strategic importance for Russia in the light of Ukraine's internal political crisis of 2014-2015, will not be sufficiently ensured. This problem can only be solved by means of "the Armenian gambit," to use chess terminology, in which a figure must be sacrificed to gain an advantage. In our case, the present political regime in Armenia, and Artsakh symbolizing it, must be sacrificed, after which a revived democratic Armenia can be transformed from Russia's military outpost in the Southern Caucasus into a full-fledged entity of international legal relations.

The model I offer for transforming the geopolitical situation in the Black Sea-Caucasian Region will essentially change the situation in this part of Eurasia on qualitatively new terms and create new ways to build economic relations and ensure collective regional safety. If this project is implemented, the extremely unstable and temporary (even in the mid-term) balance of power of the sides opposing each other in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and their allies will be replaced with a model of consolidated collective security based on long-term communality of economic interests, and not on momentary political benefit, as is the case now. The creation of a Moscow-Ankara-Baku triangle will make it possible to acquire a comprehensive and collective system of control and regulation of essentially the entire volume of overland transit of energy and commodity resources throughout the Eurasian region using methods that are far from non-economic coercion. This will mean the full and final practical realization of the idea of forming a global Eurasian Economic Union and corresponding common commodity and raw materials market from Western Asia to the Far East. The only insurmountable obstacle currently in its way is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, inherited from Armenian transnational terrorism, which, figuratively speaking, is smoldering, as well as the main entity responsible for and interested in preserving this situation—the current political regime in the Republic of Armenia dominated by "the Karabakh clan." If this regime is eliminated, the broadest opportunities will open up for global international economic and political cooperation in keeping with the regulations of international law.

*Moscow-Baku,
March-April 2014*

APPENDIX 1

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES OF TRANSNATIONAL ARMENIAN TERRORISM

DRO

Hunchak

Javakhk

Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

New Armenian Resistance

The All-Georgia National Party Virk

The Armenian National Committee of America

The Armenian Popular Movement

The Armenian Revolutionary Army

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army

The National United Party of Armenia

The Yerkrpah Volunteer Union

Transnational Armenian terrorism as a purposeful activity, as well as an independent political phenomenon and the result of this activity, which has an almost 150-year history and has touched the lives of at least six or seven generations, could not have been carried out by individuals on their own, be they heroes or villains. It could only objectively exist and reproduce (self-reproduce) within systemically stable organizational structures not only able to sustain it financially, but also to meet the vital, emotional, and social needs of the terrorists for a sufficiently long time. In other words, terrorism as a specific practice of unlawful and antisocial activity cannot exist outside the framework of a formal and structural organization (self-organization). Therefore, in addition to its list of crimes and victims, it must also leave behind a postscript list of organizations it was and still is beholden to.

The organizational structures that maintained and supported transnational Armenian terrorism (just like all other similar organizations in the world) can be subdivided into two types, or echelons, to use U.S. intelligence service terminology. The “first echelon” is comprised of certain state structures that are unlawful according to international law and national legislation. These are structures, the members of which directly participate or have participated in terrorist acts, including all the stages of their preparation and implementation, as well as in combat action in regional or local armed conflicts, although not enlisted by the opposing sides. Using terminology of Russian legislation, all of these structures are terrorist organizations or illegal armed groups. The “second echelon” comprises different types of sociopolitical organizations (parties, movements) that are legal or have been prohibited by state legislation, along with the nongovernmental trade union and humanitarian structures related to them, such as foundations, pressure groups, watchdog groups (self-defense) that do not belong to the category of armed groups and are not oriented exclusively toward terrorist activity. In so doing, their activity is maintained in keeping with one or several of the features or criteria listed below:

1. Direct participation in violence and other practical manifestations of political extremism.
2. A latent force-related component; internal structuring according to the military (militarized) model.
3. A radical political program, ideological and theoretical justification of violence, promotion of religious, racial, national intolerance, calling for a violent change in the regime or violations of the state’s territorial integrity.
4. A cover story (political platform), financial and organizational-technical support of armed groups.

According to contemporary Russian legislation, second echelon organizations that play the role of ideological (humanitarian, intellectual) covers and material-technical (financial) support of terrorist organizations are qualified as extremist.

Quite often a terrorist organization carries out the functions of the action wing of an extremist structure, and, vice versa, the extremist struc-

ture legalizes, or at least gives the terrorist underground a socializing function in the mainstream of public life. This is usually done in order to diversify the ideologists and fighters of terrorism according to formal characteristics and give the former the opportunity to avoid persecution by the law-enforcement agencies, as well as criminal liability, should their ideological followers be interrogated or brought to court for carrying out terrorist activity, or simply destroyed by law enforcers during interception of their unlawful practice.

Below is an alphabetical list of the organizational structures of transnational Armenian terrorism that have either directly carried out this kind of illegal activity throughout the twentieth century, or connived with it. The list includes only those organizations, the implication of which in terrorist activity in the territory of third countries has been proven by court sentences that have entered into force, while the governing bodies of these organizations have publicly approved and hailed the participation of their members in terrorist attacks, i.e. committed acts qualified according to contemporary Russian legislation as extremist. Organizations are not included in the list if there is no legally significant proof in the form of judicial or administrative decisions that have entered into force against them, and the intelligence services or law-enforcement agencies only suspected their implication in terrorist activity at different times. For example, despite the fact that the Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic and the State Commission of the Azerbaijan Republic for Prisoners-of-War, Hostages, and Missing Persons officially included the Union of Armenians of Russia among extremist organizations (which stands to reason in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict), I do not have sufficient grounds to consider it an organizational structure of transnational Armenian terrorism, since there is no officially established and recognized proof or legally significant decisions regarding this. Nor is there such with respect to other public structures of the Armenian Diaspora of the Russian Federation.

When speaking of the organizational structures of transnational Armenian terrorism, it should be kept in mind that due to the changed geopolitical situation, some of the organizations on the list could have significantly adjusted their doctrinal ideologemes and corresponding activity throughout their sufficiently long history. For example, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutium was initially created as party of the “first echelon,” i.e. as a political party based on nationalist and terrorist fighting methods, and remained so for more than one hundred years. However, after world Armianstvo acquired its national statehood in the form of the Republic of Armenia, it fell into the “second echelon” category, since it became a parliamentary party in this country, which, owing to its acquired status, has no right to be publicly involved in terrorist activity. However, there is another example in the history of the Armenian terrorism: the National United Party of Armenia was initially created as an underground anti-Soviet group of the “second echelon,” but ten years later one of its leaders became a terrorist after organizing an explosion in the Moscow subway in 1977. These examples graphically prove that in the historical retrospect there was never any

essential difference between Armenian terrorist and extremist organizational structures and the specific content of their activity directly depended on the specific historical and external conditions. Recognizing this, I did not classify them in “an echelon,” but included them in the general alphabetical list.

Another feature of the organizational structure of transnational Armenian terrorism is the practice of establishing several nationalist or extremist organizations under the same name at once, as well as parallel to them—a whole series of commercial structures with the same name. An example of this is the simultaneous existence today of several Armenian public structures under the name Javakhk—a compatriot union (headed by Chirac Torossian), a people’s movement (headed by Norik Karapetian), and more than two dozen commercial structures in different regions of Russia, ranging from Karelia to Vladivostok. From the operative viewpoint, such duplication of names was designed to confuse the law-enforcement agencies, primarily in Georgia, and make it more difficult for them to oppose the Armenian separatists in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. This allowed the leaders and activists of two groups with the same names to put the blame on each other if the law enforcers had any complaints about the activity of these organizations or one of them. Moreover, sociopolitical and commercial structures with the same name indicated which Armenian businessman in Russia was the unofficial sponsor of the activity of the corresponding organizations at the time, both in Armenia itself and in the adjacent regions where representatives of the Armenian Diaspora live.

I would also like to draw my readers’ attention to another specific feature of the terrorist activity carried out by Armenian extremists, which graphically characterizes its transnational nature. Several local subdivisions of transnational Armenian terrorist organizations (mainly of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), acting in certain European countries, used operational self-names in an attempt to foil the law-enforcement agencies in their efforts to intercept their unlawful activity, as well as to publicly announce the demands they wished to be met. For example, according to its participants, the name of the combat group Black April from the ASALA terrorist organization was supposed to show that, when attacking facilities belonging to the Republic of Turkey abroad, they were taking revenge on the Turkish people and authorities for the military and police operations against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during World War I (24 April, 1915 is considered the beginning of the mass deportations of Armenians to the interior of present-day Iraq).

However, when choosing operational self-names for their divisions, the Armenian militants most often wanted to remind the public once more of the reason they were committing their crimes. In particular, the Orly Group of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia specialized in attacks against French facilities outside the French Republic. Its participants demanded that the French government release its terrorist comrades, a Syrian national of Armenian extraction Varoujan Karapetian and two Turkish Armenians Nays Soner and Ohannes Se-

merci accused of the explosion at Orly airport (Paris, France) on 15 July, 1983. With respect to the more than 150 terrorist acts committed worldwide by the transnational Armenian ASALA group, approximately 100 of them were carried out by terrorists from fighting groups operating under their own names, which does not remove legal and moral responsibility from the leadership of ASALA for the blood shed and lives taken, even though these crimes were committed under other names and slogans. In so doing, we are witnesses to the self-reproduction (auto-reproduction) of transnational Armenian terrorism when the punishment of terrorists for earlier crimes committed generates a new wave of terrorist activity and violence, no longer aimed at achieving the initial idea, but at the practical realization of national criminal solidarity, in order to release the perpetrators sentenced earlier.

Operational groups emerged in the structure of transnational Armenian terrorist organizations that were focused not on Turkish, but on French or Swiss facilities. Their task was to put pressure on the governments of those European countries where their associates had been arrested and sentenced. This circumstance makes it legitimate to say that since the beginning of the 1980s, terrorist activity has stopped being a way for them to achieve the ideological aim of reviving Great Armenia in part of the territory of the Republic of Turkey and become an end in itself, a way of existence and self-expression, a kind of *idea fixe*—“terror for the sake of terror,” the only logical continuation of which could be a full-blown terrorist war.

And finally, considering the special role of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) in the political history of the Armenian people (until 1918, the Armenians identified themselves only according to religious affiliation), I am deliberately sidestepping questions relating to the interaction of the organizational structures of the spiritual hierarchy of the Armenian Gregorian Church in the twentieth century and the corresponding terrorist or extremist organizations of the Armenian nationalists in the countries where the representatives of these people lived. I believe that the Armenian Apostolic Church was indirectly involved in the terrorist activity of its coreligionists and the crimes committed by them against its will. At least it is true to say that most of the Armenian terrorists never positioned themselves as zealous parishioners and acted in keeping with specific political ideas that had little in common with a religious worldview.

DRO

A terrorist group in Armenia, called after the fighting pseudonym of General Drastamat Kanaian; it was allegedly the derivative structure of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation of Dashnaktsutiun. It has been prohibited in the territory of Armenia since 1995 due to its participation in an attempted state coup. The group was involved in internal political terrorism and the illegal transit of drugs from Iran through Armenia and the occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh on to Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine. In December 1995, militants from the group murdered Mayor of Yerevan Ambartsum Golstian, which prompted the state security agencies of Armenia to carry out a special operation against it.

The liberal circles of Armenia consider the existence of the DRO group and criminal persecution of its members to be provocation of the supporters of the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) against their political opponents from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation of Dashnaktsutiun on the eve of the 1995 parliamentary and 1996 presidential elections, which prompted President of the Republic of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosian, acting then extrajudicially, to suspend the activity of ARF Dashnaktsutiun for six months (until a court decision was issued), which made it possible for the Republican Party of Armenia to sustain a victory in two election campaigns and become the ruling party in the country.

Its leaders are Grant Markarian (a citizen of Iran) and Vahagn Avakian.

The number of militants is unknown—no more than 20 people (citizens of Armenia and the states of the Diaspora). The group has not existed since 1996, or is in a latent state.

Hunchak—The Bell

A party transnational extremist and terrorist organization, initially of a socialist, then nationalist orientation of the Armenian Diaspora, was founded in 1887 in Geneva (Switzerland) by a group of Armenian students from Russia, Avetis Nazarbekian, his future wife Marian Vardanian, Ruben Khan-Azat, Gabriel Kafian, and others, who put out the Armenian revolutionary newspaper *Hunchak* (The Bell), as the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party. It was originally established as a new type of revolutionary party with a rigid centralized hierarchy and discipline. By 1890, in the regions of residence of the Armenian Diaspora, the Hunchaks, with the assistance of the AAC hierarchy, created an extensive network of local organizations: 114—in the Ottoman Empire, 86—in the U.S., 36—in the Russian Empire (in Transcaucasia), 15—in Persia, 9—in Bulgaria, 7—in Rumania, 6—in Egypt, etc. In 1896, the party split into “socialists” and “nationalists,” as a result of which the members of Hunchak who wanted the party to only engage in national tasks broke away and created a separate party called Veragazmial Hunchakianner (Reorganized Hunchaks).

In the program published in 1888, the party’s primary goal was to liberate Western Armenia by means of a national revolt, remove it from the Ottoman Empire, and create a socialist republic in its territory. The main tool of revolutionary struggle was declared to be terror against statesmen of the Ottoman Empire and representatives of the Armenian people cooperating with them. At the end of the nineteenth century, Hunchak fighters organized demonstrations in Karin (now Erzurum) and the Istanbul district of Gumm-Galu, as well as an armed mutiny in Sassoun. And at the beginning of the twentieth century, they tried to assassinate Ottoman sultan Abdul-Hamid II and committed a number of political murders of high-ranking officials of the Russian Empire—Tbilisi Governor General Maksud Alikhanov-Avarskiy and Baku Governor Prince Nakashidze—as well as made an attempt on the life of Chief Commander in the Caucasus Infantry General Prince Golitsyn. During World War I, they formed volunteer groups for carrying out an armed struggle against the Ottoman Empire in the ranks of the Russian Imperial and French expeditionary armies. In August 1920, the Hunchaks managed to achieve the independence of the Turkish region of Cilicia, which existed for only a few hours and was destroyed by the French occupational authorities.

After declaration in 1918 of the Republic of Armenia, the Hunchak Party was forced out of Transcaucasia by ARF Dashnaktsutiun and concentrated its activity in the countries of the Middle East. After the Sovietization of Armenia in 1921, the party leadership subordinated to the Resolution of the Communist International on the Hunchak Party of 5 February, 1923, by eliminating the local party organizations by means of self-dissolution in the territory of Soviet Russia and the Armenian S.S.R.

The Hunchak Party waged a fierce competitive fight against ARF Dashnaksutiun for influence in certain places where representatives of the Armenian Diaspora had settled. In 1926, the fight between the local Dashnaksutiun and Hunchak committees for control over the Armenian quarters of Beirut (nowadays known as Bourj Hammoud) that had recently appeared led to the murder of Dashnak Vahan Vartabedian by a group headed by Mihran Agazarian. In return, one of the members of Agazarian's group was killed in 1929, and in 1933, he himself was murdered. Later, the opposition escalated into more intra-communal armed conflicts of Armenians in Beirut in May-October 1958 during the first civil war in Lebanon, as well as in March-May 1985 when Hunchak fighters killed several high-ranking activists of ARF Dashnaksutiun in various districts of Lebanon. The Hunchak Party is thought to have founded the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia created in counterbalance to the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide—the action wing of ARF Dashnaksutiun.

At present, the party has offices in the U.S., Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Armenia, Egypt, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, Australia, Britain, France, and Cyprus. It puts out the following newspapers: *Ararat* (Lebanon), *Nor Serund* (Armenia), *Jaakir* (Egypt), *Massis* (U.S.), and *Zang* (Australia), and also runs an Armenian hourly television broadcast (Canada) and radio program (Australia).

Javakhk

An extremist group of the Armenian community of Georgia, the militarized wing of the popular movement of the same name. It was founded in 1990 for supporting the separatist movement of Samtskhe-Javakhetia and the Tsalk area of Kvemo Kartli of the Georgian state, where a predominant number of Armenians live. Its political leaders are Samvel Petrossian, David Vekilian, and Vahagn and Armen Chakhalian. Its warlords are Ambartsum Gevorgian and Gurgun Sharinian.

The number of participants in the armed group (Fedayis) was no more than several hundred militants at the time of recruitment. It mainly uses small arms, machine guns, and light anti-tank grenade launches; some units of armored machinery have been seen. Until 2007, it maintained active contacts with the command of the 62nd military base of the Russian Ministry of Defense in Akhalkalaki. After reformation of the base, the military component of its activity was reduced to a minimum.

It is known that militants from the Javakhk movement participated in disarmament in January 1991 of the personal security guards of former president of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and also that they participated in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of 1988-1994. It actively opposed and continues to oppose, by means of civil disobedience, the policy of the authorities of Georgia aimed at organizing education in Samtskhe-Javakhetian schools in the Georgian language. Since 2011, it has been opposing the organization of bilingual education as well.

In 1990-2007, continuous opposition of Javakhk and the Georgian police force was seen, which culminated in the murder in 2008 of police officer Artur Burujanian, after which a special operation was carried out against the organization, as a result of which its leader Vahagn Chakhalian was detained and sentenced by the court to 10 years in prison (he was amnestied in July 2013 as a political prisoner of Michael Saakashvili's regime).

Related structures—the All-Georgia Popular Party Virk (David Rstakian), the Zang movement (Mels Torossian), and the militarized Parvents group.

External contacts—the political leadership and military command of Armenia. Javakhk is represented in the territory of Armenia by a compatriot union of the same name headed by Chirac Torossian.

Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)

A transnational terrorist organization of the Armenian Diaspora, created at the 20th congress of ARF Dashnaktsutiu in Vienna (Austria) in 1972 with the purpose of uniting young Lebanese citizens of Armenian origin into new militarized division for effective continuation of the armed struggle to realize this party's political ideas. Unlike other military-political organizations of the Armenian Diaspora, JCAG demanded that the Republic of Turkey pay the descendants of Armenians who suffered at the hands of the Turkish authorities during World War I a monetary compensation, in the same way the German authorities did with respect to the victims of the Holocaust in the Jewish state of Israel.

According to the CIA, in the 1970s-1980s, JCAG, with the support of ARF Dashnaktsutiu, committed more than 70 crimes of terrorist orientation in Western Europe and North America. Unlike ASALA, the terrorist attacks of JCAG were targeted only against Turkish diplomats and Turkish diplomatic missions and commercial structures. JCAG's victims comprised a total of 17 Turkish diplomats and persons enjoying diplomatic immunity, as well as more than 20 injured.

After the Turkish intelligence services kidnapped and murdered the organization's head Abraham Aschian in 1982, JCAG changed its name to the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA).

In October 1999, the American law-enforcement agencies arrested ANCA (the Armenian National Committee of America) Chairman Murad Topolian on the charge of organizing an explosion in front of the Republic of Turkey mission at the U.N. and leading the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide group in the territory of the country. During the trial, plea bargaining was reached, under which the charges of terrorism were dismissed in exchange for Topolian admitting to illegally storing explosives and firearms. On 24 January, 2004, he was sentenced to 37 months in federal prison and 3 years of release on bail. Thus, at the end of the twentieth century, the relation among the Armenian National Committee of America, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, and ARF Dashnaktsutiu was not juridically confirmed.

New Armenian Resistance (NAR)

A transnational Armenian terrorist organization. In 1975, it began carrying out anti-Turkish attacks and explosions in the territory of Belgium, France, Italy, and Switzerland; it also attacked British, Israeli, and Soviet facilities (which essentially set it apart from other extremist and terrorist organizations of the Armenian Diaspora). It has been evidentially proven that the organization carried out eleven terrorist attacks and made three attempted attacks. It openly supported the anti-Soviet and Russophobic National United Party of Armenia of Aykanuz Khachatryan, Stepan Zatikian, and Paruyr Hayrikian.

Nothing more is known about its existence and activity since the act of terrorist bombing at the Turkish travel agency in Brussels (Belgium) in February 1983.

The All-Georgia Popular Party Virk

A party extremist organization of the Armenian community of the Samtskhe-Javakheti Region in Georgia, an umbrella structure of the Javakhk Organization. Being anti-constitutional, it has not been officially registered with the Ministry of Justice of Georgia, despite repeated appeals.

Its aims are to form a federative structure of Georgia according to national affiliation, turn the area where the Armenian community lives into an autonomous region, oppose the actions of the Georgian authorities to settle people of other ethnicities in the region and organize teaching in schools in the state language.

In 1990-2007, the Virk Party put political and power pressure on the Georgian political leadership to prevent the 62nd military base of the Russian Ministry of Defense from being withdrawn from Akhalkalaki and saw to it that Armenian youth were not called up to serve in the armed forces of Georgia. It actively opposed and continues to oppose, by means of civil disobedience, the policy of the authorities of Georgia aimed at organizing education in Samtskhe-Javakhetian schools in the Georgian language. Since 2011, it has been opposing the organization of bilingual education as well.

Its leaders are David Rstakian and Fyodor “Mels” Torossian.

The number of active members is unknown (no more than several thousand people).

The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)

A nonparty extremist organization of the U.S. Armenian community, founded in 1918 by Vahan Kardashian, the former consul of the Ottoman Empire in Washington, under the name of American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA). It has been under the ideological influence of ARF Dashnaksutiun since its foundation.

Its primary purpose was to fight for the independence of Armenia and its recognition within the borders proposed by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and enforced in the Treaty of Sèvres, which never came into legal force. The organization had its central office in New York, and also 23 regional offices in 13 different states. After diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and the U.S., these offices were reorganized into the Armenian National Committee of America.

At present, ANCA takes active part in various spheres of political and educational activity, including drawing up legislative acts condemning “the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire” at the local, regional, federal, and international levels, participating in the American electoral process at the federal, regional, and local levels, and publishing books about “the Armenian genocide,” the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and Azerbaijan, as well as educational textbooks. Since the beginning of the 1990s, ANCA has been promulgating the 907th amendment forbidding any direct help from the U.S. to the government of the Azerbaijan Republic, which has made Azerbaijan the only state in the post-Soviet space deprived of the opportunity to receive direct support from the U.S. in compliance with the Freedom Support Act of 1992. ANCA was the main organization of those that supported H.Res. 106 (Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution) obliging the U.S. Government to recognize the genocide of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. ANCA achieved adoption of law of the State of California on teaching a history course on the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire at comprehensive schools in the state.

In parallel, it renders organizational and financial assistance to Armenian terrorist groups of anti-Turkish orientation. A number of functionaries of ANCA were directly involved in preparing and carrying out several acts of terrorism (proven episodes from mid-1976 to 13 August, 1996). Instances of illegal acquisition, plunder, transportation, and storage of firearms and explosives were noted. Activists were moved to Lebanon to undergo combat training in the educational and training centers of the ASALA organization using ANCA funds. Fighters were trained at the Hayastan (Armenia) camp in the State of Massachusetts. Since the mid-1990s, the organization has been recruiting and training volunteers from among U.S. citizens of Armenian nationality for

service in the ranks of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army (Artsakh), and also promotes the naturalization of members of the Yerkrpah Volunteer Union in the territory of the U.S.

In October 1999, U.S. law-enforcement agencies arrested Chairman of ANCA Murad Topolian on the charges of organizing an explosion in front of the Republic of Turkey mission at the U.N. and leading the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide group in the territory of the country. During the trial, plea bargaining was reached, under which the charges of terrorism were dismissed in exchange for Topolian admitting to illegally storing explosives and firearms. On 24 January, 2004, he was sentenced to 37 months in federal prison and 3 years of release on bail.

In addition to its headquarters in Washington, the ANCA also has two central regional offices in New York and Los Angeles, with more than fifty local branches united into two main regional offices—the Eastern and Western Boards of Directors, which carry out management at the federal level. The headquarters of ANCA’s Western Board is located in Glendale (the State of California), while the Eastern Board is in Watertown (the State of Massachusetts).

The Armenian Popular Movement (APM)

A nonparty transnational extremist organization of the Armenian Diaspora of Southeast Europe (the Balkan Peninsula), an umbrella structure of the transnational terrorist organizations of the Armenian Diaspora. It was founded on 15 June, 1980 in Athens (Greece) and has headquarters in several countries of the world.

Its declared purposes are resolving “the Armenian question,” i.e. forced separation of Western Armenia from the Republic of Turkey, as well as all other Armenian lands, return of the Armenians to them, and the creation of a united independent Great Armenia; gaining international recognition of “the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire” and bringing the legal, historical, and state successors to those who committed it, i.e. the authorities and people of the present-day Republic of Turkey, to the International Court of Justice; strengthening Armenian statehood in all areas, as the necessary pledge for establishing a united Armenia and important base for continuing the fight to restore the rights of the Armenian people.

In the 1980s-1990s, the APM organized demonstrations, exhibitions, scientific conferences, and campaigns in support of Armenian political prisoners and armed groups of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh in the capitals of the countries of the Balkan and the Scandinavian Peninsula. It also raised money to finance the activity of the ASALA transnational terrorist organization, recruit fighters, and provide it with information and ideological assistance. A large number of APM members (several hundreds of people) participated in the Karabakh war of 1988-1994 as a part of armed groups of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh. Now it is recruiting members of the Armenian Diaspora to serve in the ranks of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army and renders information and organizational support of Armenian repatriation to the historical homeland.

Its central printing organ in the twentieth century was the *Jokhovrdain Baykar* newspaper (Greece, it is no longer published). The *Spyurq* (Lebanon), *Hayastan* (Greece), *Azat Dzayn* (Cyprus), *Araks* (Iran), *Nor Horizon* (Sweden) and *Vasn Hayutian* (Armenia) newspapers are published in Armenian, Russian, English, Persian, Swedish, and other languages, as well as books and brochures, and movies and radio programs are released.

The Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)

A transnational terrorist organization of the Armenian Diaspora; it appeared in 1983 when the name of the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide was changed. It carried out six

terrorist attacks against representatives of the diplomatic corps of the Republic of Turkey in countries of Western Europe and North America, and also seized the Air Canada office in Paris. Its best known act of terrorism is the attempt to seize the embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Lisbon (Portugal) and the suicide bombing of the participants in the attack that followed the failed storm.

There are no data on the activity of the ARA after 1986.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun (ARFD)

A transnational military-political organization of the Armenian Diaspora. Its declared purpose is to restore control over the entire territory of historical Armenia, including part of Eastern Turkey and Azerbaijan. Its initial structures were created at the end of the nineteenth century in the form of a political party (its constituent congress was held in Tbilisi in 1890, its founders were Christapor Mikaelian, Stepan Zorian, and Simon Zavarian) under the name Commonwealth of Armenian Revolutionaries. In 1892, it adopted its contemporary name. Its subsequent practice boiled down to reaching its goals by terrorist and violent means.

Its main organizational principle was based on the autonomy of the local committees. Several committees in a specific area elected a central committee. The party was headed by a bureau—first in Russia and Iran, then in Europe, and, after its revolution, also in Turkey. After establishing a party with the assistance of Armenian Apostolic Church structures, committees formed in Russia in the main areas of Armenian residence in Transcaucasia and on the Don. The Dashnaks initially considered Russia and Iran as their rear base; the Dashnaks had no intention of interfering in Russia's internal affairs. Dashnaks' main activity was waging guerrilla war, organizing self-defense of the Armenian communities in Eastern Turkey, committing acts of terror against the local Turkic population, and opposing the authorities of the Ottoman Empire using groups of Fedayis.

After adoption of the imperial law of 12 June, 1903 on establishment of state control over the property of the Armenian Gregorian Church, the Etchmiadzin Patriarch of the AAC called on the Dashnaks to protect the church property, after which they unleashed a guerrilla war against the authorities of the Russian Empire in Russian Transcaucasia. This culminated in the so-called Armenian-Tatar slaughter of 1905, the main driving force behind which was the clergy of the AAC and ARFD fighters. Armed rebellions were also raised in the Kuban, the participants of which were engaged in terror, expropriations, and extortion. In December 1911-February 1912, a mass trial was held in St. Petersburg against the captured Dashnaks: 52 people were sentenced to imprisonment, and only four were sent to penal servitude.

At the beginning of World War I, ARFD supported Russia and created volunteer teams in the Russian army for carrying out action on the Caucasian front (which was promoted by their amnesty) distinguished by cruelty toward the indigenous Ottoman people of the territories occupied by Russia. More than 500 sentences were issued by courts martial against ARFD fighters for the military crimes they committed against civilians.

In 1918-1920, it was the main political force of the Republic of Armenia; after its Sovietization in 1923, it was self-disbanded at the request of the OGPU-NKVD (Joint State Political Directorate-People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in the territory of the Soviet Union.

ARF Dashnaksutiun continued to act as the main national and organizational force of the Armenian Diaspora. ARF Dashnaksutiun was torn by internal disputes between the left wing, which refused to recognize Soviet Armenia, and the right wing, which asked to consider Soviet Armenia the Armenian national state in fact and form. This led to several acts of terrorism against the hierarchs of the Armenian Gregorian Church and leaders of the factions. At the

same time, after accumulating funds from the Armenian Diaspora, ARFD created a powerful network of church, educational, youth, sports, scout, and other institutions, which were used as a legal cover for the fighting groups. It also established a prestigious political lobby in many countries worldwide.

During the civil war of 1975-1990 in Lebanon, the Lebanese organization of ARFD engaged in self-defense efforts, after creating its own volunteer units and maintaining strict neutrality of the Armenian quarters that had become “a state within a state.” The resources of the organizational structures of these volunteer units and personnel were used to found the ASALA group, which became the nucleus of the fighting groups of the armed formations of the Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh on the eve and in the first months of the Karabakh war of 1988-1994.

The updated political program (after creation of the Republic of Armenia) integrated elements of Armenian nationalism and radical socialist concepts. At the current stage, ARFD acts as an umbrella structure for the Armenian fighting groups, while the activity of the organization’s political component is also being stepped up.

Its leader is Vahan Hovhanissian. It is ruled by a supreme body. It has two wings that are structurally separate according to the regional principle—the Armenian and the Diaspora. The headquarters of the Armenian and foreign wings of ARFD are in Yerevan and Athens, respectively. It has regional offices and representative agencies in Armenia, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, the U.S., Russia, and European states. As a rule, a duplicate organizational structure (official and illegal) is set up. Fighting cells (*humb*) called Hay Data (Armenian Court) committees, which remain latent, are part of the illegal structure. In Russia, the Russian-Armenian Commonwealth regional public organization (Moscow) is the cover organization for the militarized structure of ARFD.

Its representative structures have their own deputy factions in the parliaments of Armenia and “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” The ARFD has a substantial political influence on the Holy See of Cilicia of the AAC (with its center in Beirut [Lebanon] and dioceses in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Venezuela, the U.S., and Canada).

Its external contacts are extremist groups of the Middle East and left-wing radical movements of Western Europe. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the organization had operative contacts with the Soviet KGB.

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)

A transnational terrorist organization of the Armenian Diaspora, which was formally the militarized wing of Hunchak (The Bell) Party. It was founded on 20 January, 1975 in Beirut (Lebanon) by descendants of emigrants from Armenia who settled in the U.S. in the first half of the twentieth century. The founder is Hagop “Mojahed” Hagopian (who was killed in 1988), one of activists of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Until October 1975, it also used the name “Support Group of Prisoner Karekin Yanikian,” who was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1974 by a court in Los Angeles for the murder of Turkish Consul Mehmet Baydar and Vice Consul Bahadır Demir.

Its declared purposes are to put military-political pressure, by means of terrorism, on the Republic of Turkey to secure its recognition of the “Armenian genocide,” receive the compensations ensuing from this, and restore the statehood of Western Armenia and unity of the historical territory of Armenia in as large an area as possible.

At the first stage of its activity, it formally acted from a Marxist-Leninist position, however in its 1981 program, it shifted to nationalist concepts. After its main infrastructure was destroyed as a result of the Israel Defense Forces invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the disagree-

ments that arose concerning methods of action, some factions (including the ASALA-Revolutionary Movement group [ASALA-RM] headed by Monte Melkonian) left the structure of the main organization.

It passed through the following stages: structurization and expansion (the second half of the 1970s); peak of activity (1981); split (1983); crisis (second half of the 1980s); and partial revival of activity (since 1990). As of today, the organization is latent. Before 1999, it was registered by the U.S. State Department as a foreign terrorist organization.

Its current leader is Levon Kazanchian.

Its nucleus consists of several hundred militants, and it has a few hundred more actively cooperating supporters.

Organizational structure is based on autonomous fighting groups (*humb*). As of the mid-1990s, 23 fighting groups have been functioning in the territory of various states. The main ASALA field stations are the Lebanese (Beirut), Syrian (Aleppo, Damascus), and Egyptian (Alexandria). The organization also functioned in the U.S., Turkey, France, Greece, Switzerland, Spain, Austria, Great Britain, Italy, and Iran. Infrastructure borrowed in the territory of Lebanon (the Bekaa Valley) and Cyprus (the Troodos Mountains) was used for combat training.

The organization's operating parameters are physical terror against employees of the Turkish diplomatic corps abroad (52 people have been killed); hostage-taking, seizing facilities and means of transportation; acts of terrorism with the use of improvised explosive devices; and political kidnapping. The main opponent is the Republic of Turkey. Some operations have also been carried out against representative offices of Western airline companies, French and Swiss facilities (for the propaganda purpose of drawing attention and putting pressure on the authorities to release fighters from imprisonment), and functionaries of Armenian parties in Lebanon (in the context of political contradictions). The total number of terrorist acts recorded amounts to 200. ASALA admits to murdering 49 people and injuring 299.

The first attack by ASALA was the explosion on 20 January, 1975 at the office of the World Council of Churches in Beirut, carried out under the name of the Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group. The last attack the ASALA was suspected of was the explosion in the Turkish Embassy in Brussels in 1997.

When carrying out terrorist attacks against civil infrastructure facilities in France and Switzerland, the ASALA fighters used other operational names, such as the Orly Group, the 3rd of October Group, the 9th of June Group, and France September.

We know that ASALA had contacts with the intelligence services of foreign states—Iran, the U.S., and the Soviet Union. In 1980-1982, in coordination with the Soviet KGB, ASALA fighters carried out a number of assaults on immigration centers in Italy, through which Armenians were migrating from the countries of Eastern Europe and the Armenian S.S.R. to the U.S. in keeping with the plans of the U.S. State Department to increase the size of the Armenian Diaspora in the country from 600 thousand to 1 million people. After the split in ASALA in 1982, the ASALA-RM faction headed by Monte Melkonian actively cooperated with the CIA.

From 1980 to 1997, ASALA had its own official printing organ—the multilingual illustrated magazine *Hayastan* (Armenia). In addition to this, various branches of the Armenian Popular Movement (APM), which supported the activity of ASALA, put out the following periodicals: *Kaydzer*, *Hay Payqar*, *Azat Hay*, *Nor Serund*, etc.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army (NKDA)

An armed separatist Armenian group in the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Region of Azerbaijan. It was first formed in 1988-1990 on the basis of a special regiment of the Ministry

of Internal Affairs of the Armenian S.S.R. comprised of militants from illegal militarized cells (*humb*) of the Krunk movement, the Astvatsatsin, Aydat, Tigran Metz, and White Crusaders militant groups, the Armenian National Army, and the Yerkrpah Volunteer Union. Razmik Petrossian, Murad Petrossian, Arkady Karapetian, and Samvel Akhaian were among the organizers of the first volunteer groups. It reached its full development in the fall of 1991 during the collapse of the Soviet Union (under the name of Karabakh Self-Defense Forces). It has had its current name since 9 May, 1992.

It took part in military operations during the intensive phase of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict (the Karabakh war) of 1988-1994. According to several parameters, the NKDA is actually a component of the Armenian armed forces. It plays a key role in the political and economic system of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The military and political leader of NKDA is Major General Samvel Babaian (who has been in prison since December 1999). Seyran Oganian, a colonel general, who replaced him as commander, is currently the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Armenia. The second president of the Republic of Armenia, Robert Kocharian, and the current president, Serzh Sargsian, were members of the NKDA command during the Karabakh war of 1988-1994.

Unit No. 33651 of the Armenian armed forces carries out operational and tactical coordination of the interaction between the NKDA and the Armenian armed forces.

By the mid-1990s, the NKDA consisted mainly of Karabakh and Azerbaijani Armenians, as well as volunteers from Armenia and foreign states where the Armenian Diaspora lives. At that time, a high percentage of the NKDA's arms were those seized from the Azeris, or left by the Soviet troops. A large amount of weapons and material-technical support came from Armenia, frequently at the expense of the regular army. By 1994, the NKDA had created an infrastructure that included five fortified areas of regimental structure with artillery and air defense force.

It was staffed by 18,000 people (including 8,000 citizens of Armenia and states of the Diaspora), plus up to 40,000 reservists who had served in structures of the NKDA and lived in the territory of Armenia and other countries of the Diaspora. The Yerkrpah Volunteer Union carries out recruitment and training of volunteers from among Armenian and foreign citizens of Armenian nationality for service in the ranks of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army (Artsakh), as well as the formation, registration, and maintenance of mobilization readiness of the reserves in peacetime, and mobilization of staff for replenishing the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army in wartime.

Its organizational and regular structure is comprised of one mountain division, a tank regiment (in Khojali), separate motorized rifle regiments, and five fortified areas. Its heavy machinery and armaments comprise 316 T-55/-72 tanks; 324 ACVs (armored combat vehicles) (AICVs [armored infantry combat vehicles]-1/-2, APCs [armored personnel carriers]-70/-80); 322 artillery and mortar systems and MLRSs (multiple rocket launcher systems) (D-44, 102 D-30, 53 D-20, 2S1, 2S3, 99 2A36, KS-19, 44 BM-21); Krug (Circle) and Osa (Wasp) anti-aircraft missile systems and Strela (Arrow) and Igla (Needle) short-range man-portable air defense systems. Data on the number of units of military equipment require revision due to losses in battle and breakdown due to natural wear and tear.

The Association of Veterans of the Artsakh War chaired by Vahan Ishkhanian is the NKDA's political support organization.

The National United Party of Armenia

A party extremist organization in the Soviet Union, created in 1966 in Yerevan on the initiative of Aykanuz Khachatryan as an underground anti-communist, anti-Soviet, and Rus-

sophobic party of Armenian nationalists in favor of the withdrawal of the Armenian S.S.R. from the Soviet Union. Since the time it was founded, Stepan Zatikian was member No. 2 in this party. He was the author of the brochure *Terror and Terrorists* and organized and carried out a series of explosions in Moscow on 8 January, 1977, including the explosion in the Moscow subway (at the time the terrorist act was organized, he was no longer participating in the party's activity). Recruitment and training of candidates for party members were carried out by the youth organization Shant (Lightning) under the leadership of Paruyr Hayrikian.

It initially had all the organizational attributes of an illegal armed group: symbols, a trial period for candidates, mandatory committing of an extremist public illegal act in order to become a full member, taking an oath of fidelity to "independent Armenia" and an oath of allegiance to the organization's leadership, etc. Its primary activities included educational and training campaigns into the mountains to develop fighting and terrorist activity skills, distributing leaflets titled "We Can Keep Quiet No More," and writing slogans of nationalist and Russophobic content on building walls. It attempted, in a homemade way, to publish a newspaper called *Paros* (The Lighthouse) and a magazine titled *In the Name of the Homeland* (the total circulation amounted to 343 copies). In 1968, it was thwarted by the Soviet KGB. The main party activists were sentenced to four years of imprisonment under Arts 65 and 67 of the Criminal Code of the Armenian S.S.R. ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and "participation in an anti-Soviet organization").

It was revived in 1972 on the initiative of Aykanuz Khachatrian and Paruyr Hayrikian after its members had served their punishment terms. The second edition of the NUPA program was characterized by a conscious rejection of the ideas of anticommunism and Russophobia, which defined it as nationalist. Its members amounted to a total of 40-50 people.

After its members Stepan Zatikian, Zaven Bagdasarian, and Akop Stepanian were sentenced to execution for committing a series of terrorist acts in Moscow in January and making an unsuccessful attempt to set off a bomb in the Kursk station in Moscow in October 1977, it ceased its activity due to the threat of persecution of its other members.

It was revived for the third time in 1988 by Paruyr Hayrikian, and currently operates under the name of the National Self-Determination Association. Many of its members belonged to armed groups of Armenian separatists of Nagorno-Karabakh and participated in the Nagorno-Karabakh war of 1988-1994.

The Yerkrpah Volunteer Union (YVU)

A nonparty extremist political movement of Armenia. It was established in the late 1980s as a set of illegal armed groups of Armenian nationalists in the territory of the Armenian S.S.R. (Tigran Mets, Astvatsatsin, and the Armenian National Army). It was subsequently reduced to a special regiment under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Armenian S.S.R. for participation in military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh. After 1993, some of the militants, retaining their internal corporate ties, were integrated into the government and economic institutions of Armenia under the name of the Yerkrpah Volunteer Union (YVU). A total of only 20% of the veterans of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from the Armenian party were part of the YVU. The first leader of the YVU Vazgen Sarkissian (in 1990-1992 a warlord, since 1993, the chairman of the union) is considered the founder of a political regime of military oligarchy in Armenia and the initiator of subordination of Armenian political and economic life to the elite of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

The YVU possesses an extensive network of local organizations and offices across the Republic of Armenia, especially in Yerevan, the Armavir Region, and Etchmiadzin. The YVU

has a total of around 10 thousand members. The Armed Forces of Armenia (AFA) and other militarized departments (the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Emergencies) pledge to assist the YVU. The Yerkrpah Volunteer Union carries out recruitment and training of volunteers from among Armenian and foreign citizens of Armenian nationality for service in the ranks of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army (Artsakh), as well as the formation, registration, and maintenance of mobilization readiness of the reserves in peacetime, and mobilization of staff for replenishing the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army in wartime.

Armed supporters of the YVU participated in putting pressure on political opponents, as well as ethnic minorities. Members of the YVU put pressure on electoral process during four national election campaigns (1995, 1996, 1998, and 1999). The YVU played the leading role in forcing President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrossian to resign on 3 February, 1998 because of disagreements between the leaders of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the YVU regarding the plan of peaceful Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement.

After Robert Kocharian was elected president of the Republic of Armenia (in 1994-1997 he was president of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic), the YVU became part of the Republican Party of Armenia, being the militarized bastion of the personal power of Robert Kocharian and the Nagorno-Karabakh clan. After the terrorist act in the National Assembly of Armenia on 27 October, 1999 as a result of which Chairman of the YVU Vazgen Sarkissian lost his life, some of the supporters of the YVU left the RPA and created their own political party.

Since 2001, the name of YVU Chairman Lieutenant General Manvel Grigorian is constantly mentioned in connection with numerous corruption scandals and economic crimes. In February 2008, in protest against using the resources of the Armenian Armed Forces in the interests of the YVU, a group of generals of the Armenian Armed Forces, including Chief of the Main Staff Colonel General Seyran Oganian, Major Generals Arshaluys Paytian, Haykaz Baghmanian, Levon Eranossian, Kamo Agajanian, and Samvel Karapetian, and Colonels Koriun Egiazarian, Murad Abramian, Felix Pogossian, Artur Grigorian, Pogos Pogossian, Samvel Ovsepien, Sayen Hayrapetian, and Nerses Egoian, left the YVU.

In Armenia, Yerkrpah Day is celebrated annually on 8 May (it was instituted in accordance with the Armenian Law on Holidays and Memorial Days of the Republic of Armenia No. ZR-200).

Its leaders are Lieutenant General of the Armenian Armed Forces Manvel Grigorian (chairman and deputy minister of defense of Armenia), Miasnik Malkhassian (leader of deputy group Hayastan), Albert Bazeian (ex-mayor of Yerevan), Smbat Ayvazian, Razmik Martirosian, Aram Sarkissian, and Vahan Shirkhanian.

APPENDIX 2

THE GRAVEST CRIMES OF TRANSNATIONAL ARMENIAN TERRORISM

(Consolidated Analytical Table)

This Table contains only those crimes (committed in the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century) that correspond to the following criteria:

- (a) it was committed by Armenian extremists, the responsibility for which was claimed by a specific terrorist or extremist group of Armenian nationalists;
- (b) it was investigated by the law-enforcement agencies of the corresponding country, and it was established that it had been committed by Armenian national extremists;
- (c) it was a crime of terror with no accompanying economic actions (extortion, racketeering, deliberate destruction of property, etc.);
- (d) the Armenian perpetrators considered the crime a link in the chain of the practical realization of their political and legal ideals and aims.

The Table presents the crimes in chronological order; it indicates the date and place of the crime, as well as the name of the Armenian extremist or terrorist organization responsible for committing it; it offers concise criminal and legal qualifications; and it describes the repercussions. This provides enough information for the interested reader to pursue further study in electronic sources or libraries. (It should be said, however, that the militants frequently used different names for their extremist groups when assuming responsibility for their crimes. For example, ASALA terrorists used the following operational names: Orly Group, the 3rd of October Group, the 9th of July Group, and France September. These names are placed in parenthesis after the name of the main structure.)

The Table is not complete, since individual crimes committed by Armenian extremists might have escaped my attention. Nevertheless, I aspired to demonstrate the scope of the crimes perpetrated by transnational Armenian terrorism rather than count them all.

**The Gravest Crimes of Transnational Armenian Terrorism
(Consolidated Analytical Table)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1896, 26 August	Istanbul, Ottoman Empire	ARFD	Hostage-taking in the International Ottoman Bank, lasted for 14 hours; two killed, four injured
1903, 14 October	Tiflis (Tbilisi), Russian Empire	Hunchak	Attempted murder of Chief Commander in the Caucasus Infantry General Prince Grigory Golitsyn (he suffered multiple stab wounds)
1904, 11 September	Elizavetpol (Ganja), Russian Empire	ARFD	Murder of Vice Governor of the Elizavetpol Gubernia Collegiate Councillor A. Andreev
1905, 1 May	Batum (Batumi), Russian Empire	Hunchak	Murder of Governor General of the Batum Region Major General M. Driagin
1905, 11 May	Baku, Russian Empire	Hunchak	Civilian Governor of the Baku Gubernia Privy Councillor Prince Mikhail Nakashidze killed by a bomb; two other people killed, one injured
1905, 21 July	Istanbul, Ottoman Empire	ARFD	Attempted murder of Sultan Abdul-Hamid II at the Yıldız Mosque by means of a mined car (or the sultan's carriage); more than 20 killed
1905, 20 August	Elizavetpol (Ganja), Russian Empire	ARFD	Murder of Governor General of the Elizavetpol Gubernia Lieutenant General Nikolay Lutsau
1907, 3 July	Alexandropol (Gumri), Russian Empire	ARFD	Commander of the 2nd Caucasian Cossack Division Lieutenant General Maksud Alikhanov-Avarskiy, his wife, and coachman killed by a bomb; two injured
1907, 21 September	Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar), Russian Empire	ARFD and the fighting group of the SR Party	Murder of Head of the Chancellery of the Commander of the Kuban Region and Appointed Hetman of the Kuban Cossack Host Collegiate Councillor Semen Rudenko
1933, 24 December	New York, U.S.	ARFD	Murder of Levon Turian, Primate of the Eastern Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the U.S. in the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross during a Christmas service
1973, 27 January	Santa Barbara, California, U.S.	Lone terrorist	Murder of Consul General of the Republic of Turkey in Los Angeles Mehmet Baydar and Vice Consul of the Republic of Turkey in Los Angeles Bahadır Demir
1973, 4 April	Paris, France		Explosions at the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey and Turkish Airlines

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1973, 26 October	New York, U.S.	ASALA (Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group)	The Turkish Information Service received a parcel with a bomb inside and a letter addressed to the Consul General signed by the Yanikian Group
1975, 20 January	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA (Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group)	Explosion in the building of the World Council of Churches
1975, 8 February	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Explosions at the Turkish Information Agency and Tourist Bureau, one policeman injured
1975, 20 February	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA (Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group)	Explosion in the Turkish Airlines office
1975, 22 October	Vienna, Austria	ASALA and JCAG	Murder of Turkish Ambassador to Austria Daniş Tunahgil at the embassy
1975, 24 October	Paris, France	ASALA and JCAG	Murder of Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to France İsmail Erez and his driver Talip Yener in a car
1975, 28 October	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Rocket attack on the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
1975, 28 December	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Rocket attack on the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
1976, 16 February	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Murder of First Secretary of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey Oktar Cirit in an office at the Consulate General
1976, 17 May	Frankfurt, FRG	ASALA	Explosion at the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey
	Cologne, FRG	ASALA	Explosion at the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey
	Essen, FRG	ASALA	Explosion at the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey
1976, 28 May	Zurich, Switzerland	JCAG	Explosions at the Swiss branch of the Turkish Garanti Bank and the office of the Turkish Labor Attaché; bombing of the Turkish Tourist Bureau is averted
1977, 8 January	Moscow, U.S.S.R.	NUPA	Explosion in a Moscow subway train; 7 killed, 37 injured; explosions in two food stores in the center of Moscow
1977, 2 May	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Explosions destroy cars of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Lebanon belonging to Military Attaché Nahit Karakaya and Administrative Attaché İlhan Özbabacan
1977, 14 May	Paris, France	NAR	Explosion at the Turkish Tourist Bureau; one injured

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1977, 29 May	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA (28 May Organization)	Bombings at Yeşilköy Airport, five killed, 42 injured, and at the Sirkeci railway station, one killed, 10 injured
1977, 9 June	Rome, Italy	JCAG	Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey in the Vatican Taha Carım murdered in St. Paul's Cathedral in Rome
1977, 20 October	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Bombing of the car of the Press Attaché of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey
1977, 30 October	Moscow, U.S.S.R.	NUPA	Attempted detonation of three bombs in the lobby of the Kursk railway station in Moscow
1978, 3 January	London, U.K.	NAR	Explosion at the Turkish business center
	Brussels, Belgium	NAR	Explosion in the apartment of a Turkish Embassy counselor
1978, 10 March	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Three bombs planted in the cars of Turkish diplomats are defused
1978, 2 June	Madrid, Spain	ASALA and JCAG	Attempt on the life of Turkish Ambassador to Spain Zeki Kunalalp; his wife Necla, her brother, retired ambassador Beşir Balcıoğlu, and driver, Antonio Torres, are killed
1978, August	Ankara, Turkey	ASALA	Monument to Atatürk shelled from a mortar
	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Explosions in public buildings
1978, 1 October	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	A bomb explodes at the bus stop in front of the Blue Mosque and in the lobby of a ferry; another bomb is defused at the Sirkeci railway station
1978, 30 October	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Explosion at a tobacco factory
1978, 6 December	Geneva, Switzerland	NAR	Explosion in front of the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey
1978, 12 December	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Explosion in front of the Turkish Airlines office
1978, 17 December	Geneva, Switzerland	NAR	Explosion in the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey
1979, January	Madrid, Spain	JCAG	Bombing of British Airways and TWA offices
1979, 6 May	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Bombing in the office trailer of Turkish Airlines
1979, 8 July	Paris, France	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Airlines, the Turkish Labor Attaché's office, and the Turkish

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
			Tourist Bureau. Prevented bombing of the office of the permanent representative of the Republic of Turkey at the OECD
1979, 22 August	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Attempted assassination of Turkish Vice Consul Niyazi Adali; two injured
1979, 27 August	Frankfurt, FRG	ASALA	Bombing of the Turkish Airlines office, one injured
1979, 29 September	Ankara, Turkey	ASALA	Two bombs are found in the transit lobby at Esenboğa Airport
1979, 5 October	Copenhagen, Denmark	ASALA	Bombing of the Turkish Airlines office, two injured
1979, 12 October	The Hague, the Netherlands	JCAG	Assassination of the son of Turkish Ambassador Ahmet Benler, who was working on a Ph.D. at the Technical University in Delft
1979, 30 October	Milan, Italy	ASALA	Explosion outside the Turkish Airlines office
1979, 8 November	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Explosion outside the Turkish Airlines office
1979, 18 November	Paris, France	ASALA	Bombing of KLM, Lufthansa, and Turkish Airlines offices, injuring three, including two policemen
1979, 26 November	Madrid, Spain	ASALA	Bombing of TWA, Italian Airlines, British Airways offices
1979, 9 December	Rome, Italy	NAR	Explosions in front of the offices of El Al, World Air Lines, British Airways and Philippine Airlines, nine injured
1979, 17 December	London, U.K.	ASALA	Explosion in front of the London office of Turkish Airlines, one injured
1979, 22 December	Amsterdam, the Netherlands	JCAG	Explosion outside the Turkish Airlines office
	Rome, Italy	ASALA	A bomb explodes in front of the Dina Boarding House. The home is a refugee center at the World Council of Churches responsible for the transfer of many Armenians from the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe and the Middle East to the United States and other countries
	Paris, France	JCAG	Turkish Tourism Attaché Yılmaz Çolpan is assassinated while walking on the Champs-Élysées
1979, 23 December	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Explosions in front of the offices of Air France and TWA
1979, December	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Two bombings at Yeşilköy Airport

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1980, 10 January	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	Explosion outside the Turkish Airlines office
1980, 14 January	Paris, France	ASALA	Explosion in the Lufthansa Airlines office
1980, 19 January	Madrid, Spain	JCAG	Explosions in front of the offices of British Airways, TWA, Swissair, and Sabena Airlines
1980, 1 February	Brussels, Belgium	NAR	Explosions in the offices of Aeroflot and Turkish Airlines
	Paris, France	NAR	Explosion in the office of the Soviet Telegraph Agency TASS
1980, 6 February	Bern, Switzerland	JCAG	Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador Dogan Türkmen
1980, 18 February	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Explosions in front of El Al, Lufthansa, and Swissair
1980, 10 March	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Two bombs explode in the Turkish Airlines office and the office of the Turkish Tourism Bureau in Rome's Piazza della Repubblica; two killed, 17 injured
1980, 17 April	Rome, Italy	JCAG	Turkish Ambassador to the Holy See Vecdi Türel is shot and seriously wounded. His chauffeur, Tahsin Güvenç, is also slightly wounded in the assassination attempt during the papal mass in St. Paul's Cathedral
1980, 20 April	Marseilles, France	ASALA (Black April)	Attempted bombing of the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey with a rocket
1980, 31 July	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Administrative Attaché of the Turkish Embassy Galip Özmen and his family are attacked. He and his fourteen-year-old daughter, Neslihan, are killed, his wife, Sevil, and his son, Kaan, are wounded
1980, 5 August	Lyon, France	ASALA	Attack on the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey
1980, 11 August	New York, U.S.	ASALA	Two paint bombs with threats are planted in the office of the permanent representative of the Republic of Turkey at the U.N.
1980, 26 September	Paris, France	ASALA	Press Attaché of the Turkish Embassy Selçuk Bakkalbaşı is shot as he enters his home
1980, 3 October	Milan, Italy	ASALA	Explosions in front of the office of the Panorama journal, which published a critical article about Armenian terrorism in Italy

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1980, 4 October	Milan, Italy	ASALA	Explosion in front of the Turkish Airlines office, two injured
	Madrid, Spain	ASALA	Explosion in the office of Alitalia Airlines, 12 injured
1980, 6 October	Beverly Hills, Los Angeles, California, U.S.	JCAG	Residence of Consul General of the Republic of Turkey Kemal Arzkan is set on fire
1980, 8 October	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosion in front of the house of the Ambassador of Switzerland in Lebanon and in the car of the Swiss embassy
1980, 9 October	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosions in the offices of Swissair and Iranian Airlines
	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA(3rd of October Group)	Attempted explosion in front of the Swiss Embassy in Lebanon
1980, 12 October	London, U.K.	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosion at the Swiss Center (restaurant and trade complex)
	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	JCAG	Explosion in the office of the Music City Tours tourist company owned by a Turk
	London, U.K.	ASALA	Explosion in the Turkish Airlines office
	New York, U.S.	JCAG	A stolen car explodes at the entrance to the hotel where the Turkish mission for the U.N. lived; three injured
	Paris, France	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosion at the Swiss tourist and information agency
1980, 20 October	Interlaken, Switzerland	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	A bomb is found in the Paris-Interlaken train
1980, 4 November	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosion at the Palace of Justice in Geneva
1980, 10 November	Strasbourg, France	ASALA and the Kurdish Workers' Party	A bomb explodes in front of the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey
	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Five people are injured in attacks on Swissair and Swiss Tourist offices
1980, 11 November	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Explosion outside the Turkish Airlines office
1980, 19 November	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Explosions outside the Turkish Airlines office and the office of Attaché for Culture and Tourism of the Turkish Embassy in Italy
1980, 25 November	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosion at the Union Bank Geneva office, one injured

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1980, 1 December	Paris, France	JCAG	Explosions at British Airways, Lufthansa, and Sabena Airlines
1980, 5 December	Marseilles, France	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	A time bomb left at the Swiss Consulate is defused
1980, 11 December	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Attempted murder of a Turkish diplomat
1980, 16 December	London, U.K.	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Two bombs placed in front of the French Tourist Bureau and a railway company are defused
1980, 17 December	Sydney, Australia	JCAG	Turkish Consul General Şarik Arıyak and Security Attaché, Engin Sever, are assassinated
1980, 25 December	Zurich, Switzerland	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	A bomb explosion destroys the radar monitor at Kloten Airport, a second bomb planted on the main runway of the airport is defused
1980, 29 December	Madrid, Spain	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Bombing of the offices of TWA and Swissair, seven injured
1980, 30 December	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Bomb attack on the Credit Suisse offices
1981, 12 January	Paris, France	ASALA (Alek Yenikomshian Commandos)	A bomb explosion destroys the car of Economic Counselor of the Turkish Embassy Ahmet Erbeyli
1981, 27 January	Milan, Italy	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Swissair and Swiss Tourist offices are damaged by bomb explosions, one injured
1981, 3 February	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	A bomb left at the Swiss Consulate is defused
1981, 5 February	Paris, France	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Air France and TWA offices are damaged by bomb explosions, one injured
1981, 22 February	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	ASALA	Attempt to blow up the Swiss Consulate
1981, 4 March	Paris, France	ASALA	Two terrorists open fire on Labor Attaché of the Turkish Embassy Reşat Morali, Religious Affairs Attaché Tecelli Arı, and Paris Representative of Anadolu Bank İlkay Karakoç
1981, 12 March	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	A group of terrorists tries to occupy the Turkish Embassy, killing two guards in the process
1981, 2 April	Copenhagen, Denmark	JCAG	Labor Attaché of the Turkish Embassy Cavit Demir is seriously wounded

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1981, 9 June	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Secretary of the Turkish Consulate Mehmet Savaş Yergüz is assassinated
1981, 11 June	Paris, France	ASALA	A Turkish Airlines office is occupied for six hours
1981, 13 June	Anaheim, California, U.S.	JCAG	Explosion at the Orange County Convention Center in Anaheim
1981, 26 June	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion in front of the Credit Suisse office
1981, 28 June	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion in the office of Swissair
1981, 1 July	Baghdad, Iraq	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion in the office of Swissair
1981, 19 July	Bern, Switzerland	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion at the Swiss Parliament building
1981, 20 July	Zurich, Switzerland	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion in an automatic photo-booth at Zurich's international airport Kloten
1981, 21 July	Lausanne, Switzerland	ASALA (9th of June Group)	A bomb planted in the women's wear section of a department store injures twenty
1981, 22 July	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion in a locker at the Cornaven train station, four injured
1981, 11 August	Copenhagen, Denmark	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion at Swissair
1981, 20 August	Paris, France	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosion in an Alitalia office
	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion outside the offices of Swiss Precision Instruments
1981, 22 August	Paris, France	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	Explosion in the Paris branch of Olympic Airways
1981, 15 September	Copenhagen, Denmark	ASALA	Explosion in front of the Turkish Airlines office injures two; the second bomb is defused
1981, 16 September	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosion at the Swiss Embassy in Tehran
1981, 24 September	Paris, France	ASALA	The terrorists who occupied the Turkish Consulate General take 56 hostages. Consul General Kaya Inal and a security guard, Cemal Özen, are seriously wounded. Özen dies of his injuries in the hospital

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1981, 3 October	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Explosions at the main post office and city courthouse in Geneva
1981, 10 October	Hollywood, California, U.S.	ASALA	A bomb explodes in Palladium, Hollywood
1981, 25 October	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Second Secretary of the Turkish Embassy Gökberk Ergenekon is wounded in the arm in an assassination attempt
1981, 25 October	Paris, France	ASALA	Fouquet's, a fashionable French restaurant, is the target of a bomb attack, three injured
1981, 27 October	Paris, France	ASALA (September-France Group)	A series of two bomb attacks at Roissy Airport: one in the parking lot and the second in a trash can near an escalator in the passenger lobby
1981, 28 October	Paris, France	ASALA (September-France Group)	A bomb explosion damages a stolen automobile near the Eiffel Tower
1981, 29 October	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA (9th of June Group)	An attempted explosion at the United Bank of Switzerland
	Paris, France	ASALA (September-France Group)	A bomb explosion in a movie theater, three injured
1981, 2 November	Madrid, Spain	ASALA	A bomb explosion in the Swissair office, four injured
1981, 5 November	Paris, France	ASALA	A bomb explodes in a locker at the Gare de Lyon, one injured
1981, 12 November	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA (Orly Group)	Explosions at the French Cultural Center and Air France offices
1981, 13 November	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A grenade attack on a police car
1981, 14 November	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A grenade attack on a sightseeing boat on the River Seine
1981, 15 November	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA (Orly Group)	Simultaneous bomb attacks are carried out against four French targets: the Union des Assurances de Paris, the Air France offices, the Banque Libano-Française, and Fransa Bank
	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A McDonald's restaurant is destroyed by a bomb
1981, 16 November	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A bomb explosion in a locker at the Gare de l'Est, two injured

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1981, 20 November	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	JCAG	The Turkish Consulate General in Beverly Hills suffers extensive damage
1981, 21 November	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (Orly Group)	A bomb explosion at Air France and the French Embassy in Iran
1981, 15 December	London, U.K.	ASALA (3rd of October Group)	A bomb explosion at Swissair and the Swiss tourist information center
1982, 14 January	Toronto, Canada	ASALA	A bomb explosion at the Consulate of the Republic of Turkey
1982, 17 January	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A bomb explodes at the Union of Banks and a second bomb is defused at Crédit Lyonnais
	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA (9th of June Group)	Two bombs explode in a parking lot
1982, 19 January	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A bomb explodes at the Air France office in the Palais des Congrès
1982, 21 January	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	Explosion in the 16th arrondissement
1982, 28 January	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	JCAG	Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles Kemal Arikan is assassinated while driving to work
1982, 15 March	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	A bomb explodes in a police car
1982, 16 March	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	A bomb explodes in a police car
1982, 22 March	Cambridge, Mass., U.S.	JCAG	A gift shop belonging to Turkish Honorary Consul General in Boston Orhan Gündüz is blown up; the owner is injured
1982, 26 March	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	A bomb explodes in a movie theater in the Armenian quarter, two killed, 16 injured
1982, 8 April	Ottawa, Canada	ASALA and JCAG	Commercial Attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa Kani Güngör is seriously wounded in a knife attack
1982, 24 April	Cologne, FRG	NAR	Attempted explosion at a Turkish bank
	Dortmund, FRG	NAR	A bomb explodes at a Turkish bank
1982, 4 May	Cambridge, Mass., U.S.	JCAG	Turkish Honorary Consul General in Boston Orhan Gündüz is assassinated
1982, 10 May	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Bombs exploded at Credit Suisse and Union Bank
1982, 18 May	Tampa, Florida, U.S.	JCAG	Attack on the office of Turkish Honorary Consul General Nash Karahan

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1982, 24 May	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA and PLO fighters	A bomb explodes in a car, 12 killed, 25 injured
1982, 26 May	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	ASALA	A bomb damages the office of the Swiss Banking Corporation
1982, 30 May	Los Angeles, California, U.S.	ASALA	A bomb is found in the Air Canada cargo terminal
1982, 7 June	Lisbon, Portugal	JCAG	Administrative Attaché of the Turkish Embassy Erkut Akbay and his wife, Nadide Akbay, are assassinated in front of their home
1982, 20 July	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	Sixteen are injured in a bomb explosion near a cafe in the Place Saint-Severin in the Latin Quarter
1982, 21 July	Rotterdam, the Netherlands	ASALA (Armenian Red Army)	Attempted assassination of Turkish Consul General in Rotterdam Kemalettin Demirer
1982, 24 July	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	Explosion in Paris' Pub Saint-Germain in the Latin Quarter, two injured
1982, 7 August	Ankara, Turkey	ASALA	Hostages are taken at Esenboga Airport, 10 killed, 82 injured
1982, 8 August	Paris, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A bomb is defused at a telephone company in the 17th arrondissement
1982, 27 August	Ottawa, Canada	JCAG	Military Attaché of the Turkish Embassy Colonel Atilla Altikat is assassinated in his car
1982, 9 September	Burgaz, Bulgaria	JCAG	Administrative Attaché of the Turkish Consulate General in Burgaz Bora Suelkan is assassinated in front of his home
1982, 22 October	Boston, Mass., U.S.	JCAG	A bomb is defused on board a Northwest Orient airplane
1983, 22 January	Paris, France	ASALA (Suicide Group of the Harnicvaharabian Minas Simonian Commando Martyrs)	Attempted explosion at the ticket office of Turkish Airlines in Orly Airport
	Paris, France	ASALA (Chabin Karahissazop)	Hand-grenade attack on the Turkish Airlines office
1983, 2 February	Brussels, Belgium	NAR	Explosion in an office of Turkish Airlines
1983, 28 February	Luxembourg, Luxembourg	NAR	A bomb explosion is averted at the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1983, 28 February	Paris, France	ASALA	A bomb explodes at the Marmara Travel Agency, which organized trips to Turkey, one killed
1983, 9 March	Belgrade, Yugoslavia	JCAG	Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia Galip Balkar is assassinated in central Belgrade. His chauffeur, Necati Kayar, is shot in the stomach
1983, 24 May	Brussels, Belgium	ASALA	Bombs explode in front of the Turkish Embassy's Culture and Information offices and in front of Turkey's Marmara Travel Agency
1983, 16 June	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	A market is attacked with grenades and machine guns, two killed, 21 injured
1983, 8 July	Paris, France	NAR	Hand-grenade attack on the offices of the British Council carried out to protest against the trials of Armenians in London
1983, 14 July	Brussels, Belgium	ASALA, JCAG, ARA	Terrorists murder Administrative Attaché of the Turkish Embassy Dursun Aksoy
1983, 15 July	Paris, France	ASALA	A bomb explodes in the luggage terminal of Turkish Airlines in Orly, eight killed, 55 wounded
1983, 22 July	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (Orly Group)	Bombs explode at the French Embassy and Air France
1983, 25 July	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (Orly Group)	A bomb explodes in the Trade Mission of the French Republic
1983, 27 July	Lisbon, Portugal	ARA	Five terrorists took Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and his family hostage. His wife, Cahide Mihçioğlu, was blown to pieces. The DCM, Yurtsev Mihçioğlu, and his son, Atasay, were injured; one policeman was killed, another injured; all the terrorists were liquidated
1983, 31 July	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (Orly Group)	Attempted explosion at the Egyptian missions
1983, 7 August	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (Orly Group)	Explosions at the Egyptian missions
1983, 10 August	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (Orly Group)	A mined car explodes on the grounds of the French Embassy
1983, 17 August	Tehran, Iran	ASALA (Orly Group)	Murder of an Air France employee
1983, 27 August	Cologne, FRG	ASALA	Bomb explosion at the Consulate of France, two killed, 23 injured
1983, 9 September	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	Two cars of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Iran are blown up

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1983, 1 October	Marseilles, France	ASALA (Orly Group)	A bomb blast destroys U.S., Soviet, and Algerian pavilions at an international trade fair in Marseilles, one killed, 26 injured
1983, 6 October	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	A bomb explodes in a car of the Embassy of France in Iran, two injured
1983, 29 October	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Hand-grenade attack on the French Embassy
1984, 8 February	Paris, France	ASALA	Bomb threat on an Air France flight to New York; the flight was delayed by an hour and a half
1984, 28 March	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	A timed series of attacks is carried out against Turkish diplomats; First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy Hasan Servet Öktem and Sergeant Ismail Pamukçu were wounded
1984, 28 April	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	In an attempted assassination of Secretary at the Turkish Embassy Sadiye Yönder, her husband, Isik Yönder, is killed
1984, 20 June	Vienna, Austria	ARA	A bomb explodes in a car belonging to Assistant Labor and Social Affairs Counselor at the Turkish Embassy Erdoğan Özen, killing him and injuring five others, including two policemen
1984, 13 August	Lyon, France	ASALA	Explosion in a locker at the railway station
1984, 3 September	Istanbul, Turkey	ARA	A mined car explodes at the museum of the Topkala Palace, two killed
1984, 8 September	Baku, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	Terrorist	A bomb explodes in bus No. 106, killing one and injuring three
1984, 19 November	Vienna, Austria	ARA	Enver Ergun, Deputy Director of the Center for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations, Vienna, is assassinated
1984, 25 December	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Bombs explode in two buildings in Eastern Beirut belonging to French commercial structures
1985, 3 January	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	A bomb explodes in the France Press building in Western Beirut; an explosive device is defused at the entrance to Banque Libano-Française
1985, 12 March	Ottawa, Canada	ARA	Hostages are taken in the Turkish Embassy, Ambassador Coşkun Kırca manages to escape, but suffers extensive injuries

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1985, 28 November	Paris, France	ASALA	French police arrest the leader of ASALA-RM Monte Melkonian, a U.S. citizen; a search of his home produced explosives and explosive devices
1986, 23 November	Melbourne, Australia	ASALA	Explosion opposite the Consulate General of the Republic of Turkey kills one and injures one
1988, 12 December	Gugark, Spitak District, Armenia, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A Stinger missile downs Il-76 aircraft; all of the passengers and the crew of 3 (79 people in all) were killed
	Khankendi, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A Stinger missile downs the An-12 passenger aircraft of the state air company of Yugoslavia; two members of the crew were killed
1989, 16 September	Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A bomb explodes in a passenger bus going from Tbilisi to Baku, five killed, 25 injured
1990, 13 February	Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A bomb explodes in a passenger bus going from Shusha to Baku at the 105th km of the Evlakh-Lachin highway, 16 killed
1990, 24 March	Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A blast at the 364th km of the Norashen-Baku railway destroys a diesel locomotive, three freight cars, and 150 m of rails
1990, 11 July	Askeran District, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A passenger bus going from Terter to Kelbajar is fired at from submachine-guns, eight killed, 23 wounded
1990, 10 August	Khanlar District, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A passenger bus is blown up on the Samkhor-Ganja highway at the village of Nadel, 17 killed, 16 injured
	Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A Tbilisi-Aghdam passenger bus is blown up, 20 killed, 30 injured
1990, 15 September	Khankendi, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	Bomb explosion at the TV and Radio Center, Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, Azerbaijan S.S.R.
1990, 30 November	Askeran District, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A passenger bus carrying employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan from Shusha to Khankendi airport is blown up, two injured

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1991, 8 January	Khankendi, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	Attempted murder of Major General of militia V. Kovalev, head of the Department of the Internal Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region
1991, 14 March	Aghdam District, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	Explosion in an Aghdam-Shusha passenger bus, three killed, four injured
1991, 9 May	Khankendi, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	Attempted murder of Second Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of Azerbaijan Viktor Polianichko
1991, 30 May	Khasaviurt, Daghestan, Russia	NKDA	A bomb explodes in a Moscow-Baku passenger train, 11 killed, 22 injured
1991, 31 June	Khasaviurt, Daghestan, Russia	NKDA	A bomb explodes in a Moscow-Baku passenger train, 16 killed, 20 injured
1991, 8 September	Aghdam District, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A passenger bus on the Aghdam-Qaradağlı route is blown up, six killed, 36 injured
1991, 7 October	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Press Attaché of the Republic of Turkey in Greece Çetin Görgü is murdered
1991, 20 November	Khojavent District, Azerbaijan, U.S.S.R.	NKDA	A Stinger missile downs an Mi-8 helicopter with a peacekeeping mission on board, 22 killed, including three members of the crew
1992, 8 January	Baku, Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan	Explosion on the Sovetskaia Kalmykia ferry going from Krasnovodsk to Baku, 25 passengers killed, 88 injured
1992, 28 January	Shusha, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan	NKDA	A Stinger missile downs an Mi-8 helicopter going from Aghdam to Shusha, 44 killed, including three members of the crew
1992, 28 July	Baghdad, Iraq	ARA	Irada Rzaeva, wife of the Envoy of the Azerbaijan Republic to Iraq, and Nikhal Hasanov, daughter of the Consul of the Azerbaijan Republic in Baghdad, are killed
1992, 18 September	Yerevan, Armenia		Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Ashtarak District Council of Yerevan Hovhannes Sukiassian and his driver Varujan Abramian are killed

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1993, 28 February	Gudermes, Chechen Republic, Russia	NKDA	Explosion on a Kislovodsk-Baku passenger train, 11 killed, 18 injured
1993, 3 May	Yerevan, Armenia		Department Head of Armenian Railways Ambartsum Kandilian and his driver, Akop Unikian, are killed
1993, 2 June	Baku, Azerbaijan	NKDA	A bomb explodes in a passenger car in a siding of the railway station in Baku
1993, 11 December	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	Administrative Attaché of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Iran Çağlar Yücel is murdered
1994, 1 February	Baku, Azerbaijan	NKDA	Explosion in a Kislovodsk-Baku passenger train, three killed, 20 injured
1994, 9 February	Khudat, Azerbaijan	NKDA	A bomb explodes in a freight car
1994, 18 March	Khankendi, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan	NKDA	A Stinger missile downs military-transport aircraft S-130 Hercules of the Air Force of Iran, 34 killed, including three crew members
1994, 13 April	Daghestanskie Ogni, Daghestan, Russia	NKDA	Explosion in a Moscow-Baku passenger train, three killed, three injured
1994, 3 July	Baku, Azerbaijan	NKDA	Explosion in a Baku subway train, 13 killed, 42 injured
1994, 7 July	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Counselor of the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Greece Haluk Sipahioğlu is assassinated
1998, 8 August	Yerevan, Armenia		Prosecutor General of Armenia Ghenrikh Khachatryan is murdered
1998, 10 December	Yerevan, Armenia		Deputy Defense Minister of Armenia Vaghran Khorkhoruni is murdered
1999, 9 February	Yerevan, Armenia		Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Commander of the Internal Affairs Forces Artsrun Margarian is murdered
1999, 27 October	Yerevan, Armenia		Chairman of the Council of the Armenia Public TV and Radio Company Tigran Nagdalian is murdered
1999, 27 October	Yerevan, Armenia	ARFD	Terrorist act in the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, killing Speaker Karen Demirchian, Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkissian, Vice Speakers Ruben Miroian and Yury Bakhshian, Minister for Operational Issues Leonard Petrossian, and deputies Armenak Armenakian, Ghenrik Abramian, and Mikael Kotanian

Consolidated Analytical Table (continued)

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
2013, 31 January	Yerevan, Armenia		Attempted murder of Chairman of the Union for National Self-Determination Paruyr Hayrikian

NOTE:

The following abbreviations were used while compiling the Consolidated Analytical Table:

NKDA —The Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army

ARA —The Armenian Revolutionary Army

ARFD —The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaksutiun

NAR —The New Armenian Resistance

NUPA —The National United Party of Armenia

ASALA —The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

JCAG —The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

APPENDIX 3

COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS ON THE HISTORY OF ARMENIAN TERRORISM

- 3A** CIA Directorate of Intelligence Research Paper
*The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia:
A Continuing International Threat*
- 3B** Judgment of the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of
the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. of 15 March, 1985
in the Case of Igor Makhovskiy
- 3C** Judgment of the Tambov Garrison Military Court of
11 March, 1996 in the Case of Jahan Oganessian,
Ashot Goloian, and Boris Simonian
- 3D** Judgment of the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of
the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic of 29 April,
1998 in the Case of Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov

Comments to the Documents

All forms of terror (transnational Armenian terror being one of them) are the most brutal, sophisticated, cynical and, therefore, most dangerous threat to state and public security. This banality puts terrorism in a nutshell and defines the anti-terrorist struggle as the main mission of the special services and law-enforcement agencies in every civilized and self-respecting country all over the world.

This struggle (the prevention of terrorist attacks and investigation of crimes of terror) has produced a heap of documents of different legal statuses ranging from operational reports to court sentences. For various reasons, these documents are not made known to the public, who have to be satisfied with media reports that cannot be checked or verified. I have deliberately gone beyond these limits to demonstrate that the problem of transnational Armenian terrorism was very prominent in the twentieth century and will probably survive in the twenty-first century. This means that the public should gain its own impression about the scope of the problem and the price the special services and law-enforcement agencies in many countries have already paid for establishing control and subsequently curbing the terrorist activities of Armenian nationalists.

For obvious reasons, I have limited myself to several documents carefully selected from the heap of similar papers related to my subject to convince the reader that some twenty years ago Armenian terrorism was a problem of planetary dimensions that threatened Russia (and the Soviet Union before it) and its citizens. I am convinced that not all Armenians are terrorists and that violence and terror are not their immanent qualities. The documents presented here show, however, that public and political institutions of the Armenian ethnicity (the state, parties, public and religious unions, the Church, etc.) never rejected terror when it was possible and, more so, when they could avoid punishment and retribution. This is true of the Caucasus (both the Northern and Southern Caucasus) and the rest of the world.

The first document in my documentary collection is CIA Directorate of Intelligence Research Paper *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat* compiled in the first quarter of 1983 and dealing with the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), one of the most active and efficient terrorist organizations of Armenian terrorists. Declassified on 30 April, 2013, it was published on the CIA official website once sensitive information that might reveal the sources of information had been removed. The special services never declassify documents—they declassify information. To keep the names of the informers or certain specifics of organization and information exchange inside the analytical departments of the special services, certain places or even fragments of the text were hidden under strips of paper glued to the text. This is done by all special services in all countries and makes the patches in the published texts a sure sign of their authenticity. Closer scrutiny reveals the borders of the paper strips used to conceal too sensitive information or even pages of sensitive information (this happened to pages ii and iv) left out of the publication.

The same section contains several court sentences against the organizers and perpetrators of the terrorist acts committed in the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, and the Azerbaijan Republic in the last quarter of the twentieth century, not simply by ethnic Armenians, but also by members of underground anti-Soviet Armenian nationalist organizations or officials of the special services of the Armenian Republic or accomplices of other nationalities drawn into Armenian terrorist activities. The choice was prompted by my intention to demonstrate that Armenian terrorism was a prominent problem in Russia during Soviet power and in post-Soviet times and by the desire to give people normally unfamiliar with court sentences a chance to read documents of this sort and, in particular, their rare examples passed twenty-odd years ago. This is done in full compliance with the official policy of information openness.

It should be said that before the early 1990s (that is, in the pre-computer age) official (and all other) documents were typed on typewriters, hence the imperfect type. Here the photocopies of court sentences are accompanied by their translations into English.

The letters along the left side of all the documents can barely be seen because the originals were bound together with other relevant documents once the case was closed and were not to be removed from the file no matter what.

The first of the court sentences published here relates to Igor Makhovskiy who, on 15 March, 1985, was sentenced by the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. to 15 years in prison for his involvement in the bomb explosion in a bus in Baku on 8 September, 1984. The crime was organized by Ghenrikh Vartanov, who was sentenced to treatment in a psychiatric clinic as a person of diminished responsibility. This means that Makhovskiy, who had been drawn into the crime by Vartanov, was treated as the main culprit. Significantly, ethnic Armenian Vartanov, who was driven by ideas of nationalism and blood feud and made and detonated the bomb, was declared a person of diminished responsibility who needed psychiatric treatment. Ethnic Russian Makhovskiy, who helped him, was sentenced to 15 years of detention, with the first 5 years in prison. This was a grossly politicized sentence stemming from the official ideology of proletarian internationalism, which treated the aggressive nationalism of “numerically small peoples” as derangement, while the desire of Russians to help as a crime.

The second document is the sentence of the Tambov Garrison Military Court of 11 March, 1996 against Head of the Department of Intelligence in Enemy Territory of the National Security Directorate of the Republic of Armenia Lieutenant Colonel Jahan Oganessian, an official of the same Directorate Major Ashot Goloian, and a consultant of the Second Department of the Antiterrorist Directorate of the Federal Counterterrorist Service of the Russian Federation Major Boris Simonian, who joined them (answering the call of ancestral blood). They were accused of making preparations to carry out a series of terrorist acts in Russia. This document proves beyond doubt that, in the first half of the 1990s, it was not only Chechen separatists, but also the special services

of the Republic of Armenia (today Russia's closest ally) that were waging a war of terror against Russia. Acting and retired officers of the Armenian state security structures managed to draw Russian citizens into their criminal designs, contrary to the officially declared policy of friendship and good neighborly relations.

The sentence of the Tambov Garrison Military Court against officials of the National Security Directorate of the Republic of Armenia and their accomplice, an ethnic Armenian employed by the Federal Security Service (FSS) of the RF, who participated in terrorist activity in the territory of Russia and Azerbaijan, contained an interesting historical fact that escaped the attention of the investigatory team. However, it was described in the documents with all the details as befits professional jurists. I have in mind the TT gun with an inscription "To Comrade Melkumov from the NKVD" (NKVD—Russian abbreviation for the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.—*Ed.*). It was established that the gun (in the possession of former Lieutenant Colonel of the Special Services of Armenian S.S.R. Oganessian) was directly related to the history of Armenian transnational terrorism of the 1920s, that is, the time when political terror was part and parcel of the state policy of the Republic of Armenia ruled by Dashnaktsutun.

In October 1919, a decision was made at the Ninth Congress of the ARF Dashnaktsutun in Yerevan to carry out Operation Nemesis to liquidate the former leaders of the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic personally involved in the police and military operations that had caused numerous deaths among the Armenians during the 1905-1907 revolution in Russia and World War I. Operational leadership and material support was entrusted to Hakob Ter-Hakobian, better known as Shahan Natalie, and Grigor Merjanov. The delegates passed the death sentence (devoid of any legal power) against 41 people; nine of these were carried out.

Ismail Enver Pasha, former Chief of General Staff of the Ottoman Empire, was one of the 41 sentenced to death and one of the nine liquidated. After the defeat of his country in World War I, he moved to Central Asia to lead the Basmachi movement in the Bukhara Khanate (the territory of Uzbekistan) in the hope of finally realizing his ideas of pan-Turkism and moving as far away as possible from the Armenian nationalists. Hakob Melkumian, a member of Dashnaktsutun, joined, as volunteer Yakov Melkumov, the Special Cavalry Brigade of the State Political Directorate—the First Separate Turkestan Cavalry Brigade gathered to fight the Basmachi. In a series of clashes, the Soviet Chekists routed the main Basmachi forces. On 4 August, 1922, in the village of Chagana, 25 km from the town of Baljuan (today in the territory of Tajikistan), the Basmachi commanders, including Ismail Enver Pasha, were liquidated. Later, Hakob Melkumian claimed the honor; in 1958, he described his involvement in this operation as "an act of retribution against one of the main participants in and ideologists of the 'genocide of the Armenians' in the Ottoman Empire in 1915."

In 1936, his 15-year-long service in the state security structures of the Soviet Union was rewarded with an "honorary revolutionary weap-

on”; after his death, the gun was returned to the state to be kept at the KGB Museum at the Council of Ministers of the Armenian S.S.R. At the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, the gun was requisitioned from the museum and given to the head of the intelligence-subversive group of the National Security Directorate of the Republic of Armenia that operated in Moscow. When the sentence against Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian came into force, the gun, as an instrument of crime and material evidence, was destroyed. In this way, the history of one object reflected the entire history of transnational Armenian terrorism in the territory of Russia and the Soviet Union.

The third document in my collection is the court sentence against former Captain of the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan Azer Aslanov sentenced by the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic to life imprisonment on 29 April, 1998 for the bomb explosion in the Baku subway on 3 July, 1994 that killed 13 and injured 42. He carried out the terrorist act on the instigation of the special services of the Republic of Armenia. This document was included in this collection for two reasons. First, citizens of Russia should know that Armenian terrorists organized terrorist acts not only in the Moscow but also in the Baku subway. Second, and more important, for some time after the crime, Azer Aslanov had been hiding in the RF, was tracked down, arrested by the joint efforts of the FSS of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of National Security of the Azerbaijan Republic, and transferred to the Azerbaijan Republic. This is a graphic example of efficient and fruitful cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan in their joint opposition to the Armenian terrorist aggression waged against them. The sentence was drafted in Azeri (the state language of Azerbaijan) and in Russian (since the Russian special services had been involved in tracking down and arresting the criminal).

The meaning of the documents published below is not limited to the history of the countries involved; they demonstrate how they coped with transnational Armenian terrorism at different times in history. In the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Azerbaijan Republic, the response was harsh and uncompromising, in Yeltsin’s Russia, it was viewed as a sort of “prank,” the punishment for which was much milder than the gravity of the crime. In the United States, it was regarded as a geopolitical tool to be used against the Soviet Union in the military-political confrontation between the East and the West.

APPENDIX 3A


CIA Directorate of Intelligence Research Paper *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat*

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The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat



A Research Paper

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APPENDIX 3A

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The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by the Terrorism Analysis Branch, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, [redacted] Office of European Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Terrorism Analysis Branch, OGI, [redacted]

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The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat

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**The Armenian Secret Army
for the Liberation of Armenia:
A Continuing International Threat**

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 20 December 1983
was used in this report.*

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) poses a growing threat to a number of US policy interests. Although most ASALA attacks have been against Turks, West European and a few US facilities have also been struck. Moreover, an apparent increase in contacts with Libya and Syria may expose the Marxist-oriented ASALA to additional anti-American influences. The rightwing Armenian terrorist group, the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide, has focused almost exclusively on Turkish targets.

In a development that has ominous implications for international cooperation against terrorism, several West European nations have apparently reached accommodations with ASALA, allowing the terrorists freedom to pursue Turkish targets in exchange for promises not to attack indigenous citizens. The Turks have responded angrily against what they see as European indifference to or connivance with ASALA terrorism. They are strongly pressing the United States both to put pressure on European governments and to give more direct assistance in combating that threat.

Despite some setbacks, the major Armenian terrorist groups retain considerable capability. ASALA and the Justice Commandos have assassinated 50 Turkish officials and private citizens and have conducted over 200 bombings since 1975. ASALA's shift toward indiscriminate violence during the past four years makes large-scale casualties more likely as the group targets commercial aircraft and crowded public places. Recent fragmentation within ASALA and Armenian political groups, in our estimation, increases the risk of terrorist violence, particularly in Western Europe, as the various splinter groups vie for the attention of the Armenian community.

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The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat

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The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat

Background to Armenian Terrorism

Armenian terrorist groups ostensibly want to create an independent Armenian homeland. Most of the historic Armenian homeland was conquered in the mid-13th century by the Ottoman Turks, who moderated Armenian discontent by the distinctive Ottoman "millet" system. This gave Armenians and other minorities a large measure of independence in exchange for passive political loyalty. Armenians lived in their own communities and practiced their faith and customs under the leadership of the Armenian patriarch. Over time, the ethnic cohesiveness encouraged by the millet system fostered nationalism within the Ottoman Empire. Serbs, Greeks, and Bulgarians, with the assistance of interested Western powers, forged their own identities and agitated for autonomous nation states.

Armenian revolutionary groups at the end of the 19th century sought to establish an independent Armenian state. During World War I, some Armenians in eastern Turkey allied themselves with the Russians in the belief that Russian assistance later would guarantee an independent Armenia. Reported Armenian "fifth column" activities against the hard-pressed Ottoman state led to the deportation of Armenians from eastern Turkey into what is Syria today. Turkish bureaucrats, under imprecise orders, treated local Armenian populations as traitors. During the forced summer march of 1915, tens of thousands of Armenians died en route or were slaughtered by local groups, including Kurdish tribesmen. Estimates of the total death toll range from 600,000 to 1.5 million, providing an emotional rallying point used by Armenian terrorist groups to justify their actions. Today 50,000 of the 60,000 Armenians in Turkey live in Istanbul, which has become the seat of the Armenian Gregorian Church in Turkey and Patriarchate.

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia

ASALA was formed in January 1975. Its declared goals include "liberation" of traditional Armenian lands—encompassing parts of present-day Turkey, Iran, and the Soviet Union—payment of reparations by the Turkish Government, and public acknowledgment by the Turkish Government of the 1915 genocide. Moreover, in accord with its Marxist-Leninist ideology, ASALA advocates armed struggle to achieve the liberation of Armenia and to further the interests of the exploited classes. ASALA has stated that its revolutionary theory distinguishes it from the other major Armenian terrorist group, the rightwing Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG).

ASALA appears to be a group of young revolutionaries, most in their twenties and living or having lived in Lebanon. An ASALA terrorist captured in 1982 said that ASALA was organized along military lines into what he called brigades or divisions. Until recently we knew little about the ASALA decisionmaking process or the identities of the leadership core.¹

Apparently by a central committee—whose location is unknown—oversees the group's activities.

ASALA originally used support apparatus—overt, legal groups—which, in our view, probably provided surveillance, propaganda, and logistic assistance for ASALA terrorist operations. These support groups—Popular Movements for the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (PMASALA)—were active in Paris, London, and Ottawa.

¹ In 1980 Hagop Hagopian—a common Armenian name, which we believe to be an alias—publicly identified himself as the chief spokesman for ASALA. Although Lebanese press dispatches reported that Hagopian was killed in the Israeli bombing of Beirut on 31 July 1982,

the announcement of Hagopian's death may have been a hoax to allow his escape from Beirut.

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Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide

The second prominent Armenian terrorist organization, the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), is a rightwing, nationalistic group without links to ASALA, other terrorist groups, or patron states. JCAG, like ASALA, demands an Armenian homeland and official Turkish recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide. [redacted]

We believe the Justice Commandos were created in 1975 by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF)—also known as the Dashnag Party—the most important and powerful Armenian political organization. The ARF was founded in 1890 by a group of Armenian intellectuals in the Transcaucasus region of Russia, as a response to violence committed against Armenian people under the rule of Turkish Sultan Abdul Hamid. From its inception, the ARF has aligned itself with whoever provided the best opportunity for an autonomous Armenian state. Since the end of World War II, the ARF has held a conservative, anti-Communist ideology and has been involved in violence against both the Turks and the Soviets, whom they hold responsible for the destruction of the Armenian republic in 1920. [redacted]

Our analysis and a large body of evidence indicate that JCAG is the action wing of the ARF. We suspect that the ARF created a military wing to counter the emergence of the Marxist-Leninist ASALA, which was probably drawing the more radical, violence-prone youth away from the ARF. Competition between JCAG and ASALA has been keen during the past few years. Several terrorist attacks against Turkish interests have been claimed by both groups, and the success of one group sometimes seems to spur the other to act. We have also seen a few instances of members defecting from one group to the other, presumably not out of ideological conversion but

simply to have greater opportunities to conduct operations against Turks. The prominent English-language publication Armenian Reporter cites the August 1983 conviction in Los Angeles of an ASALA member—the son of a prominent ARF leader—as evidence of the growing disenchantment and desertion of Dashnag youth to more active radical groups such as ASALA. [redacted]

JCAG has operated predominantly against Turkish targets. Its attacks—usually assassinations of high-ranking Turkish diplomatic personnel conducted in public places during daylight hours—exhibit boldness, professionalism, and meticulous planning and training. JCAG employs surveillance/countersurveillance techniques to ensure the success of its operations. Its infrequent bombings of Turkish facilities, which appear to be conducted as warnings to Turkish diplomats, are followed within two or three months by assassination attempts. [redacted]

In contrast to ASALA, JCAG has not yet conducted or threatened to conduct reprisal attacks to force the release of captured operatives, who are considered “un-uniformed soldiers” by JCAG. We believe JCAG assassins—only rarely apprehended—are recruited and trained within the ARF Youth Federation on a one-time “kill” basis. After an assassination, the JCAG operative is seldom used again in a terrorist operation. [redacted]

ASALA's headquarters in West Beirut was severely disrupted by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and the subsequent expulsion of the Palestinians. [redacted]

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APPENDIX 3A

CIA Directorate of Intelligence Research Paper

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat

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A February 1981 press conference with ASALA leader, Hagop Hagopian (hooded figure in center).

We believe ASALA did fragment, with some members in France and Syria; however, we suspect a portion of the ASALA membership has remained in Beirut, perhaps in an inactive status.

Changing Tactics and Organization

ASALA's tactics—assassinations and bombings—have undergone major changes during the past four years; the most important shift has been ASALA's willingness to attack targets involving non-Turkish victims. In 1979 ASALA began targeting Western interests—especially French and Swiss—in retaliation for arrests of ASALA members. ASALA has also conducted hostage operations—sieges at the Turkish Embassy in Tehran and Paris during 1981—aimed at attracting sustained public attention. A more lethal shift in tactics surfaced in the Orly Airport bombing on 15 July 1983, which killed eight and wounded 55. The bomb, planted in a suitcase, had been intended to explode while the Turkish airliner was in flight, which would have caused scores of casualties.

A mid-1982 upsurge in indiscriminate violence by ASALA—using the covername Orly Group—provoked changes within the organization.

In our view, ASALA jettisoned its support groups because of their reluctance to support ASALA's violent campaign against non-Turkish targets. The discarding of ASALA's support apparat

resulted in further changes in ASALA's infrastructure.

We also believe that there is a parallel Europe-wide effort by ASALA to develop a broad base of support for its political goals.



A press release of 28 July announced that the congress had created an Armenian Liberation Organization dedicated to international political efforts to gain an Armenian homeland. Failure by the congress and the new political organization to condemn Armenian terrorist violence may indicate that pro-ASALA delegates control both groups.

ASALA's indiscriminate violence has also provoked fragmentation within the terrorist ranks. A new splinter group—the ASALA Revolutionary Movement—was formed in Beirut in August 1983, pledging to continue the armed struggle but only against what they consider legitimate "military targets." We interpret "military targets" to mean Turkish diplomatic and official installations.

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ASALA has made contradictory statements regarding its relations with West European terrorist groups. Claims by some ASALA members of operational ties to the Italian Red Brigades and the Spanish Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) terrorists have been denied by ASALA spokesmen and communiques. ASALA has also claimed an alliance with the Kurdish Worker's Party (KWP) and joint participation, with the KWP, in an attack on the Turkish Consulate in Strasbourg, France, in November 1980. No other claims of joint operations have been issued. [redacted]

Foreign Government Links

Syria. Although Syria has given little assistance to ASALA in the past, we believe that this is changing in the wake of the invasion of Lebanon and the resulting evacuation of some ASALA members to Damascus. [redacted]

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Members of ASALA engaged in terrorist training in southern Lebanon. [redacted]



[redacted]

Iran. Although ASALA initially supported Khomeini's revolution, the 1981 execution of two ASALA members in Iran and the recent repression of Armenians there have caused ASALA to reverse its position. According to an Armenian nationalist journal, Khomeini is engaging in religious persecution of Armenians, including the closure of Armenian schools and the imposition of a "non-Islamic" tax on the Armenians. The Armenian Center in Isfahan was attacked by Revolutionary Guards in April 1981—on the anniversary of the genocide observed by Armenians around the world. Since the arrests of 51 Armenians in Paris after the Orly bombing, French installations in Tehran have been the target of several attacks by the Orly Group (an ASALA covername). We suspect these attacks may have been conducted with Iranian approval if not assistance. Franco-Iranian relations have been severely strained in the wake of French Government sanctuary for dissident Iranian hijackers of an Iranian aircraft in July 1983 and the sale of French military equipment to Iraq. [redacted]

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~~Secret~~**Armenian Terrorism:
Types of Attacks**

	Total	Unsuccessful Assassination Attempts	Assassinations	Bombing Incidents	Miscellaneous *
Total	203	17	12	161	8
1983	17	2	0	12	3
1982	23	5	2	15	1
1981	53	1	4	44	4
1980	51	2	5	44	0
1979	28	2	1	25	0
1978	14	1	0	13	0
1977	4	1	0	3	0
1976	6	1	0	5	0
1975	7	2	0	5	0

* Hostage/barricade incidents, grenade/machinegun attacks.

Turks. ASALA's apparent success in working out local accommodations with some European governments and its public statements to this effect may explain Ankara's attitude. The Turkish Government also believes that Armenian assassinations of Turkish diplomats have not received priority police attention. The threat of ASALA reprisals has periodically resulted in suspended sentences or expulsion of the ASALA members from a country. ASALA's public communiques regarding such concessions have heightened Turkish perceptions that some West European governments are sympathetic to the Armenian terrorist cause.

The Swiss Reaction

Swiss authorities may have been influenced by implicit ASALA threats following two separate arrests of ASALA members. On 3 October 1980, two ASALA operatives in Geneva were arrested after a bomb they were assembling detonated. A group calling itself the October 3 Organization immediately began a bombing campaign against the Swiss Government to force the release of the two prisoners. On 1 January 1981, ASALA declared a cessation of

The West European Response

Armenian terrorism has significantly strained Turkey's relations with several West European countries in which Armenian attacks have taken place (see table). In Ankara's view, the West Europeans—particularly the French and the Swiss—are doing far less than they could to thwart Armenian violence against

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The June 9 Organization began a bombing campaign in Switzerland to free ASALA operative Mardiros Jamgotchian, who was arrested for the murder of a Turkish diplomat in Geneva.

attacks against Switzerland until the trial date of one of the terrorists. Before the expiration of the ASALA deadline, one terrorist was given a suspended sentence, released, and banned from Switzerland for 15 years; shortly after the deadline, the other prisoner was given a suspended sentence and released.

The second Swiss-ASALA confrontation followed the arrest of ASALA operative Mardiros Jamgotchian on 9 June 1981 for the murder of a Turkish consular officer in Geneva. As in the previous case, a group calling itself the June 9 Organization began a bombing campaign against Swiss targets. Shortly after Jamgotchian was sentenced to 15 years in prison on 19 December 1981, ASALA publicly announced that attacks would cease so that it could work out Jamgotchian's release. ASALA indicated that it was declaring the truce in light of "new developments" in the case, presumably the judge's condemnation of the Turkish Government for not officially recognizing the 1915 massacre and his references to the plight of the Armenians.

In two subsequent appeals hearings, Jamgotchian's 15-year sentence has been upheld.

The French Connection

France at one time also maintained an informal channel with ASALA. This conduit may have facilitated negotiations after the arrest of the four ASALA members who, on 24 September 1981, seized the Turkish Embassy in Paris and killed a guard in the process. ASALA claimed that the police had promised political asylum for the ASALA members in return for their surrender and publicly gave the French until 22 November 1981 to release the four terrorists. In the absence of French action, ASALA resumed its attacks two days after the deadline. ASALA later announced that it was halting its attacks against French interests because the government had agreed to give the prisoners political status. This "truce" was broken after French authorities arrested Vicken Tcharkhutian in June 1982 for suspected involvement in a bombing in the United States. That summer ASALA conducted two bombings in Paris but halted its attacks once more when the French court refused to extradite Tcharkhutian to the United States. Tcharkhutian was subsequently released from custody and permitted to go to the Middle East. In January 1983 ASALA resumed its activity against Turkish targets in France.

Accommodation With Italy

ASALA has tried to arrange an agreement with Italy to halt the emigration of Armenians from their traditional homelands in the Soviet Union. ASALA called for the closure of all emigration centers in Italy on 22 December 1979 when the group attacked a Rome pension that housed Armenian emigrants. Hagopian claimed in a February 1982 interview that an agreement had been reached under which ASALA


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Figure 1
Armenian Terrorism: Number of Incidents per Country, 1975-83



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would not conduct attacks in Italy except against Turkish targets. In return, the Italians would close the emigration offices within six months. Although Hagopian later said that the Italians reneged by simply moving the offices and changing their names, there have been no more ASALA attacks in Italy.

The Turkish Response

Armenian terrorism is a serious domestic political issue. Unlike other political issues in Turkey, however, it arouses no significant disagreement along right-left lines. Most Turks, regardless of their political views,

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
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Figure 2
Armenian Terrorism: Attacks Claimed by Groups, 1975-83

Number of attacks



Total: 168 attacks

MMMO 284

share a common reaction to Armenian terrorism—anger, revulsion, and an intransigent unwillingness to accept the Armenian version of history. There is little disagreement across the Turkish political spectrum that Armenian terrorism should be dealt with firmly and directly.

The ASALA attack at Ankara's airport in August 1982—the first significant Armenian terrorist attack inside Turkey since 1979—focused public concern in Turkey on the threat posed by Armenian terrorists. Ankara's twofold public approach to the problem—refuting Armenian charges of genocide and threatening retaliation by Turkish "hit squads"—failed to still Armenian propaganda or halt terrorist attacks. Through diplomatic channels, the Turkish Government attempted to pursue coordinated international efforts to thwart Armenian terrorism.

Enhanced security precautions at Turkish installations also failed to deter terrorists whose fanaticism had, in some cases, reached "suicide operation"

proportions or whose skill and planning were superior to Turkish defensive measures.

the Turkish Government has begun exploring more active counterterrorist methods. We believe the training of commandos to strike against Armenian terrorists was initially aimed at defusing criticism within the Turkish Government of Evren's soft approach to terrorism. Although Turkish leaders have approved plans for using these squads, such a move would be politically costly. Turkey's military rulers are already smarting from the intense West European criticism of martial law and human rights abuses. We do not believe the government of Prime Minister Ozal would jeopardize military and economic aid from West European countries by officially and publicly sanctioning such attacks, which will be played up by the Armenian press.

The Armenian community in Turkey is unsympathetic to the terrorist groups. The Patriarch of the Armenian Gregorian Church in Istanbul has consistently spoken out, condemning the violence. Opposition to the terrorists derives principally from the community's fear that further attacks against Turkish interests might induce the Turks—frustrated by their government's inability to deal with the extremists abroad—to retaliate against Armenians in Turkey.

Impact on US Interests

The direct threat to American interests only emerged with the mid-1982 imprisonment of Armenian terrorists in the United States. On 30 May 1982, three ASALA terrorists were arrested for attempting to bomb the Air Canada freight terminal in Los Angeles. The bomb was intended to gain freedom for four Armenians who had been arrested in Toronto and were charged with conspiracy to extort money from wealthy Armenians in Canada. The conviction of the three ASALA members has not resulted in any retaliatory attacks to date, although, given ASALA's past record, attacks might still be conducted in an attempt to force the judge into giving the prisoners light sentences.

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Turkish diplomat slain in Paris in March 1987. [redacted]



The activities of Armenian terrorist groups have caused some tension between Ankara and Washington. Implying that Western intelligence agencies are withholding information, the Turks have pressed for specific identities, locations, and plans of Armenian terrorists. The United States does share information with the Turks, but US legal constraints prohibit the passage of information concerning US citizens and subjudice material. Several West European countries are legally limited from providing information on suspected Armenian terrorists who also hold citizenships in those countries. [redacted]

The Turks have requested US training in defensive counterterrorist techniques. A US-Turkish Committee on Armenian Terrorism was formed in 1982 in Ankara to discuss joint cooperation efforts, and the anticipated passage of legislation to fund the protection of foreign consular personnel in the United States may also ease Turkish pressure. [redacted]

Outlook

We believe the fragmentation within ASALA increases the threat of terrorist violence. The splintering of ASALA—as well as the continuing threat from the Justice Commandos—presage a struggle among the groups for support from the Armenian populace. We expect attacks against Turkish targets to be the focal point for this struggle. We believe that the failure of the Armenian Congress to renounce terrorist violence may be perceived by the terrorists as a green light to conduct attacks as a means of swaying Armenian public opinion to their cause. US residents, citizens, and property may also be future targets of Armenian terrorist groups, especially if the trend toward indiscriminate violence continues. [redacted]

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Neither stepped-up enforcement nor intelligence activities have noticeably impaired Armenian terrorist capabilities. Recent attacks show that Armenian terrorists can strike with virtual impunity. We suspect that ASALA's expanded contacts with Libya may eventually increase the group's terrorist potential. We believe Syrian involvement with ASALA may also bolster Armenian capabilities, particularly if Syria is providing training and a base of operations for ASALA terrorists. [redacted]

We expect that future Armenian attacks will increase the pressure on the Turkish Government to take strong action. Armed Turkish retaliation could further damage Ankara's international image and strain relations with other European nations. Any Turkish retaliation against Armenian terrorists would result in sharp Armenian retribution, probably in the form of more frequent and lethal attacks. Ankara will encounter added frustration as it pressures Washington and other NATO members for a unified international approach to terrorism. [redacted]

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Appendix

**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
January 1975–December 1983 ***

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1975			
20 January	Beirut, Lebanon	Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group	Bomb discovered at World Council of Churches office
8 February	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish tourist center
20 February	Beirut, Lebanon	Yanikian Group	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
22 October	Vienna, Austria	ASALA and JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador and driver
24 October	Paris, France	ASALA and JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador
28 October	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Rocket attack on Turkish Embassy
28 December	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Two rockets fired at Turkish Embassy
1976			
16 February	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Assassination of Turkish First Secretary
17 May	Frankfurt, West Germany	ASALA	Firebombing of Turkish Consulate
	Cologne, West Germany	ASALA	Firebombing of Turkish Consulate
	Essen, West Germany	ASALA	Firebombing of Turkish Consulate
28 May	Zurich, Switzerland	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Consulate and a Turkish bank
1977			
14 May	Paris, France	New Armenian Resistance (NAR) and Youth Action Group	Bombing of Turkish tourism office
29 May	Istanbul, Turkey	28 May 1977 Organization	Bombing of Yesilkoy Airport, killing six; bombing of train station
9 June	Rome, Italy	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican
20 October	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Bomb destroyed car of Turkish press attache
1978			
3 January	London, England	NAR	Bombing of Turkish bank
	Brussels, Belgium	NAR	Bombing of apartment of a Turkish Embassy counselor
10 March	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Three bombs exploded under cars owned by Turkish diplomats
2 June	Madrid, Spain	ASALA and JCAG	Assassination of brother, wife, and chauffeur of Turkish Ambassador to Spain
August	Ankara, Turkey	ASALA	Bombing of statue of Ataturk
	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Bombing of public buildings
1 October	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Bomb exploded at a bus stop in front of the Grand Mosque and in a waiting room of a car/passenger ferry landing; another bomb was discovered before it exploded in a railroad station
30 October	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Bombing of a cigarette factory

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The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat

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**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
January 1975–December 1983 * (continued)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
6 December	Geneva, Switzerland	NAR	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
12 December	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
17 December	Geneva, Switzerland	NAR	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
1979			
January	Madrid, Spain	JCAG	Bombing of British Airways and TWA offices
6 May	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Bombing of a Turkish Airlines trailer
8 July	Paris, France	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish tourism office and Turkish labor attache's office
22 August	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Attempted assassination of Turkish Vice Consul
27 August	Frankfurt, West Germany	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
29 September	Ankara, Turkey	ASALA	Two bombs were found in transit lounge in Esenboga Airport
5 October	Copenhagen, Denmark	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office, injuring two
12 October	The Hague, Netherlands	JCAG	Assassination of son of Turkish Ambassador
30 October	Milan, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
8 November	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
18 November	Paris, France	ASALA	Bombing of KLM, Lufthansa, and Turkish Airlines offices, injuring three
26 November	Madrid, Spain	ASALA	Bombing of TWA, Italian airlines, British Airways offices
9 December	Rome, Italy	NAR	Bombing of El Al and British Airways offices, injuring nine
17 December	London, England	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office, injuring one
22 December	Amsterdam, Netherlands	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of a pension housing Armenian emigrants
	Paris, France	Commandos of Armenian Avengers (probably JCAG)	Assassination of Turkish Press attache
23 December	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Air France and TWA offices and a small Armenian transit center
December	Istanbul, Turkey	Group not specified	Two bombings at Yesilkoy Airport
1980			
14 January	Paris, France	ASALA	Bombing of Lufthansa Airlines Office
19 January	Spain	JCAG	Bombing of British Airways, TWA, Swissair, and Sabena Airlines offices
1 February	Brussels, Belgium	NAR	Bombing of Aeroflot and Turkish Airlines offices
	Paris, France	NAR	Bombing of Soviet Information Office
6 February	Bern, Switzerland	JCAG	Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador
18 February	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of El Al, Lufthansa, and Swissair offices
10 March	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office, killing two and wounding 17
17 April	Rome, Italy	JCAG	Attempted assassination of the Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican

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~~Secret~~**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
January 1975–December 1983 * (continued)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
20 April	Marseilles, France	Black April	Attempted bombing of Turkish Consulate with a rocket
31 July	Athens, Greece	ASALA	Assassination of attache at Turkish Embassy
5 August	Lyon, France	ASALA	Attempted assassination of Turkish Consul
26 September	Paris, France	ASALA	Attempted assassination of Turkish Press attache
3 October	Milan, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of offices of magazine, <i>Panorama</i>
4 October	Milan, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
	Madrid, Spain	ASALA	Bombing of Alitalia office, injuring 12
6 October	Beverly Hills, United States	JCAG	Firebombing of Turkish Consul General's residence
8 October	Beirut, Lebanon	October 3	Bombing at Swiss Ambassador's house and bombing of Swiss Embassy car
9 October	Beirut, Lebanon	October 3	Bombing of Swissair and Iranian Airlines offices
	Beirut, Lebanon	October 3	Attempted bombing of Swiss Embassy
12 October	London, England	October 3	Bombing of Swiss Center (a restaurant and shopping complex)
	Los Angeles, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Music City Tours
	London, England	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
	New York City, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish mission to the United Nation
	Paris, France	October 3	Bombing of Swiss tourist office
20 October	Interlaken, Switzerland	October 3	Bomb discovered on train from Paris to Interlaken
4 November	Geneva, Switzerland	October 3	Bombing of Palace of Justice
10 November	Strasbourg, France	ASALA and Kurdish Worker's Party	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Swissair and Swiss national tourist offices
11 November	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office

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The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat

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~~Secret~~**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
January 1975–December 1983^a (continued)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
19 November	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
25 November	Geneva, Switzerland	October 3	Bombing of Geneva office of Union Bank
1 December	Paris, France	JCAG	Bombing of British Airways, Lufthansa, and Sabena Airlines offices
5 December	Marseilles, France	October 3	Bomb discovered at Swiss Consulate
11 December	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Attempted assassination of Turkish diplomat
16 December	London, England	October 3	Bomb discovered at the French tourist and railroad offices
17 December	Sidney, Australia	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish General Consul and bodyguard
25 December	Zurich, Switzerland	October 3	Bombing of Zurich airport radar
29 December	Madrid, Spain	October 3	Bombing of TWA and Swissair offices, injuring seven
30 December	Beirut, Lebanon	October 3	Bombing of Credit-Suisse Bank
1981			
12 January	Paris, France	ASALA	Attempted assassination of Turkish official
19 January	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA	Bombing of Armenian businessman's vehicle as part of extortion effort
27 January	Milan, Italy	October 3	Bombing of Swissair and the Swiss tourist office, injuring one

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~~Secret~~**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
January 1975-December 1983* (continued)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
3 February	Los Angeles, United States	October 3	Bomb discovered at Swiss Consulate
5 February	Paris, France	October 3	Bombing of Air France and TWA offices
22 February	Los Angeles, United States	ASALA	Attempted bombing of Swiss Consulate
	Los Angeles, United States	ASALA	Bombing of carpet store
4 March	Paris, France	ASALA	Assassination of Turkish Economic Counselor
12 March	Tehran, Iran	ASALA	Attempted takeover of Turkish Embassy
2 April	Copenhagen, Denmark	JCAG	Attempted assassination of Turkish Labor Counselor
9 June	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Assassination of Turkish consular officer
13 June	Anaheim, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Anaheim Convention Center
26 June	Los Angeles, United States	June 9	Bombing of Credit-Suisse Bank
28 June	Tehran, Iran	June 9	Bombing of Swissair office
1 July	Baghdad, Iraq	June 9	Bombing of Swissair office
19 July	Bern, Switzerland	June 9	Bombing of Swiss parliament
20 July	Zurich, Switzerland	June 9	Bombing at Zurich International Airport
21 July	Lausanne, Switzerland	June 9	Bombing of a department store
22 July	Geneva, Switzerland	June 9	Bombing at Geneva railway station
	Geneva, Switzerland	June 9	Bombing of Coravin
11 August	Copenhagen, Denmark	June 9	Bombing of Swissair office
20 August	Paris, France	October 3	Bombing of Alitalia office
	Los Angeles, United States	June 9	Bombing of Swiss watch company
22 August	Paris, France	October 3	Bombing of Olympic Airways
15 September	Copenhagen, Denmark	ASALA	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office (one bomb defused)
16 September	Tehran, Iran	June 9	Bombing of Swiss passport office
24 September	Paris, France	ASALA	Takeover of Turkish Consulate
3 October	Geneva, Switzerland	June 9	Bombing of courthouse and post office
10 October	Hollywood, United States	ASALA	Bombing of the Hollywood Palladium
25 October	Rome, Italy	ASALA	Attempted assassination of Second Secretary at Turkish Embassy
28 October	Paris, France	September France	Bombing of car near Eiffel Tower
29 October	Geneva, Switzerland	June 9	Attempted bombing of United Bank of Switzerland
	Paris, France	September France	Bombing of movie theater
2 November	Madrid, Spain	ASALA	Bombing of Swissair office, injuring four
3 November	Geneva, Switzerland	June 9	Bombing of the Palace of Justice and post office
12 November	Beirut, Lebanon	Orly Group	Bombing of Air France office and French cultural center
13 November	Paris, France	Orly Group	Grenade attack on police car
14 November	Paris, France	Orly Group	Grenade throws at tourist boats on the Seine

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**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
January 1975-December 1983* (continued)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
15 November	Beirut, Lebanon	Orly Group	Bombing of Air France, Banque Libano-Francaise, Union des Assurance de Paris, and Fransa Bank
	Paris, France	Orly Group	Bombing at McDonalds fast food restaurant
16 November	Paris, France	Orly Group	Bombing at Paris railroad station
20 November	Los Angeles, United States	JCAG	Bombing of the Turkish Consulate
21 November	Tehran, Iran	Orly Group	Bombing of Air France office and French Embassy
15 December	London, England	October 3	Bombing of Swissair office and Swiss Tourist Information Office
1982			
13 January	Switzerland	Group 15	Bombing of a match factory
14 January	Toronto, Canada	ASALA	Bombing of office of Honorary Consulate of Turkey
19 January	Paris, France	Orly Group	Bombing of Air France office
21 January	Paris, France	Orly Group	Bombing in 16th Arrondissement
28 January	Los Angeles, United States	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Consul General
15 March	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Bombing of a patrol car
16 March	Geneva, Switzerland	ASALA	Bombing of a patrol car
22 March	Cambridge, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
8 April	Ottawa, Canada	ASALA and Armenian Liberation Front (probably linked to JCAG)	Attempted assassination of Turkish Commercial Counselor
24 April	Cologne, West Germany	NAR	Attempted bombing of Turkish bank
	Dortmund, West Germany	NAR	Bombing of Turkish bank
4 May	Boston, United States	JCAG	Assassination of the Honorary Turkish Consul
21 May	Toronto, Canada	ASALA	Bombing of two cars of Armenian who was being escorted by ASALA
24 May	Beirut, Lebanon	ASALA in cooperation with radical Palestinians	Car bomb, killing 12 and injuring 25
27 May	Ottawa, Canada	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish military attache
30 May	Los Angeles, United States	ASALA	Bomb discovered at Air Canada freight terminal
7 June	Lisbon, Portugal	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish attache and wounding of wife, who later died
20 July	Paris, France	Orly Group	Bombing of a cafe in the Latin Quarter
21 July	Rotterdam, Netherlands	Red Armenian Army	Attempted assassination of Turkish Consul General
24 July	Paris, France	Orly Group	Bombing of a pub in the Latin Quarter
7 August	Ankara, Turkey	ASALA	Attempted hostage-taking situation at Esenboga Airport, killing 10 and wounding 78
8 August	Paris, France	Orly Group	Bomb discovered in front of a telephone company
9 September	Burgas, Bulgaria	Combat Units of Justice Against Armenian Genocide	Assassination of the Turkish administrative attache

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~~Secret~~**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,
January 1975–December 1983 * (continued)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
22 October 1983	Boston, United States	JCAG	Bomb found aboard Northwest Orient aircraft
22 January	Paris, France	ASALA Suicide Group of the Harnicavaharabyan Minas Simonian Commando Martyrs	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
	Paris, France	ASALA "Chabis Karabissazop"	Attempted bombing of Turkish airlines counter, Orly Airport
28 February	Paris, France	ASALA	Bombing of privately owned travel agency featuring trips to Turkey, in which one woman was killed
9 March	Belgrade, Yugoslavia	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia
24 May	Brussels, Belgium	ASALA	Bombings of Turkish travel agency and Turkish tourist office
16 June	Istanbul, Turkey	ASALA	Grenade and machinegun attack on bazaar, killing two and wounding 23
14 July	Brussels, Belgium	ASALA, JCAG, and Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)	Assassination of Turkish administrative attache
15 July	Paris, France	ASALA	Bomb exploded at Turkish Airlines counter at Orly Airport, killing eight and wounding 55
22 July	Tehran, Iran	Orly Group	Bombing of French Embassy and Air France office
25 July	Tehran, Iran	Orly Group	Bombing of French trade mission
27 July	Lisbon, Portugal	ARA	Takeover of Turkish Embassy, which resulted in killing of hostages and deaths of five terrorists
31 July	Tehran, Iran	Orly Group	Attempted bombing of Egyptian Interests Section offices (under diplomatic protection of France)
7 August	Tehran, Iran	Orly Group	Two bombings at Egyptian Interests Section office
10 August	Tehran, Iran	Orly Group	Car bombing at French Embassy compound
17 August	Tehran, Iran	Orly Group	Shooting of Air France employee

* The statistics in this chronology are drawn from our file of international terrorism and media reports on targets/victims that meet our criteria for an international event. These statistics are as accurate as the details of events allow. The groups or organizations listed for specific incidents are believed responsible, either by claim

or attribution made by police and security services based on method of operation or target attacked. Some of the names are believed to be cover names for organizations used to mislead police and security investigations or to inflate the number and strength of Armenian terrorist groups.

~~Secret~~

Approved for Release: 2013/04/30

APPENDIX 3B

Judgment of the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. of 15 March, 1985 in the Case of Igor Makhovskiy

Дело № 43

1985 г.

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П Р И Г О В О Р

Именем Азербайджанской Советской Социалистической Республики
Судебная коллегия по уголовным делам Верховного суда Азерб.ССР
по I инстанции

15 марта 1985 г. город Баку

в составе: председательствующего члена Верховного суда Зейналова А.
народных заседателей 1) Королевой Р.Ф. 2) Авагимова Р.А.

с участием прокурора Парсаденова О.
общественного обвинителя Попова О.М.

адвокатов Змудь И.М. и Карамановой С.С.

переводчика Алиева З.

при секретаре Новрузовой Р.М.

рассмотрев в открытом судебном заседании дело по обвинению

Маховского Игоря Михайловича, 1960 года рождения, уроженца города Баку, русского, гражданина СССР, члена ВЛКСМ, семейного, ранее не судимого, обучавшегося на первом курсе электро-механического факультета Азербайджанского института нефти и химии имени М.Азизбекова, проживавшего в городе Баку по адресу: 7-й микрорайон, дом.5, кв.53, у

в совершении преступления предусмотренного ст.ст.17, 94 п.6 и ст.с 17, 15, 94 п.п.4,6 УК Азерб.ССР

у с т а н о в и л а :

Подсудимый Маховский Игорь Михайлович, зная что его товарищ Вартанов Генрих Суренович с целью мести окружающим, которых считал виновными в неустроенности личной жизни, намерен совершить убиство людей путем взрывов в общественных местах поддержал эти преступные намерения и принял участие в совершении 8 сентября 1984 года в городе Баку взрыва в двухсалонном пассажирском автобусе марки "Икарус-28001" маршрута № 106 с государственным номерным знаком 90-II АГТ, в результате которого пассажир Сурхалидов Ф.К. скончалась от полученных телесных повреждений, пассажиром Максуровой Г.Д. и Мехтиева Т.Х. были причинены менее тяжкие телесные повреждения, а пассажиру Зорину В.С. - легкие телесные повреждения.

Преступление Маховским И.М. совершено при следующих обстоятельствах. Подсудимый Маховский И.М. в июле 1984 года, узнав о намерении Вартанова Г.С. с целью мести совершить убиство людей путем изготовления самодельного взрывного устройства поддержал его и принял активное участие в совершении преступления. По инициативе Маховского, во взрывном устройстве было применено электро-механическое приспособление для взрыва заряда в заданное время. Хорошо разбираясь в электротехнике и зная, что Вартанов не в состоянии изготовить электровзрыватель, Маховский в августе 1984 года изготовил его у себя на квартире, для чего использовал имевшиеся у него механический будильник "Слава", микропереключатель типа МП-II, бумажный конденсатор типа КБТ-4, провода марки МГТВ и ИВ, а также три гальванических элемента типа 373, представленные ему Вартановым.

Изготовив электровзрыватель, Маховский дважды в мастерской, оборудованной Вартановым в подвале дома, в котором проживал последние дни, пытался его на срабатывание по времени и, убедившись в надежности

Case No. 43 1985

J U D G M E N T

**In the name of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic
The Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of
the Azerbaijan S.S.R. of Original Jurisdiction**

15 March, 1985

City of Baku

Consisting of: Chairman of the Supreme Court A. Zeynalov,
People's Assessors (1) R. Koroleva, (2) R. Avagimov,
with the participation of Prosecutor O. Parsadanov,
Public Prosecutor O. Popov,
Lawyers I. Zmud and S. Karamanova, and
Translator Z. Aliev,
in the presence of Secretary R. Novruzova,
having heard in a public court session the case against

Igor Makhovskiy, born in 1960, living in Baku, Russian, a citizen of the Soviet Union, member of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol), married, previously unconvicted, first-year student at the Electromechanical Department of the Azizbekov Azerbaijan Institute of Petrochemistry, residing in Baku at the following address: 7th micro region, building 5, Apt. 53,

accused of committing the crime envisaged in Arts 17, 94(6) and Arts 17, 15, 94(4, 6) of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Criminal Code,

h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t :

Defendant Igor Makhovskiy, well aware that his companion Ghenrikh Vartanov intended to kill people by setting off bombs in public places to take revenge on those he blamed for his personal misery, supported these criminal intentions and was an accomplice to the explosion that occurred on 8 September, 1984 in the city of Baku in an articulated Ikarus-28001 passenger bus, state license plate 90-11 AGT, traveling route No. 106, as a result of which passenger F. Surkhalizade died from the injuries sustained, passengers G. Mansurova and T. Mekhtieva sustained less serious injuries, and passenger E. Zorin was slightly injured.

Makhovskiy's crime was committed under the following circumstances. In July 1984, defendant Makhovskiy, having learned of Vartanov's intention, for the purpose of revenge, to kill people by making a homemade explosive device, supported him and took active part in committing the crime. On Makhovskiy's initiative, an electromechanical gadget for detonating the charge at the given time was used to make the explosive device. Experienced in the use of electrical equipment and knowing that Vartanov could not make an electric detonator, in August 1984, Makhovskiy made the said detonator in his apartment using a Slava mechanical alarm clock, an MP-11 microswitch, a KBG-4 paper condenser, MGShV and IV wires, and three 373-type galvanic cells, with which Vartanov supplied him.

After making the electric detonator, Makhovskiy carried out two tests in Vartanov's workshop in the basement of the building where the latter lived and, being

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работы электровзрывателя, передал его Вартанову для использования во взрывном устройстве.

По предложению Маховского, во взрывчатом веществе самодельного взрывного устройства, помимо серы от спичек, были применены магний и марганец. Маховский, зная, что в мастерских аэропорта "Бина" имеются детали из сплава, содержащего магний, вместе с Вартановым во второй половине августа 1984 года поехали в указанный аэропорт, где представившись комсомольскими работниками, обманым путем присоединили у работников аэропорта Тунина В.Ф. и Айрапетяна А.Т. четыре диска от тормозного устройства самолета ТУ-134 "Б" из сплава, содержащего магний.

Маховский явился инициатором изготовления корпуса самодельного взрывного устройства из чугуна-наиболее хрупкого и хорошо раздробляющегося металла.

3 сентября 1984 года Вартанов по изготовленному им эскизу заказал за 15 рублей токаря опытно-экспериментального завода "Нефтемаш" Халковского В.Ф. чугунный корпус для взрывного устройства размерами: высотой 200 мм, наружным диаметром 100 мм, толщиной стенок 8 мм и толщиной дна 10 мм. Получив 6 сентября 1984 года готовый корпус, Вартанов, вечером того же дня изготовил взрывчатую смесь, используя для этого опилки от диска, содержащего магний, кристаллический марганец и серу от спичек, а затем собрал взрывное устройство, засыпав в чугунный корпус взрывчатую смесь, на которую уложил электромеханическое приспособление. Об изготовлении взрывного устройства Вартанов тут же, 6 сентября 1984 года уведомил Маховского, сообщив, что взорвет его в пассажирском автобусе.

8 сентября 1984 года, примерно в 12 часов Вартанов зашел и поставил часы электро-механического приспособления взрывного устройства на срабатывание через два часа, закомуфлировал его в два экземпляра газеты "Правда" от 30 августа 1984 года и поехал на конечную остановку автобусов, расположенную около колхозного рынка пос.Монтина г.Баку, где подложил подготовленное к взрыву устройство между сиденьями 5-го и 6-го рядов двухосевого пассажирского автобуса марки "Икарус-28001". маршрута № 106, государственный номерной знак 90-II АГТ. Примерно в 13 часов 50 минут на проспекте Нариманова, напротив здания политехнического института, когда в автобусе № 90-II АГТ находилось 19 человек, а в первом салоне куда было подложено изготовленное Маховским и Вартановым взрывное устройство, 12 человек произошел взрыв, в результате которого пассажир Сурхализаде Ф.И. скончалась от полученных телесных повреждений, пассажирам Мансуровой Г.Д. и Мехтиева Т.Х. были причинены менее тяжкие телесные повреждения, а пассажиру Зорину Е.С. - легкие телесные повреждения.

Будучи допрошенным в суде подсудимый Маховский И.М. в предъявленном ему обвинении виновным себя признал и показал, что с Вартановым Генрихом Суреновичем познакомился при случайных обстоятельствах в марте 1984 года и подружился. Вартанов рассказал, что в жизни ему не везет, материально обеспечен плохо, на работе постоянно подвергается унижениям, и потому хотел мстить "нечестным людям". При одной из встреч Вартанов спросил у него сможет ли сделать часовой механизм

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convinced that the electric detonator functioned reliably, gave it to Vartanov to be used in the explosive device.

At Makhovskiy's suggestion, magnesium and manganese were used in the explosive substance of the homemade explosive device, in addition to sulfur from matches. Makhovskiy, knowing that parts made from an alloy containing magnesium could be obtained at Bina airport, went with Vartanov to the said airport in the second half of August 1984, where, introducing themselves as Komsomol workers, received four disks from the brake mechanism of a TU-134 "B" plane made from a magnesium-containing alloy from airport employees V. Tunin and A. Hayrapetian by fraudulent means.

Makhovskiy suggested that the case of the homemade explosive device be made from cast iron, an extremely brittle metal that disintegrates easily.

On 3 September, 1984, Vartanov ordered a cast iron case in accordance with his blueprint for 15 rubles from machinist V. Khalkovskiy at the Neftemash experimental design plant for an explosive device 200 mm in height, with an outer diameter of 100 mm, walls 8 mm thick, and bottom 10 mm thick. After receiving the case on 6 September, 1984, Vartanov, prepared an explosive mixture in the evening of the same day using shavings from the magnesium-containing disk, crystal manganese, and sulfur from matches, and then assembled the explosive device, poured the explosive mixture into the cast iron case and placed the electromechanical gadget on top of the mixture. Vartanov immediately notified Makhovskiy on 6 September, 1984 that the explosive device was ready and that it would be detonated in a passenger bus.

On 8 September, 1984, at approximately 12:00 PM, Vartanov wound up and set the timer of the electromechanical gadget of the explosive device to go off in two hours, wrapped it in two copies of *Pravda* newspaper of 30 August, 1984 and went to the bus terminal located near the collective farm market in the settlement of Montino in Baku where he placed the device between the seats of the 5th and 6th rows of an articulated Ikarus-28001 passenger bus, state license plate 90-11 AGT, traveling route No. 106. At approximately 13:50, when the bus, carrying 19 passengers (12 of them in the front where the bomb had been planted), was traveling along Narimanov Avenue, across from the Polytechnic Institute, the device exploded, mortally wounding passenger F. Surkhalizade (who later died in the hospital), gravely injuring G. Mansurova and T. Mekhtieva, and slightly injuring E. Zorin.

When interrogated in court, defendant Makhovskiy pleaded guilty to the charge brought against him and related how he had met Vartanov by accident in March 1984 and they had become friends. Vartanov told him about his unfair lot in life, how poorly off he was, and how he was constantly insulted at work, so he wanted to take revenge on "dishonest people." During one of their meetings, Vartanov asked him if he

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для взрывного устройства, так как он сам пытался сделать такой механизм, однако ничего из этого не вышло. Подсудимый Маховский показал далее, что он согласился изготовить такое приспособление для взрывного устройства. Вартанов принес ему три батарейки типа "Марс", кроме этого он использовал свои электропровода, микропереключатель, конденсаторы и будильник марки "Слава", принадлежавшей его теще Новиковой В. Примерно в 10-х числах августа 1984 года он изготовил электромеханическое приспособление, испытал дважды в подвальном помещении квартиры Вартанова и передал ему для применения во взрывном устройстве. Маховский показал также, что Вартанов говорил о своем намерении совершить взрыв в автобусе или метро для того, чтобы погубило больше людей. Далее Маховский показал, что Вартанов в качестве заряда хотел использовать серу от спичек. Он предложил Генриху использовать в качестве заряда смесь магния и марганца, которые имеют свойства хорошо воспламеняться. И сказал, что магний можно достать в Бакинском аэропорту. 18 августа 1984 года вместе с Генрихом поехали в аэропорт "Бина" и купили четыре обода, содержащие магний и привезли домой. Маховский показал, что идея изготовления корпуса взрывного устройства из чугуна, объясняя это тем, что чугун наиболее хрупкий и хорошо раздробляющийся металл. 6 сентября 1984 года Генрих сообщил, что самодельное взрывное устройство он собрал и намерен подложить в автобус с людьми. 6 сентября 1984 года, примерно в 16-17 часов он встретился с Генрихом, который рассказал, что взрывное устройство подложил в автобус № 106, в котором произошел взрыв, и что имеются жертвы.

Вместе с тем, подсудимый Маховский показал в суде, хотя Вартанов предупреждал его о том, что использует взрывное устройство в автобусе с целью убийства большого количества людей, однако считая его человеком слова, а не дела, ~~что~~ не применит взрывное устройство. Этот довод подсудимого Маховского судебная коллегия считает не заслуживающим доверия по следующим основаниям.

Подсудимый Маховский из бесед с Вартановым знал, что он распространял по городу автоматические карандаши с иголками, а также листовки с тем, чтобы вызвать недовольство у людей. Указанные обстоятельства давали основания Маховскому считать, что Вартанов, поставившему перед собой цель достигая любыми средствами. Доводы подсудимого Маховского в этой части не состоятельны еще и потому что поддержав преступные намерения Вартанова совершить убийство людей путем взрывов, он принял активное участие в подготовке к совершению этого преступления, изготовил электромеханическое взрывное приспособление, подсказал использовать для взрывной смеси магний и помог его достать. Для того, чтобы от взрыва пострадало больше людей советовал использовать для изготовления корпуса взрывного устройства чугун, а также советовал подложить взрывное устройство в наиболее людных местах-чайхене и кинотеатре. Указанные обстоятельства свидетельствуют об умышленных действиях подсудимого Маховского. Совершенное Маховским преступление находит свое подтверждение и другими доказательствами, исследованными в суде. Так, из показаний свидетеля Халковского В.Ф., работающего токарем опытно-экспериментального завода "Нефтемаш" видно, что в конце августа, начале сентября 1984 года он по эскизу, представленному Вартановым изготовил чугунный стакан, и в ходе предварительного следствия представил оставшийся у него эскиз.

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could make a timer for an explosive device, since he had tried to make one himself but had been unable to. Defendant Makhovskiy went on to say that he agreed to make such a timer for the explosive device. Vartanov brought him three Mars batteries, in addition to which he used his own electric wires, microswitch, condensers, and a Slava alarm clock belonging to his mother-in-law V. Novikova. At the beginning of August 1984, he made the electromechanical gadget, tested it twice in a basement of Vartanov's apartment building and gave it to him to be used in the explosive device. Makhovskiy also said that Vartanov spoke about his intention to cause an explosion in a bus or the subway in order to kill as many people as possible. Makhovskiy went on to say that Vartanov wanted to use sulfur from matches as the charge. He suggested that Ghenrikh use a mixture of magnesium and manganese, which have good combustion properties. He said that magnesium could be obtained at an airport in Baku. On 18 August, 1984, he and Ghenrikh went to Bina airport and bought four magnesium alloy disks and brought them home. Makhovskiy said that it was his idea to make the bomb case out of cast iron, since cast iron is the most brittle metal and disintegrates easily. On 6 September, 1984, Ghenrikh reported that he had put together the explosive device and intended placing it in a bus full of people. On 8 September, 1984, at around 16:00-17:00, he met Ghenrikh, who told that he had put the explosive device in bus No. 106, in which there had been an explosion, and that there are victims.

At the same time, defendant Makhovskiy told in court that although Vartanov had warned him that he was going to set off the explosive device in a bus in order to kill a large number of people, he did not really think he would do it, being a man of words and not of deeds. The judicial chamber did not find this argument of defendant Makhovskiy credible on the following grounds.

From conversations with Vartanov, defendant Makhovskiy knew that he distributed propelling pencils with needles instead of pencil leads, as well as leaflets in order to make people angry. This was sufficient reason for Makhovskiy to believe that Vartanov would achieve his set goal by any means. Defendant Makhovskiy's arguments in this respect can also be considered unsubstantial since, by supporting Vartanov's criminal intentions to kill people by setting off a bomb, he took active part in the preparation of this crime by manufacturing the electromechanical explosive gadget, suggested using magnesium for the explosive mixture, and helping to procure it. He also suggested using cast iron for making the case of the explosive device to ensure more victims, and also proposed placing the explosive device in one of the most crowded places—a teahouse or movie theater. This testifies to the fact that defendant Makhovskiy's actions were premeditated. The crime committed by Makhovskiy is also confirmed by other evidence investigated in court. For example, the testimony of witness V. Khalkovskiy, a machinist at the Neftemash experimental design plant, makes it clear that at the end of August-beginning of September 1984, he made a cast iron case according to Vartanov's blueprint, and presented this same blueprint, which he still possessed, during the preliminary inquest.

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Допрошенный в суде свидетель Тунин В.Ф. показал, что он работает слесарем по ремонту самолетов в аэропорту "Бина" Примерно в первой половине августа 1984 года к нему подошли двое молодых людей, представившись комсомольскими работниками и спросили имеется ли у него магниевый сплав. Достав часть полукольца от самолета спросил ребят этот ли сплав им нужен. Парень русской национальности, как ему потом стало известно Маховский, ответил, что именно такой сплав им нужен. Второй парень по национальности армянин поминтересовался, можно ли взять еще этого металла. Он дал им еще три кольца от тормозного устройства колеса самолета. ТУ-134 б. Аналогичные показания дал свидетель Айрапетян А.Т.

Потерпевшая Мехтиева Т.Х. показала, что 8 сентября 1984 года примерно в 14 часов 30 минут возвращалась домой на автобусе маршрута № 106. Как только проехали перекресток у политехнического института в автобусе раздался громкий, резкий взрыв. Весь автобус наполнился серо-синим дымом, чувствовался сильный жар. После взрыва все закричали, вскочили со своих мест и стали выбегать из машины. Далее свидетель Мехтиева показала, что она почувствовала сильную боль в левой руке и правой ноге, обгорели также волосы на голове. В больнице ей оказали необходимую помощь.

Допрошенные в суде потерпевшие Мансурова Г.Д. и Зорин Е.С. показали, что они получили ожоги в автобусе маршрута № 106 при описанных выше обстоятельствах.

Допрошенная в больнице Сурхализаде Фатима Кямил кызы показывала, что 8 сентября 1984 года она ехала в автобусе № 106, увидев по сиденью сверток завернутый в газету, и решив, что кто-то из пассажиров забыл свой сверток, приоткрыла край газеты и увидела металлический предмет черного цвета. Не прошло и 2-х минут как этот предмет взорвался, оттуда вырвалось пламя и сильный дым, отчего она получила сильные ожоги.

Аналогичные показания дали свидетели Лобанова С., Евсеев В., Якубова К., Агаева Ф., Джаванян Г. и Гасанов А.

Допрошенные в суде врачи скорой медицинской помощи Расулова Х и Санькова Г. показали, что по вызову они приехали на место происшествия и оказали первую неотложную помощь пассажирам автобуса, пострадавшим от взрыва.

Свидетель Магеррамова С. показала в суде, что она работает в магазине, напротив Политехнического института и услышав взрыв, вышла из магазина, увидев женщину, пострадавшую от взрыва. помогла ей дойти до больницы.

Из заключения судебно-медицинской экспертизы (трупа) Сурхализаде Ф.К. № 828 от 13 сентября 1984 года видно, что причиной смерти послужила интоксикация от термического ожога I, II, III степени полученными ею в результате взрыва в автобусе 8 сентября 1984 года

Из заключений судебно-медицинских экспертиз за № 3740 от 3 октября 1984 года, № 3796 от 8 октября 1984 года и 3869 от 12 октября 1984 года усматривается, что в результате взрыва в автобусе,



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Witness Tunin, when interrogated in court, testified to the fact that he worked as an airplane repair mechanic at Bina airport. Some time during the first two weeks of August 1984, two young men approached him, introducing themselves as Komsomol workers, and asked if he had any magnesium alloy. Showing them a disk from one of the planes, he asked if this was the alloy they needed. The Russian guy, who he later found out was Makhovskiy, replied that it was precisely the alloy they needed. The second guy, an Armenian, asked if they could have some more of this metal. He gave them three more disks from a brake mechanism of a TU-134 “B” plane. Similar evidence was given by witness A. Hayrapetian.

Injured T. Mekhtieva testified that on 8 September, 1984 at around 14:30, she was traveling home on bus No. 106. As soon as it passed the intersection near the Polytechnic Institute, there was a loud, intense explosion. The bus filled with a gray-blue smoke and it became extremely hot. After the explosion, everyone began shouting, jumping up from their seats, and rushing out of the bus. Witness Mekhtieva went on to testify that she felt severe pain in her left arm and right foot, and her hair was scorched. She was attended to in the hospital.

Victims G. Mansurova and E. Zorin interrogated in court testified that they received burns in bus No. 106 under the circumstances described above.

Fatima Surkhalizade, interrogated in the hospital, testified that on 8 September, 1984, she was riding in bus No. 106; seeing something wrapped in newspaper under the seat and deciding that one of the passengers must have forgotten his parcel, she lifted the edge of the newspaper and saw a black metal object. No more than two minutes later, this object blew up producing flames and thick smoke, from which she was badly burned.

Similar testimonies were given by witnesses S. Lobanova, V. Evseev, K. Yakubova, F. Agaeva, G. Javanian, and A. Hasanov.

Emergency medical physicians Kh. Rasulova and G. Sankova testified that they were summoned to the scene of the crime and provided first emergency aid to the bus passengers and victims of the explosion.

Witness S. Magerramova testified in court that she works in a shop across from the Polytechnic Institute and, hearing an explosion, came out of the shop. Seeing a woman injured in the explosion, she helped her reach the hospital.

From the conclusion of the forensic medical examination of F. Surkhalizade (corpse) No. 828 of 13 September, 1984, it can be seen that the cause of death was intoxication from thermal burns of the first, second, and third degrees, received as a result of the explosion in the bus on 8 September, 1984.

It follows from the conclusions of forensic medical examinations No. 3740 of 3 October, 1984, No. 3796 of 8 October, 1984, and No. 3869 of 12 October, 1984 that as a result of the explosion in the bus, victims Mansurova and Mekhtieva received less

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потерпевшим Мансуровой и Мехтиева причинены менее тяжкие телесные повреждения, вызвавшие длительное расстройство здоровья, а Зорину легкое телесное повреждение, вызвавшее кратковременное расстройство здоровья.

При осмотре места происшествия были обнаружены чугунный корпус с навинчивающейся крышкой, части часового механизма марки "Слава", микропереключатель типа МП-II, остатки бумажного конденсатора типа КЕГ-4, обрывки проводов марки МГШВ и ИВ, части изоляционного материала, части элемента "373" и обрывки газеты "Правда" от 30 августа 1984 года.

При осмотре пустыря за домом, где жил Вартанов были обнаружены диски от тормозного устройства самолета ТУ-134 б, содержащего магни

Помимо изложенного вина подсудимого Маховского подтверждается следующими заключениями экспертов.

Заключением комплексной судебно-технической экспертизы от 12 сентября 1984 года о том, что корпус и крышка самодельного взрывного устройства изготовлены из серого чугуна марки СЧ 15 и, что указанные детали, в промышленности не применяются.

Заключением технико-химической экспертизы № 52 от 14 сентября 1984 года о том, что в качестве заряда взрывного устройства была использована пиротехническая смесь на основе мелкодисперсного магния и окислителей, которыми могли быть зажигательная масса спичечных головок и перманганат калия.

Заключением криминалистической экспертизы № 58 "а" от 2 октября 1984 года о том, что остатки предметов, изъятые с места взрыва, явились самодельным взрывным устройством, состоящим из корпуса и размещенных в нем самодельного пиротехнического заряда, будильника и электрической части, выполненной из последовательно соединенных проводами средств инициирования, микровыключателя и источника тока (трех батарей)

Заключением трассологических экспертиз за № 603 от 10 октября и № 665 от 17 октября 1984 года о том, что корпус и крышка взрывного устройства изготовлена на токарном станке типа 16 к 25 с применением различных резцов, а накатка на крышке взрывного устройства исполнена накатником, представленным в распоряжение следствия свидетелем Халковским В.Ф. По технологии, указанной свидетелем Халковским на допроса возможно изготовление корпуса и крышки взрывного устройства, изъятых с места происшествия.

Заключением дополнительной комплексно-взрывотехнической экспертизы № 61 от 18 октября 1984 года о том, что выброшенные подсудимым Маховским на свалку провода и изъятые провода с места взрыва, однородны, а при изготовлении СВУ применялся эпоксидный клей, в состав которого входила эпоксидная смола, имеющая родовую принадлежность с веществом, находящимся в пузырьке, выброшенным Маховским на свалку

Заключением комплексной криминалистической экспертизы № 60 от 26 октября 1984 года о том, что болванка, представленная свидетелем

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serious injuries, which caused long-term health impairment, while Zorin received a slight injury that caused short-term health impairment.

During an inspection of the scene, a cast iron case with screwed-on lid, parts of a Slava alarm clock, an MII-11 microswitch, remains of a KBG-4 paper condenser, pieces of MGShV and IV wire, scraps of insulating material, parts of a 373-type element, and scraps of *Pravda* newspaper of 30 August, 1984 were found.

During an inspection of the waste ground behind the building where Vartanov lived, disks from a brake mechanism of a TU-134 “B” plane containing magnesium were found.

In addition to the above, defendant Makhovskiy’s guilt is confirmed by the conclusions of the following experts’ examinations.

The conclusion of a complex judicial technical experts’ examination of 12 September, 1984 confirmed that the case and cover of the homemade explosive device were manufactured from gray cast iron of SCh 15 type and that the specified parts are not used in industry.

The conclusion of technical and chemical examination No. 52 of 14 September, 1984 confirmed that a pyrotechnic mixture based on fine magnesium and oxidizers was used as the charge for the explosive device, which could have been an incendiary mass of match heads and potassium permanganate.

The conclusion of forensic examination No. 58 “a” of 2 October, 1984 confirmed that the remains of the objects confiscated from the explosion site were a homemade explosive device consisting of a case and a self-made pyrotechnic charge, an alarm clock, an electric part made from a primer connected by means of wires, a microswitch, and a source of current (three batteries).

The conclusion of trace evidence examinations No. 603 of 10 October and No. 665 of 17 October, 1984 confirmed that the case and cover of the explosive device were made on a 16- to 25-type lathe using various cutters, and the knurl on the cover of the explosive device was made using the knurling tool presented to the investigation by witness V. Khalkovskiy. The technique specified by witness Khalkovskiy during the interrogation could have been used to make the case and cover of the explosive device confiscated from the scene.

The conclusion of additional comprehensive explosive experts’ examination No. 61 of 18 October, 1984 confirmed that the wires discarded by defendant Makhovskiy and the wires confiscated from the site of the explosion were the same, while an epoxy glue was used to make the homemade explosive device, which contains epoxy resin belonging to the substance found in the bottle Makhovskiy discarded at the waste dump.

The conclusion of comprehensive forensic examination No. 60 of 26 October, 1984 confirmed that the blank presented by witness Khalkovskiy and the case of the explosive

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Халковским и корпус взрывного устройства, из одной марки чугуна СЧ 15 1412-79. Сам корпус взрывного устройства и крышка не соответствуют эскизу, представленному им же, толщина спинки увеличена в 1,6 раза, толщина дна стакана увеличена в 2,3 раза, а толщина стенки крышки увеличена на 0,6 мм. Допущенные отклонения от эскиза, явились причиной разрушения корпуса СВУ на две части. При соблюдении же изготовлением СВУ всех заказанных размеров, в результате взрыва могли образоваться осколки, способные нанести находящимся в зоне их действия людям, телесные повреждения различной тяжести.

Заключением криминалистической экспертизы № 5/8 от 22 января 1985 года о том, что металл, приобретенный подсудимыми Вартановым и Маховским в аэропорту содержит магний.

Проверив материалы дела судебная коллегия считает, что исследованными в суде доказательствами вина подсудимого Маховского И.М. в совершенном преступлении полностью подтверждена.

Заключением судебно-психиатрической экспертизы № I/c от 15 января 1985 года установлено, что Вартанов Г.С. страдает хроническим психическим заболеванием в форме шизофрении, в отношении совершенного им общественно опасного деяния признан невменяемым, нуждающимся в направлении на принудительное лечение в психиатрическую больницу специального типа.

Судебная коллегия, обсуждая вопрос о правильности юридической квалификации совершенного Маховским преступления приходит к выводу о том, что действия Маховского, оказавшего Вартанову содействие в совершении умышленного убийства из мести при отягчающих обстоятельствах, то есть способом, применение которого заведомо было опасным для жизни многих лиц, надлежит квалифицировать по ст.17 и п.6 ст.94 УК Азерб.ССР.

Умышленные же действия Маховского, направленные на содействие в убийстве Вартановым двух и более лиц, поскольку преступные намерения не были осуществлены по причинам, независимым от его воли, следует квалифицировать по ст.ст.17, 15 и п.4,6 УК Азерб.ССР.

Поскольку подлежит доказыванию размер гражданского иска, заявленного представителем потерпевшей Мамедовой Ш. в сумме 3133 рубля, судебная коллегия признает право потерпевшего на иск с передачей вопроса о размерах удовлетворения иска на рассмотрение гражданского судопроизводства.

При назначении наказания судебная коллегия принимает во внимание характер и степень общественной опасности, совершенного преступления личность Маховского, обстоятельства дела, смягчающие и отягчающие ответственность.

Подсудимый Маховский И.М., ранее не судим, характеризуется положительно.

Вместе с тем судебная коллегия учитывает характер совершенного преступления, все обстоятельства дела, а также то, что преступление

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device were made from the same brand of cast iron SCh 15 1412-79. The case of the explosive device and cover do not correspond to the blueprint he presented, the back is 1.6-fold thicker, the bottom is 2.3-fold thicker, and the wall is 0.6 mm thicker. The deviations from the blueprint were the reason the case of the homemade explosive device broke in two. If the device had been made to order, it might have produced shards that could have inflicted injuries of varying severity on those within its range.

The conclusion of forensic examination No. 5/8 of 22 January, 1985 confirmed that the metal acquired by defendants Vartanov and Makhovskiy at the airport contains magnesium.

After examining the case papers, the judicial chamber considers that the evidence investigated in court fully confirms that defendant Igor Makhovskiy is guilty of the crime committed.

The conclusion of forensic psychiatric examination No. 1/c of 15 January, 1985 established that Ghenrikh Vartanov suffers from a chronic mental disease in the form of schizophrenia and cannot be held accountable for the socially dangerous act he committed, requiring compulsory treatment in a special lunatic asylum.

When discussing the accuracy of the legal qualification of the crime committed by Makhovskiy, the judicial chamber came to the conclusion that Makhovskiy's actions in assisting Vartanov to commit premeditated murder out of revenge under aggravating circumstances, that is, in a way that was intentionally life-threatening to many persons, should be qualified according to Art 17 and Art 94(6) of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Criminal Code.

Makhovskiy's premeditated actions to assist Vartanov in killing two or more persons, since the criminal intention was not carried out for reasons beyond his will, should be qualified according to Arts 17, 15 and 94(4, 6) of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Criminal Code.

Since the amount of the civil suit declared by a representative of injured Mamedova in the sum of 3,133 rubles requires substantiation, the judicial chamber recognizes the plaintiff's right to sue with transfer of the claim to civil legal proceedings for settlement.

When assigning punishment, the judicial chamber kept in mind the nature and degree of public danger of the committed crime, Makhovskiy's personality, and the attenuating and aggravating circumstances of the case.

Defendant Makhovskiy, previously unconvicted, has a positive character reference.

Nevertheless, the judicial chamber takes into consideration the nature of the committed crime, all the circumstances of the case, as well as the fact that Makhovskiy com-

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Маховским совершено в группе. С учетом вышесказанного судебная коллегия считает необходимым назначить отбывание Маховским первых пяти лет наказания в виде заключения в тюрьме.

На основании изложенного и руководствуясь ст.ст.319 - 325 УПК Азерб.ССР, судебная коллегия

п р и г о в о р и л а :

Маховского Игоря Михайловича признать виновным по ст.ст.17, 94 п.6 и ст.ст.17, 15, 94 п.п.4,6 УК Азерб.ССР. По ст.ст.17, 94 п.6 УК Азерб.ССР назначить пятнадцать лет лишения свободы. По ст.ст.17, 15, 94 п.п.4,6 УК Азерб.ССР назначить двенадцать лет лишения свободы. На основании ст.38 УК Азерб.ССР путем поглощения менее строгого более строгим окончательно определить наказание в виде лишения свободы сроком на пятнадцать лет с отбыванием первых пяти лет наказания в тюрьме, в остальной части наказания - в исправительно-трудовой колонии усиленного режима. Начало срока отбывания наказания исчислить с 21 сентября 1984 года.

Вещественные доказательства: металлический стакан, кольцо, пластину, части электробатарей, детали часов будильника, куски электропроводов, изоляционный материал, части микровыключателя, обрывки газеты "Правда", металлическую болванку, приспособление для накатывания на металл, три тормозных устройства, хозяйственную сетку, резиновые перчатки, пассатижи, коловорот, электронные реле времени, флакон с эпоксидной смолой, хранящиеся в следственном отделе КТБ Азербайджанской ССР -уничтожить.

Приговор окончательный, кассационному обжалованию не подлежит.

Председательствующий:

Народные заседатели:

Верно: член Верховного суда Азерб.ССР

Зейналов А.А.

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mitted the crime in a group. Taking into account the above-said, the judicial chamber deems it necessary for Makhovskiy to serve the first five years of punishment in prison.

On the basis of the above-stated and guided by Arts 319-325 of the Criminal Procedural Code of Azerbaijan S.S.R., the judicial chamber

h a s i s s u e d t h e f o l l o w i n g j u d g m e n t :

Igor Makhovskiy shall be found guilty under Arts 17 and 94(6) and Arts 17, 15, and 94(4, 6) of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Criminal Code. According to Arts 17 and 94(6) of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Criminal Code, he shall be sentenced to fifteen years of imprisonment. Under Arts 17, 15, and 94(4, 6) of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Criminal Code, he shall be sentenced to twelve years of imprisonment. Under Art 38 of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. Criminal Code, by means of incorporation of a less severe into a more severe punishment in the form of imprisonment for fifteen years, he shall serve the first five years of punishment in prison and the rest in a correctional labor colony with a reinforced regime. The term of punishment shall begin on 21 September, 1984.

Material evidence: metal case, disk, plate, electric battery parts, parts of an alarm clock, pieces of electric wires, insulating material, parts of a microswitch, scraps of *Pravda* newspaper, a metal blank, a metal knurling tool, three brake mechanisms, a string shopping bag, rubber gloves, flat-nose pliers, a brace drill, electronic timers, and a bottle of epoxy resin, which are kept in the investigative department of the KGB of the Azerbaijan S.S.R.—to be destroyed.

The sentence is final and not subject to cassation appeal.

Chairman:

People's Assessors:

This is a true certified copy:

member of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. *A. Zeynalov*

APPENDIX 3C

Judgment of the Tambov Garrison Military Court of 11 March, 1996 in the Case of Jahan Oganessian, Ashot Goloian, and Boris Simonian

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копия.

П Р И Г О В О Р № _____

Народной Российской Федерации

11 марта 1996 года, город Тамбов

Военный суд Тамбовского гарнизона в закрытом судебном заседании в расположении военного суда в составе:

Президиум Тамбовского гарнизона - полковника юстиции ВАСИЛЬКО И.А.,
нарядных заседателей - майоров МАКИЕВА И.И. и МУРАВЬЕВА С.С.,
при секретарях КУВЛОВИЧ В.А. и МАЦЕРИКОВОЙ В.А.,
с участием государственного обвинителя старшего военного прокурора 3 Управления Главной военной прокуратуры полковника юстиции ИМОТИНКОВА С.Г. и защитников - адвокатов ДАВЫДОВА В.С., БАРЕНЦОВА И.В. и СУКЛАВИЧЕВА С.И.,

бывшего

рассмотрел уголовное дело по обвинению начальника отдела разведывательных операций из территории противника Государственного Управления национальной безопасности Республики Армения подполковника запаса

ОГАНЕСЯНА ДЖАНА АНУШАЙИОУАЧА, родившегося 21 июня 1954 года в городе Ереване, армянина, гражданина Республики Армения, с высшим образованием, женатого, имеющего на иждивении двоих несовершеннолетних детей 1976 и 1984 года рождения, ранее не судимого, призванного для поступления в Высшую школу КГВ СССР в 1976 году районным военным комиссариатом имени 26 бакинских комиссаров города Еревана, воинское звание "лейтенант" присвоено в 1981 году,

в совершении преступлений, предусмотренных ст.ст.78 (в редакции закона РСФСР от 25 июня 1982 года и Указа Президента Верховного Совета РСФСР от 30 января 1984 года), 86, 15 и 86¹, 15 и 86¹ ч.2, 213³ ч.2, 15 и 213³ ч.2, ч.1 ст.217¹, 218 ч.1 УК РСФСР,

бывшего сотрудника Государственного Управления национальной безопасности Республики Армения майора запаса

ГОЛОИАН АШОТА АРАРАТОВИЧА, родившегося 23 августа 1957 года в городе Ереване, армянина, гражданина Республики Армения, с высшим образованием, женатого, имеющего на иждивении двоих детей 1987 и 1990 года рождения, ранее не судимого, работающего водителем-механиком фонда "Технологическое и интеллектуальное развитие России" в г.Москве, имеющего постоянную прописку и квартиру в городе Ереване, временно проживающего в г.Москве Солнцевский проспект" д.34, кв.148,

в совершении преступлений, предусмотренных ст.ст.78 (в редакции закона РСФСР от 25 июня 1982 года и Указа Президента Верховного Совета РСФСР от 30 января 1984 года), 86, 15 и 86¹, 15 и 86¹ ч.2, 213³ ч.2, 15 и 213³ ч.2, 218 ч.1 УК РСФСР

Copy.

J U D G M E N T N O. _____**IN THE NAME OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

11 March, 1996,

City of Tambov

The Military Court of the Tambov Garrison, in private at the court location, consisting of:

CHAIRMAN—Colonel of Justice P. Vlasenko,

PEOPLE'S ASSESSORS—Majors M. MAKEEV and S. MURAVIEV,

in the presence of Secretaries E. KURILOVA and V. MESHCHERIAKOV,

with the participation of public prosecutor, Senior Military Prosecutor of the Third Administration of the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office Colonel of Justice O. PLOTNIKOV and lawyers for the defense V. DIKOV, N. EVREINOV, and S. SUKALENKO,

having heard the criminal case against former head of the department of intelligence operations in enemy territory of the National Security Directorate of the Republic of Armenia Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserves

JAHAN ANUSHAVANOVICH OGANESSIAN, born on 21 July, 1954 in the city of Yerevan, Armenian, a citizen of the Republic of Armenia, with a higher education, married, with two dependent underage children born in 1978 and 1984, previously unconvicted, summoned for enrollment in the Higher School of the KGB of the Soviet Union in 1976 by the 26 Baku Commissars District Military Commissariat in the city of Yerevan, conferred the military rank of lieutenant in 1981,

accused of committing the crimes envisaged by Arts 78 (in the version of the R.S.F.S.R. Law of 25 July, 1962 and Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of R.S.F.S.R. of 30 January, 1984), 86, 15 and 86, 15 and 86.1 of Part 2, 213.3 of Part 2, 15 and 213.3 of Part 2, Art 217.1 of Part 1, 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code,

former employee of the National Security Directorate of the Republic of Armenia Major in the Reserves

ASHOT ARARATOVICH GOLOIAN, born on 23 August, 1957 in the city of Yerevan, Armenian, a citizen of the Republic of Armenia, with the higher education, married, with two dependent children born in 1987 and 1990, previously unconvicted, working as a driver-mechanic at the Technological and Intellectual Development of Russia Foundation in Moscow, and with permanent residence and an apartment in the city of Yerevan, temporarily living in Moscow at 34, Solntsevskiy Avenue, Apt. 148,

accused of committing the crimes envisaged in Arts 78 (in the version of R.S.F.S.R. Law of 25 July, 1962 and the Decree of Presidium of the Supreme Council of the R.S.F.S.R. of 30 January, 1984), 86, 15 and 86, 15 and 86.1 of Part 2, 213.3 of Part 2, 15 and 213.3 of Part 2, 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code,

2.

консультанта 2-го отдела Управления по борьбе с терроризмом
национальной службы контрразведки Российской Федерации майора

СИМОНЯН БОРИС АШОТОВИЧ, родившегося 8 декабря
1952 года в городе Брэване, армянина, гражданина
Российской Федерации, с высшим образованием, женато-
го, имеющего на иждивении несовершеннолетнего ребен-
ка 1982 года рождения, ранее не судимого, воинское
звание "лейтенант" присвоено после окончания Высшей
школы КГБ СССР в 1981 году, проживавшего по адресу:
Московская область, г. Реутов, Мобильный проспект,
д. 12, кв. 251,

в совершении преступлений, предусмотренных ст.ст. 15 и 213³ ч.2,
в редакции Закона РСФСР от 25 июля 1962г. и Указа Президента
Российского Совета РСФСР от 30 января 1984 года), 15 и 86¹ ч.2,
ст. 1, 260 п. "б" УК РСФСР.

судебным следствием военный суд

у с т а н о в и л:

В феврале 1993 года Оганесян, являвшийся начальником отдела
разведывательных операций на территории противника Государствен-
ного управления национальной безопасности Республики Армения, за-
явил жителю Калининградской области Российской Федерации Хат-
ковскому для совершения разведывательных операций и террористиче-
ских действий на территории Республики Азербайджан.

(в настоящее время Хатковский осужден Верховным Судом Азер-
байджана за шпионаж и терроризм к 8 годам лишения свободы и отби-
тия наказания на территории Азербайджана).

В середине мая 1993 года в городе Минеральные Воды Оганесян
пошел у неустановленного следствием лица 7 тротильных шашек,
гранату РГД-5 с запалом, 2 взрывателя МУВ-2, 3 запала Мд-5, 4
детонатора марки Мд-8-А, 12 метров детонирующего шнура и
шнуров огнепроводного шнура.

В тот же день в городе Минеральные Воды он поставил задачу
Хатковскому на закладку в состав товарного поезда в городе дер-
бент, следующего в Азербайджан взрывного устройства, передав Хат-
ковскому 7 тротильных двухсотграммовых шашек, взрыватель МУВ-2,
гранату и гранату РГД-5 с запалом, а остальные приобретенные
Хатковским при посредничестве и гранату спрятав вместе с Хатковским в
дербенте, откуда впоследствии Хатковский забрал их, перевез домой
и спрятал их дома до изъятия их органами следствия в мае 1994 года.

Выполняя указание Оганесяна, Хатковский на железнодорожной
станции дербент 19 мая 1993 года заложил под полувагон состава
товарного поезда взрывное устройство, состоящее из 7 тротильных
шашек и двух взрывателей, не выислав направления движения поезда.
Хатковский поручил ближайшему исполнителю Хатковским подготовленных дейст-
вий взрывателем и взрывателем замедленного действия подрыва

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consultant of the Second Department of the Counterterrorism Administration of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation, Major

BORIS VAZGENOVICH SIMONIAN, born on 8 December, 1952 in the city of Yerevan, Armenian, a citizen of the Russian Federation, with a higher education, married, with a dependent underage child born in 1982, previously unconvicted, conferred the military rank of lieutenant after graduating from the Higher School of the KGB of the Soviet Union in 1981, residing at the following address: 122, Yubileyny Avenue, Apt. 251, Reutov, Moscow Region,

accused of committing the crimes envisaged by Arts 15 and 213.3 of Part 2 (in the version of the R.S.F.S.R. Law of 25 July, 1962 and Decree of Presidium of the Supreme Council of the R.S.F.S.R. of 30 January, 1984), 15 and 86.1 of Part 2, 213.3 of Part 2, 260("b") of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code,

h a s e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t :

In February 1993, Oganessian, who was head of the department of intelligence operations in enemy territory of the National Security Directorate of the Republic of Armenia, recruited Khatkovskiy, a resident of the Kaliningrad Region of the Russian Federation, to carry out intelligence and terrorist operations in the Azerbaijan Republic.

(At present, Khatkovskiy has been sentenced by the Supreme Court of Azerbaijan to 8 years of imprisonment, to be served in the territory of Azerbaijan, for espionage and terrorism.)

In mid-May 1993, in Mineralnye Vody, Oganessian procured 7 TNT blocks, RGD-5 grenades with fuses, two MUV-2 detonators, three MD-5 fuses, four KD-8-A detonating caps, 12 meters of detonating cable, and 46 meters of fuse from an unidentified person.

The same day in Mineralnye Vody, he asked Khatkovskiy to place an explosive device in a freight train in the city of Derbent going to Azerbaijan, after giving Khatkovskiy seven two hundred-gram TNT blocks, a MUV-2 detonator, two fuses, and an RGD-5 grenade with a fuse. He and Khatkovskiy hid the other explosive devices and grenade in the same place, which Khatkovskiy later retrieved, took home, and kept them prior to confiscation by the investigation authorities in May 1994.

Following Oganessian's instructions, on 19 May, 1993, Khatkovskiy placed the explosive device consisting of seven TNT blocks and two detonators under the boxcar of a freight train at the Derbent railway station, without determining which the direction the train was going. Due to Khatkovskiy's unreliable preparation of the firing fuse and delay action detonator, the explosive device failed to go off, and on 30 May, 1993, it was

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взрывного устройства не произошло и 30 мая 1993 года оно было обнаружено и изъято обходчиком вагонов заместителем на станции Изверальные Воды и передано правоохранительным органам.

В конце мая 1993 года Оганесян на армянском участке Ваганьковского кладбища города Москвы приобрел у неустановленного следствием гражданина 9 тротильных пачек весом 200 гр каждая, взрыватели и запал, которые некоторое время хранил, а затем передал их гражданину Хатковскому, который 2 июня 1993 года изготовил взрывное устройство и подорвал им пустой пассажирский вагон на железно-дорожной станции Баку.

В первых числах июля 1993 года Оганесян вновь приобрел у неустановленного следствием гражданина 3,4 кг тротила, 4 взрывателя замедленного действия ВЗДМ, 15 взрывателей иных наименований, 6 запалов, 3 заряда взрывчатого вещества к минам замедленного действия, пистолет ИМ серии ИР : 1115, 42 патрона калибра 9 мм, пистолет ТТ серии ХБ : 3516, 8 патронов калибра 7,62 мм, боевой патрон калибра 7,62 мм, которые хранил в квартире матери своей сожительницы в городе Москве.

В начале июля 1993 года он передал Симонову 3,4 кг тротила, 4 взрывателя ИВБ-2; 2 запала ВДМ и 2 взрывателя ВЗДМ. До 17 июля 1993 года приобретенные взрывчатые вещества Симонов хранил у себя на работе, а 17 июля 1993 года по указанию Оганесяна передал Хатковскому в номере гостиницы "Измайловская" 1,2 кг тротила, 2 взрывателя ИВБ-2, 2 запала ВДМ и взрыватель ВЗДМ, которые были изъяты у гражданина Хатковского при его задержании в городе Баку и в его тайнике.

Оставшиеся взрывчатые вещества Симонов передал обратно Оганесяну в начале сентября 1993 года.

Взрывчатые вещества и средства взрывания Оганесян продолжал хранить в квартире матери своей сожительницы в городе Москве, где они были изъяты во время обыска после задержания Оганесяна 13 мая 1994 года.

Кроме того, пистолет ИМ серии ИР : 1115 Оганесян носил в указанное время, а пистолет ТТ серии ХБ : 3516 до 12 января 1994 год

12 января 1994 года, улетая из Москвы в Ереван, Оганесян передал для сохранения Голояну пистолет ТТ серии ХБ : 3516 с восемью боевыми патронами. Знает, что пистолет является боевым, Голоян отвез его на хранение в квартиру гражданина Метросяна, где пистолет длительное время хранился, а затем, после ареста Голояна и Оганесяна в начале июня 1994 года, был передан родственнику Метросянов р. ботнику милиции Лусейнову, который и выдал его 16 июня 1994 года.

Кроме того, подсудимые Оганесян, Голоян, Симонов органами при задержании обвиняются в том, что:

- совместно с гражданином Хатковским в феврале-июле 1993 года, объединившись в устойчивую организованную группу, разработали план террористических актов, распределили роли между собой и, преследуя

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discovered and confiscated by train inspector Izmestiev at the Mineralnye Vody train station and handed over to the law-enforcement agencies.

At the end of May 1993, Oganessian procured 9 TNT blocks, weighing 200 grams each, detonators, and fuses from an unidentified person at Vagankov cemetery in Moscow, which he kept for some time and then gave to Khatkovskiy, who used them to make an explosive device on 2 June, 1993 and blew up an empty passenger carriage at a railway station in Baku.

At the beginning of July 1993, Oganessian once again procured from an unidentified person 3.4 kg of TNT, four VZD6Ch delayed action detonators, 15 other types of detonator, six fuses, three explosive charges for delayed action mines, a PM pistol (KR series No. 1115), 42 9mm caliber cartridges, a TT gun (HB series No. 3516), eight 7.62mm caliber cartridges, and a 14.5mm caliber service cartridge, which he kept at the apartment of his girlfriend's mother in Moscow.

At the beginning of July 1993, he gave Simonian 3.4 kg of TNT, two MUV-2 detonators, two MD5M fuses, and two VZD6Ch detonators. Until 17 July, 1993, Simonian kept the acquired explosives at work, and after 17 July, 1993, according to Oganessian's instructions, he gave 1.2 kg of TNT, two MUV-2 detonators, two MD5M fuses, and a VZD6Ch detonator to Khatkovskiy in his room at the Izmailovskaya Hotel, which were confiscated in Baku and in his hiding place during Khatkovskiy's detention.

Simonian gave the remaining explosives back to Oganessian at the beginning of September 1993.

Oganessian continued to store explosives and blasting supplies in the apartment of his girlfriend's mother in Moscow, where they were confiscated during a search after Oganessian's arrest on 13 May, 1994.

Oganessian was also carrying a PM pistol (KR series No. 1115) at the indicated time, as well as a TT gun (HB series No. 3516) until 12 January, 1994.

When he flew from Moscow to Yerevan on 12 January, 1994, Oganessian gave Goloian the TT gun (HB series No. 3516) with eight service cartridges for safekeeping. Knowing it was a service gun, Goloian brought it to Petrossian's apartment for safekeeping, where the gun was kept for a long time, and then, after Goloian and Oganessian's arrest at the beginning of June 1994, he gave it to police officer Huseynov, who was a relative of Petrossian, who in turn handed it over on 16 June, 1994.

Defendants Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian are also accused by the preliminary inquest agencies of the following:

—together with Khatkovskiy in February-July 1993, after joining into a stable organized group, they developed a plan to carry out terrorist acts, distributed the roles among themselves and, with the aim of having an impact on the decision-making of the authorities of Azerbaijan, using Khatkovskiy as the executor, on 19 May, 1993, placed an explosive device in a freight train in Derbent, and in July 1993 placed an explosive device under the collector of a gas pipeline in Baku, but since the explosion did not occur, against their

цель оказать воздействие на принятие решения органами власти Азербайджана, используя Хатковского как исполнителя, 19 мая 1993 года заложили взрывное устройство в вагон грузового поезда в городе Дебенте, а в июле 1993 года заложили взрывное устройство под коллектор газопровода в городе Баку, но так как взрыва не произошло по вине их воли, то их действия квалифицировали по ст.ст. 15 и 213 ч.2 УК РСФСР, как приготовление и покушение на терроризм;

- Оганесян, Голоян и Хатковский, объединившись в организованную группу, распределив роли, преследуя цель нарушения общественной безопасности и оказавши воздействие на принятие решений органами власти Азербайджанской Республики 2 июня 1993 года произвели совместно с Хатковским подрыв пассажирского вагона на железнодорожной станции Баку и этими действиями совершили преступление, предусмотренное ст. 213 ч.2 УК РСФСР;

- Голоян, совместно с Оганесяном и Хатковским, совершил в период 19-30 мая 1993 года покушение на подрыв товарного вагона грузового поезда, чем совершил по выводам следствия преступление, предусмотренное ст.ст. 15 и 86 УК РСФСР;

- Оганесян и Голоян, действуя в составе организованной группы совместно с Хатковским в Баку, 2 июня 1993 года организовали и совершили подрыв пассажирского вагона, чем совершили умышленное повреждение подвижного состава, которое повлекло нарушение нормальной работы транспорта, преступление, предусмотренное ст.86 УК РСФСР;

- объединившись в устойчивую группу с Хатковским в последних числах мая 1993 года в городе Баку совершили действия, направленные на подрыв газопровода, но не довели их до конца по причинам, не зависящим от их воли, т.е. совершили преступление, предусмотренное ст.ст. 15 и 86 ч.2 УК РСФСР;

- в период с 19 мая 1993г. по 20 июля 1993 года Оганесян трижды в составе организованной группы и 3-и лично, Голоян дважды в составе организованной группы в этот же период и Симонян один раз 20 июля 1993 года в составе организованной группы переместили через Государственную границу Российской Федерации (СССР) сокрытые в специальных хранилищах взрывчатые вещества, оружие, средства взрывания т.е. преступление, предусмотренное ст.76 УК РСФСР (в редакции Закона РСФСР от 25 июня 1992 года и Указа Президиума Верховного Совета РСФСР от 30.01.1984г.);

- Оганесян 4 июля 1993 года, следуя авиарейсом "Бреван-Москва" в качестве пассажира, перевоз на воздушном судне взрывчатые вещества, т.е. совершил преступление, предусмотренное ч.1 ст.117¹ УК РСФСР;

- Симонян, являясь должностным лицом (консультантом отдела), отвечая за выявление террористических групп, с февраля 1993 года по май 1994 года систематически злоупотреблял служебным положением, проявлял бездействие, из личной заинтересованности укрывал, активно помогал деятельности группы, руководимой Оганесяном, что повлекло тяжкие последствия - совершение группой терроризма, контрабанды повреждение транспортных средств и газопровода, приобретение, хранение и сбыт взрывчатых веществ и оружия, а также существенный материальный ущерб в размере 20 тыс.руб, т.е. преступление, предусмотренное ст.200, п."б" УК РСФСР.

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will, their actions were qualified under Arts 15 and 213.3 of Part 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code as preparations for and attempted terrorism;

—Oganessian, Goloian, and Khatkovskiy after joining into an organized group and distributing roles, pursuing the aim of violating public safety and having an impact on the decision-making of the authorities of the Azerbaijan Republic, on 2 June, 1993, set off a bomb, in cooperation with Khatkovskiy, in a train at a railway station in Baku and, by these actions, committed the crime envisaged by Art 213.3 of Part 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code;

—Goloian, in cooperation with Oganessian and Khatkovskiy, attempted, between 19-30 May, 1993, to blow up a boxcar of a freight train, thus committing, according to the facts uncovered by the investigation, the crime envisaged by Arts 15 and 86 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code;

—Oganessian and Goloian, working as a part of organized group, in cooperation with Khatkovskiy, organized and carried out an explosion in a passenger carriage on 2 June, 1993 in Baku, in so doing causing deliberate damage to rolling stock and disrupting normal operating procedures, thus committing the crime envisaged by Art 86 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code;

—after forming a stable group with Khatkovskiy, at the end of May 1993 in Baku, they made preparations to blow up a gas pipeline, but were unable to carry through their plans for reasons beyond their will, thus committing the crime envisaged by Arts 15 and 86.1 of Part 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code;

—between 29 May, 1993 and 20 July, 1993, Oganessian, three times as a part of an organized group and three times individually, Goloian, twice as a part of an organized group during the same period, and Simonian, once as a part of an organized group on 20 July, 1993, moved explosives concealed in special containers, guns, and blasting supplies across the border of the Russian Federation (Soviet Union), thus committing the crime envisaged by Art 78 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code (in the version of R.S.F.S.R. Law of 25 July, 1962 and Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. of 30.01.1984);

—on 4 July, 1993, Oganessian took explosives on the airplane he boarded as a passenger from Yerevan to Moscow, thus committing the crime envisaged by Art 117.1 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code;

—Simonian, as an official (a department consultant), responsible for identifying terrorist groups, systematically abused his official position between February 1993 and May 1994, by showing inaction and concealing the terrorist activity out of personal interest, thus actively assisting the activity of the group run by Oganessian, which led to grave consequences, carried out group terrorism, smuggling, damage to transportation vehicles and a gas pipeline, acquisition, storage and sale of explosives and guns, as well as substantial material damage of 20 thousand rubles, that is, committed the crime envisaged by Art 260("b") of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

5.

В судебном заседании подсудимые Оганесян, Голоян и Симонян виновными себя в предъявленном обвинении органами предварительного следствия не признали и при этом пояснили:

- Оганесян, - что в феврале-марте 1993 года, он, будучи начальником подразделения ГвГВ Армении познакомился с гражданином Хатковским, который представился журналистом газеты "Демократический Альзит". Будучи заинтересованным в объективном освещении событий в нагорном Карабахе он поддерживал с ним отношения как в Ереване, так и в Москве. Однако никаких поручений криминального характера Хатковскому не давал, взрывчатых веществ и средств взрывания ему не передавал, указаний где и какие взрывы он должен был осуществить на территории Азербайджана и России не давал. В связи со служебной деятельностью в учебных целях он дважды на армянском наряде г. Москвы от неизвестного ему лица по условленным обстоятельствам получал взрывчатые вещества, средства взрывания и пистолет 12, о чем было известно руководству ГвГВ Армении. Указанные взрывчатые вещества он хранил в квартире матери своей сожительницы в городе Москве, ни в Ереван, ни из Еревана в Москву никаких взрывчатых веществ и средств взрывания ни на самолете, ни на ином виде транспорта не перевозил, контрабандой оружия и взрывчатых веществ в период с февраля 1993 года по май 1994 года не занимался.

Вылетая из Москвы в Ереван 12 января 1994 года он в машину, управляемой Голояном, по своей забывчивости оставил пистолет 12 марки ХБ 301С с дарственной надписью "Мелкумову от Ашд", который был неисправен, т.к. ствол пистолета был просверлен. После возвращения в Москву об этом пистолете забыл.

Подсудимый Оганесян также заявил, что никакую преступную группу с участием Голояна и Симоняна он не организовывал, а поддерживал с ними дружеские отношения, как с земляками и с товарищами по работе, иногда высказывая им некоторые просьбы.

Голоян, - что после увольнения в 1992 году из органов госбезопасности Армении он продолжал поддерживать дружеские отношения с Оганесяном и Симоняном и после переезда на работу в г. Москву в фирму "Иирр". Однако ни в период проживания в Ереване до июня 1993 года, ни в период проживания в Москве до его задержания 13 июля 1994 года он ни в какую организованную группу Оганесяном не вступал и никаких действий, связанных с подготовкой и проведением террористических актов на территории Азербайджана и России не осуществлял. Только в июне 1993 года по просьбе Оганесяна и Симоняна вместе с Симоняном в районе гостиницы "Измайловская" передал Хатковскому, которого знал как знакомого Оганесяна 50 тыс. рублей, на что Хатковский передал исполненную на фотобумаге расписку, содержание которой он не помнит.

12 января 1994 года в аэропорту "Внуково" перед вылетом в Ереван Оганесян оставил в его машине пистолет марки 12, номера которого он не запомнил, но на нем была надпись "Мелкумову от Ашд", обоймой боевых патронов к пистолету. Указанный пистолет он отдал жене своего начальника по фонду "Иирр" Абдрахмановой и оставил в квартире.

5.

During the trial, defendants Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian pleaded not guilty to the charges brought against them by the preliminary inquest agencies, explaining this as follows:

—Oganessian said that in February-March 1993, he, as division head of the National Security Directorate of Armenia, became acquainted with Khatkovskiy, who introduced himself as a journalist of the *Democratic Tilsit* newspaper. Being interested in objective coverage of the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, he kept in touch with him both in Yerevan and in Moscow, however he did not give Khatkovskiy any criminal assignments, did not pass on any explosives or blasting supplies to him, nor give him any instructions about where and what explosions he was to carry out in Azerbaijan and Russia. In relation to his professional activity, he twice received explosives, blasting supplies, and a PM pistol from an unidentified person at the Armenian cemetery in Moscow for training purposes and under agreed circumstances, which the leadership of the National Security Directorate of Armenia knew about. He kept the specified explosives in the apartment of his girlfriend's mother in Moscow. He did not take any explosive substances or blasting supplies either from Moscow to Yerevan, or from Yerevan to Moscow by plane, or by any other means of transport, nor was he engaged in trafficking weapons and explosives between February 1993 and May 1994.

When he flew from Moscow to Yerevan on 12 January, 1994, he left a TT gun (HB series No. 3516) by mistake in the car driven by Goloian with an inscription "for Melkumov from the NKVD," which was out of commission, since the gun barrel had been perforated. After he returned to Moscow, he forgot about this gun.

Defendant Oganessian also declared that he did not organize any criminal group with Goloian and Simonian's participation, but maintained friendly relations with them as with compatriots and fellow students, sometimes asking them to do things.

—Goloian said that after he was discharged from the state security agencies of Armenia in 1992, he continued to maintain friendly relations with Oganessian and Simonian after moving to Moscow to work for the TIRR company. However, he did not join any organized group with Oganessian or perform any actions relating to the preparation and carrying out of acts of terrorism in the territory of Azerbaijan or Russia, either while he was living in Yerevan before June 1993, or while living in Moscow before his detention on 12 January, 1994. Only since July 1993, at the request of Oganessian and Simonian, he together with Simonian gave Khatkovskiy, whom he knew as Oganessian's acquaintance, 50 thousand rubles near the Izmailovskaya Hotel, for which Khatkovskiy gave him a receipt on photographic paper, the content of which he did not remember.

On 12 January, 1994 at Vnukovo airport before his departure for Yerevan, Oganessian left a TT gun in his car, the number of which he did not remember, but it had an inscription "for Melkumov from the NKVD," with a holder of service cartridges belonging to the gun. He took the specified gun to Abdrakhmanova, his boss's wife at the TIRR company, and left it in her apartment.

Симонян, - что по просьбе своего товарища Оганесяна в феврале 1993 года встретил на Ваганьковском кладбище г.москвы граждан на Хатковского, о котором знал как о человеке, который сочувствует армянам в их войне в Нагорном Карабахе.

по просьбе Оганесяна он неоднократно бронировал Хатковскому места в гостинице "Россия". вместе с тем, как заявил Симонян, он не знал о какой-либо противоправной деятельности Хатковского совместно с Оганесяном, каких-либо взрывчатых веществ и средств взрыва от Оганесяна не получал и Хатковскому не передавал.

17 июля 1993 года в гостинице "Змайловская" встречался с Хатковским и передал ему 30 тыс.рублей по просьбе Оганесяна. в этот же день Хатковский передал ему пачку зашвеченной (отобумажки для использования в бытовых целях, которую он хранил дома. Несмотря на полное отрицание своей вины подсудимыми их виновность подтверждается совокупностью доказательств, исследованных в суде.

Как следует из сообщения и.о.начальника ГШБ Республики Армения шахназарова Оганесян и Голоян каких-либо заданий по организации и проведению спецмероприятий на территории России не получали, личное оружие, взрывчатые вещества и средства подрыва при выезде их в командировку в Российскую Федерацию им не выдавались. "Котовский" Игорь Анатольевич по учету ГШБ Армении не проходит.

Между тем, допрошенный в судебном заседании свидетель Мурашкин пояснил, что он в июне 1992 года познакомился с Оганесяном Джааном, представившемся сотрудником ГШБ Армении. в ходе состоявшегося разговора Оганесян предложил участвовать в войне на стороне Армении против Азербайджана, а позже определил его для подготовки в центр спецназа в санаторий "Ареник" для последующего участия в специальных операциях. Оганесян часто выезжал в Москву и от туда привозил оружие и специальное снаряжение.

Как следует из протокола опознания Мурашкин в ходе предварительного следствия 9 ноября 1994 года по фотографии опознал Оганесяна, как своего непосредственного начальника, а также Голояна, с которым часто встречался в здании I Управления ГШБ Армении.

из исследованных в суде показаний допрошенного в ходе предварительного следствия правоохранительными органами России в качестве свидетеля Хатковского следует, что он в конце 1992 года от семьи Осемян (беженцев из Нагорного Карабаха) получил предложение участвовать в войне против Азербайджана на стороне Армении. приняв предложение из-за стремления поправить свое материальное положение он прибыл в Эриван, где в конце января 1993 года познакомился с Оганесяном и согласился сотрудничать со спецслужбой Армении. в марте 1993 года, будучи в Калининградской области, через знакомых получил удостоверение журналиста газеты "Демократический Тильзит" которое использовал в ходе неоднократных поездок в г.Баку в разведывательных целях и для совершения террористических актов.

6.

—Simonian said that at the request of his friend Oganessian, in February 1993, he met Khatkovskiy, whom he knew as someone who sympathizes with the Armenians in their war in Nagorno-Karabakh, at the Vagankov cemetery in Moscow.

At Oganessian's request, he reserved Khatkovskiy a room at the Rossiya Hotel on several occasions. However, as Simonian declared, he did not know about any joint activity between Khatkovskiy and Oganessian, did not receive any explosives or blasting supplies from Oganessian, and did not give them to Khatkovskiy.

On 17 July, 1993, he met Khatkovskiy in the Izmailovskaya Hotel and, at Oganessian's request, gave him 30 thousand rubles. The same day Khatkovskiy gave him a pack of exposed photographic paper for household use, which he kept at home. Despite complete denial of their guilt, the body of evidence investigated in court confirms their culpability.

As follows from the report by Shakhnazarov, acting chief of the National Security Directorate of the Republic of Armenia, Oganessian and Goloian had not been given any assignments to organize or carry out special operations in Russia, nor had they been issued any personal weapons, explosives, or blasting supplies upon their departure for a business trip to the Russian Federation. Igor "Kotovskiy" is not registered with the National Security Directorate of Armenia.

Meanwhile, witness Murashkin, interrogated during a court session, explained that in June 1992, he became acquainted with Oganessian, who introduced himself as an employee of the National Security Directorate of Armenia. During the conversation, Oganessian suggested that he take part in the war against Azerbaijan on the side of Armenia, and later arranged for him to participate in training at a special troops center at Arevik sanatorium for subsequent participation in special operations. Oganessian often went to Moscow and from there brought back weapons and special equipment.

As follows from an identification report, on 9 November, 1994, during the preliminary inquest, Murashkin identified Oganessian on a photograph as his direct boss, as well as Goloian, whom he often met at the National Security Directorate of Armenia.

It follows from the testimony Khatkovskiy gave in court when interrogated during the preliminary inquest by the Russian law-enforcement agencies as a witness that at the end of 1992, he received an offer from the Osepien family (refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh) to participate in the war against Azerbaijan on the side of Armenia. Accepting the offer in an effort to improve his financial situation, he went to Yerevan, where at the end of January 1993, he became acquainted with Oganessian and agreed to cooperate with the intelligence service of Armenia. In March, 1993, while in the Kaliningrad Region, he was supplied by acquaintances with identification of a journalist of the *Democratic Tilsit* newspaper, which he used during numerous trips to Baku for intelligence purposes and for carrying out acts of terrorism.

В конце февраля 1993 года познакомился на Саганьковском кладбище г. Москвы при помощи условленного пароля с Симоняном, который неоднократно устраивал его в гостиницу "Россия" по брони № Б. 17 июля 1993 года Симонян принес в номер гостиницы "Измайловская" 6 тротильных шашек и взрыватели, которые они упаковали в коробку из-под фотобумаги, а фотобумагу он отдал Симоняну. В тот же день Симонян для поездки в Баку дал ему 30 тыс., а Голоюна передал еще 50 тыс. рублей, о чем он на листе фотобумаги написал расписку о получении денег.

Хатковский также пояснил, что в середине мая 1993 года в городе Минеральные Воды, куда из Москвы он прилетел вместе с Оганесяном, Оганесян передал ему семь двухсотграммовых тротильных шашек, взрыватель, 3 запала и гранату РГД-5 с запалом. Другие взрывоопасные предметы - 4 гранаты, огнепроводный шнур они спрятали в тайнике недалеко от вокзала, откуда он, Хатковский, забрал их и увез домой в Калининградскую область. Во время передачи взрывчатых веществ и средств взрывания Оганесян поставил ему задачу произвести закладку взрывного устройства в один или два состава на станции Дербент, которые следовали бы в Азербайджан. Из-за дефицита времени и страха быть разоблаченным он, Хатковский, не видя направления движения поезда 19 мая 1993 года заложил прятанное им взрывное устройство в один из грузовых вагонов на станции Дербент, о чем доложил Оганесяну.

В конце мая 1993 года он получил от Оганесяна 9 тротильных шашек, взрыватели, с помощью Голоюна упаковал их, уехал в г. Баку, где на железнодорожной станции заложил под пустой пассажирский вагон взрывное устройство и подорвал его.

17 июля 1993 года в гостинице "Измайловская" г. Москвы, выполнив задание Оганесяна взял у Симоняна, который принес в гостиницу взрывчатые вещества и средства взрывания, 6 двухсотграммовых тротильных шашек, 3 взрывателя и 2 запала, а также деньги от Симоняна - 30 тыс. руб. и Голоюна - 50 тыс. рублей, с которыми уехал в Баку, где 6 августа 1993 года был задержан, а взрывчатые вещества изъяты. Хатковский также пояснил, что из порученных взрывчатых веществ часть он устанавливал под газовым коллектором в г. Баку, но затем, отказавшись от взрыва, изъезд их.

Свидетель также пояснил, что за период работы с Оганесяном получил от него и через Голоюна и Симоняна, примерно, 470 тысяч рублей для поездок в Азербайджан, а также в качестве вознаграждения.

Эти свои показания Хатковский подтвердил и при проведении очных ставок с участием Симоняна, Голоюна, Оганесяна в присутствии их адвокатов.

Согласно протоколу задержания от 6 августа 1993 года у Хатковского при его задержании полицией города Баку изъяты две тротильные шашки, перевязанные между собой изолентой, моток изоленты типа "скотч" и другие вещи, а согласно протоколу проверки показаний на месте от 7 августа 1993 года Хатковский в городе Баку указал место в районе дома № 4 по улице Алекперова, где он спрятал в черном целлофановом пакете находившемся в коробке из-под фотобумаги, окле-

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At the end of February 1993, he became acquainted with Simonian at the Vagankov cemetery in Moscow using a modified password, who made reservations for him at the Rossiya Hotel on several occasions through the Federal Security Service (FSS). On 17 July, 1993, Simonian brought six TNT blocks and detonators to his room in the Izmailovskaya Hotel, which they packed in a photographic paper box, and he gave the photographic paper to Simonian. The same day, Simonian gave him 30 thousand rubles for a trip to Baku, and Goloian gave him another 50 thousand rubles, for which he wrote a receipt on a sheet of the photographic paper.

Khatkovskiy also explained that in the middle of May 1993, in Mineralnye Vody, where he arrived with Oganessian from Moscow, Oganessian gave him seven two hundred-gram TNT blocks, a detonator, three fuses, and the RGD-5 grenade with a fuse. They hid other explosive supplies—two grenades and some detonating fuse—in a hiding place near the station, from where he, Khatkovskiy, retrieved them and took them home with him to the Kaliningrad Region. During transfer of the explosives and blasting supplies, Oganessian asked him to place an explosive device in one or two trains at the Derbent station going to Azerbaijan. Due to the shortage of time and fear of being exposed, he, Khatkovskiy, without finding out the direction of the train, on 19 May, 1993, placed the explosive device he had prepared in one of freight cars at the Derbent station, which he reported to Oganessian.

At the end of May 1993, Oganessian gave him 9 TNT blocks, detonators, with Goloian's help he packed them, went to Baku, placed the explosive device under an empty carriage at the railway station, and detonated it.

On 17 July, 1993 at Izmailovskaya Hotel in Moscow, carrying out Oganessian's assignment, received six two hundred-gram TNT blocks from Simonian, who brought explosives, blasting supplies, three detonators, and two fuses to the hotel, as well as 30 thousand rubles from Simonian and 50 thousand rubles from Goloian, with which he went to Baku, where on 6 August, 1993, he was detained and the explosives were confiscated. Khatkovskiy also explained that he placed some of the explosive supplies listed under a gas collector in Baku, but then, deciding not to detonate them, withdrew them.

The witness also explained that when working with Oganessian, he received from him and through Goloian and Simonian, approximately 470 thousand rubles for trips to Azerbaijan, as well as by way of remuneration.

Khatkovskiy also confirmed this testimony during a line-up with Simonian, Goloian, Oganessian's participation in the presence of their lawyers.

According to the detention report of 6 August, 1993, two TNT blocks bound with insulating tape, a reel of adhesive tape, and other things were confiscated from Khatkovskiy during his detention by the police of Baku, and according to the onsite testimony verification report of 7 August, 1993, Khatkovskiy showed the place in Baku at 4, Alikperov Street where, in a black plastic bag, he had hidden four TNT blocks in a

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енные лентой "скотч" 4 тротильные шашки, а в пачке из-под сигарет "Монгана" - 3 детонатора.

Тот факт, что Хатковский в конце января 1993 года ушел для участия в войне на стороне Армении по ее рекомендательному письму своим знакомым, следует из показаний свидетеля Осепян - беженки из нагорного Карабаха.

Как следует из заявления правоохранительным органам жены Хатковского - гражданки Ермоленко, примерно, в июле 1993 года Хатковский привез домой две гранаты РГД-5, два взрывателя к ним, 4 детонатора и два мотка шнура - черного и желтого цвета.

В ходе состоявшихся у них разговоров она узнала, что ее муж выполняет какие-то задания армянских спецслужб, ездит в город Баку, занимается производством взрывов. Так как муж просил - она о его деятельности никому не рассказывала.

Согласно акту добровольной выдачи Ермоленко 22 апреля 1994 года выдала правоохранительным органам две гранаты РГД-5, 2 запала к ним, 4 детонатора и два мотка огнепрободного и детонирующего шнура.

Из протокола обыска от 13 мая 1994 года усматривается, что на квартире матери сожительницы Станесяна гражданки Лочневой в городе Москве работниками МС были обнаружены и изъяты: граната РГД-5 с запалом, 11 двухсотграммовых тротильных шашек, 3 шашки из вещества оранжевого цвета, подрывная машинка, более 20 различных взрывателей, конические воронки, пистолет ИЖ-18Б серии К², патроны, штык-нож к автомату Калашникова.

Как следует из протокола осмотра места происшествия от 30 мая 1993 года на первом пути Северного парка железнодорожной станции Минеральные воды в поезде № 1215 в буферной балке автосцепки вагона № 00048923 обнаружено и изъято взрывное устройство, состоящее из 7 тротильных шашек и детонатора взрывателя.

Дежурный по Минераловодскому Л. С. лейтенант милиции Карагланов в своем рапорте на имя Минераловодского транспортного прокурора сообщил, что при осмотре грузового поезда № 1215 осмотрщик вагонов изместьев на буферной балке обнаружил черный целлофановый пакет, в котором находилась коробка из-под цветной фотобумаги, а в ней 6 тротильных шашек. К одной из них прозрачной лентой был прикреплен предмет похожий на детонатор. Эти вещи изместьев отнесены дальше от железной дороги под дерево. Он же, Карагланов, составил протокол осмотра места происшествия по показаниям изместьева на местности.

Из справки и натурального листа, представленного начальником железнодорожной станции Дербент следует, что вагон № 00048923 19 мая 1993 года находился в городе Дербенте, откуда был отправлен 23 мая 1993 года по установленному маршруту на ст. Максим Горький Приволжской железной дороги.

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photographic paper box wrapped in adhesive tape and three detonators in a Montana cigarette box.

It follows from the testimony of witness Osepian, a refugee from Nagorno-Karabakh, that Khatkovskiy left at the end of January 1993 to participate in the war on the side of Armenia based on a letter of recommendation she send to her acquaintances.

According to the statement of Khatkovskiy's wife, Ermolenko, to the law-enforcement agencies, around July 1993, Khatkovskiy brought home two RGD-5 grenades, two ignition fuses to them, four detonators, and two reels of fuse—black and yellow in color.

During their ensuing talks, she learned that her husband was carrying out some assignments from the Armenian intelligence services, traveling to Baku, and engaged in carrying out explosions. At her husband's request, she did not tell anyone about his activity.

According to an act of voluntary surrender, on 22 April, 1994, Ermolenko gave the two RGD-5 grenades, the two ignition fuses to them, four detonators, and two reels of safety and detonating fuse to the law-enforcement agencies.

From the search report of 13 May, 1994, it follows that FSS employees found and confiscated an RGD-5 grenade with an ignition fuse, 11 two hundred-gram TNT blocks, three blocks of an orange colored substance, a blasting machine, more than 20 various detonators, conic funnels, a PM pistol (KR series No. 1115), cartridges, and a bayonet knife to a Kalashnikov assault rifle in the apartment of Oganessian girlfriend's mother, citizen Kochneva, in Moscow.

As follows from the report of the inspection of the scene of 30 May, 1993, an explosive device consisting of seven TNT blocks and a detonator was discovered and confiscated on the first track of the northern depot of the Mineralnye Vody railway station in train No. 2515 in a buffer beam of an automatic coupling of carriage No. 60048923.

The person on duty at the Mineralnye Vody Line Internal Affairs Department, police lieutenant Karaglanov testified in an official report addressed to the Mineralnye Vody transport prosecutor that during an inspection of freight train No. 2515, carriage inspector Izmistiev found a black plastic bag, in which was a color photographic paper box containing 6 TNT blocks, on a buffer beam. An object similar to a detonator was attached to one of the blocks with transparent tape. Izmistiev removed these items as far as possible from the railroad track and placed them under a tree. He, Karaglanov, drew up the inspection report according to Izmistiev's testimony at the site.

It follows from the fact sheet and consigner list presented by the chief of Derbent railway station that on 19 May, 1993, carriage No. 60048923 was in the city of Derbent, from where it departed on 28 May, 1993 along the established route to Maxim Gorky station of the Volga railroad.

9.

То обстоятельство, что 16 мая 1993 года Хатковский и Оганесян вместе вылетали из аэропорта Внуково в город Минеральные Воды, имели места в самолете: 22а и 22б подтверждается корешками авиационных билетов, исследованными в суде.

Согласно проведенному в ходе следствия следствию эксперменту взрывное устройство, замоченное под балку товарного вагона грузового поезда в силу своеобразной конструкции балки могло находиться там длительное время и не выпасть при движении поезда.

Свидетель Долгова (знакомая Хатковского) пояснила в суде, что познакомилась с Хатковским в городе Баку. В июне 1993 года ездила с ним в Москву. При этом номер в гостиницу "Госсин" помог им приобрести Борис по брони органов безопасности. Будучи в городе Минеральные Воды Хатковский показывал ей недалеко от железнодорожного вокзала тайник, где у него находилась взрывчатка.

Как следует из протокола обыска от 13 мая 1994 года органам предварительного следствия в квартире Симоняна изъяты, наряду с другими предметами, 71 лист засвеченной фотобумаги.

По заключению эксперта-криминалиста 71 лист фотобумаги, изъятой у Симоняна, при изготовлении, исходит из характеристики бумаги и надписей на коробке, которая была изъята со взрывчаткой у Хатковского 6 августа 1993 года, мог быть упакован в указанную коробку.

Согласно заключению экспертов-криминалистов от 23 сентября 1994 года № 38, проводивших комплексную криминалистическую экспертизу взрывчатых веществ, средств взрывания и иных предметов, изъятых у Хатковского, Оганесяна, Армоденко, а также заключению экспертов-криминалистов от 6 января 1995 года № 18, проводивших комплексную криминалистическую экспертизу 6 тротильных пашек, изъятых 6 и 7 августа 1993 года в г. Баку однородны по химическому составу между собой, а также с 6 тротильными пашками, обнаруженными на ж.д. станции Минеральные Воды 30 мая 1993 года, 11 тротильными пашками, изъятыми у Оганесяна, фрагментами тротильной палки, обнаруженной и изъятой 11 июня 1993 года сотрудниками Минералводовского ГОУ, и двумя фрагментами тротильной палки, изъятой у заместителя начальника Минералводовского ГОУ, где они являются взрывчатыми веществами военного назначения.

Три палки оранжевого цвета изготовлены из гексогена - бризантного взрывчатого вещества военного назначения. Они однородны между собой по своему химическому составу и не однородны по химическому составу с тротильными пашками. Эксперты также указали, что среди представленных на исследование с тротильных пашек, изъятых 6 и 7 августа 1993г. в г. Баку, с тротильных пашек, обнаруженных на ж.д. станции Минеральные Воды и 11 тротильных пашек, изъятых при обыске у Оганесяна имеются группы пашек, на бумажных обложках которых маркировочные надписи отпечатаны с одной печатной формы, изготовлены на одном и том же предприятии и с различной степенью вероятности могут быть отнесены к одной партии промышленного выпуска.

9.

The fact that on 16 May, 1993, Khatkovskiy and Oganessian flew together from Vnukovo airport to Mineralnye Vody, occupying seats 22a and 22b, is confirmed by the ticket stubs examined in court.

According to the experiment carried out during the investigation, the explosive device placed under the beam of the boxcar of the freight train could have remained there for a long time and not fall out during movement of the train owing to the beam's special design.

Witness Dolgova (Khatkovskiy's acquaintance) explained in court that she became acquainted with Khatkovskiy in Baku. In June 1993, she went with him to Moscow. Boris helped them to get a room in the Rossiya Hotel using the security services reservation privilege. When they were in Mineralnye Vody, Khatkovskiy showed her the hiding place near the railway station where he kept explosives.

As follows from the search report of 13 May, 1994 by the preliminary inquest agencies, 71 sheets of exposed photographic paper, along with other objects, were confiscated in Simonian's apartment.

According to the conclusion of the forensic experts' examination, judging from the characteristics of the paper and inscriptions on the box confiscated from Khatkovskiy on 6 August, 1993, the 71 sheets of photographic paper could have been packed in the specified box.

According to the conclusion of the forensic experts (No. 38 of 23 September, 1994) who carried out a comprehensive forensic examination of the explosives, blasting supplies, and other items confiscated from Khatkovskiy, Oganessian, and Ermolenko, as well as the conclusion of the forensic experts (No. 68 of 6 January, 1995) who carried out an additional comprehensive forensic experts' examination, the six TNT blocks confiscated on 6 and 7 August, 1993 in Baku are identical in chemical composition. They are also identical to the six TNT blocks found at the Mineralnye Vody railway station on 30 May, 1993, to the 112 TNT blocks confiscated from Oganessian, to the fragments of the TNT block found and confiscated on 1 June, 1993 by the staff of the Mineralnye Vody municipal police department, as well as to two fragments of a TNT block confiscated from the deputy chief of the Mineralnye Vody Department of Internal Affairs. All of them are explosive substances designed for military use.

Three orange-colored blocks are made of hexogen—a high explosive designed for military use. They are identical in chemical composition among themselves and not identical in chemical composition to the TNT blocks. Experts also specified that among the six TNT blocks presented for examination confiscated on 6 and 7 August, 1993 in Baku, the six TNT blocks found at the Mineralnye Vody railway station, and the 11 TNT blocks confiscated during a search of Oganessian's apartment, there are groups of blocks, on the paper covers of which the inscriptions are printed in the same way and which are made at the same enterprise, and with a varying degree of probability they can be related to the same consignment.

10.

Взрыватели ИД-5а, ИДВ-2 и ИД-5а являются изделиями военно-технического назначения и предназначены для взрывания зарядов ВЗ. Гранаты ИД-5, запалы УЗРГВ-2 относятся к взрывчатым веществам состоят и используются в вооружении армейских подразделений, являются взрывными устройствами - штатными боеприпасами.

По выводам эксперта-криминалиста Л. ЗБ от 16 августа 1994 года пистолет ИД, изъятый у Оганесяна серии ИД : 1115 является штатным нарезным огнестрельным оружием военного образца. Пистолет исправен и пригоден для производства выстрелов.

Выводы экспертов, как научно-обоснованные, данные специалистами высокой квалификации военный суд считает достоверными.

Из рапорта начальника УВБ ОВД Чертаново-Ажное Хусейнова следует, что 13-14 мая 1994 года его двоюродная сестра Абдрахманова передала ему сверток на хранение, не сказав, что в нем. 16 июля 1994 года, после того, как сестра позвонила и сообщила, что ее вызвали на допрос в органы безопасности, он осмотрел сверток и обнаружил там пистолет ТТ с именной надписью на ствольной части "А.Мелкумову от ИВВД СССР, 1945 год", обойму к пистолету ТТ с 6 патронами калибра 7,62мм, обойму к пистолету ИД с 6 патронами калибра 9 мм, 21 мелкокалиберный патрон, пистолет мелкокалиберный, газовый револьвер "Гуар-80" и другие предметы.

Об обнаруженном в свертке оружии сразу доложила своему начальнику.

Материалы уголовного дела по мелкокалиберному пистолету, пистолету "Гуар-80", патронам малокалиберным и к пистолету ИД выделены в отдельное производство в отношении гражданина Петросяна).

4 июля 1994 года экспертами-криминалистами войсковой части 1443 было дано заключение, что представленный на исследование пистолет конструкции Токарева (ТТ) ИД : 3010 исправен и пригоден для производства выстрелов соответствующими патронами как оружие военного образца.

В ходе предварительного следствия Оганесяном было заявлено ходатайство о проведении повторной криминалистической экспертизы пистолета. По заявлению Оганесяна на момент изъятия пистолета в его ствольной части имелось сквозное отверстие, которое было затем заделано сотрудниками УВД Р. для приведения оружия в пригодное состояние.

В соответствии с заключением экспертов-криминалистов Российского федерального центра судебной экспертизы пистолет ТТ серии ИД : 3010 собран из разных частей и деталей пистолета указанной конструкции.

Экспериментальная стрельба показала о пригодности пистолета к производству выстрелов.

Вместе с тем эксперты установили нарушение целостности ствола, который был ранее просверлен, а затем заварен и обработан. Установить время ремонта ствола не представилось возможным из-за отсутствия методик такого исследования.

10.

VZD-6ch, MUV-2 and MD-5M detonators are weaponry intended for detonating explosive material. RGD-5 grenades and UZRGM-2 fuses are explosive materials. They are used by army subdivisions, and are in fact explosive devices—regular ammunition.

According to the conclusions of forensic expertise (No. 35 of 15 August, 1994), the PM pistol confiscated from Oganessian (KR series No. 1115) is a regular military rifled firearm. The pistol is serviceable and can be used for firing.

The military court considers the experts' conclusions reliable as scientifically justified and presented by highly qualified specialists.

As follows from the official report of Huseynov, chief of the Chertanovo Yuzhnoye Department of Internal Affairs, on 13-14 May, 1994, his cousin Abdrakhmanova gave him a parcel to keep, without telling him what was in it. On 16 June, 1994, after his sister called and said that she had been summoned to the security service for questioning, he examined the parcel and found a TT gun with a nominal inscription on the barrel that said "for Melkumov from the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., 1945," a cartridge clip to the TT gun containing eight 7.62mm caliber service cartridges, a cartridge clip for a PM pistol containing eight 9mm caliber cartridges, 21 small-caliber cartridges, a small-caliber gun, a Jaguar-80 gas revolver, and other items.

He immediately told his boss about what he had found in the parcel.

(The documents of criminal case on the small-caliber gun, Jaguar-80 revolver, and small-caliber cartridges for the PM pistol have been appropriated to a separate case relating to Petrossian.)

On 4 July, 1994, the forensic experts of army unit 34435 presented a conclusion that the Tokarev (TT) gun (HB No. 3516) presented for examination is serviceable and can be used for firing the corresponding cartridges as a service weapon.

During the preliminary inquest, Oganessian made a petition for a repeated forensic examination to be carried out, since, according to Oganessian's statement, when the gun was confiscated, there was a perforation in its barrel, which was later welded by FSS employees to make it suitable for use.

According to the conclusion of forensic experts of the Russian Federal Center of Judicial Examination, the TT gun (HB series No. 3516) was assembled from different parts of a gun of the specified design.

Experimental firing showed that the gun was suitable for use.

At the same time, the experts found a perforation in its barrel, which was later repaired.

It is impossible to establish the time the barrel was repaired since such a method of verification does not exist.

11.

Указанный пистолет неисправен. Неисправность заключается в нарушении первоначальной целостности ствола, обусловленной некачественным его ремонтом. Однако указанная неисправность на производство выстрелов не влияет. Пистолет работоспособен - к стрельбе пригоден.

Оценивая данное заключение экспертов, указавших, что первое заключение по пистолету ТТ было дано экспертами без должного исследования ствола при осмотре оружия, суд считает его научно-обоснованным.

Что же касается заявления Оганесяна, что пистолет ТТ серии № 3018 был непригоден для стрельбы до его изъятия органами следствия, а затем был отремонтирован сотрудниками МЛР, то его признает несостоятельным по следующим причинам.

Оставляя пистолет для сохранения Голоюну, Оганесян передал ему снаряженный пистолет 8 боевыми патронами. В свою очередь Голоюня пояснил, что увидев пистолет ТТ с дарственной надписью он в целях безопасности разрядил его, вынув обойму с патронами из пистолета. Каких-либо мотивов возможных действий по якобы произведенному ремонту пистолета сотрудниками МЛР Оганесян не привел.

Таким образом, приведенные доказательства подтверждают виновность подсудимых в содеянном.

Показания Хатковского как последовательные, согласующиеся с другими доказательствами по делу военный суд признает достоверными и кладет в основу приговора.

К тому же показания Хатковского согласуются и с показаниями подсудимых, которые они давали органам предварительного следствия. При допросе их в качестве обвиняемых с соблюдением всех их процессуальных прав.

Так, Оганесян, признавая себя виновным в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст. 218 ч. 1 УК РСФСР на допросе в качестве обвиняемого 23 мая 1994 года пояснил, что он незаконно хранил и везил оружие и взрывчатку. Часть её он передал Хатковскому по распоряжению своего руководства. Часть взрывчатки в августе 1993 года передал Хатковскому Симонян по его просьбе. Деньги Хатковскому он передал как он сам, так и Симонян и Голоюня по его просьбе.

На допросе в качестве обвиняемого 23 мая 1994 года Голоюня, признавая себя виновным вместе с тем показал, что в январе 1994 года перед вылетом в Армян Оганесян передал ему на временное хранение пистолет ТТ, который он в тот же день отвез и передал жене своего начальника Петросяна.

Обвиняемый Симонян 23 мая 1994 года, частично признавая себя виновным в предъявленном обвинении пояснил, что в феврале 1993 года оказывал помощь в выявлении возможного наблюдения за Хатковским, помогал по просьбе Оганесяна устраивать в гостиницу Хатковского по брони службы безопасности, а в июле 1993 года получил от

11.

The said gun is defective due to a poorly repaired perforation in its barrel. However, the said defect does not affect its ability to fire. The gun can be used for firing.

The court considers this expert opinion, indicating that the first expert conclusion regarding the TT gun was drawn up without proper examination of the barrel, scientifically justified.

The court considers Oganessian's statement that the TT gun (HB series No. 3516) was unsuitable for firing before it was confiscated by the investigation authorities, and then repaired by FSS employees, unsubstantiated for the following reasons.

When Oganessian gave the gun to Goloian for safekeeping, it was loaded with eight service cartridges. In turn, Goloian explained that when he saw the TT gun with an inscription on it, he unloaded it for safety reasons, removing the cartridge holder from the gun. Oganessian did not give any reasons for why the FSS employees might have repaired the gun.

So this evidence confirms the guilt of the defendants in the offense.

The military court deems Khatkovskiy's testimony reliable, since it is consistent and in compliance with the other testimonies on the case.

What is more, Khatkovskiy's testimony is also in compliance with the testimonies the defendants gave to the preliminary inquest agencies when they were interrogated as the accused with the observance of all their procedural rights.

So, Oganessian, pleading guilty to the crime envisaged by Art 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, when interrogated as the accused on 23 May, 1994, explained that he unlawfully stored and carried weapons and explosives. He gave some of them to Khatkovskiy on the instructions of his bosses. Simonian passed on some of the explosives to Khatkovskiy in August 1993 at Oganessian's request. He, as well as Simonian and Goloian at his request, gave Khatkovskiy money.

When interrogated as the accused on 23 May, 1994, Goloian, without pleading guilty, testified that in January 1994, before departing for Yerevan, Oganessian gave him a TT gun for temporary storage, which he took and gave to the wife of his boss, Petrossian, the same day.

On 23 May, 1994, accused Simonian, partially pleading guilty to the imposed charge, explained that in February 1993 he assisted in exposing possible observation of Khatkovskiy, helped, at Oganessian's request, to reserve a hotel room for Khatkovskiy through the security service, and in July 1993 received explosives from Oganessian,

Оганесян взрывчатку, часть которой 17 июля 1993 года передал Хатковскому, а остальную часть возвратил Оганесяну. Знал, что с помощью этой взрывчатки Хатковский намеревался подорвать газопровод в г. Баку.

Впоследствии при допросах в качестве обвиняемых, а затем и в суде при допросе в качестве подсудимых Оганесян, Голоян и Симонян от данных показаний на допросах в качестве обвиняемых отказались и стали утверждать, что вынуждены были давать такие показания согласно материалам, разработанным спецслужбами Азербайджана, боясь, что они могут быть выданы азербайджанским правоохранительным органам.

От их объяснения о мотивах изменения показаний в ходе предварительного следствия суд с учетом всех, исследованных в суде, доказательств считает надуманными с целью избежать ответственности за содеянное.

Давая юридическую оценку действиям Оганесяна, Голояна и Симоняна, суд исходит из того, что как это установлено в суде Оганесян организовал устойчивую организованную группу с Хатковским для совершения правонарушений.

Голоян и Симонян, будучи осведомленными о деятельности группы, оказывали Оганесяну и Хатковскому помощь исходя из дружеских и земляческих побуждений, т.е. выступали как пособники, а потому суд исключает из их обвинения указанный квалифицирующий признак.

Поскольку Оганесян 19 мая 1993 года организовал, представил взрывчатые вещества Хатковскому, обучил Хатковского правилам обращения со взрывчатыми веществами к средствам взрыва, указал место, т.е. станцию Дербент, где Хатковский заложил под товарный вагон грузового поезда взрывное устройство, чем совершил действия, направленные на умышленное повреждение подвижного состава, которое могло повлечь нарушение нормальной работы транспорта, однако свои действия не довел до конца по причинам, не зависящим от его воли, т.к. не взорвалась взрывчатка 30 мая 1993 года была обнаружена и изъята на станции минеральные воды 30 мая 1993 года, а потому его действия в этой части квалифицирует по ст.ст. 15 и 80 УК РСФСР, как их квалифицировали органы предварительного следствия.

При этом суд исключает из обвинения Оганесяна квалификацию этих же действий по ст.ст. 15 и 213 ч.2 УК РСФСР, как излишне предъявленную, поскольку ни в ходе предварительного следствия, ни в суде не добыто каких бы то ни было доказательств, свидетельствующих о том, что закладкой взрывного устройства на территории Российской Федерации Оганесян или Хатковский стремились нарушить общественную безопасность в России или воздействовать на принятие решений органами власти на территории России.

Так как Голоян каких-либо действий, связанных с оказанием помощи по подготовке и закладке взрывного устройства в Дербенте ни Оганесяну, ни Хатковскому не оказывал, то в его действиях в этой части отсутствует состав преступления и он по ст.ст. 15 и 80 УК РСФСР и 213 ч.2 УК РСФСР подлежит оправданию.

12.

some of which he gave to Khatkovskiy on 17 July, 1993, and returned the rest to Oganessian. He knew that Khatkovskiy intended to blow up a gas pipeline in Baku using these explosives.

Later, when interrogated as the accused, and again in court, when interrogated as defendants, Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian withdrew these testimonies and began claiming that they were forced to give them in keeping with the documents drawn up by the intelligence services of Azerbaijan, being afraid that they might be handed over to the Azerbaijani law-enforcement agencies if they refused.

Taking into account all the evidence investigated in court, the court considers the explanations of why they changed their testimonies during the preliminary inquest to be far-fetched and aimed at avoiding liability for the offense.

When presenting its legal assessment of Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian's actions, the court proceeds from the fact that, as established in court, Oganessian created a stable organized group with Khatkovskiy for the purpose of committing offenses.

Goloian and Simonian, being aware of the group's activity, assisted Oganessian and Khatkovskiy as friends and compatriots, i.e. acted as accomplices, and therefore the court excludes the said qualification from their charges.

Since on 19 May, 1993, Oganessian organized [the explosion], gave explosives to Khatkovskiy, trained Khatkovskiy in handling explosives and blasting supplies, specified the place, i.e. the Derbent station, where Khatkovskiy placed the explosive device under the boxcar of a freight train, in so doing causing deliberate damage to rolling stock and disrupting normal operating procedures, however, was unable to carry his actions through for reasons beyond his will, since the undetonated explosive was found and confiscated on 30 May, 1993 at the Mineralnye Vody railway station, his actions are qualified in compliance with Arts 15 and 86 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, as qualified by the preliminary inquest agencies.

Thus the court excludes from Oganessian's charge the qualification of these same actions according to Arts 15 and 213.3 of Part 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, as superfluous, since neither during the preliminary inquest, nor in court, was any evidence produced, proving that Oganessian or Khatkovskiy, by setting up the explosive device in the territory of the Russian Federation, sought to violate public safety in Russia or influence decision-making by the authorities in the territory of Russia.

Since Goloian did not carry out any actions to assist either Oganessian or Khatkovskiy to prepare and set up the explosive device in Derbent, there is no *corpus delicti* in these actions, and, according to Arts 15 and 86.1 and 213.3 of Part 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, are subject to acquittal.

Органы предварительного следствия вменили в вину подсудимым Оганесяну, Голоюну и Симонию, что они в июле 1993 года в составе организованной группы обеспечили Хатковского взрывчатыми веществами и денежными средствами, организовали его въезд в город Баку для совершения террористического акта - подрыва газопровода с целью нарушения общественной безопасности и оказания воздействия на принятие решения органами власти Азербайджанской Республики, которые Хатковский не довел до конца по причинам, не зависящим от воли Оганесяна, Голоюна и Симония и квалифицировали их действия по ст.ст. 15 и 213, ч. 2 и 15 и 86¹, ч. 2 УК РСФСР, а также вменили в вину подсудимым Оганесяну и Голоюну, что они в составе организованной группы с Хатковским в конце мая 1993 года разработали план, снабдили Хатковского деньгами для поездки к месту заминированной акции, снабдили его взрывчатыми веществами и средствами взрыва, в результате чего Хатковский 2 июня 1993 года на железнодорожной станции Баку подорвал пассажирский вагон, причинив ущерб в размере 338,200 рублей, чем нарушили общественную безопасность, оказали воздействие на принятие решений органами власти, создав опасность гибели людей и причинив значительный материальный ущерб и квалифицировали их действия по ст. ст. 213, ч. 2 и 86 УК РСФСР.

Как следует из постановления органов следствия Министерства национальной безопасности Республики Азербайджан от 15 февраля 1994 года уголовное преследование в отношении Хатковского за покушение на взрыв газопровода в городе Баку 20 июля 1993 года было прекращено на том основании, что Хатковский сам заявивший о заминировке взрывного устройства под газопровод пояснил, что спустя непродолжительное время извлек взрывное устройство и разуконплексовал его, не имея намерения больше применить, т.е. добровольно отказался от исполнения.

В силу изложенных обстоятельств за покушение на подрыв газопровода и терроризм Симонян как пособник также не может нести уголовную ответственность. Данное обвинение подлежит исключению.

Что же касается Оганесяна и Голоюна, то вменить им в вину действия, предусмотренные ст.ст. 15 и 213, ч. 2 и 15 и 86¹, ч. 2, 213³ ч. 2 и 86 УК РСФСР у военного суда не имеется правовых оснований, исходя из следующего.

В соответствии п. 4 ст. 5 УК РСФСР иностранные граждане за преступления, совершенные вне пределов РСФСР (СССР) подлежат ответственности по уголовному кодексу РСФСР в случаях, предусмотренных международными договорами.

Договор между Российской Федерацией и Азербайджанской Республикой о правовой помощи и правовых отношениях по гражданским, семейным и уголовным делам, регулирующий эти вопросы хотя и был подписан 22 декабря 1992 года, однако ратифицирован Государственной Думой 21 июля 1994 года, одобрен Советом Федерации 27 июля 1994 года, а подписан Президентом Российской Федерации и вступил в силу 4 августа 1994 года.

13.

The preliminary inquest agencies charge defendants Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian with supplying Khatkovskiy, in July 1993 as a part of organized group, with explosives and money, arranging his departure to Baku to commit an act of terrorism—blowing up a gas pipeline for the purpose of violating public safety and influencing decision-making by the authorities of the Azerbaijan Republic, which Khatkovskiy did not carry through for reasons beyond Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian's will—and qualified their actions according to Arts 15 and 213.3 of Part 2 and 15 and 86.1 of Part 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code. They also charge defendants Oganessian and Goloian with drawing up a plan of action, as a part of an organized group with Khatkovskiy at the end of May 1993, supplying Khatkovskiy with money for a trip to the site of the planned action, giving him explosives and blasting supplies, as a result of which Khatkovskiy blew up a passenger carriage at a Baku railway station on 2 June, 1993, causing damage of 388,280 rubles, by which he violated public safety and influenced decision-making by the authorities, threatening human life and causing significant material damage, and qualified their actions according to Arts 213.3 of Part 2 and 86 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

As follows from the resolution of the investigation authorities of the Ministry of State Security of the Azerbaijan Republic of 15 February, 1994, criminal prosecution regarding Khatkovskiy for attempting to blow up a gas pipeline in Baku was halted on 26 July, 1993 on the grounds that Khatkovskiy, who said himself that he had placed an explosive device under the gas pipeline, explained that a short time later he removed the explosive device and dismantled it, with no intention of ever using it again, that is, he voluntarily refused to perform the assignment.

Owing to the stated circumstances, Simonian cannot be brought to account as an accomplice in the attempt to blow up the gas pipeline and terrorism. This incrimination is dismissed.

As for Oganessian and Goloian, the military court does not have the legal grounds to charge them with the actions envisaged by Arts 15 and 213.3 of Part 2, 15 and 86.1 of Part 2, 213.3 of Part 2, and 86 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, based on the following:

In compliance with Art 5(4) of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, foreign citizens shall be brought to account for crimes committed outside the R.S.F.S.R. (Soviet Union) under the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code in cases envisaged by international agreements.

The agreement between the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijan Republic on legal assistance and legal relations on civil, family, and criminal cases regulating these issues, although signed on 22 December, 1992, was ratified by the State Duma on 21 July, 1994, approved by the Federation Council on 27 July, 1994, signed by the President of the Russian Federation, and came into force on 4 August, 1994. Therefore, this agreement did not exist at the time Goloian, Oganessian, and Simonian committed the acts they are charged with.

Следовательно, на время совершенных и инкриминируемых деяний Голояну, Оганесяну и Симониану такого договора не имелось.

Кроме того, Оганесян, Голоян и Симониан органами следствия обвиняются в том, что в период с 29 мая 1993 года по 26 июля 1993 года Оганесян, трижды в составе организованной группы и трижды лично, Голоян дважды в составе организованной группы в тот же период и Симониан один раз в составе организованной группы переместили через Государственную границу Российской Федерации (СНГ) скрытые в специальных хранилищах взрывчатые вещества, оружие, средства взрыва, т.е. совершили преступления, предусмотренного ст. 76 УК РСФСР (в редакции Закона РСФСР от 20 июня 1992 года и Указа Президиума Верховного Совета РСФСР от 30.01.1994г.).

В суде установлено, что Закон о государственной границе Российской Федерации был принят 1 апреля 1993 года.

Вместе с тем, как следует из сообщения Главного штаба пограничных войск Российской Федерации пограничные войска к осуществлению контроля пассажиров в аэропортах приступили в период с мая 1993 г. по февраль 1994 года в зависимости от направления.

Что же касается проезда по железной дороге, то как пояснил в своих показаниях Хатковский, на тот период времени (февраль-июль 1993 года) никакого пограничного или таможенного контроля не существовало.

В связи с изложенным суд считает, что у Оганесяна, Голояна и Симониана отсутствует состав преступления, предусмотренный ст. 76 УК РСФСР и в этой части они подлежат оправданию.

Оганесян органами следствия обвиняется в том, что 4 июля 1993 года, следуя авиарейсом Ереван-Москва в качестве пассажира, провоз на воздушном судне взрывчатые вещества, т.е. совершил преступление, предусмотренное ст. 217^а, ч. 1 УК РСФСР.

Это обвинение Оганесяна в ходе предварительного расследования строилось исключительно на показаниях Оганесяна.

В ходе судебного рассмотрения дела Оганесян показал, что дважды приобретал взрывчатые вещества и средства взрыва на армянском участке меганьковского кладбища и никаких взрывчатых веществ из Еревана в Москву, в том числе и на самолете не доставлял каких-либо иных доказательств, свидетельствующих о том, что 4 июля 1993 года Оганесян провозил на воздушном судне взрывчатые вещества ни органами следствия, ни судом не добыто, а потому суд считает, что по данному обвинению Оганесян должен быть оправдан за недоказанностью его участия в совершении преступления.

Симониан органами предварительного следствия обвиняется также и в том, являясь должностным лицом (консультантом отдела Управления по борьбе с терроризмом министерства безопасности Р.) и отвечая за выявление и разработку террористических групп и организаций, с февраля 1993 года по май 1994 года систематически злоупот-

14.

Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian are also accused by the investigation authorities of the following: between 29 May, 1993 and 20 July, 1993, Oganessian, three times as a part of an organized group and three times individually, Goloian, twice as a part of an organized group during the same period, and Simonian, once as a part of an organized group on 20 July, 1993, moved explosives concealed in special containers, guns, and blasting supplies, across the border of the Russian Federation (Soviet Union), thus committing the crime envisaged by Art 78 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code (in the version of R.S.F.S.R. Law of 25 July, 1962 and Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. of 30.01.1984).

It was established in court that the Law on the State Border of the Russian Federation was adopted on 1 April, 1993.

At the same time, as follows from a statement by the General Staff of Border Troops of the Russian Federation, border troops began exercising control of passengers at airports during the period from May 1993 to February 1994, depending on where they were going.

As for journeys by rail, as Khatkovskiy explained in his testimonies, no border or customs control existed during February-July 1993.

Due to the above-stated, the court deems that there is no *corpus delicti* envisaged by Art 78 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code with respect to Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian, therefore, in this respect, they are subject to acquittal.

Oganessian is accused by the investigation authorities of transporting explosives on the airplane he boarded on 4 July, 1993 as a passenger from Yerevan to Moscow, thus committing the crime envisaged by Art 217.1 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

This accusation against Oganessian was based during the preliminary inquest entirely on Oganessian's testimony.

During the judicial examination of the case, Oganessian testified that twice he procured explosives and blasting supplies in the Armenian section of the Vagankov cemetery but did not take any explosives from Yerevan to Moscow, including by airplane. Neither the investigation agencies, nor the court has any other proof testifying that on 4 July, 1993 Oganessian transported explosives by airplane, therefore the court deems that Oganessian should be acquitted of this accusation due to the absence of proof of his participation in the commission of this crime.

Simonian is also accused by the preliminary inquest agencies of systematically abusing his official position from February 1993 to May 1994 as an official (consultant of Department of the Counterterrorism Administration of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation) responsible for identifying and dealing with terrorist groups and organizations, by showing inaction and concealing their activity out of personal interest,

реблял своим служебным положением и как представитель власти, являя бездействие, из личной заинтересованности укрывал деятельность одной из таких групп, руководимой Оганесяном, активно помогал ее членам, что повлекло тяжкие последствия – совершение группой преступлений, а также существенный материальный вред на сумму 20 тыс. рублей, т.е. в совершении преступления, предусмотренно го ст. 260 ч. "б" УК РСФСР.

Между тем, в суде из инструкции о функциональных обязанностях должностных лиц Управления по борьбе с терроризмом министерства безопасности РФ установлено, что Симонян, являясь консультантом отдела, каких-либо пов на самостоятельную деятельность и приняти решений не имел, о всех своих намерениях и действиях обязан был докладывать начальнику отдела и его заместителю.

Допрошенный в судебном заседании начальник отдела свидетель Илатонов пояснил, что в период с февраля 1993 года по май 1994 года Симонян какими-то дополнительными полномочиями не наделялся, работал в соответствии с инструкцией, организационно-распорядительных функций не имел, административно-хозяйственные обязанности не исполнял.

Свидетель Гроппа – бывший начальник отделения, в суде пояснил, что 20 тыс. рублей Симоняном было списано по указанию руководства отдела в служебных интересах.

Таким образом, приведенные доказательства дают основание суду считать, что Симонян должностным лицом не являлся, а потому не может нести ответственность за должностное преступление и подлежит оправданию.

Действия Оганесяна, который незаконно приобрел, хранил, носил и сбывал взрывчатые вещества, средства взрывания, боевые патроны, оружие в период февраля 1993 года – май 1994 года военный суд квалифицирует по ст. 216 ч. 1 УК РСФСР.

Так как Голоян 12 января 1994г. без разрешения приобрел у Оганесяна в г. Москве огнестрельное оружие и боеприпасы – пистолет и 8 патронов к нему, хранил, носил их и сбыв гражданке Абдрахмановой, то эти его действия суд квалифицирует по ст. 216, ч. 1 УК РСФСР.

Поскольку Симонян в июле 1993 года в городе Москве без соответствующего разрешения приобрел у Оганесяна взрывчатые вещества и средства взрывания, которые незаконно носил, хранил, 17 июля 1993 года часть их сбыв Хатковскому, а остальные сбыв Оганесяну, то его действия военный суд квалифицирует по ст. 216, ч. 1 УК РСФСР.

Органами предварительного следствия в качестве отягчающих ответственность обстоятельств Голояна и Симоняна вменены – совершение преступлений лицами, ранее совершавшими преступления, совершение преступлений организованной группой, совершение преступлений общеопасным способом, а Симоняну, кроме того, преступления 17 июля 1993 года в состоянии опьянения.

15.

actively assisting the activity of the group run by Oganessian, which led to grave consequences, the commission of crimes, as well as substantial material damage of 20 thousand rubles, thus committing the crime envisaged by Art 260(“b”) of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Meanwhile, in court, it was established from the instructions on the functional obligations of officials of the Counterterrorism Administration of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation that Simonian, as a department consultant, had no authority to carry out independent activity and decision-making and was obliged to report on all of his intentions and actions to the head of department and his deputy.

The head of department, witness Platonov, interrogated in a court session, explained that between February 1993 and May 1994, Simonian did not have any additional authority, worked according to the instructions, and did not carry out any administrative functions.

Witness Groppa, former head of the department, explained in court that Simonian wrote off the 20 thousand rubles as instructed by the department leadership in official interests.

So the evidence presented gives the court grounds to deem that Simonian was not an official and therefore cannot bear responsibility for an official crime and is subject to acquittal.

The military court qualifies the actions of Oganessian, who illegally acquired, stored, carried, and sold explosives, blasting supplies, service cartridges, and weapons between February 1993 and May 1994 in compliance with Art 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Since Goloian acquired the following firearms and ammunition from Oganessian on 12 January, 1994 in Moscow without a permit: a TT gun and 8 cartridges to it, stored, carried them and sold them to citizen Abdrakhmanova, the court qualifies these actions according to Art 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Since in July 1993 in Moscow, Simonian acquired explosives and blasting supplies from Oganessian without a permit, which he illegally carried, stored, and sold in part to Khatkovskiy on 17 July, 1993, and then sold the rest to Oganessian, the military court qualifies his actions according to Art 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

The preliminary inquest agencies charge Goloian and Simonian, by way of aggravating circumstances, with committing crimes by persons who have previously committed an offense, crimes by an organized group, and dangerous crimes, and Simonian, in addition, with a crime committed on 17 July, 1993 in a state of alcoholic intoxication.

Суд считает, что по приведенным выше обоснованиям нет достаточных данных для вменения перечисленных выше отягчающих обстоятельств в вину подсудимым Симонову и Головину. Что же касается отягчающего обстоятельства – совершения преступления в состоянии опьянения Симоновым, то военный суд также не находит достаточных оснований для его вменения. Симонов принес, передал и помог упаковать взрывчатые вещества и средства взрывания 17 июля 1995 года Хатковскому, будучи трезвым. Закончив выполнение объективной стороны состава преступления, Симонов и Хатковский употребили спиртные напитки, что не может вменяться ему в вину по уголовно-правовому делу.

Что же касается Оганесяна, то суд при назначении наказания ему учитывает в качестве отягчающих обстоятельств совершение им повторных преступлений, обоснованно вмененных по данному делу, совершение преступлений с Хатковским как организованной группой, совершение преступления опасным способом.

Вместе с тем суд принял во внимание, что Оганесян, Головин, Симонов впервые привлекаются к судебной ответственности, ранее характеризовались положительно, имеют на иждивении несовершеннолетних детей.

На основании изложенного и руководствуясь ст.ст. 301, 303 УК РСФСР, военный суд

П Р И Г О В О Р И Л:

Обвиняемый ДЖАНАН АБРАХАМОВИЧА признать виновным в ношении, хранении, приобретении огнестрельного оружия, боевых припасов и взрывчатых веществ, а равно в сбыте взрывчатых веществ без соответствующего разрешения, т.е. в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст.216, ч.1 УК РСФСР, на основании которой лишить его свободы сроком на 4 (четыре) года;

То же признать виновным в организации действий, направленных на умышленное повреждение подвижного состава, которое могло повлечь нарушение нормальной работы транспорта, однако повреждений не наступило по причинам, не зависящим от его воли, т.е. в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст.ст.16 и 66 УК РСФСР, на основании которой лишить его свободы сроком на 5 (пять) лет.

По совокупности совершенных преступлений окончательно наказание Оганесяну определять путем частичного сложения назначенных наказаний – лишение свободы в исправительно-трудовой колонии строгого режима сроком на 6 (шесть) лет.

Обвиняемый ДЖАНАН АБРАХАМОВИЧА по предъявленному ему обвинению в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст.76 УК РСФСР (в редакции Закона РСФСР от 20 июля 1992 года и Указа Президиума Верховного Совета РСФСР от 30 января 1994 года), оправдать за отсутствием в его действиях состава преступления, а по предъявленному обвинению в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст.274, ч.1 УК РСФСР, оправдать за недоказанность его участия в совершении преступления.

16.

The court considers that there is insufficient evidence to charge defendants Simonian and Goloian with regard to the aggravating circumstances given above. Nor does the military court find sufficient grounds for charging Simonian with respect to the aggravating circumstance—committing a crime in a state of alcoholic intoxication. Simonian was sober on 17 July, 1993, when he brought, handed over, and helped Khatkovskiy to pack the explosives and blasting supplies. After they completed the objective part of the *corpus delicti*, Simonian and Khatkovskiy partook of alcoholic drinks, for which he cannot be charged under a criminal case.

As for Oganessian, the court keeps in mind by way of aggravating circumstances when assigning his punishment that he committed repeated crimes substantially imputed under this case, committed crimes with Khatkovskiy as an organized group, and committed a dangerous crime.

Nevertheless, the court took into account that a process against Oganessian, Goloian, and Simonian is taken out for the first time, that they have previous positive character references and have dependent underage children.

On the basis of the above-stated and guided by Arts 301, 303 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, the military court

ISSUED THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENT:

JAHAN ANUSHAVANOVICH OGANESSIAN shall be found guilty of carrying, storing, and acquiring firearms, service ammunition, and explosives, as well as selling explosives without a permit, i.e. of committing the crime envisaged by Art 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, on the basis of which shall be sent to prison for 4 (four) years;

He shall also be found guilty of organizing actions aimed at deliberate damage to rolling stock and the disruption of normal operating procedures, however no damage was incurred for reasons beyond his will, i.e. of committing the crime envisaged by Arts 15 and 86 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, on the basis of which he shall be sent to prison for 5 (five) years.

With respect to the cumulative crimes, Oganessian's final punishment shall be determined by partial cumulation of the penalties—imprisonment in a maximum security correctional labor colony for 6 (six) years.

JAHAN ANUSHAVANOVICH OGANESSIAN shall be acquitted of the crime envisaged by Art 78 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code brought against him (in the version of the R.S.F.S.R. law of 25 July, 1962) due to the absence of *corpus delicti* in his actions, and acquitted with respect to the accusation brought against him of committing the crime envisaged by Art 217.1 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, due the absence of proof of his participation in commission of the crime.

17.

ГОЛОИАН АШОТ АРАКЛОВИЧА признать виновным в приобретении, хранении, ношении и сбыте огнестрельного оружия и боевых припасов без соответствующего разрешения, т.е. в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст.216, ч.1 УК РСФСР (в редакции Закона от 27 октября 1991г., с изменениями, внесенными указом Президиума Верховного Совета от 3.11.1992 года), на основании которой лишить его свободы сроком на 1 (один) год 9 (девять) месяцев 20 (двадцать во семь) дней, т.е. на срок фактически отбытого наказания.

ГОЛОИАН АШОТ АРАКЛОВИЧА по обвинению в совершении преступлений, предусмотренных ст.ст.76 (в редакции Закона РСФСР от 25 июля 1992 года и указа Президиума Верховного Совета РСФСР от 30 января 1994 года), 15 и 86, 18 и 213, ч.2 УК РСФСР, оправдать за отсутствием в его действиях состава преступления.

СИМОНИАН БОРИС ВАКТЯНОВИЧА признать виновным в приобретении, хранении, ношении и сбыте взрывчатых веществ, т.е. в совершении преступления, предусмотренного ст.216 ч.1 УК РСФСР (в редакции Закона от 27 октября 1991 года с изменениями, внесенными указом Президиума Верховного Совета от 3.11.1992 года), на основании которого лишить его свободы сроком на 2 (два) года, с отбыванием наказания в исправительно-трудовой колонии общего режима.

СИМОНИАН БОРИС ВАКТЯНОВИЧА по обвинению в совершении преступлений, предусмотренных ст.ст.76 (в редакции Закона РСФСР от 25 июля 1992 года и указа Президиума Верховного Совета РСФСР от 30 января 1994 года) и 200 п. "б" УК РСФСР оправдать за отсутствием в его действиях состава преступления.

Срок отбытия наказания ОГАНЕССИАН, ГОЛОИАН и СИМОНИАН, с зачетом времени задержания и предварительного заключения в связи с данным делом, исчислять с 13 мая 1994 года.

меру пресечения в отношении ГОЛОИАН – заключение под стражу – отменить, освободив его из-под стражи в зале суда.

До вступления приговора в законную силу меру пресечения в отношении ОГАНЕССИАН и СИМОНИАН – заключение под стражу – оставить без изменения и содержать их в следственном изоляторе № 1 г.г. Тамбовской области.

по вступлении приговора в законную силу вещественные доказательства по делу: 2 контрольных талона к авиабилетам № 000229 и 000230, две половинки билетов Госбанка СССР достоинством 10 и 20 руб., 4 записные книжки Катковского, 3 видеокассеты с оперативными материалами и 2 видеокассеты с допросами обвиняемых – хранить по делу; служебное удостоверение на имя сотрудника КСР капитана СИМОНИАН В. В., пистолет ПМ серии КР № 1110, 29 патронов калибра 9 мм, шпак-нож в ножнах к автомату ААА, 20 тротильных шашек (4,0 кг тротила, 3 тротильных шашки с промежуточными зарядами №-1), 3 гранаты МД-Б с 3 запалами МД-Б-2, 7 запалов МД-Б, 4 взрывателя замедленного действия МД-Б, 3 взрывателя замедленного действия МД-Б-44, 6 упрощенных

17.

ASHOT ARARATOVICH GOLOIAN shall be found guilty of acquiring, storing, and selling firearms and service ammunition without a permit, i.e. of committing the crime envisaged by Art 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code (in the version of the law of 27 October, 1961, with amendments made by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of 3.12.1982), on the basis of which he shall be sent to prison for 1 (one) year 9 (nine) months and 28 (twenty eight) days, i.e. for the term of sentence actually served.

ASHOT ARARATOVICH GOLOIAN shall be acquitted of committing the crimes envisaged by Arts 78 (in the version of the R.S.F.S.R. Law of 25 July, 1962 and the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the R.S.F.S.R. of 30 January, 1984) 15 and 86, 15 and 213.3 of Part 2 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code due to the absence of *corpus delicti* in his actions.

BORIS VAZGENOVICH SIMONIAN shall be found guilty of acquiring, storing, and selling firearms and service ammunition without a permit, i.e. of committing the crime envisaged by Art 218 of Part 1 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code (in the version of the law of 27 October, 1961, with amendments made by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of 3.12.1982), on the basis of which he shall be sent to prison for 2 (two) years and serve his term in a minimum security correctional labor colony.

BORIS VAZGENOVICH SIMONIAN shall be acquitted of committing the crimes envisaged by Arts 78 (in the version of the R.S.F.S.R. Law of 25 July, 1962 and the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the R.S.F.S.R. of 30 January, 1984) and 260("b") of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code due to the absence of *corpus delicti* in his actions.

Allowing for the time spent in custody during arrest and preliminary detention, OGANESSIAN, GOLOIAN and SIMONIAN shall begin serving their terms on 13 May, 1994.

The measure of restraint in relation to GOLOIAN—detention—shall be cancelled, releasing him from custody in the courtroom.

The measure of restraint in relation to OGANESSIAN and SIMONIAN—detention—shall remain unchanged until the sentence comes into legal force and they shall be kept in pretrial detention center No. 1 of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Tambov Region.

When the sentence comes into legal force, the evidence under the case: two stubs of air tickets No. 800229 and No. 800236, two halves of tickets of the State Bank of the Soviet Union for 10 and 25 rubles, four notebooks belonging to Khatkovskiy, three videotapes of operational materials, and two videotapes of interrogations of the accused shall remain with the case; official identification in the name of employee of the Moscow criminal investigation department, Captain B. SIMONOV, the PM pistol (KR series No. 1115), 29 9mm caliber cartridges, a bayonet knife in a sheath belonging to an AKM machine gun, 25 TNT blocks (4.6 kg of TNT, three TNT blocks with intermediate PZ-2 fuses, three RGD-5 grenades with three UZRGM-2 fuses, seven MD-5M fuses,

16.

модернизированных взрывателя ДД-2, взрывателей ДД-3, взрывное устройство ДВ-4, подрывную машинку ДМ-4, проводную линию к подрывной машинке, датчик элемента неизвлекаемости, комплектующие взрывных устройств 14 индикаторов повышенного давления, 40 ворохов из колпачков, 2 крышки, заглушку от противотанковой мины ДМ-4, столет ТТ серии ДБ 3516, 2 патрона калибра 7,62 мм, 10 метров детонирующего шнура ДД-12; 6 метров огнепроводного шнура ДД-1, 4 капсулы-детонатора ДД-Б-А, 3 фрагмента двухсотграммовой тротилово-важки - передать в Управление ДБ по Тамбовской области, 2 картонные коробки из-под патронов калибра 9 мм, картонную коробку зеленого цвета, пачку из-под сигарет "Давыдов", картонную коробку из-под залпов ДД-12, полиэтиленовый пакет белого цвета, картонную коробку серого цвета, коробку зеленого цвета и липкую ленту с нее картонную коробку из-под капсулы-детонаторов ДД-Б-А, коробку из-под телефонного аппарата, оклеенную лентой "скотч" и части этой ленты, 2 куска липкой ленты с концов детонирующего шнура ДД-12, 2 листов упаковочной бумаги с пятнами фиолетового цвета, 2 коробки из-под фотобумаги, оклеенные липкой лентой типа "скотч", фрагменты взрывателя замедленного действия ДД-04, 3 пачки из-под сигарет иностранного производства, коробку из-под фотобумаги, пакет черного цвета из-под фотобумаги, липкую ленту "скотч" с пачки из-под сигарет, 3 куска пластилина, моток липкой ленты "скотч", 16 листов фотобумаги - как не представляющие ценности - уничтожить.

Судебные издержки в сумме 1 млн. 200 тыс. рублей, связанные с выплатой вознаграждения адвокату Сукаленко за счет федерального бюджета, который осуществлял защиту интересов подсудимого Симоняна по назначению суда взыскать с осужденного Симоняна в доход государства.

Судебные издержки в сумме 2.952.000 руб., связанные с выплатой расходов по явке свидетелей в ходе предварительного следствия и в суд взыскать с осужденных в равной доле с каждого, т.е. по 984.000 рублей, в доход государства.

Приговор может быть обжалован и опротестован в кассационном порядке в военный суд Московского военного округа через военный суд Тамбовского гарнизона в течение 7 суток со дня его провозглашения, а осужденными отнесено и Симоняном в тот же срок со дня вручения им копии приговора.

Подлинный за надлежащими подписями.

Копия верна:

Полковник юстиции
С. А. Газизова

Отп. Газизова

Ксерокопия верна:

Полковник юстиции
С. А. Газизова

Н. А. Власенко

Н. А. Власенко

18.

four delayed action VZD-6ch detonators, three delayed action VZD-ZM detonators, one delayed action VZD-144ch detonator, six simplified MUV-2 modernized detonators, MV-5 detonators, a VUZ-4 explosive device, a PM-4 blasting machine, wire for the blasting machine, a sensor activator, accessories to the explosive devices, 14 high-pressure indicators, 40 funnels from caps, two covers, a cap from an anti-tank mine MPU-2, a TT gun (HB series No. 3516), two 7.62mm caliber cartridges, 10 meters of DShE-12 detonating fuse; eight meters of OSH detonating fuse, four KD-8-A detonating caps, and three fragments of a two hundred-gram TNT block shall be transferred to the FSS Administration of the Tambov Region, two cardboard boxes of 9mm caliber cartridges, a green cardboard box, a Davidoff cigarette box, a cardboard box of MD-5M fuses, a white plastic bag, a gray cardboard box, a green box and adhesive tape from it, a cardboard box of KD-8-A detonating caps, a telephone box wrapped in adhesive tape and pieces of this tape, two pieces of adhesive tape, [six?] ends of DShE-12 detonating fuse, 12 sheets of packing paper with violet spots, two photographic paper boxes bound in adhesive tape, fragments of a delayed action VZD-6ch detonator, three foreign cigarette boxes, a photographic paper box, a black photographic paper bag, the adhesive tape from a cigarette box, three pieces of plasticine, a reel of adhesive tape, and 68 sheets of photographic paper shall be destroyed as being of no value.

As appointed by the court, the sum of 1 million 200 thousand rubles in judicial expenses relating to remuneration from the federal budget of lawyer Sukalenko, who defended the interests of defendant Simonian, shall be collected from convicted Simonian and transferred to the state treasury.

Judicial expenses in the sum of 2,952,885 rubles relating to the payment of expenses for the appearance of witnesses during the preliminary inquest and in court shall be collected in an equal amount from each of the accused, i.e. 964,275 rubles each, to be transferred to the state treasury.

The sentence may be appealed and protested under cassational procedure in a military court of the Moscow military district through the Military Court of the Tambov Garrison within seven days from the date of its announcement, while convicted Oganessian and Simonian may do the same in the same amount of time from the day they are handed copies of their sentence.

The original has been duly signed.

This is a true certified copy:

CASE CHAIRMAN

COLONEL OF JUSTICE

N.A. VLASENKO

This is a true copy of the original document:

Typed by Gazizova

CASE CHAIRMAN

COLONEL OF JUSTICE

N.A. VLASENKO

APPENDIX 3D

Judgment of the Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of the Azerbaijan Republic of 29 April, 1998 in the Case of Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov

Дело № 136-1998г.

П Р И Г О В О Р
ИМЕНЕМ АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ

Судебная коллегия по уголовным делам Верховного суда Азербайджанской Республики по I инстанции

29 апреля 1998 г.

город Баку

В составе председательствующего Члена Верховного суда-Мирасова Р.В.
Народных заседателей- Зейналовой Д., Искендеровой М.
С участием прокурора- Гасанова М.П.
Адвоката- Кадырова С.
При секретаре- Ханларове Э.А.

рассмотрев в открытом судебном заседании по обвинению

Асланова Азера Салман оглы, 1967 года рождения, уроженца г.Баку, гражданина Азербайджанской Республики, семейного, по национальности лезгин, не работающего, образование высшее-военное, ранее не судимого, проживающего по адресу: г.Баку, поселок Ахмедлы, ул.Джаваншира, дом № 15 "в", квартира № 26

в преступлении, предусмотренном ст.ст.57,61,71,94п.4 и 220ч.1 УК Азербайджанской Республики

У С Т А Н О В И Л А :

Подсудимый Асланов Азер Салман оглы в 1994-м году изменил Родине и с целью ослабления Азербайджанского Государства совершил взрыв в Бакинском метрополитене, направленный на массовое уничтожение людей, причинение им телесных повреждений, на разрушение и повреждение путей и средств сообщения, а также умышленное убийство двух и более лиц.

Данные преступления были совершены Азером Аслановым при следующих обстоятельствах.

Так, Асланов А.С., являясь военнослужащим срочной службы Министерства Обороны Азербайджанской Республики и, принимая участие в боевых действиях на фиаулинском направлении армяно-азербайджанского вооруженного конфликта в качестве командира батальона в/ч 702, 14 января 1994 года попал в армянский плен и находясь в плену, в ущерб суверенитету, территориальной неприкосновенности, государственной безопасности и обороноспособности, а также с целью оказания иностранному государству помощи в проведении враждебной деятельности против Азербайджанской Республики, перешел на сторону врага, был завербован спецслужбами Армении и Нагорного Карабаха для проведения диверсии в Бакинском метрополитене.

Для осуществления этой цели армянской стороной, якобы для освобождения сына из плена, в Армению предварительно была вызвана его мать-Асланова Тажибат Насред кызы, которая находилась в заложниках у армян до совершения Аслановым А.С. диверсионного акта.

Исполняя порученное ему задание, Асланов А.С. 2-го июля 1994 года вечером поездом Кисловодск-Баку прибыл в г.Баку и путем сокрытия от таможенного контроля пронес через таможенную границу Азербайджанской Республики незаконно приобретенное им в г.Ереване у сотрудников спецслужб Армении и Нагорного Карабаха, хранимое без соответствующего раз-

Case No. 136-1998

J U D G M E N T
IN THE NAME OF THE AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC

**The Judicial Chamber on Criminal Cases of the Supreme Court of
the Azerbaijan Republic of Original Jurisdiction**

29 April, 1998

City of Baku

Consisting of: Chairman, Member of the Supreme Court—R. Mirzoev,
People's Assessors—D. Zeinalova and M. Iskenderova,
with the participation of Prosecutor M. Hasanov,
Lawyer—S. Kadyrov,
Secretary—E. Khanlarov,

having heard in a public court session the criminal case against

Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov, born in 1967, a native of Baku, a citizen of the Azerbaijan Republic, married, a Lezghian by nationality, unemployed, higher military education, previously unconvicted, residing at the following address: 15 "c" Javanshir St., Apt. 26, the settlement of Akhmedli, Baku,

accused of the crime envisaged by Arts 57, 61, 71, 94(4), and 220 of Part 1 of the Azerbaijan Republic Criminal Code

H A S E S T A B L I S H E D T H A T:

Defendant Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov betrayed his Homeland in 1994 and for the purpose of undermining the Azerbaijan state effectuated an explosion in the Baku subway aimed at the mass destruction of people, the infliction of bodily harm, the destruction and damage of routes and means of transportation, as well as the premeditated murder of two and more persons.

These crimes were committed by Azer Aslanov under the following circumstances:

Azer Aslanov, being an army conscript of the Ministry of Defense of the Azerbaijan Republic and taking part in military operations on the Fizuli front of the Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict as the commander of a battalion of army unit 702, was taken captive by the Armenians on 14 January, 1994 and while in captivity, to the detriment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, state security, and defensive ability of his country, as well as for the purpose of rendering assistance to a foreign state in carrying out hostile activity against the Azerbaijan Republic, went over to the side of the enemy and was recruited by the intelligence services of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh for carrying out an act of sabotage in the Baku subway.

In order to achieve this goal, the Armenian side summoned his mother, Tajibat Nasred kyzy Aslanova, in advance to Armenia, where she was held hostage before Aslanov committed the act of sabotage, allegedly to effectuate the release of her son from captivity.

To execute the task he was assigned, on the evening of 2 July, 1994, Aslanov arrived in Baku on the Kislovodsk-Baku train and, concealing 3 kg of plastic explosive and a MUV-4 explosive device (a modernized universal detonator), which he had illegally acquired in Yerevan from employees of the intelligence services of Armenia and

решения взрывчатое вещество-пластит в количестве 3 кг и взрывное устройство МУВ-4/модернизированный универсальный взрыватель/.

3 июля 1994 года утром он сел в электропоезд на станции метро "1 мейли" и следуя до 8 часов утра по линиям Бакинского метрополитена, путем визуального наблюдения и хронометража времени установил наи место наибольшего скопления пассажиров и время наибольшего нахождения электропоезда в пути на перегоне между станциями "Низами"- "28 мая" и "Гянджлик". После этого, на станции "Низами", выйдя во второй по ходу движения электропоезда к станции "28 мая" вагон, при подъезде к станции умышленно, с целью ослабления государства, разрушения и повреждения путей и средств сообщения, а также умышленного убийства двух и более лиц, выдержку чеку и привада имеющееся у него взрывное устройство в боевое положение, оставил пакет со взрывным устройством на полу вагона возле второго нерабочего дверного проема.

По прибытии электропоезда на станцию "28 мая", дождавшись окончания высадки и посадки пассажиров, он покинул вагон и направился к выходу со станции, а электропоезд отправился в тоннель и через непродолжительный промежуток времени в 8 часов 31 минуту произошел взрыв установленного Аслановым А.С. взрывного устройства, в результате чего погибло 13 человек, 42 человека получили телесные повреждения различной степени тяжести, повреждены все 5 вагонов электропоезда, государству причинен материальный ущерб на сумму 6.757.500.000ман.

Допрошенный в судебном заседании подсудимый Асланов Азер Салман оглы виновным себя в предъявленном обвинении признал частично и показал, что 14 января 1994 года во время боя он попал в плен к армянам и был перевезен в г.Цулу, а затем в г.Ханкенди. Будучи в плену он неоднократно подвергался избиению со стороны армян, которые вербовали его и склоняли к проведению диверсионных актов на территории Азербайджанской Республики. В мае-июне 1994 года, находясь в плену у армян, ему была предоставлена возможность переговорить по телефону с домом и во время разговора его матери и жене сообщили, что для его освобождения из плена необходимо кому-либо из ближайших родственников приехать в г.Ереван, привезти его офицерское удостоверение и одежду.

Сотрудники армянских спецслужб неоднократно говорили ему о том, что ввиду того, что он по национальности лезгин, они хотят освободить его из плена, однако им нужен человек, который подтвердил был его национальную принадлежность, после чего он вместе с этим человеком будет освобожден и отправлен домой в г.Баку.

17 июня 1994 года в г.Ереван прибыла его мать-Асланова Таджибат, которая с собой привезла его офицерское удостоверение и одежду. После приезда матери, армяне доставили их в г.Цулу, где они проживали в "доме: сотрудник спецслужб Нагорного Карабаха Вагдасарян Карен, который вызвал его к себе и сообщил, что час расплаты "настал" и ему для осуществления взрыва в Бакинском метрополитене необходимо выехать в г. Баку. Армяне пригрозили, что в случае его отказа от выполнения этого задания, они отправят его мать в Цулинскую тюрьму и как к ней там будут относиться, ему известно. После этого он вынужденно согласился с их требованиями и вместе с сотрудниками спецслужб Нагорного Карабаха и Армении, начал подготовку к осуществлению диверсии, для чего выехал в г.г.Ханкенди и Ереван, где ему были даны соответствующие инструкции и передан модернизированный универсальный взрыватель МУВ-4 и взрывчатое вещество пластит, которое для конспирации было упрятано в специально-приспособленные тайники- балончики из под дезодоранта и освежителя воздуха.

Для инструктажа и выяснения времени и места осуществления диверсии он, 1 июля 1994 года вылетел самолетом из г.Ереван в г.Минеральные Воды. В этот же день поездом Кисловодск-Баку он отправился в г.Баку,

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Nagorno-Karabakh and kept without a corresponding permit, succeeded in bringing them across the customs border of the Azerbaijan Republic.

On the morning of 3 July, 1994, he boarded an electric train at the Akhmedli metro station and, travelling the Baku subway until 8:00 AM, established the place of greatest congestion of passengers and the longest time the train was on the tracks between the Nizami and the 28 May and Ganjlik stations by means of visual observation and time tracking. After that, at the Nizami station, after boarding the second carriage of the electric train going to the 28 May station, he intentionally, as the train neared the station, for the purpose of undermining the state, destroying and damaging railway tracks and means of transportation, as well as committing the premeditated murder of two and more persons, pulled out the lock pin of the explosive device he had with him, thus readying it for detonation, and left the bag containing the explosive device on the floor of the carriage near the second non-operating doorway.

When the electric train arrived at the 28 May station, he waited until people had disembarked and embarked, then left the carriage and went toward the station exit. The train headed into the tunnel and a short time later at 8:31 AM, the device left by Aslanov exploded, resulting in 13 deaths, 42 persons receiving injuries of varying severity, damage to all five carriages of the electric train, and 6,757,500,000 manats in damages to the state.

When interrogated in court, defendant Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov partially pleaded guilty to the charge brought against him and testified that on 14 January, 1994, during fighting, he was captured by the Armenians and taken to Shusha, and then to Khankendi. While in captivity, he was repeatedly beaten by the Armenians, who won him over to their side and induced him to carry out acts of sabotage in the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic. In May-June 1994, while in captivity, he was given the opportunity to call home and, during a conversation with his mother and wife, was told that one of his close relatives would have to come to Yerevan and bring his officer identification and clothing in order to secure his release.

Employees of the Armenian intelligence services repeatedly told him that in view of the fact that he was Lezghian by nationality, they wanted to release him from captivity, however they needed someone who could confirm his national identity, after which he and this person would be released and sent home to Baku.

On 17 June, 1994, his mother, Tajibat Aslanova, arrived in Yerevan, bringing his officer identification and clothing with her. After his mother arrived, the Armenians took them to Shusha, where they lived in the "home" of Karen Bagdasarian, an employee of the intelligence services of Nagorno-Karabakh, who summoned him and told him that the day of reckoning had come for him too and that he would have to go to Baku to set off a bomb in the Baku subway. The Armenians threatened that if he refused to perform this assignment, they would send his mother to Shusha prison, and he knew how she would be treated there. After hearing this, he had no other choice but to succumb to their demands and, along with employees of the intelligence services of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, began preparing for the act of sabotage. For this he went to Khankendi and Yerevan, where he was given corresponding instructions and a modernized universal MUV-4 detonator and plastic explosive, which, for conspiracy, was hidden in especially adapted deodorant and air freshener cans.

On 1 July, 1994, he flew from Yerevan to Mineralnye Vody to receive instructions and clarification of the time and place for carrying out the act of sabotage. The same day,

куда и прибыл вечером 2 июля 1994 года.

В г. Баку он привез с собой хранящийся у него МУВ-4 и взрывчатое вещество-пластит. Поздним вечером, 2 июля 1994 года он пришел к себе домой по адресу: г. Баку, поселок Ахмедлы, уд. Джаваншира 15 "в", кв. 26 и застал дома свою жену Асланову Анеелу, её сестру Зейналову Насибу и жену их брата Газибекову Халиму. В руках у него был пакет со взрывчаткой, к которому он запретил притрагиваться. На вопрос домашних "где мать", он ответил, что она временно осталась у армян в г. Шуше, он же должен передать одно важное письмо, после чего вернется в г. Шушу и вместе с матерью они придут домой в г. Баку.

Переночевав дома, рано утром 3 июля 1994 года он прибыл на станцию "Ахмедлы" Вакинского метрополитена, откуда на электропоезде отправился в центр города и следуя по линии метрополитена путем хронометража произвел замер времени движения и нахождения электропоезда на перегонах, после чего примерно в 8 часов 25 минут на станции "Низами" сел во 2-ой вагон по ходу движения электропоезда к станции "28 мая". Находясь в вагоне на перегоне между станциями "Низами" и "28 мая" он повернул имеющийся у него модернизированный универсальный взрыватель МУВ-4 во взрывчатое вещество пластит и привел взрывное устройство в боевое положение, после чего начался 4-х минутный отсчет времени до момента срабатывания взрывного устройства и непосредственного наступления взрыва. По прибытии электропоезда на станцию "28 мая" он оставил имеющийся у него пакет со взрывчаткой на полу вагона возле второго нерабочего дверного проема, дождавшись окончания высадки и посадки пассажиров непосредственно перед закрытием дверей покинул вагон и направился к выходу со станции. Находясь на эскалаторе он услышал громкий взрыв и понял, что оставленная им в вагоне взрывчатка сработала.

В этот же день, 3 июля 1994 года, он на поезде выехал из г. Баку: прибыв в г. Минеральные Воды сообщил по телефону своей жене Аслановой Анеэле, что это он совершил взрыв в Вакинском метрополитене, после чего в этот же день улетел в г. Ереван, где в качестве заложника у армян находилась его мать-Асланова Таджибет.

По прибытии в г. Ереван он доложил сотрудникам спецслужб Вагдасяну Карему и Агвану о том, что выполнил их задание, после чего его вновь отвезли в г. Шушу. Через несколько дней его мать армяне отпустили домой и она увезла с собой привезенные ей для него костюм, в котором и выехал в г. Баку, его же самого оставили в г. Шуше, т.к. со слов армян ни должны были освободить его при посредничестве депутата Парламента еспублики Дагестан, что и произошло 25 октября 1994 года.

Азер Асланов так же показывал, что не признает себя виновным по ст. 7 УК Азербайджанской Республики потому, что он Родине своей никогда не изменял, а взрыв в метрополитене был вынужден совершить, поскольку мать его Асланова Таджибет оставалась заложницей у армян.

Виновность Асланова А.С. в инкриминируемых ему преступлениях омиют его признательных показаний подтверждается также другими доказательствами.

Так, допрошенный на предварительном следствии в качестве свидетеля Гасанов Гусейн Эльяс оглы показал, что 3 июля 1994 года, окончив свою работу примерно в 8 часов, он на станции "Эльмяр Академиясы" сел во 2-ый вагон электропоезда, следующего к станции "28 мая". В пути следования к ст. "28 мая" он обратил внимание на стоящего возле второго нерабочего дверного проема молодого человека, примерно 25-26 лет, выше среднего роста, у которого были короткие каштановые волосы с открытым лбом. Одет он был в серые брюки и светлую рубашку. В руках у этого человека был целлофановый пакет, который он держал возле своих ног. По прибытии на станцию "28 мая" в вагон вошло много людей и по этой причине и потерял этого молодого человека из виду и куда девался находящийся у него целлофановый пакет он не увидел. После отправления электропоезда

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he took the Kislovodsk-Baku train to Baku where he arrived on the evening of 2 July, 1994.

He brought the MUV-4 detonator and plastic explosive with him to Baku. Late in the evening on 2 July, 1994, he went to his home in Baku, the settlement of Akhmedli, 15 "c" Javanshir St., Apt. 26, where he found his wife Anella Aslanova, her sister Nasiba Zeinalova, and their brother's wife Khalima Gazibekova at home. He was carrying the bag containing the explosive, which he forbade anyone to touch. When his relatives asked him where his mother was, he answered that she was staying temporarily with the Armenians in Shusha, he was to deliver one important letter, after which he would return to Shusha and bring his mother back home to Baku.

After spending the night at home, early in the morning on 3 July, 1994, he went to the Akhmedli station of the Baku subway, from where he took an electric train to the city center and, while traveling the subway, measured how much time the train was in motion between stations by means of time tracking, after which at approximately 8:25 AM at the Nizami station, he boarded the second carriage of the electric train going to the 28 May station. Between the Nizami and 28 May stations, he pulled out the lock pin of the explosive device he had with him, thus readying it for detonation, after which began the 4-minute countdown until the time the explosive device would go off and there would be an explosion. When the train arrived at the 28 May station, he left the bag containing the explosive device on the floor of the carriage near the second non-operating doorway, waited until people had disembarked and embarked, then right before the doors closed, left the carriage and went toward the station exit. As he climbed the escalator, he heard a loud explosion and understood that the explosive device he had left in the carriage had gone off.

The same day, on 3 July, 1994, he took a train from Baku and, when he arrived in Mineralnye Vody, phoned the wife Anella Aslanova to say that he had set off a bomb in the Baku subway, then left the same day for Yerevan where the Armenians were holding his mother, Tajibat Aslanova, hostage.

When he arrived in Yerevan he reported to employees of the intelligence services Karen Bagdasarian and Agvan that he had performed their assignment, after which he was taken to Shusha again. A few days later, the Armenians allowed his mother to go home and she took with her the suit she had brought for him (the one he had worn when he went to Baku), while he had to stay in Shusha, since, according to the Armenians, they needed to arrange his release with a deputy of the Parliament of the Republic of Daghestan, which happened on 25 October, 1994.

Azer Aslanov also testified that he pleads not guilty to the charge against him under Art 7 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic because he never betrayed his Homeland, but he was forced to effectuate the explosion in the subway because his mother Tajibat Aslanova was being held hostage by the Armenians.

In addition to his confessionary statements, Aslanov's guilt of the crimes he is charged with is also confirmed by other evidence.

For example, Husein Elias Ogly Hasanov, interrogated during the preliminary inquest as a witness, testified that on 3 July, 1994, having ended work at approximately 8:00 AM, boarded the second carriage of the electric train going to the 28 May station at the Elmlər Akademiyası station. On the way to the 28 May station, he noticed a young man of about 25-26 years in age, taller than average with short brown hair and an open forehead standing near the second non-operating doorway. He was wearing gray trousers and a light-colored shirt. He was carrying a plastic bag, which he held near his feet. When

из со станции "28 мая", примерно в 8 часов 30 минут в их втором вагоне произошел взрыв, который произошел в том самом месте, где находился этот молодой человек.

Из показаний Гасанова Г.Э. также видно, что он обратил внимание на этого молодого человека по той причине, что сперва тот рукой поправил имеющийся у него пакет, произвел внутри него какие-то движения, а затем отодвинул его ногой.

От полученных в результате взрыва телесных повреждений, Гасанов Г.Э. 8 июля 1994 года скончался в клинической больнице. /т.2 л.д.132-135, т.3 л.д.1-4/.

Из материалов дела видно, что допросе Гасанова Г.Э. присутствовал его сын Гасанов Керим Гусейн оглы, который прочтя показания отца, своей подписью удостоверил составленный 4 июля 1994 года протокол допроса.

Допрошенный в суде качестве потерпевшего Гасанов Керим Гусейн оглы показывал, что действительно в результате происшедшего 3 июля 1994 года взрыва на перегоне между станциями "28 мая"- "Гянджалик" Вакинского метрополитена, находящийся во втором вагоне его отец Гасанов Гусейн Эляс оглы получил тяжкие телесные повреждения и был доставлен для оказания медицинской помощи в клинику больницы № 5 г.Баку. 4 июля 1994 года в его присутствии отец был допрошен работником Прокуратуры Азербайджанской Республики и ввиду того, что отец не имел физической возможности прочесть и подписать протокол допроса, он, сынуя прочтя этот протокол и удостоверившись в его соответствии данным отцом показания, подписал его.

Гасанов К.Г. также показывал, что он хорошо помнит данные отцом показания о том, что он возвращался домой на метро со станции "Эльмир Академиям". Отец находился во 2-ом вагоне электропоезда. На этой же или же на последующей ст. "Низами" в их 2-ой вагон вошел показавшийся отцу подозрительным молодой человек, который стоял напротив него возле второго нерабочего дверного проема. Парень был худощавым, выше среднего роста, с редкими не длинными волосами, с зачесанными на висках. В руках у него парня был целофановый пакет. На перегоне между ст. "Низами" и "28 мая" парень опустив руки в пакет совершил в нем какие-то манипуляции, после чего положил пакет на пол и отодвинул его ногой. На ст. "28 мая" отец потерял парня из виду, т.к. в вагон вошло много людей. Через небольшой промежуток времени, после отправления поезда со станции "28 мая" в вагоне на том самом месте, где с пакетом стоял подозрительный парень, произошел взрыв.

Допрошенный в судебном заседании потерпевший Тахмазов Джалад Джамиль оглы показывал, что в результате взрыва в Вакинском метрополитене 3 июля 1994 года погибли его сын Тахмазов Джамиль и его жена Тахмазова Замина.

Допрошенный в судебном заседании потерпевший Мамедов Гошкар Ветен оглы показывал, что 3 июля 1994 года примерно в 8 часов 30 минут находился во 2-ом вагоне одного из электропоездов Вакинского метрополитена и после отправления поезда со станции "28 мая" к станции "Гянджалик" в их вагоне произошел взрыв, в результате чего он получил телесные повреждения.

Аналогичные показания дали допрошенные в суде потерпевшие: Шелестик Валентина Ивановна, Дсиф Магомед оглы, Джабраилов Джалад Аллахверди оглы, Вахрамов Бахрам Гачай оглы, Алиев Яшар Тофик оглы, Эфендиев Вахид Гусейн оглы, Бабаев Раджаб Исмет оглы и Мехтиева Сима Алекпер кзым, а так же допрошенные на предварительном следствии потерпевшие: Гумбатов Гальнера Адиль кзым, Амирбеков Кичали Гьяляли оглы, Мухтарли Далии Исрафил оглы, Мухтарли Исрафил Азиз оглы, Махмудбекова Фериде Рафик кзым, Садыгов Вугар Вагиф оглы, Гасанов Мубариз Галавага оглы, Ахмедов

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the train arrived at the 28 May station, many people entered the carriage, so he lost sight of the young man and did not see what he did with the plastic bag. After the electric train had set off from the 28 May station, at approximately 8:30 AM, an explosion went off in the second carriage at the very place where the young man had been standing.

It also follows from Hasanov's testimony that he paid attention to this young man because first he fiddled with something inside the bag he was holding and then pushed it away with his foot.

Hasanov died on 8 July, 1994 in a clinical hospital from the injuries incurred as a result of the explosion (vol. 2 file sheets 132-135, vol. 3 file sheets 1-4).

From the case papers, it is clear that his son Kerim Husein Ogly Hasanov was present at Hasanov's interrogation, and, after reading his father's testimony, authorized the interrogation report done on 4 July, 1994 with his signature.

Kerim Husein Hasanov, interrogated in court as a victim, testified that his father, Husein Elias Ogly Hasanov, being in the second carriage, did indeed receive serious injuries in the explosion on 3 July, 1994 between the 28 May and Ganjlik stations of the Baku subway and was taken to clinical hospital No. 5 in Baku to be rendered medical assistance. On 4 July, 1994, in his presence, his father was interrogated by a prosecutor of the Azerbaijan Republic and since his father was physically incapable of reading and signing the interrogation report, he, after reading the report and vouching that it complied with his father's testimony, signed it.

Kerim Hasanov also testified that he well remembers the testimony his father gave that he was returning home by subway from Elmlər Akademiyası station. His father was in the second carriage of the train. At that station, or the following one, Nizami, a young man boarded, who his father thought looked suspicious, and stood opposite him near the second non-operating doorway. The guy was thin, taller than average, with sparse short hair, thinning at the temples. The guy was carrying a plastic bag. Between the Nizami and 28 May stations, the guy, putting down the bag, fiddled with something inside it, and then placed it on the floor, pushing it away with his foot. At the 28 May station, his father lost sight of him since many people entered the car. A short time later, after the train has left the 28 May station, there was an explosion in the carriage in the very place where the suspicious guy had been standing with the bag.

Injured Jalal Jamil Ogly Takhmazov, interrogated in court, testified that as a result of explosion in the Baku subway on 3 July, 1994, his son Jamil Takhmazov and wife Zamina Takhmazova were killed.

Injured Goshkar Vetem Ogly Mamedov, interrogated in court, testified that on 3 July, 1994 at approximately 8:30 AM, he was in the second carriage of an electric train of the Baku subway and after the train departed from the 28 May station in the direction of the Ganjlik station, there was an explosion in the carriage, as a result of which he was injured.

Similar testimonies were given by victims Valentina Shelestiuk, Yusif Mahomed Ogly, Jalal Allahverdi Ogly Jabrailov, Bakhram Gachay Ogly Bakhrarov, Yashar Tofik Ogly Aliev, Vakhid Husein Ogly Efendiev, Rajab Ismet Ogly Babaev and Sima Alekper kyzy Mekhtieva, who were interrogated in court, as well as the following victims interrogated during the preliminary inquest: Gulnara Adyl kyzy Gumbatova, Kichali Gulali Ogly Amirbekov, Dalin Israfil Ogly Mukhtarli, Israfil Aziz Ogly Mukhtarli, Farida Rafik kyzy Makhmudbekova, Vugar Vagif Ogly Sadykhov, Mubariz Yualaaga Ogly Hasanov,

5.

Алиббас Али оглы, Гейдаров Акгар Али оглы, Мехралиев Мугаддас Арбаб оглы, Спутяков Виктор Владимирович, Агаларова Махсуба Джамиль кызы, Алиева Рубаба Дардан кызы, Гахреманова Анда Алигусейн кызы, Дадашев Ариф Касым оглы, Амирова Ася Мирза кызы, Всифов Талиб Эббат оглы, Мамедов Низами Нариман оглы, Исмаилов Виталет Табриз оглы, Шахварова Гюльсаят Хансур кызы, Вортников Вячеслав Григорьевич, Абасева Вера Ивановна и Исмаев Аскер Мамед оглы.

Допрошенная в суде в качестве свидетеля жена Асланова Азера-Асланова Анелла Орудж кызы показала, что её муж Асланов Азер с января 1994 года находился на службе в армии Азербайджанской Республики и участвовал в боевых действиях на Физулинском направлении армяно-азербайджанского вооруженного конфликта. Позднее ей стало известно о том, что Азер попал в плен к армянам. Находясь в плену, в июне 1994 года Азер звонил домой или лично или через посредников-лиц армянской национальностей и они просили для освобождения Азера привезти его удостоверение личности офицера Вооруженных Сил бывшего Советского Союза и одежду. После этого из Москвы к ним домой позвонил человек по имени Артур и спросил какое они приняли решение, на что она ответила, что в Ереван поедет мать Азера-Асланова Таджикибат. Артур сообщил ей, что ей необходимо прибыть в аэропорт г. Еревана, где её будут встречать каждый день до 18 июня 1994 года. После этого телефонного разговора, мать Азера-Асланова Таджикибат, собрав деньги у родственников и соседей, 15 июня 1994 года на поезде выехала в г. Минеральные Воды, а оттуда на самолете в г. Ереван. Примерно 19-20 июня 1994 года из Москвы позвонил Артур и сообщил, что свекровь долетела нормально и в настоящий момент находится с Азером.

2 июля 1994 года, она, её сестра Зейналова Насиба и жена их брата Газибекова Халима находились дома по адресу г. Ваку: поселок Ахмедлы, ул. Джаваншира 15"а", кв. 26. Поздно вечером в дверь постучали. Открыв дверь она увидела своего мужа Асланова Азера, который был одет в костюм темно-серого цвета, светлую рубашку и туфли черного цвета, т.е. в ту одежду, которую ему в г. Ереван отвезла его мать Асланова Таджикибат. В руках у Азера был целофановый пакет, который он запретил ей трогать. В пакете находились какие-то предметы, похожие на балончики из под дезодоранта или освежителя воздуха. Азер сообщил, что мать осталась у армян в г. Шуше, а он, передав важную записку неизвестному ей человеку, вернется за ней в г. Шушу и они вместе приедут в г. Ваку. Ничего конкретного Азер по поводу передачи записки или письма ей не сообщил.

3 июля 1994 года рано утром Азер, прихватив принесенный с собой пакет, ушел из дома и лишь 4 июля 1994 года позвонил домой из г. Минеральные Воды и сообщил, что это он 3 июля 1994 года совершил взрыв в Бакинском метрополитене из-за того, что мать находилась заложником у армян и другого выхода у него не было.

Асланова А.С. так же показала, что 10 июля 1994 года домой приехала её свекровь Асланова Таджикибат, которой она сообщила, что во время её нахождения у армян в ночь со 2-го на 3-е июля 1994 года Азер был в г. Ваку и ночевал дома, после чего он уехал, а затем по телефону сообщил ей о совершенной им диверсии и взрыве в Бакинском метрополитене.

Асланова Анелла далее показала, что через несколько дней её свекровь Асланова Таджикибат вернулась в г. Ваку, а через несколько месяцев муж-Асланов Азер вызвал её с детьми в г. Махачкала, где она и проживала до ареста мужа.

5.

Aliabbas Ali Ogly Akhmedov, Akger Ali Ogly Heydarov, Mugaddas Arbab Ogly Me-khraliev, Viktor Vladimirovich Sputanov, Makhmuba Jamil kyzy Agalarova, Rubaba Dardan kyzy Alieva, Aida Alihusein kyzy Gakhramanova, Arif Kasym Ogly Dadashev, Asya Mirza kyzy Amirova, Talyb Eibat Ogly Yusifov, Nizami Nariman Ogly Mamedov, Vidaset Tabriz Ogly Ismailov, Gulsavat Mansour kyzy Shashvarova, Vya-cheslav Grig-orievich Bortnikov, Vera Ivanovna Abaeva, and Asker Mamed Ogly Isaev.

Azer Aslanov's wife, Anella Oruj kyzy Aslanova, interrogated in court as a wit-ness, testified that her husband, Azer Aslanov, had served in the army of the Azerbaijan Republic since January 1994 and participated in military operations on the Fizuli front of the Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict. Later she found out that Azer had been taken prisoner by the Armenians. While in captivity, in June 1994 Azer called home, either personally or through intermediaries—persons of Armenian nationality—and said that in order to secure Azer's release, someone must bring his official identification, showing he was an officer of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union, and clothing. After that, a person by the name of Artur called them at home from Moscow and asked what decision they had made, to which she answered that Azer's mother, Tajibat Asla-nova, would go to Yerevan. Artur told her that she needed to come to the airport of Yerevan where someone would be there to meet her every day until 18 June, 1994. After this telephone conversation, Azer's mother, Tajibat Aslanova, after borrowing money from relatives and neighbors, went to Mineralnye Vody by train on 15 June, 1994, and from there by plane to Yerevan. Around 19-20 June, 1994, Artur called from Moscow and told her that her mother-in-law had arrived safely and at that moment was with Azer.

On 2 July, 1994, she, her sister Nasiba Zeinalova and their brother's wife Khalima Gazibekova were at home at the following address: 15 "c" Javanshir St., Apt. 26, the settlement of Akhmedli, Baku. Late in the evening, there was a knock at the door. Open-ing the door, she saw her husband Azer Aslanov, who was dressed in a dark gray suit, a light-colored shirt, and black shoes, i.e. the clothes his mother, Tajibat Aslanova, had taken to him in Yerevan. Azer was carrying a plastic bag, which he forbade her to touch. In the bag were some objects that looked like cans of deodorant or air freshener. Azer said that his mother had stayed with the Armenians in Shusha, and that he, after deliver-ing an important letter to someone she did not know, would return to Shusha for her and they would come back to Baku together. Azer did not say anything specific about deliv-ery of the note or letter.

On 3 July, 1994, early in the morning, Azer, taking the bag he had brought with him, left the house and did not call home until 4 July, 1994 from Mineralnye Vody, say-ing that he had set off a bomb on 3 July, 1994 in the Baku subway because his mother was being held hostage by the Armenians and he had no other choice.

Anella Aslanova testified that on 10 July, 1994, her mother-in-law, Tajibat Asla-nova, arrived home, and she told her mother-in-law that during her stay with the Arme-nians, on the night of 2-3 July, 1994, Azer had been in Baku and spent the night at home, after which he left and then phoned to tell her about the act of sabotage and bomb he had set off in the Baku subway.

Anella Aslanova testified further that a few days later her mother-in-law, Tajibat Aslanova, returned to Baku, and a few months after that her husband, Azer Aslanov, sum-moned her and the children to Makhachkala, where she lived until her husband's arrest.

Из материалов дела видно, что 25 марта 1997 года при проведении обыска на квартире отца Аслановой Анееллы-Газибекова Оруджа Тариверди оглы в селе Хей-Оба Хачмасского района был обнаружен мужской костюм-тройка темно-серого цвета в полодку.

Как усматривается из протокола обыска от 25 марта 1997 года и показаний Аслановой Анееллы именно этот костюм её свекровь Асланова Таджибат взяла с собой для Азера при поездке в июне 1994 года в Ирмений. В этом же костюме в ночь со 2-го на 3-е июля 1994 года Азер пришел домой в г. Баку и на следующее утро ушел из дома. Возвратившись из Армении в г. Баку свекровь привезла этот костюм домой/в.6 л.д.16, т.7 л.д.195-198/.

Допрошенная в судебном заседании в качестве свидетеля Асланова Таджибат Нарред кзын показала, что её сын Асланов Азер с января 1994 года принимал участие в боевых действиях на физулинском направлении фронта. Через некоторое время ей стало известно о том, что Азер попал к армянам в плен и для его освобождения ей надлежит выехать в г. Ереван, что она и сделала в середине июня 1994 года. О том, что ей необходимо выехать в г. Ереван, ей домой по телефону сообщили неизвестные лица армянской национальности. В г. Ереван она привезла с собой для Азера костюм, рубашку и черные туфли, а также его офицерское удостоверение, которое передала в аэропорту г. Еревана, встречавшим её людям.

Прибыв в г. Ереван она увидела своего сына Асланова Азера и их повезли в г. Шушу. В начале июля 1994 года Азер на несколько дней уехал в неизвестном ей направлении, после чего вновь вернулся в г. Шушу, где они находились и жили в неизвестном ей доме. После возвращения Азера, она уехала домой в г. Баку, а Азер остался у армян, т.е. с их слов необходимо было выполнить некоторые формальности в оформлении документов при его освобождении из плена.

В октябре 1994 года Азер был освобожден из плена и передан представителю Парламента Республики Агачстан и с того времени с семьей проживал в г. Мехачкале.

Асланова Т.Н. также показала, что при возвращении из г. Еревана в г. Баку она привезла с собой темно-серый костюм, а удостоверение личности офицера ей не вернули. По прибытии в г. Баку ей от жена Азера-Аслановой Анееллы стало известно о том, что во время её нахождения у армян в г. Шуше, в г. Баку домой приехал Азер. В это время у них находилась сестра Анееллы-Зейналова Насиба и жена их брата Газибекова Халима. Азер сообщил им, что пока мать осталась у армян, скоро он поедет к армянам и вернется вместе с ней. Со слов Анееллы у Азера был пакет, внутри которого были какие-то предметы, похожие на баллончики из-под дезодоранта. Азер запретил ей дотрагиваться до пакета, сказав, что там опасные вещи.

Допрошенная в судебном заседании в качестве свидетеля Зейналова Насиба Орудж кзын показала, что примерно в июне-июле 1994 года, точную дату не помнит, она и жена брата Газибекова Халима были в гостях у старшей сестры Аслановой Анееллы, муж которой Асланов Азер в это время находился в армянском плену в Карабахе. Свекровь Анееллы-Асланова Таджибат в это время также находилась в Карабахе, куда она выехала для освобождения Азера и армянского плена. Анеелла дома была одна с детьми и она часто помогала сестре по домашним делам и уходу за детьми. Повидно вечером они готовились ко сну, и в это время домой пришел муж Анееллы-Асланов Азер, который ей ничего конкретного по поводу своего прибытия в г. Баку не сообщил.

6.

It follows from the case papers that on 25 March, 1997 that a man's dark gray striped three-piece suit was found during a search of the apartment of Anella Aslanova's father, Oruj Tariverdi Ogly Gazibekov, in the village Khan-Oba of the Khachmaz District.

It follows from the report of the search of 25 March, 1997 and Anella Aslanova's testimony that her mother-in-law, Tajibat Aslanova, took this suit with her for Azer during the trip in June 1994 to Armenia. This was the same suit Azer was wearing when he came home on 2-3 July, 1994 and in which he left the next morning. When she returned to Baku from Armenia, her mother-in-law brought this suit with her (vol. 6 file sheet 16; vol. 7 file sheets 195-198).

Interrogated in court as a witness, Tajibat Narred kyzy Aslanova testified that since January 1994 her son Azer Aslanov had been taking part in military operations on the Fizuli front. Some time later, she found out that Azer had been taken prisoner by the Armenians and for his release she must come to Yerevan, which she did in the middle of June 1994. She was told on the phone by unknown persons of Armenian nationality that she must come to Yerevan. She brought a suit, a shirt, and black shoes, as well as his officer identification with her to Yerevan for Azer, which she gave to the people who met her at the airport in Yerevan.

When she arrived in Yerevan she saw her son, Azer Aslanov, and then they were taken to Shusha. At the beginning of July 1994, Azer left for a few days, she knew not where, then returned to Shusha where they had been living in a house she did not know the owner of. After Azer's return, she went home to Baku, and Azer remained with the Armenians, i.e. they said it was necessary to execute some paperwork formalities regarding his release from captivity.

In October 1994, Azer was released from captivity and handed over to a representative of the Parliament of the Republic of Daghestan, and since then had been living with his family in Makhachkala.

Tajibat Aslanova also testified that when she returned from Yerevan she brought the dark gray suit home with her, but she was not returned her son's official I.D. When she arrived in Baku, she found out from Azer's wife, Anella Aslanova, that while she was with the Armenians in Shusha, Azer had come home to Baku. At that time, Anella's sister, Nasiba Zeinalova, and their brother's wife Khalima Gazibekova were at the house. Azer told them his mother was staying with the Armenians, but soon he would go back to Shusha and bring his mother home. According to Anella, Azer was carrying a bag in which there were some objects that looked like cans of deodorant. Azer forbade her to touch the bag, saying that the objects were dangerous.

Interrogated in court as a witness, Nasiba Oruj kyzy Zeinalova testified that around June-July 1994, she could not remember the exact date, she and her brother's wife, Khalima Gazibekova, were visiting her older sister Anella Aslanova, whose husband Azer Aslanov was in Armenian captivity in Karabakh at the time. Anella's mother-in-law, Tajibat Aslanova, was also in Karabakh at that time, where she had gone to facilitate Azer's release from Armenian captivity. Anella was at home alone with the children, so she often came to help her sister with the household chores and take care of the children. Late in the evening, just as they were going to bed, Anella's husband, Azer Aslanov, came home, saying nothing specific about why he had come to Baku.

7.

Проснувшись утром она Азера дома не застала и куда он ушел, ей не было известно. С какой целью Азер приехал из плена в г. Баку и почему опять вернулся в армянский плен ей ничего не было известно.

Аналогичные показания дала и допрошенная на предварительном следствии свидетельница Гавибекова Халима Абдулкафар кмак/т. 7 л. д. 247-251/.

Допрошенный на предварительном следствии в качестве свидетеля Асланов Салман Гейдар оглы показал, что его сын Асланов Азер в январе 1994 года в качестве командира батальона принимал участие в проведении боевых действий на фиаулинском направлении армяно-азербайджанского вооруженного конфликта и через некоторое время попал в армянский плен, после чего им домой позвонили неизвестные ему лица армянской национальности и сообщили, что для освобождения Азера из плена, в г. Ереван должен приехать кто-либо из его ближайших родственников, после чего его жена Таджикибат в июне 1994 года выехала в г. Ереван. Примерно через 3-4 недели она вернулась в г. Баку, но без Азера, так как армяне сообщили, что необходимо соблюсти какие-то формальности и оформить необходимые документы. Освободили Азера из плена в октябре 1994 года, и помог в этом депутат из Дагестана Махачев Гадам, после чего сын с семьей проживал в г. Махачкале и в г. Баку не возвращался.

Асланов С. Г. так же показал, что жена Азера-Асланова Аселла позднее сообщила ему о том, что во время нахождения его жены Таджикибат в г. Шуше у армян, внезапно домой пришел Азер. В это время дома находились Аселла, её сестра Зейналова Насиба и жена их брата Гавибекова Халима. Азер провел дома одну ночь и не сообщил им зачем конкретно он приехал в г. Баку, только лишь сообщил, что Таджикибат временно осталась у армян. С собой у Азера был пакет, в котором находился какой-то предмет, похожий на баллончик на под дезодоранта. К этому пакету Азер запретил притрагиваться/т. 7 л. д. 202-209/.

Из имеющегося в деле постановления о возбуждении ходатайств о продлении срока следствия и содержания обвиняемого Асланова Азера Салман оглы под стражей от 29 ноября 1996 года, усматривается, что виновность Асланова А. в совершении им взрыва в Бакинском метрополитене подтверждается и изобличающими его показаниями бывшего сотрудника военной контрразведки так называемой "Нагорно-Карабахской Республики" Саркисяна С. С., представленной им магнитофонной пленкой с показаниями Асланова А. С., о содеянной им диверсии. Однако, при направлении уголовного дела в Прокуратуру Азербайджанской Республики вышеизложенные протоколы следственных действий сотрудниками Следственного Управления ФСБ Российской Федерации не были приобщены к материалам уголовного дела № 69 /т. 7 л. д. 12-14/.

Допрошенный на предварительном следствии в качестве свидетеля житель г. Москвы Аюкян Артур Шмавович показал, что он родился в г. Ханкенди, в настоящее время проживает в г. Москве и с 1990 года знаком с сотрудником спецслужбы-контрразведки Нагоного Карабаха Вагдсаряном Кареном, который в мае-июне 1994 года из г. Шуши по телефону 194-93-80 позвонил к нему домой в г. Москву и сообщил, что у них в плену находится офицер армии Азербайджанской Республики по имени Азер. Вагдсарян Карен дал ему номер телефона в г. Баку, где проживают родители и жена Азера, которым он должен был сообщить, что для освобождения Азера им необходимо прилететь в г. Ереван. После этого он позвонил в г. Баку и переговорил сначала с матерью Азера, а затем с его женой Аселлой и оставил им свой московский номер телефона. Через некоторое время из г. Баку позвонила жена Азера и сообщила, что свекровь выехала в Нагорный Карабах, однако никакой информации от неё нет.

7.

When she woke up in the morning, Azer was not at home and she did not know where he had gone. She did not know why Azer had arrived in Baku from captivity, nor why he then returned to Armenian captivity.

Witness Khalima Abdulkafar kyzy Gazibekova, interrogated during the preliminary inquest, also gave a similar testimony (vol. 7 file sheets 247-251).

Salman Heydar Ogly Aslanov, interrogated during the preliminary inquest as a witness, testified that since January 1994, his son, Azer Aslanov, has been taking part as a battalion commander in military operations on the Fizuli front of the Armenian-Azerbaijani armed conflict and some time later was captured by the Armenians, after which some unknown persons of Armenian nationality called him at home and said that one of his close relatives would have to come to Yerevan to secure Azer's release from captivity. After this, his wife, Tajibat, left for Yerevan in June 1994. Approximately three to four weeks later, she returned to Baku, but without Azer, since the Armenians said that some formalities had to be observed and necessary documents processed to secure Azer's release. Azer was released from captivity in October 1994, and Gaji Makhachev, a deputy from Daghestan, assisted him in this, after which his son and family lived in Makhachkala and did not return to Baku.

Salman Aslanov also testified that Azer's wife, Anella Aslanova, told him later that while his wife, Tajibat, was in Shusha with the Armenians, Azer had unexpectedly come home. At this time, Anella, her sister Nasiba Zeinalova, and their brother's wife Khalima Gazibekova were at home. Azer spent one night at home, but did not tell them anything specific about why he had come to Baku, only saying that Tajibat was staying temporarily with the Armenians. Azer had a bag with him in which there was an object that looked like a can of deodorant. Azer forbade them to touch the bag (vol. 7 file sheets 202-209).

It follows from the petition to extend the time of the investigation and detention of accused Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov of 29 November, 1996 that Aslanov's guilt in causing the explosion in the Baku subway is also confirmed by the testimony of S. Sargsian, a former employee of military counterintelligence of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which exposes him by means of a tape of Aslanov's testimony about the act of sabotage he committed. However, when the criminal case was sent to the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Azerbaijan Republic, the employees of the Criminal Investigation Department of the FSS of the Russian Federation had not attached the above-mentioned investigatory reports to criminal case No. 69 (vol. 7 file sheets 12-14).

Resident of Moscow Artur Shmavonovich Hakobian, interrogated during the preliminary inquest as a witness, testified that he was born in Khankendi, currently lives in Moscow, and has known Karen Bagdasarian, an employee of the counterintelligence service of Nagorno-Karabakh since 1990. Bagdasarian called him by phone at 194-93-80 in Moscow from Shusha in May-June 1994 and told him that they had an officer of the army of the Azerbaijani Republic in captivity by the name of Azer. He gave him the phone number in Baku where Azer's parents and wife lived and told him to call them and tell them that one of them was to come to Yerevan to secure Azer's release. After that he called Baku and talked first with Azer's mother, and then with his wife Anella, and left them his Moscow telephone number. Some time later, Azer's wife called from Baku and said that her mother-in-law had left for Nagorno-Karabakh, however she had not heard anything from her.

8.

Акопян А.Ш. также показал, что однажды ему домой в г.Москву по вышеуказанному телефону позвонил человек по имени Азер и сообщил, что он тот самый Азер, которому он помогал в вызволении из плена/т.7 л.д. 139-140/.

В записной книжке, изъятой дома у Акопяна А.Ш. при обыске указан номер телефона 71-21-14 и имена Яша, Азиз, Анелла. Поэтому по поводу он показал, что это домашний телефон в г.Баку офицера азербайджанской армии по имени Азер. Этот телефон и имена записано им со слов Вагдасаряна Карена. Анелла-жена Азера, а Яша-его брат/т.6 л.д.242; т.7 л.д. 144-156/.

Допрошенный на предварительном следствии в качестве свидетеля житель г.Махачкала Окмазов Тагир Мухтарович показал, что с Аслановым Азером Салман оглы он знаком с конца 1994 года, т.е. со времени его вызволения Махачевым Гаджи из плена и приезда в г.Махачкалу. Об Асланове А. ему известно, что он в звании капитана служил в Азербайджанской армии, воевал в Нагорном Карабахе, где и был взят в армянский плен. Асланов Азер сам лично сообщил ему о том, что находясь в плену, армяне якобы для его освобождения вывалили мать, но матери его не отдали, а оставив её в аэлониках потребовали от него выехать в г.Баку и произвести там взрыв метро, что он и сделал, после чего вернулся в Армению, а его мать отпустили/т.7 л.д.272-275/.

Допрошенный на предварительном следствии в качестве свидетеля г. Ростов-на-Дону Шейдаев Садикулла Нарулла оглы показал, что 17 или 18 февраля 1997 года он и его жена Шейдаева Фатима Джагулла кызы в г. Ростове-на-Дону в Управлении Федеральной службы Безопасности Российской Федерации по Ростовской области имели свидание со своим родственником Аслановым Азером, который в ходе свидания сообщил им, что это он совершил взрыв в Бакинском метрополитене, имевший место 3 июля 1994 года.

Шейдаев С.Н. также показал, что еще до проведения свидания ему от матери Азера и его адвоката было известно о совершении Азером взрыва в Бакинском метрополитене/т.7 л.д.298-300/.

Допрошенный в суде в качестве свидетеля Гасанов Заид Гочали оглы показал, что с марта 1994 года он находился в армянском плену в г.Шуше и Ханкенди. Среди находившихся с ним в плену был и Асланов Азер, с которым он познакомился в Шушинской тюрьме. Асланов А. был в звании капитана и с его слов попал в плен в январе 1994 года в результате контузии.

Аналогичные показания на предварительном следствии дали и допрошенные свидетели Ахмедов Амиль Ахмед оглы, Алиев Фамиль Гейдарали оглы, Эминов Магил Джаби оглы, Мамедов Анвар Шакир оглы, Мамедов Новруз Курбан оглы и Алиев Мушвиг Надир оглы/т.7 л.д.228-229, 161-164, 242-243, 261-262, т.8 л.д.215-216; т.9 л.д.1-2/.

Допрошенный в судебном заседании в качестве свидетеля Мамедов Алиага Исиф оглы показал, что с 1991 года он с семьей проживает по адресу: г.Баку, поселок Ахмедлы, ул.Джаваншира 15"в", кв.27. Его соседями по лестничной площадке является семья Аслановых, старший сын которых Азер добровольно ушел на Карабахский фронт, где попал к армянам в плен. Летом 1994 года среди соседей пошел разговор о том, что для освобождения Азера и его выкупа у армян нужна большая сумма денег и все соседи, в том числе и он, в меру своих возможностей оказывали финансовую помощь семье Аслановых. Спустя 5-6 месяцев после этого, осенью 1994 года армяне освободили Азера и со слов его матери Таджибат Азер находился на лечении в военном госпитале в Дагестане.

8.

Artur Hakobian also testified that someone by the name of Azer once called him at home in Moscow at the telephone number specified above and said that he was Azer, the person he had helped release from captivity (vol. 7 file sheets 139-140).

The phone number 71-21-14 and names Yasha, Azik, and Anella were found in an address book confiscated during a search of Artur Hakobian's home. He testified in this regard that it was the home telephone number in Baku of an officer of the Azerbaijani army by the name of Azer. This phone number and names were dictated to him by Karen Bagdasarian. Anella is Azer's wife, and Yasha, his brother (vol. 6 file sheet 242; vol. 7 file sheets 144-156).

Resident of Makhachkala Tagir Mukhtarovich Okmazov, interrogated during the preliminary inquest as a witness, testified that he has known Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov since the end of 1994, i.e. since Gaji Makhachev released him from captivity and he arrived in Makhachkala. He knew that Azer Aslanov served as a captain in the Azerbaijani army and had been fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, where he was taken prisoner by the Armenians. Azer Aslanov told him personally that while in captivity, the Armenians allegedly summoned his mother to secure his release. However, he was not rejoined with his mother, instead they took her hostage and demanded that he go to Baku and set off a bomb in the subway there, which he did; after which he returned to Armenia, and his mother was released (vol. 7 file sheets 272-275).

Sadikulla Narulla Ogly Sheidaev, interrogated during the preliminary inquest as a witness, testified that on 17 or 18 February, 1997, he and his wife Fatma Jagulla kzy Sheidaeva had visited their relative Azer Aslanov in Rostov-on-Don in the Department of Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation for the Rostov Region, who told them that it was he who set off the bomb in the Baku subway on 3 July, 1994.

Sadikulla Sheidaev also testified that, even before this visit, he knew from Azer's mother and his lawyer that Azer had set off a bomb in the Baku subway (vol. 7 file sheets 298-300).

Zaid Gochali Ogly Hasanov, interrogated in court as a witness, testified that since March 1994, he had been in Armenian captivity in Shusha and Khankendi. Azer Aslanov was also among the people in captivity with him, and he became acquainted with him in the Shusha prison. Azer Aslanov held the rank of captain and, from his words, was taken prisoner in January 1994 due to concussion.

Similar testimonies were also given by the following witnesses interrogated during the preliminary inquest: Amil Akhmed Ogly Akhmedov, Famil Heydarali Ogly Aliev, Magil Jabi Ogly Eminov, Anar Zakir Ogly Mamedov, Novruz Kurban Ogly Mamedov, and Mushvig Nadir Ogly Aliev (vol. 7 file sheets 228-229, 161-164, 242-243, 261-262; vol. 8 file sheets 215-216; vol. 9 file sheets 1-2).

Aliaga Yusif Ogly Mamedov, interrogated in court as a witness, testified that since 1991 he has been living with his family at the following address: 15 "c" Javanshir St., Apt. 27, the settlement of Akhmedli, Baku. He lives on the same floor as the Aslanov family, the oldest son of whom, Azer, left voluntarily to go to the Karabakh front, where he was taken prisoner by the Armenians. In the summer of 1994, there was talk among the neighbors that a large sum of money was needed in ransom for Azer's release from the Armenians, and all the neighbors, he included, did everything they could to render the Aslanov family financial assistance. Five or six months later, in the fall of 1994, the Armenians released Azer and according to his mother, Tajibat, Azer was receiving treatment in a military hospital in Daghestan.

9.

Аналогичные показания дала и допрошенная на предварительном следствии в качестве свидетеля Наджафова Зергяль Вахтияр кыям/т.7 л.д.267-271/.

Допрошенный в судебном заседании в качестве свидетеля машинист электродепо "Нариманов" Бакинского метрополитена Новрузов Имамверди Гусейнали оглы показал, что 3 июля 1994 года он с утра находился на работе и управлял электропоездом № 27 по маршруту "Мемар Аджеми"- "Нефчиляр"- "Мемар Аджеми". Примерно в 8 часов 30 минут электропоезд под его управлением прибыл на станцию "28 мая", где во 2-ой вагон пошло много пассажиров. При отправлении электропоезда кто-то из пассажиров 2-го вагона попрердержал дверь вагона, а затем после его словесного вмешательства посредством микрофона отпустил дверцу вагона. После отправления электропоезда по направлению к станции "Гянджлик" во 2-ом по ходу движения вагоне произошел взрыв.

Имеющимися в уголовном деле заключениями судебно-медицинских экспертиз №№ 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599 от 3 июля 1994 года; № 607 от 10 июля 1994 года; №№ М-4, М-5, М-6, М-7, М-8 от 14 июля 1994 года и № М-9 от 12 августа 1994 года установлено, что причиной смерти Зульфугаровой Тофиги Гейтаран кыям, Шкиль Зинаиды Дмитриевны, Мурсаловой Гумру Вакил кыям, Дсифова Хагани Вагиф оглы, Кучер Ольги Васильевны, Фараалиева Шахбаз Гусейн оглы, Махмудбековой Фериды Рафик кыям, Гасанова Гусейна Эльяс оглы, Тахмасовой Замини Гумбат кыям, Вайрамова Вайрама Новруз оглы, Тахмасова Джамилы Джалал оглы, Курбановой Нисы Касым кыям и Азимова Мейдана Ахман оглы явилось получение ими тяжелых телесных повреждений и травматического шока от сильного ожога, наступившие в результате взрыва в Бакинском метрополитене, происшедшего 3 июля 1994 года/т.2 л.д. 81-139/.

Заключениями судебно-медицинских экспертиз за №№ 2407, 2418, 2419 от 17 августа 1994 года; №№ 2447, 2462, 2463 от 20 августа 1994 года; №№ 2459, 2460, 2461 и 2464 от 22 августа 1994 года; №№ 2510, 2511, 2513 от 25 августа 1994 года; №№ 2514, 2515 от 26 августа 1994 года; №№ 2518, 2526 от 27 августа 1994 года; № 2607 от 2 сентября 1994 года; № 2701 от 8 сентября 1994 года; № 2839 от 19 сентября 1994 года; №№ 2885, 2887 от 5 октября 1994 года; №№ 2880, 2879, 2881 от 11 октября 1994 года; №№ 2980, 2981, 2982 от 2 ноября 1994 года; № 2955 от 27 октября 1994 года; №№ 92, 93 от 22 февраля 1995 года; №№ 94-99 от 23 февраля 1995 года и № 106 от 25 февраля 1995 года установлено, что в результате происшедшего 3 июля 1994 года взрыва в вагоне на перегоне между станциями "28 мая"- "Гянджлик" Бакинского метрополитена Ахмедов Алиаббас Али оглы, Дсиф Магомед оглы, Агаларова Махбуба Джамиль кыям, Гейдаров Акпер Али оглы, Гумбатов Гальнара Адиль кыям, Шелестях Валентина Ивановна, Гехраманова Аида Алигусейн кыям получили тяжелые телесные повреждения; Амирбеков Кичали Гальали оглы, Гарибова Парвана Бараш кыям, Мамедов Готкер Ветен оглы, Гасанов Кубарка Валзага оглы, Слутанов Виктор Владимирович, Амирова Ася Мирас кыям, Алиева Яшер Тофик оглы, Садыхов Вугар Вагиф оглы, Мухтарлы Рамин Исрафил оглы, Мухтарлы Исрафил Азиз оглы, Мехралиев Мурадас Арбаб оглы, Джабраилов Джамал Аллахверди оглы, получили менее тяжелые телесные повреждения; Мамедов Низами Нариман оглы, Вайрамов Расим Мамед оглы, Вабоев Раджаб Исмет оглы, Исмаилов Виталет Тебриз оглы, Дсифов Талиб Эйбат оглы, Аббасов Тельман Аскер оглы, Дадашев Ариф Гасим оглы, Исаев Аскер Мамед оглы, Эфендиев Вахид Дсиф оглы, Парла Алмейда, Намзаева Анира Мансур кыям, Ибрагимова Зохра Вайрам кыям, Ари Давис Скотесни, Экейнте Тот Гарриш, Вортников Вячеслав Григорьевич, Кулиева Наджиба Ягуб кыям, Абаева Вера Викторовна, Мамедов Камил Назир оглы, Мамедов Аслан Алай оглы, Мамедов Омар Алай оглы, Алиева Рубеба Дардан кыям и Махтияева Симе Алекпер кыям, получили легкие телесные повреждения/т.2 л.д. 140-270/.

9.

A similar testimony was also given by Zargul Bakhtiar kyzy Najafova, interrogated at the preliminary inquest as a witness (vol. 7 file sheets 267-271).

Imamverdi Huseinali Ogly Novruzov, an engine operator of the Narimanov electric depot of the Baku subway, interrogated in court as a witness, testified that on 3 July, 1994, he had been at work since morning and was operating electric train No. 27 traveling the Memar Ajemi-Neftchilar-Memar Ajemi route. At approximately 8:30 AM, the electric train he was operating arrived at the 28 May station where many passengers boarded the second carriage. As the train was about to depart, one of the passengers in the second carriage held open the door, releasing it after he gave a verbal warning over the loud speaker. After the train had set off toward the Ganjlik station, there was an explosion in the second carriage.

It is established from the conclusions of forensic medical examinations Nos. 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599 of 3 July, 1994; No. 607 of 10 July, 1994; Nos. M-4, M-5, M-6, M-7, M-8 of 14 July, 1994 and No. M-9 of 12 August, 1994, available in the criminal case, that the death of Tofigi Geitaran kyzy Zulfugarova, Zinaida Dmitrievna Shkil, Gumra Vekil kyzy Mursalova, Khagani Vagif Ogly Yusifov, Olga Vasilievna Kucher, Shakhbaz Husein Ogly Farzaliev, Farida Rafik kyzy Makhmudbekova, Husein Elias Ogly Hasanov, Zamina Gumbat kyzy Takhmazova, Bairam Novruz Ogly Bairamov, Jamil Jalal Ogly Takhmazov, Nisa Kasim kyzy Kurbanova, and Meidan Rahman Ogly Azimov was caused by grave injuries and traumatic shock from serious burns brought about by the explosion in the Baku subway on 3 July, 1994 (vol. 2 file sheets 81-139).

It is established from the conclusions of forensic medical examinations Nos. 2407, 2418, 2419 of 17 August, 1994; Nos. 2447, 2462, 2463 of 20 August, 1994; Nos. 2459, 2460, 2461, and 2464 of 22 August, 1994; Nos. 2510, 2511, 2513 of 25 August, 1994; Nos. 2514, 2515 of 26 August, 1994; Nos. 2518, 2526 of 27 August, 1994; No. 2607 of 2 September, 1994; No. 2701 of 8 September, 1994; Nos. 2839 of 19 September, 1994; Nos. 2885, 2887 of 5 October, 1994; Nos. 2880, 2879, 2881 of 11 October, 1994; Nos. 2980, 2981, 2982 of 2 November, 1994; No. 2955 of 27 October, 1994; Nos. 92, 93 of 22 February, 1995; Nos. 94-99 of 23 February, 1995 and No. 106 of 25 February, 1995 that as a result of the explosion on 3 July, 1994 in the carriage between the 28 May and Ganjlik stations of the Baku subway Aliabbas Ali Ogly Akhmedov, Yusif Mahomed Ogly, Makhbuba Jamil kyzy Agalarova, Akper Ali Ogly Heydarov, Gulnara Adyl kyzy Gumbatova, Valentina Ivanovna Shelestiuk, and Aida Alihusein kyzy Gakhramanova received serious injuries; Kichali Gulali Ogly Amirbekov, Parvana Barash kyzy Garibova, Goshkar Veten Ogly Mamedov, Mubariz Balaaga Ogly Hasanov, Viktor Vladimirovich Sputanov, Asya Mirza kyzy Amirova, Yashar Tofik Ogly Aliev, Vugar Vaghif Ogly Sadykhov, Ramin Israfil Ogly Mukhtarli, Israfil Aziz Ogly Mukhtarli, Mugadas Arbab Ogly Mekhraliev, and Jahmal Allakhverdi Ogly Jabrailov received less serious bodily injuries; and Nizami Ari-man Ogly Mamedov, Rasim Mamed Ogly Bairamov, Rajab Ismet Ogly Babaev, Vitalet Tebriz Ogly Ismaylov, Talyb Eybat Ogly Yusifov, Telman Asker Ogly Abbasov, Arif Gasim Ogly Dadashev, Asker Mamed Ogly Isaev, Vakhid Yusif Ogly Efendiev, Paola Almeida, Ganira Mansour kyzy Namazova, Zokhra Vayram kyzy Ibrahimova, Garry Davis Skatesin, Tot Garrin Ekeints, Vyacheslav Grigorievich Bortnikov, Najiba Yagub kyzy Qulieva, Vera Viktorovna Abaeva, Kamil Nazir Ogly Mamedov, Aslan Alai Ogly Mamedov, Omar Alai Ogly Mamedov, Rubaba Dardan kyzy Alieva, and Sima Alekper kyzy Mekhtieva received slight bodily injuries (vol. 2 file sheets 140-270).

10.

Из заключения комплексной судебно-криминалистической экспертизы за № 4215/94 ЭКУ МВД и 3329/3332 НИИСЭПКК от 15 сентября 1994 года усматривается, что взрыв в вагоне № 11049 электропоезда № 27 был совершен взрывным устройством, состоящим из металлического предмета /корпуса/, снаряженного ВВ типа нитросоединения толуола массой приблизительно 2 кг. 700гр. инициирующим устройством взрыва могли служить электродетонатором, срабатывающие от электронного, часового или механического взрывного устройства типа МУВ, обладающие индукционными и замедляющими способностями/т.5 л.д.2-42/.

Из справки, представленной администрацией Бакинского метрополитена, усматривается, что в результате взрыва повреждены все 5 вагонов электропоезда и государству причинен ущерб на сумму 6.757.500.000 манат /т.8 л.д.130/.

Из заключения судебно-психиатрической экспертизы № 191 от 11 февраля 1997 года усматривается, что Асланов Азер Салман оглы вменяем, психически здоров, в момент совершения им преступлений мог отдавать отчет в своих действиях и руководить ими/т.6 л.д.55-56/.

Приведенные доказательства дают основания судебной коллегии считать виновность Асланова Азера Салман оглы в совершении вышеописанных преступлений, установленной полностью и его преступные действия подлежат квалификации по ст.ст.57, 61, 71, 94п.4 и 220ч.1 УК Азербайджанской Республики.

Назначая наказание подсудимому, судебная коллегия наряду с тяжестью совершенных преступлений учитывает и причинение этими преступлениями особо тяжелых последствий, выразившихся в массовом убийстве людей, причинение им телесных повреждений, разрушения путей и средств сообщений.

На основании изложенного и руководствуясь ст.ст.323-325, 333-335 УПК Азербайджанской Республики, судебная коллегия

П Р И Г О В О Р И Л А :

Асланова Азера Салман оглы признать виновным по ст.ст.57, 61, 71, 94п.4, 220ч.1 УК Азербайджанской Республики и назначить ему по ст.57 УК- 12-двенадцать лет лишения свободы с конфискацией имущества, по ст.61 УК- 14-четырнадцать лет лишения свободы с конфискацией имущества, по ст.71-УК-5-пять лет лишения свободы с конфискацией имущества, по ст.94п.4 УК пожизненное лишение свободы, по ст.220ч.1 УК- 2-два года лишения свободы.

На основании ст.38 УК Азербайджанской Республики путем поглощения менее строгого наказания более строгим, окончательную меру наказания Асланову Азеру Салман оглы определить пожизненное лишение свободы с конфискацией имущества с отбыванием всего срока наказания в тюрьме.

Взыскать с Асланова Азера Салман оглы в счет Бакинского метрополитена ущерб в сумме 6.757.500.000 -шесть миллиардов семьсот пятьдесят семь миллионов пятьсот тысяч манатов.

Приговор окончательный, кассационному обжалованию и опротестованию не подлежит.

Председательствующий:

подпись

Народные заседатели:

две подписи

Верно.Член Верховного суда

Мирзоев Р.В.

10.

It follows from the conclusions of the comprehensive judicial and forensic examination, No. 4215/94 made by the Expert-Criminalistic Center of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and No. 3329/3332 made by the Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise, of 15 September, 1994 that the explosion in carriage No. 11049 of electric train No. 27 was caused by an explosive device consisting of a metallic object (case) filled with approximately 2 kg 700 grams of a BB-type TNT nitrocompound; the explosion could have been set off by an electric detonator, triggered by an electronic, clockwork, or mechanical MUV explosive device with induction and moderating efficiency (vol. 5 file sheets 2-42).

It follows from the report presented by the administration of the Baku subway that as a result of the explosion, all five carriages of the electric train were damaged and damage to the state amounted to 6,757,500,000 manats (vol. 8 file sheets 130).

It follows from the conclusion of forensic-psychiatric examination No. 191 of 11 February, 1997 that Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov is in full possession of his faculties, sane, and at the time he committed the crimes was aware of what he was doing and in control of his actions (vol. 6 file sheets 55-56).

The evidence provided gives the judicial chamber reason to deem Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov fully guilty of committing the crimes described, and his criminal acts shall be qualified according to Arts 57, 61, 71, 94(4) and 220 of Part 1 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic.

When prescribing punishment for the defendant, the judicial chamber, in addition to the gravity of the crime, also takes into account the especially serious consequences caused by these crimes, expressed in the mass killing of people, the infliction of bodily harm, and the destruction of routes and means of transportation.

On the basis of the above-stated and guided by Arts 323-325, 333-335 of the Criminal Procedural Code of the Azerbaijan Republic, the judicial chamber

HAS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENT:

Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov shall be found guilty according to Arts 57, 61, 71, 94(4) and 220 of Part 1 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic and sentenced under Art 57 of the Criminal Code to 12 (twelve) years of imprisonment with confiscation of property, according to Art 61 of the Criminal Code to 14 (fourteen) years of imprisonment with confiscation of property, according to Art 71 of the Criminal Code to 5 (five) years of imprisonment with confiscation of property, according to Art 94(4) of the Criminal Code to life imprisonment, and according to Art 220 of Part 1 of the Criminal Code to 2 (two) years of imprisonment.

On the basis of Art 38 of the Criminal Code of the Azerbaijan Republic, by means of incorporation of a less severe into a more severe punishment, Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov shall be assigned a definitive final punishment of life imprisonment with confiscation of property, serving the entire term of punishment in prison.

Azer Salman Ogly Aslanov shall recover damages amounting to 6,757,500,000 (six billion seven hundred fifty seven million five hundred thousand) manats in favor of the Baku subway.

The sentence is final and not subject to cassation appeal or protest.

Chairman: signature

People's Assessors: two signatures

This is a true certified copy. Member of the Supreme Court

R.B. Mirzoev

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